MARK A. KEARNEY, District Judge.
Joel Snider is serving a thirty to sixty-year sentence in state prison after his August 2014 plea of guilty but mentally ill to a July 2010 third degree murder and burglary in this District. As our Court of Appeals recently instructed in Geness v. Cox, mentally ill persons may proceed on Americans with Disabilities Act claim against the state.
Mr. Snider is now entering his seventh year of pro se litigation challenging accommodations provided to him in state and federal courts, conditions of his custody, and arguing state actors retaliate against him for his grievances. He is also pursuing Post-Conviction Relief Act claims in state court challenging his 2014 guilty plea. He apparently has not exhausted state court remedies, nor has he sought habeas relief seeking to vacate his guilty plea. He instead filed at least four actions in this District and two in Western District of Pennsylvania with largely the same arguments although focused on different prisons. We now have four federal trial judges reviewing the same or very similar prison treatment issues as well as state court judges reviewing his guilty plea. We sua sponte raised the issue of consolidating these two cases before us but the state actor defendants argued the federal cases are not related given different correctional facilities and defendants. Mr. Snider has yet to get near a trial date; he has not proceeded beyond the pleadings before us.
Our review is more complicated by Mr. Snider pro se appealing interlocutory Orders continuing to divest trial courts of jurisdiction: e.g., he now has five matters in our Court of Appeals, including an appeal of our Order denying him a volunteer guardian ad litem and our Order denying him permission to appeal this same interlocutory order. We cannot determine whether Mr. Snider has valid federal claims in many instances because we cannot get to the merits of his pleadings. We are not presently aware of an attorney willing to represent Mr. Snider. Even if we did know of an attorney, we are not certain Mr. Snider will listen to an attorney as he claims attorneys representing him erred in both his criminal case warranting post-conviction relief and in the 2013 case in this District where volunteer counsel settled a claim for him but he now wants to vacate the settlement claiming his volunteer counsel did not consult with him.
In his latest series of filings, Mr. Snider pro se asks all the four federal judges with the six cases to consolidate earlier filed cases in this District into later filed cases in the Western District of Pennsylvania. We cannot and will not do so today as to the cases before us as there is no articulated basis to transfer venue today and, even if we did transfer, the transferee district would need to consolidate.
But we must now stay the resolution of nine pending motions to dismiss in Mr. Snider's 2015 case at No. 15-951 before us because he appealed an interlocutory decision in No. 15-951 after we told him twice he could not do so. These appeals could be considered frivolous which would not stay our ongoing progress for all the reasons in our detailed findings in support of our September 30, 2019 Order denying a guardian ad litem. But his arguments have marginal validity and the issues affect all aspects of his case at No. 15-951 as he claims he is incompetent to proceed without a guardian ad litem and appointment of counsel in this civil action and presumably others. This same argument arguably applies to No. 18-801 also before us with two pending and briefed motions to dismiss.
In accompanying Orders, we deny Mr. Snider's motions for consolidation but unfortunately must stay the progress of No. 15-951 and No. 18-801 and direct all parties to file no further briefing in either of these two cases until jurisdiction is vested back in our Court. Absent further grounds, we will not transfer venue of No. 15-951 as the claims arise in this District. We may transfer venue of No. 18-801 as it arises from conduct in the Western District of Pennsylvania but not until after our Court of Appeals resolves the present appeal of our September 30, 2019 Order in No. 15-951 denying a guardian ad litem. We deny relief in the third case at No. 18-1789 as there is no matter before us after we dismissed the case and Mr. Snider appealed our dismissal.
Police arrested Joel Snider in July 2010 for murder and other charges arising from the shooting death of Sudharman Joseph Fenton in Union County, Pennsylvania.
On August 8, 2014, Mr. Snider entered a negotiated plea of guilty but mentally ill to one count of third-degree murder and one count of burglary.
Mr. Snider alleges he is disabled under the Rehabilitation Act (RA), 29 U.S.C. § 794, and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, 12181, because of mental illness and a hearing impairment.
