MEMORANDUM

ROBERT D. MARIANI, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Tyrone Martin, an inmate who, at all relevant times, was housed at the Smithfield State Correctional Institution, in Huntingdon, Pennsylvania ("SCI-Smithfield"), initiated the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Presently pending before the Court are Plaintiffs motions to appoint counsel. (Docs. 153, 154, 156). For the reasons set forth below, the motions will be denied without prejudice.

Although prisoners have no constitutional or statutory right to appointment of counsel in a civil case, the Court has discretion "to request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 456-57 (3d Cir. 1997); Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 499 (3d Cir. 2002); Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated that the appointment of counsel for an indigent litigant should be made when circumstances indicate "the likelihood of substantial prejudice to him resulting, for example, from his probable inability without such assistance to present the facts and legal issues to the court in a complex but arguably meritorious case." Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22, 26 (3d Cir. 1984).

The initial determination to be made by the Court in evaluating the expenditure of the "precious commodity" of volunteer counsel is whether the case has some arguable merit in fact or law. Montgomery, 294 F.3d at 499. If a plaintiff overcomes this threshold hurdle, other factors to be examined are:

Id. (citing Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155-57). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals added two other factors to be taken into consideration: (1) the court's willingness to aid the indigent party in presenting his or her own case; and (2) the available supply of lawyers willing to accept section 1915(e) requests within the relevant geographic area. See Gordon v. Gonzalez, 232 F. App'x 153 (3d Cir. 2007).

On November 9, 2016, November 30, 2016, and February 14, 2018, the Court previously denied similar motions for appointment counsel filed by Plaintiff. (See Docs. 7, 16, 17, 119, 120). Since the entry of those Orders, Plaintiff has continued to demonstrate a reasonable ability to litigate this action pro se. Furthermore, his latest motions fail to set forth sufficient special circumstances or factors which would warrant the appointment of counsel. See Tabron, 6 F.3d at 153, 155-57. Plaintiff requests counsel to help him obtain copies of his legal materials and court filings. (Docs. 153, 154, 156). Thus far, Plaintiff has demonstrated the ability to properly and forcefully prosecute his claims. Despite Plaintiffs incarceration, investigation of the facts is not beyond his capabilities and he is familiar with the facts of his case. Moreover, the Court notes that it does not have a large group of attorneys who would represent this action in a pro bono capacity.

Based on the foregoing, it does not appear that Plaintiff will suffer prejudice if forced to prosecute this case on his own. The Court's duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143, 147-48 (3d Cir. 1985), coupled with Plaintiffs apparent ability to litigate this action, militate against the appointment of counsel. Accordingly, the motions for appointment of counsel will be denied, however the denial will be without prejudice. As the Court in Tabron stated,

Tabron, 6 F.3d at 156-57. Therefore, in the event that future proceedings demonstrate the need for counsel, the matter may be reconsidered either sua sponte or upon motion of Plaintiff.

A separate Order shall issue.