MEMORANDUM

MALACHY E. MANNION, District Judge.

I. Background

Petitioner, Gordon C. Reid, an inmate currently confined in the United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241. (Doc. 1, petition). He challenges his "placement in the Special Management Unit (SMU)". Id. Specifically, Reid contends that his "designation to the SMU violated his right to due process where prison officials relied upon information disqualified by BOP Program Statement and/or Code of Federal Regulations to establish a basis for designating him to the SMU." Id. Reid complains that his disciplinary history was used towards criteria to place him in the SMU, and that he was not provided a copy of the Hearing Administrator's Report until his transfer to the SMU, and that his unit staff provided ineffective guidance on what appeal authority existed within the Bureau of Prisons to submit an appeal regarding his assignment to the SMU. Id. For relief, he seeks "release from the SMU, placement in general population as appropriate to Petitioner's custody and safety, reversal and expungement of the SMU designation in his record." Id. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

II. Discussion

It is well-settled that a habeas corpus petition may be brought by a prisoner who seeks to challenge either the fact or duration of his confinement in prison. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973). Federal habeas corpus review is available only "where the deprivation of rights is such that it necessarily impacts the fact or length of detention." Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 540 (3d Cir. 2002).

Moreover, in Levi v. Ebbert, 353 Fed. Appx. 681, 682 (3d Cir. 2009), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concisely stated that claims concerning the determination of a federal prisoner's custody level "do not lie at the `core of habeas' and, therefore are not cognizable in a §2241 petition." The Court of Appeals observed that habeas corpus review should not be undertaken because the custody classification claims asserted did not challenge the fact or length of the prisoner's confinement. See id. Levi also correctly noted that prisoners simply "have no constitutional right to a particular classification." Id. See also Schwarz v. Meinberg, 2011 WL 2470122 *2 (C.D. Ca. May 31, 2011) (custody classification claims by federal inmate not cognizable on habeas review).

In the instant case, Petitioner's challenge to his current custody classification is not a challenge to the fact or duration of his confinement. He does not claim that his judgment of conviction was invalid or that he is being confined in prison unlawfully. He does not seek release from prison, nor does he seek to be released sooner from prison. Rather, Petitioner complains that his current custody classification is not in accordance with BOP policy. This classification, however, does not affect the length of his sentence. Significantly, Petitioner does not seek relief that would shorten the length of his current sentence and incarceration in prison. Nor does he seek release from prison by attacking the legality of his judgment or conviction. Therefore, his claims are not properly asserted in a habeas petition brought under 28 U.S.C. §2241, but rather must be pursued through the filing of a Bivens1 action. A claim concerning the determination of custody classification does not lie at the "core of habeas" in that it does not challenge the fact or length of a sentence or confinement and, therefore, is not cognizable in a §2241 petition. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500; see Leamer, 288 F.3d at 542-44. Moreover, prisoners have no constitutional right to a particular classification. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9 (1976). Consequently, the petition will be dismissed without prejudice to any right Reid may have to reassert his claim in a properly filed civil rights complaint.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be DISMISSED. An appropriate order will follow.

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2011 WL 2470122 (C.D.Cal.)

(Cite as: 2011 WL 2470122 (C.D.Cal.))

H

Benjamin Schwarz, Youngstown, OH, pro se.

Daniel Ackerman, United States Attorney's Office Riverside Branch Office, Riverside, CA, for Respondent.

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE

MARGARET M. MORROW, District Judge.

*1 On June 23, 2010, Benjamin Schwarz ("petitioner") received a 90—month federal sentence, followed by five years of supervised release, for possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. (See Declaration of Sarah Schuh ("Schuh Decl.") at ¶ 4 & Exh. A). At the time he commenced this action, petitioner was a federal prisoner incarcerated at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Los Angeles, California ("MDC").FN1 (See Petition at 1-2).