Before pleading guilty but mentally ill to third degree murder in August 2014, Mr. Snider filed Snider v. Motter, No. 13-1226 pending before Judge Brann. In his Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Snider alleged Warden Jaqueline Motter, Clinton County Correctional Facility, correctional officers, and nurses violated Mr. Snider's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and the ADA during pre-trial detention by using excessive force, deliberate indifference to medical needs, and discriminated against him on the basis of his disability by failing to provide him with a reasonable accommodation in violation of Title II of the ADA.
After counsel from the Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project entered her appearance on behalf of Mr. Snider, the parties reached a settlement and agreed to a dismissal of the case on March 27, 2019. Mr. Snider then filed a notice of appeal challenging, among other orders, the stipulation of dismissal upon the parties' settlement. Mr. Snider's appeal is currently pending in our Court of Appeals at No. 19-1991.
On August 4, 2014, Mr. Snider pleaded guilty but mentally ill to third degree murder. His counsel submitted a sentencing memorandum.
Dr. Watson concluded Mr. Snider possessed the mental capacity to assist his counsel in his defense and the capacity to stand trial on his current criminal charges, opining:
Dr. Watson then opined on Mr. Snider's mental state at the time of the offenses, including four issues: (1) "whether Mr. Snider was suffering from mental disease or defect at the time of the acts with which he is charged"; (2) "whether Mr. Snider was laboring under such defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the acts he was doing at the time of the offenses;" (3) "whether Mr. Snider was laboring under such defect of reasons, from disease of the mind, as not to know that what he was doing was wrong at the time of the offense"; and (4) "whether Mr. Snider, due to mental disease or defect lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law at the time of the offenses."
Dr. Watson opined, "with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Mr. Snider was laboring under a mental disease or defect (Schizophrenia, Paranoid Type) which so impaired his reason on July 4 and July 5, 2010 [dates of the offenses] that with respect to the acts with which he is charged, he did not know the nature and quality of the acts, nor did he know the wrongfulness of the acts, nor did he have substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law."
Three of Mr. Snider's six current cases are before us: Snider v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, No. 15-591; Snider v. McKeehan, No. 18-801; and, Snider v. United States, No. 18-1789.
In No. 15-951, Mr. Snider sues over seventy entities and individuals including the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, the United States, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania's Unified Judicial System, the Pennsylvania Attorney General's office, various prison wardens and corrections officers. He claims each violated his rights under the ADA and RA, the United States Constitution, and Pennsylvania law. He alleges he is being excluded from programs and services in the state and federal court system and within the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.
Mr. Snider's complained-of conduct can be broken into six broad categories:
Mr. Snider seeks declaratory relief each of these Defendants violated his rights; damages; injunctive relief to "address ongoing retaliation, obstruction, defamation, exclusion and failure to accommodate"; "a name clearing hearing"; costs, and other relief we deem equitable.
After reviewing dozens of his filings where he repeatedly sought relief for being denied access to the courts as a person with an alleged mental illness, we sua sponte ordered the parties show cause why we should not hold an evidentiary hearing and review medical records relating to Mr. Snider's mental condition.
Nine groups of Defendants moved to dismiss. After granting Mr. Snider extensions to respond by January 3, 2020, he has not timely opposed the motions to dismiss.
Mr. Snider brought another case in 2018 at No. 18-801 to "address the impeding and frustrating of [his] attempts to have meaningful court access for the claims he is attempting to present in" No. 15-951.
This 2018 complaint covers the time period beginning July 2017 and the conduct of prison officials at SCI Somerset.
He claims retaliation for attempted court access and for helping other inmates with grievances in violation of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and the anti-retaliation provision of the ADA; supervisory liability for failing to address repeated constitutional violations; defamation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and state law; an "official cover up" of legal claims in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and anti-retaliation provision of the ADA; liability for a policy or practice of retaliation for attempted court access in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the anti-retaliation provision of the ADA; Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs and state law malpractice and negligence claims; disability discrimination under the ADA and RA and "regarded as disabled" resulting in exclusion from programs, activities and services; and, denial of meaningful access to the courts in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Defendants moved to dismiss. Mr. Snider filed oppositions to the motion to dismiss. The substantive issues are now ripe for our decision.
