REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL AND TO REVERSE AND REMAND DECISION OF COMMISSIONER
GERALD B. COHN, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation. Victoria Lee Steckler ("Plaintiff") seeks judicial review of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration's decision finding of not disabled. As set forth below, the undersigned recommends to GRANT Plaintiff's appeal and REVERSE and REMAND the Commissioner's decision in this case.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To receive disability or supplemental security benefits under the Social Security Act ("Act"), a claimant bears the burden to demonstrate an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); accord 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).
The Act further provides that an individual:
shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). Plaintiff must demonstrate the physical or mental impairment "by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(D).
Social Security regulations implement a five-step sequential process to evaluate a disability claim. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The process requires an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") to decide whether an applicant (1) is engaged in "substantial gainful activity;" (2) suffers from a "severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment;" (3) suffers from "an impairment(s) that meets or equals one" listed in the regulation's appendix; (4) has a residual functional capacity ("RFC") allowing for performance of "past relevant work;" and (5) can "make an adjustment to other work." Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 551 (3d Cir. 2005).
If at any of the steps a determination exists that a plaintiff is or is not disabled, evaluation under a subsequent step is not necessary. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. See Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 551. If the claimant satisfies this burden, then the Commissioner must show at step five that jobs exist in the national economy that a person with the claimant's abilities, age, education, and work experience can perform. Id.
In reviewing a decision of the Commissioner, the Court is limited to determining whether the Commissioner has applied the correct legal standards and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("Court shall review only the question of conformity with such regulations and the validity of such regulations"). Substantial evidence is a deferential standard of review. See Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence "does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather `such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); see also Johnson v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008). Substantial evidence is "less than a preponderance" and "more than a mere scintilla." Jesurum v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
The Court may neither re-weigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the fact-finder. Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 552. The Court will not set the Commissioner's decision aside if it is supported by substantial evidence, even if the Court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir.1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).
II. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") pursuant to Title II of the Act and an application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") pursuant to Title XVI of the Act in July 2014, alleging disability since February 1, 2014, as amended. (Tr. 43, 91, 104, 148, 150, 166). Following an administrative hearing held in December 2015, where Plaintiff and a Vocational Expert ("VE") testified, an ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled pursuant to a decision issued on March 3, 2016. (Tr. 16-37). Plaintiff was 48 years of age as of the date of the ALJ's decision. (Tr. 30, 32). In June 2016, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review (Tr. 1-7), making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of judicial review. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1481; 422.210(a). This action followed.
III. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
On appeal, Plaintiff alleges three errors: (1) The ALJ erroneously found Plaintiff's gastroparesis nonsevere, and thus overestimated her RFC; (2) the ALJ erroneously assigned little weight to the assessment of the treating physician which, if credited, would have compelled a finding of disability; and (3) the ALJ failed to present a hypothetical question containing all of Plaintiff's credibly established limitations to the VE.1 (Pl. Br. at 3) (Doc. 12).
A. Plaintiff's Treating Physician
Plaintiff states the ALJ erred in affording little weight to the opinion of Raymond J. Kraynak, D.O., who opined Plaintiff should be permanently disabled. (Pl. Br. at 10). On November 30, 2015, Dr. Kraynak completed a Medical Source Statement in which he opined Plaintiff was capable of lifting and carrying less than 10 pounds, standing and walking less than 2 hours, and sitting less than 2 hours in an 8-hour work day. (Tr. 890). He further opined Plaintiff would need to lie down at unpredictable intervals during a work shift as often as 1 to 3 times per day, was limited in reaching, handling, fingering, feeling and pushing/pulling, and could never twist, stoop (bend), crouch, or climb. (Tr. 891). Dr. Kraynak further opined Plaintiff would be absent from work due to her impairments more than 3 times per month. (Tr. 892). In addition, in a treatment note dated October 26, 2015, Dr. Kraynak stated: "This woman is profoundly disabled and is not able to work in any capacity." (Tr. 853). The ALJ reviewed the opinion of Dr. Kraynak:
As for the opinion evidence regarding the claimant's physical functioning, the [ALJ] has considered the medical source statement of Dr. Kraynak. Dr. Kraynak indicates that the claimant is "profoundly disabled." Dr. Kraynak further indicated that the claimant could perform a range of less than full time, less than sedentary work with absences of three or more per month. This assessment is inconsistent with the longitudinal evidence and is an overestimate of the claimant's limitations that is not corroborated by the clinical examinations of various specialists that have treated the claimant. The claimant's treating specialists note no motor, gait, reflex, or sensory deficits. Furthermore, as with all opinions rendered as to a claimant's status as "disabled," this issue is clearly reserved for the Commissioner. As such, the [ALJ] affords little weight to Dr. Kraynak's assessment.
(Tr. 29). The ALJ gave little weight to the opinion Plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Kraynak. (Id.) The ALJ found the longitudinal evidence did not support Dr. Kraynak's opinion precluding employment. (Id.) The ALJ observed Plaintiff's treating specialists noted no motor, gait, reflex, or sensory deficits. (Id.) From the record, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the RFC to perform:
light work ... The claimant can lift/carry 10 pounds frequently and up to 20 pounds occasionally. She can sit, stand, and walk 6 hours each in an 8-hour day. She can occasionally climb ramps/stairs but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She must avoid unprotected heights, moving machinery, and occupations with noise above a level 3 intensity level. She can have only occasional exposure to extreme cold temperatures, wetness, vibration, and environmental irritants such as dust fumes, odors, and gases. Mentally, she is limited to work involving simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, i.e. generally considered unskilled. She can have no interaction with the public and only occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors.
(Tr. 25). However, the ALJ points to no medical opinions to contradict the work limitations put forth by Dr. Kraynak. Rarely can a decision be made regarding a claimant's RFC without an assessment from a physician regarding the functional abilities of the claimant. See Doak v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1986) ("No physician suggested that the activity [the claimant] could perform was consistent with the definition of light work set forth in the regulations, and therefore the ALJ's conclusion that he could is not supported by substantial evidence.") Similarly, in this case, the ALJ notes the "longitudinal evidence" and "no motor, gait, reflex, or sensory deficits." (Tr. 29). These vague notations are insufficient to reject a medical opinion identifying work limitations from a treating physician. Without any medical opinion being credited with regards to all of Plaintiff's limitations, the ALJ impermissibly relied on speculation or lay interpretation of medical evidence to reach the conclusion regarding Plaintiff's RFC. See Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317-18 (3d Cir. 2000); Ferguson v. Schweiker, 765 F.2d 31, 37 (3d Cir. 1985) (The ALJ may not substitute his own judgment for that of a physician). Therefore, substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's RFC finding when the ALJ did not rely on any medical opinion reject Dr. Kraynak's opinion regarding Plaintiff's limitations.
B. Other Allegations of Error
Plaintiff's additional claims of error, including allegations of failing to find a severe impairment for gastroparesis, may be remedied through the case's treatment on remand. Thus, the Court declines to address those claims. A remand may produce different results on these claims, making discussion of them moot. Burns v. Colvin, 156 F.Supp.3d 579, 598 (M.D. Pa. 2016). See also Steininger v. Barnhart, 2005 WL 2077375, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2005) (declining to address plaintiff's other arguments for remand, "as the ALJ's findings may be revised in any decision issued following the new hearing"); LaSalle v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2011 WL 1456166, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2011). Bruce v. Berryhill, 294 F.Supp.3d 346, 364 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
Accordingly, the ALJ's decision lacks substantial evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS to GRANT Plaintiff's appeal and REVERSE and REMAND the Commissioner's decision in this case.
V. NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A Judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The Judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The Judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions.