On September 1, 2010, petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ("Prior Petition"), in this Court, Benjamin Schwarz v. Erwin Meinberg, Warden, Case No. ED CV 10-1320 MMM (FMO), raising the following claims for federal habeas relief: (1) the federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") discriminated against petitioner because of his nationality by refusing to designate him to a "prison camp[;]" and (2) the conditions at the MDC are unsanitary and inhumane, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.FN2 (See Court's Order of October 6, 2010, at 1, Benjamin Schwarz v. Erwin Meinberg, Warden, Case No. ED CV 10-1320 MMM (FMO)). On October 6, 2010, the Court dismissed the Prior Petition without prejudice to allow petitioner to file a new action after he exhausted his administrative remedies. (See id. at 1 & 4; Judgment, Benjamin Schwarz v. Erwin Meinberg, Warden, Case No. ED CV 10-1320 MMM (FMO)).

On November 8, 2010, petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody ("Petition") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on December 4, 2010 ("Motion"). Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion ("Opposition") on March 10, 2011. Respondent filed a Reply to the Opposition on March 21, 2011. On May 13, 2011, petitioner filed a "Declaration and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Response to Respondent's Reply on Respondent's Mo [ti]on to Dismiss, Based on Failure of Prudential Exhaustion; Request for Permission to File this Response" ("Sur-Reply").

DISCUSSION

The instant Petition raises, in essence, the same claims that petitioner raised in the Prior Petition: (1) the BOP refuses to designate petitioner to a "BOP camp" because of his Canadian citizenship; and (2) the conditions of the cells at the MDC, specifically with respect to the toilets, are unsanitary, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (See Petition at 3).

Respondent contends that the Petition should be dismissed because petitioner has not fully exhausted his administrative remedies and the Petition fails to state a cognizable habeas claim. (See Motion at 3 & 4-8). Under the circumstances, the Court does not need to determine whether petitioner properly exhausted his federal administrative remedies with respect to the two claims raised in the instant Petition because, even assuming petitioner had exhausted his administrative remedies, the Petition fails to state cognizable habeas claims.FN3

*2 It is well-settled that claims relating to the conditions of a prisoner's confinement are not cognizable on federal habeas review. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir.2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1063, 124 S.Ct. 2388, 158 L.Ed.2d 963 (2004) ("[H]abeas jurisdiction is proper where a challenge to prison conditions would, if successful, necessarily accelerate the prisoner's release . . . . [H]abeas jurisdiction is absent . . . where a successful challenge to a prison condition will not necessarily shorten the prisoner's sentence."); Early v. Quintana, 2010 WL 5829211, at *3 n. 1 (C.D.Cal.2010), report and recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 662710 (C.D.Cal.2011) ("To the extent that petitioner . . . is attempting to raise conditions of confinement claims . . ., the Court is unable to consider such claims because they are not cognizable on habeas review."). Similarly, claims relating to an inmate's custody classification and/or designation to prison camp are also not cognizable. See, e..g., Levi v. Ebbert, 2009 WL 2169171, at *8 (M.D.Pa.), aff'd, 353 F.App'x 681 (3d Cir.2009) (district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petitioner's habeas claims regarding his custody classification and federal camp or low security prison eligibility because "they are not cognizable in a § 2241 habeas petition[,]" i.e., "they do not affect the length of his sentence and will not result in a quicker release of Petitioner from prison than his [projected] release date [ ]"); Estrada v. Chavez, 2009 WL 1383328, at *4-5 (D.Ariz.2009) (finding that petitioner did not challenge the execution of his sentence where petitioner argued that "the application of Program Statement 5100.08 to classify [him] as a Medium Security inmate violate[d] the Due Process Clause [ ]" and sought an order directing the BOP to reclassify him as a low security inmate and determine if he qualified for a transfer to a lower-security institution, because "[e]ven if th[e c]ourt concluded that Petitioner's disciplinary infractions were erroneous or that his custody level was inaccurately calculated, at most, that would impact the security level of the institution at which [he] would be eligible to serve his term of imprisonment and to which he could be transferred. The length of his sentence would not change[.]").FN4 In short, petitioner's claims relating to the conditions of his confinement at the MDC and the BOP's refusal to designate him to a prison camp, (see Petition at 3), are not cognizable on federal habeas review as they do not challenge the duration of his confinement.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (Document No. 6) is granted.

2. Judgment shall be entered dismissing this action without prejudice.