On September 10, 2018, Mr. Snider brought another case at No. 18-1789 against the United States and the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania under the Rehabilitation Act alleging the United States and the District Court excluded him from participation in District Court's programs and activities because of his mental health disabilities. Mr. Snider alleged he "attempted to participate in the court's programs between May 3, 2013 and the present day"; "[t]he court knew of his mental health disability and saw how it adversely affected his ability to present his pleadings, pursue his arguable claims and have them fairly review by the court"; but nevertheless "the court repeatedly failed to make accommodations for his disability or to make modifications to their rules and policies."
Mr. Snider complains the District Court violated the Rehabilitation Act by failing to accommodate his mental health diagnoses in his prosecution of two other cases pending before it: Snider v. Motter, No. 13-1226 and Snider v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, No. 15-951. In each of these actions, Mr. Snider complains about the treatment he received in prison including the denial of adequate medical care for his mental health diagnoses and placement in solitary confinement and other mistreatment in retaliation for filing lawsuits all of which prevented his ability to prosecute his claims. Mr. Snider complains the court in both actions denied him counsel and denied his motions for leave to amend his complaints and extensions of time to file notices of appeal. He claims all this conduct—treatment in prison and the District Court's orders— work to exclude him from participation in the District Court's "programs and activities."
When Mr. Snider filed this original complaint in September 2018, he also moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
On January 4, 2019, Mr. Snider moved for leave to amend his complaint.
On January 7, 2019, Mr. Snider filed a notice of appeal to our Court of Appeals from the dismissal of his original complaint and the denial of his motion to file objections to our October 2, 2018 Order dismissing his case.
After withdrawing his notice of appeal, which our Court of Appeals granted, again moving for appointment of counsel which we denied without prejudice because of our lack of jurisdiction, Mr. Snider changed his mind, and filed a motion to withdraw his motion to withdraw his appeal. On November 15, 2019, the Court of Appeals denied Mr. Snider's motion to withdraw motion to dismiss the appeal, which it construed as a motion to reopen the appeal, and the motion for appointment of counsel and to reopen appeal.
Mr. Snider then petitioned for rehearing. On December 17, 2019, our Court of Appeals notified Mr. Snider any additional documents attached to the petition must be accompanied by a motion to file the exhibits attached to the petition for hearing as required by Local Appellate Rules. Our Court of Appeals directed Mr. Snider to file a motion or leave to attach exhibits to the petition for rehearing no later than December 31, 2019. Mr. Snider filed his motion for leave on December 26, 2019. The petition for rehearing remains pending before our Court of Appeals.
On January 3, 2020, we denied Mr. Snider's Motion to amend his complaint because his pending appeal in this action divests us of jurisdiction and because his proposed amendment to sue the United States, its officials, and the District Court appears to be futile.
On January 18, 2019, we ordered the Commonwealth Defendants in case No. 15-951 to file a status memorandum explaining the relationship between case No. 15-951 and case No. 18-801 including the possibility of consolidating No. 18-801 into No. 15-951 and the relationship, if any, of the other named Defendants to the Commonwealth Defendants.
The Commonwealth responded cases Nos. 15-951 and 18-801 should remain separated because they have separate and distinct facts and claims.
Mr. Snider disagreed with the Commonwealth's argument on the relationship between his cases at No. 15-951 and No. 18-801.
We did not consolidate the actions as we need to determine whether there is a claim in either of these cases before we consolidate.
Mr. Snider filed two cases currently pending in the Western District of Pennsylvania: (1) Snider v. Wittig, No. 18-703 assigned to Judge Cercone and referred to Judge Lenihan; and (2) Snider v. Gilmore, No. 18-735 assigned to Judge Bissoon and also referred to Judge Lenihan.
Mr. Snider filed Snider v. Wittig on May 25, 2018. Judge Lenihan granted Mr. Snider's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. On November 18, 2019, Mr. Snider filed a "Supplementary Complaint"
Mr. Snider complains of conduct at SCI Greene (as alleged in No. 15-951, but SCI Greene is not a defendant in No. 15-951): improper medical care; denial of reasonable accommodations for his mental health disability for meaningful participation in programs and activities of the prison; retaliation for filing grievances; failure to train staff to respond to mentally ill prisoners; refusal to provide him assistance in practicing his religion including failure to arrange for Hindu worship service and, because he is a Hindu, prison officials refused to allow him to attend Christian worship services; failure to provide him accommodation in providing legal help by the prison librarian resulting in denial of meaningful court access; impeding his claims in Snider v. Corbett, No. 13-1226 (before Judge Brann) and Snider v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, No. 15-951; confiscation of religious items; impeding his mail; and false disciplinary charges. He claims violations of the ADA and RA; a claim alleging a pattern and practice of retaliation for protected acts and impeding prison access to court; a First Amendment violation and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act for impeding his religious practice; retaliation for his attempted access to court and use of the prison grievance system and for providing other inmates with legal help in violation of the First Amendment, ADA and RA; a "hostile environment" in violation of the Eighth Amendment and state law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim; a "cover-up" in violation of the First Amendment; Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs; procedural due process violation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment and Pennsylvania statute; and a denial of meaningful access to court in violation of the First Amendment.
On December 19, 2017, Judge Lenihan denied Mr. Snider's Motion for review under Rule 17 requesting a guardian ad litem, citing our September 30, 2019 Memorandum in No. 15-951.
Mr. Snider filed Snider v. Gilmore on June 5, 2018. Judge Lenihan granted Mr. Snider's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Mr. Snider filed an Amended Complaint on November 15, 2019.
In a September 6, 2019 Order, Judge Lenihan denied Mr. Snider's Motion for an order to perform a mental health evaluation seeking to compel his alleged treating physician to perform a mental health examination. She explained to Mr. Snider he should submit a request to his treating physician Dr. Bloom for an evaluation.
On November 26, 2019, Judge Bissoon denied Mr. Snider's Motion to merge his two cases in the Western District of Pennsylvania finding Mr. Snider filed what appears to be the same complaint as in Gilmore, merger is inappropriate now since both actions present the same allegations, and there is no reason for two identical cases to be pending in the District. She dismissed the case without prejudice as duplicative of Gilmore, 18-703.
On December 17, 2019, Judge Bissoon vacated her November 26, 2019 Order after Mr. Snider explained his "Supplementary Complaint" is only meant to clarify his claims and to address defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint.
Judge Bissoon's December 17, 2019 Order also vacated her November 26, 2019 Memorandum Order regarding a mental health evaluation. Judge Bissoon found Mr. Snider provided evidence from his treatment providers a court order is required for a mental health evaluation. She ordered Mr. Snider's current mental health providers at the facility where he is currently housed arrange for a mental health evaluation which should, to the extent possible, memorialize Mr. Snider's current diagnoses, primary symptoms and corresponding limitations, prescribed medications and the efficacy of the medications. Judge Bissoon's preference is for the evaluation to be performed by a mental health professional at the facility, but an evaluation by an independent physician is acceptable. Judge Bissoon ordered this evaluation completed by February 17, 2020.
Mr. Snider repeatedly appeals interlocutory orders delaying the progress on his case as we are divested (albeit temporarily) of jurisdiction. We are back in the same spot now as Mr. Snider filed four appeals and one writ of mandamus arising from the same conduct.
On January 10, 2019, Mr. Snider appealed our decision in dismissing his case at No. 19-1789. In this most recently dismissed case, Mr. Snider sued the United States, the former acting Attorney General of the United States, and the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania under the Rehabilitation Act alleging discrimination on the basis of his disability by "fail[ing] to provide him with reasonable accommodations for his disability, causing him to be excluded from participation in and from receiving the benefits of their programs."
Mr. Snider appealed our Order as well as our Order denying him leave to file objections or a motion for reconsideration. On October 30, 2019, Mr. Snider moved to withdraw his appeal which our Court of Appeals granted on November 1, 2019. Three days later, Mr. Snider changed his mind, filing a motion to withdraw his motion to withdraw his appeal. The Court of Appeals denied the motion, construing it as a motion to reopen the appeal. Mr. Snider petitioned for rehearing and our Court of Appeals directed Mr. Snider to move for leave to attach exhibits to his petition for rehearing. Mr. Snider filed his motion for leave to attach exhibits to his petition for rehearing which is presently pending.
On May 6, 2019, Mr. Snider appealed ten orders entered by Judge Brann in Snider v. Corbett, No. 13-1226, including the Order dismissing claims against medical Defendants and an ADA claim against correctional officers after the settlement of Mr. Snider's claims obtained with the assistance of counsel from the Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project. Our Court of Appeals required Mr. Snider file a brief and joint appendix by December 30, 2019 but Mr. Snider moved for enlargement of time. On January 7, 2020, the Court of Appeals granted Mr. Snider's motion, allowing him a sixty-day extension to file his brief and appendix.
On December 6, 2019, Mr. Snider appealed our September 30, 2019 Memorandum and Order and our December 2, 2019 Order in No. 15-951 after we twice denied him an opportunity to file an interlocutory appeal. On December 26, 2019, he moved for leave to amend his petition for appeal due to his mental health disability and filed an amended petition the same day. On January 10, 2020, Mr. Snider filed "Appellant's Argument in Opposition of Dismissal." These matters remain pending. In this appeal, Mr. Snider is arguing we erred by finding him competent to proceed in this matter as he seeks a guardian ad litem and appointment of counsel.
On December 20, 2019, Mr. Snider again appealed our September 30, 2019 and December 2, 2019 Orders in No. 15-951. He filed these appeals notwithstanding our denial of his right of permission to appeal. He again seeks an Order from our Court of Appeals as to appointment of a guardian ad litem following our extensive factual review. On December 24, 2019, our Court of Appeals advised Mr. Snider his appeal will be submitted to a panel for possible dismissal due to a jurisdictional defect. Mr. Snider did not respond to our Court of Appeals' jurisdictional question, instead moving for clarification of the Court's December 24, 2019 letter and a request for an extension of time to pay his filing fee and for responding to the jurisdictional question.
On January 10, 2020, the Court of Appeals denied Mr. Snider's motion for extension of time to pay the filing fees as unnecessary, and ordered Mr. Snider to pay the filing fee to the District Court or file a second motion to proceed in forma pauperis by January 22, 2020. The Court of Appeals granted Mr. Snider's motion for an extension of time to file a response to the Legal Division's December 24, 2019 letter regarding a possible jurisdictional defect to January 22, 2020. If Mr. Snider fails to pay the filing fee or file a motion for in forma pauperis, his appeal will be dismissed without further notice.
On December 24, 2019, Mr. Snider petitioned for writ of mandamus requesting the Court of Appeals to order the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in Snider v. Wittig, No. 18-703 and Snider v. Gilmore, No. 18-735 to (a) docket and file his legal documents; (b) serve court orders upon him; and (c) "Fed.R.Civ.P. 17 & appointment of Guardian ad litem [sic]." On December 24, 2019, the Clerk of the Court issued an order deferring action on the writ of mandamus pending the submission of the filing fee or a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis within fourteen days of the order. Mr. Snider did not comply with either option.
On September 11, 2015, Mr. Snider filed a petition under the Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA").
In his PCRA petition, first filed pro se and later amended by his counsel, he raised claims "regarding [his] mental illness and whether his guilty plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent."
On remand, the PCRA court scheduled hearings for February 12, 2018, December 20, 2018, and April 1, 2019. The criminal docket from the Union County Court of Common Pleas reflects a motion for appointment of new counsel filed by Attorney Ulmer but denied on June 22, 2018; Mr. Snider's motion to stay proceedings in July 2018 pending appointment of new counsel denied on July 3, 2018; a second motion for appointment of new counsel filed by Mr. Snider on December 7, 2018 on which the court scheduled a hearing on December 20, 2018; and, Mr. Snider's motion for continuance or for a bifurcated hearing on December 19, 2018 denied by the PCRA court.
On June 7, 2019, the PCRA court denied Mr. Snider's amended PCRA petition. Mr. Snider filed a notice of appeal on July 18, 2019.
We today specifically address Mr. Snider's Motions now before us to consolidate and transfer the three cases assigned to us, Snider v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, No. 15-951; Snider v. McKeehan, No. 18-801; and the now dismissed Snider v. United States, No. 18-1789; Judge Brann's case Snider v. Motter, No. 13-1226; and Judge Cercone's case, Snider v. Wittig, No. 18-703 pending in the Western District with and into Judge Bissoon's case, Snider v. Gilmore, No. 18-735 also pending in the Western District.
In all six motions, Mr. Snider asks we, Judge Brann, Judge Cercone, and Judge Bissoon consolidate and transfer all six cases into the later filed Snider v. Gilmore, No. 18-735 and stay all cases except Gilmore pending (1) filing of an amended complaint in Gilmore to include all claims and pleadings from all cases; (2) filing a "supplementary complaint" in Gilmore "setting out how he is currently being frustrated from presenting and litigating his claims in a meaningful way"; (3) filing a "motion for restraining order" seeking an order against "prison authorities to ensure [his] meaningful opportunity to present his claims and the parties will litigate the motion"; (4) the question of Mr. Snider's "competency, partial incapacitation, limitations imposed by his mental health, etc [sic] and any resulting relief from the court which are currently pending in" Snider v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, No. 15-951; Snider v. Wittig, No. 18-703; and Snider v. Gilmore, No. 18-735 will be consolidated in Gilmore and the parties will continue to litigate those issues; (5) all motions to dismiss will be stayed until his appeals and mandamus action are resolved; and (6) if, after resolution of the appeals and mandamus action, Judge Bissoon "feels that the pleadings and claims presented in the consolidated amended complaint ... cannot be joined in one action or that they would be better litigated in separate actions, the parties then litigate that issue."
Mr. Snider filed motions in all six pending federal cases to consolidate and transfer venue of all cases to the Western District. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42 governs consolidation and 28 U.S.C. § 1404 governs transfer of venue for convenience.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42 provides a court may consolidate actions involving a common question of law or fact and "(1) joining for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay."
Consolidation may only be effected by the transferee court, here Judge Bissoon in Snider v. Gilmore, if we transferred our cases to the Western District under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
A plaintiff may move to transfer venue on convenience grounds under Section 1404(a).
As the party moving for transfer of venue, Mr. Snider bears the burden of demonstrating "(1) the case could have been brought initially in the proposed transferee forum; (2) the proposed transfer will be more convenient for the parties and witnesses; and (3) the proposed transfer will be in the interest of justice."
Jumara's private factors include (1) plaintiff's forum preference as manifested in the original choice; (2) defendant's preference; (3) whether the claim arose elsewhere; (4) convenience of the parties as indicated by their relative physical and financial condition; (5) convenience of the witnesses — but only to the extent the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial; and (6) location of books and records (similarly limited to the extent that the files could not be produced in the alternative forum).
Jumara's public interest factors include (1) enforceability of the judgment; (2) practical considerations to make the trial easy, expeditious, or inexpensive; (3) relative administrative difficulty in the two fora resulting from court congestion; (4) local interest in deciding controversies at home; (5) public policies of the fora; and (6) familiarity of the trial judge with the applicable state law in diversity cases.
The analysis is "flexible and individualized," and we have "broad discretion in deciding a motion to transfer venue."
As explained, we are divested of jurisdiction at least as to actions No. 15-951 and 18-1789 because of Mr. Snider's currently pending appeals in those cases. Mr. Snider offers no basis to transfer other than convenience before one judge. Absent some basis under Jumara, we cannot transfer venue. We may consider a motion to transfer venue after we resolve the pending motions to dismiss Mr. Snider's complaint in No. 18-801 and after we consider the Defendants' arguments as to why we should not transfer claims arising from SCI Somerset in the Western District. We are not aware of possible grounds to transfer No. 15-951 relating to conduct entirely within this District.
The filing of a timely notice of appeal generally divests us of jurisdiction over issues related to the appeal, with a few exceptions.
Our Court of Appeals, in several circumstances, held District Court judges may retain jurisdiction upon finding an appeal frivolous. An appeal from an order denying a motion for arbitration "will not stay the district court proceedings if it is `frivolous or forfeited.'"
Our Court of Appeals defined "[a] matter is not frivolous if any of the legal points are arguable on their merits."
We twice denied Mr. Snider permission to file an untimely interlocutory appeal of our September 30, 2019 Order denying the appointment of a guardian ad litem. We carefully studied the records of his present capacity including the lack of a finding from any medical professional. After our examination of his medical records and consistent with our understanding of the governing law under Fed.R.Civ.P. 17, we found no basis for finding a volunteer guardian ad litem who would then possibly hire a volunteer lawyer. We also are familiar with the variety of his arguments; he is always mindful of timely filings and seeks redress. His arguments often lack merit. But he proceeds as he is entitled to. He disagrees and now asserts he needs a guardian. He is appealing our September 30, 2019 Order denying him a guardian and is now seeking a second bite at the apple before Judge Bissoon in the Western District.
His legal points are marginally arguable. Given the nature of his arguments he is not competent notwithstanding our interlocutory orders, we err on the side of caution. We do so with hesitation. The over seventy Defendants in No. 15-951 moved to dismiss. The Defendants in No. 18-801 moved to dismiss. We await Mr. Snider's briefing in No. 15-951. The motions in No. 18-801 are ripe for decision. All Defendants wish to progress and resolve the claims. We trust our Court of Appeals will timely address the pending appeals of our interlocutory orders filed without permission and we will then have this issue behind us. Until then, we will stay further review of the pending motions to dismiss in both Nos. 15-951 and 18-801.
For almost seven years, prisoner Joel Snider has pro se files a flurry of papers in this District often arguing he needs counsel and now pursuing appointment of a guardian ad litem. When Judge Brann found counsel to volunteer on Mr. Snider's behalf, counsel settled his claims, some of which are nevertheless included in his complaint in No. 15-951, but Mr. Snider is now seeking to challenge that settlement and representation provided by his volunteer counsel. Mr. Snider's civil cases before us arise from the same general claims, but rather than allow us to address his claims he continues to appeal interlocutory decisions he views as adverse. In doing so, he repeatedly divests us of jurisdiction and further delays resolving his claims some of which focus on the right to counsel for allegedly mentally impaired persons in our civil cases. We recognize the importance of this civil rights issue under the ADA as described by our Court of Appeals in Geness.
We cannot consolidate our cases in this District into two later filed cases in the Western District of Pennsylvania. We may consolidate cases in our active docket into the first filed matter in this District. But Mr. Snider's first filed matter in 2013 before Judge Brann is now in the Court of Appeals and his second filed matter before us at No. 15-951 is also now on appeal. The appeal from Judge Brann's Order is from a final dismissal Order which, if affirmed by our Court of Appeals, would end further prosecution unless the Supreme Court accepted review. We are currently faced with the nine motions to dismiss in No. 15-951 as fully ripe as are the two motions to dismiss in No. 18-801. But given Mr. Snider's appeal of our September 30, 2019 Order finding no grounds to appoint a guardian ad litem based on the medical records and our extensive factual findings, we must defer to our Court of Appeals to resolve his challenge to our findings. As such, we must further delay and stay the resolutions of the motions to dismiss in No. 15-951. While there is no pending appeal precluding us from addressing the pending and briefed motions to dismiss in No. 18-801, the issues are the same and we cannot distinguish Mr. Snider's alleged lack of competency to proceed in No. 15-951 with a competency to proceed in No. 18-801.
In sum, we have long recognized resolving Mr. Snider's claims requires a substantive review of his claims beyond the procedural dance created by his activity. He is litigating in several courts with several cases. He creates this disorder and then seeks extensions and claims he cannot manage his litigation. He disavows lawyer advice and then seeks a guardian who will need a lawyer. But as Mr. Snider is now before our Court of Appeals on five different matters, we cannot proceed while he appeals our findings of his competence to proceed without a guardian ad litem. In the accompanying Orders, we deny Mr. Snider's Motion to consolidate, but stay the proceedings in Nos. 15-951 and 18-801. We will not accept further pleadings or motions other than those seeking immediate relief under the Prison Litigation Reform Act unless so directed by our Court of Appeals after its review.
In his Second Amended Complaint in Snider v. Motter, No. 13-1226, Mr. Snider alleges Warden Jaqueline Motter, Clinton County Correctional Facility, correctional officers, and nurses violated Mr. Snider's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and the ADA during pre-trial detention by using excessive force, deliberate indifference to medical needs, and discriminated against him on the basis of his disability by failing to provide him with a reasonable accommodation in violation of Title II of the ADA. See ECF Doc. No. 222 (Second Amended Complaint) in No. 13-1226. Mr. Snider alleges "numerous incidents of retaliation and harassment related to his religion and mental illness during his incarceration" at the Clinton County Correctional Facility. Id. at ¶ 22. The Clinton County Correctional Facility is in this District.
