OPINION BY BOWES, J.:

Y.S. ("Mother") appeals from the December 21, 2011 order wherein the orphans' court terminated her parental rights to her minor son K.M. pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) and (b).1 We affirm.

The orphans' court summarized the pertinent facts as follows:

Trial Court Opinion, 2/13/12, at 2-3.

Following K.M.'s placement in the care of Luzerne County Children and Youth Services ("CYS"), the juvenile court ordered the then-seventeen-year-old Mother to complete parenting classes, drug and alcohol treatment, mental health services, and maintain safe and stable housing. N.T., 8/2/11, at 33. The court also ordered urine screens to ensure Mother's compliance. Id. Mother initially complied with the court-ordered directives; however, when CYS attempted to extend Mother's visitations with K.M. during summer 2010 from supervised visitation to weekend visitation, Mother failed to abide by the rules CYS established to ensure K.M.'s safety. Id. at 34-50, 79. Specifically, following the first and only weekend visitation, Mother flouted CYS's rules regarding K.M.'s return to the agency following the visitation — she hurriedly returned the child with a soiled diaper and without ensuring that K.M. had his medical supplies. Id. at 42-43.

In addition, Mother neglected her son's medical conditions during the weekend visitation, lied to CYS about her availability to discuss the visitation, and concealed two troubling episodes that occurred while K.M. was in her care during July 9-12, 2010. Id. at 43-47. For example, Mother attempted to hide from CYS that an assailant shot at her male companion, whom she refused to identify, shortly after she and K.M. had left his company. Id. at 50-51. Mother also attempted to obscure a related incident wherein an assailant broke the window of her CYS-approved residence during the weekend visitation. Id. Rather than advising CYS immediately of either incident, Mother went to her mother's home, which was not approved by the agency, for the remainder of the weekend visitation and hurriedly returned K.M. to CYS under the pretense of having to rush off for a job interview, so that she could avoid discussing the situation with CYS. Id. at 51.

During the subsequent investigation into the shooting, the police discovered multiple bundles of heroin inside a bedroom drawer in Mother's residence and charged Mother with possession of a controlled substance. Id. at 54, 190. The police also discovered Father's photo identification, men's clothing, and bullets matching the caliber of a shell casing recovered from the shooting. Id. at 190-191. Father's identification was discovered in Mother's home along with men's clothing, although Mother had previously advised CYS that she ceased contact with Father and did not know his whereabouts. Id. at 52, 81-82. While the police identified Father as the assailant who shot at Mother's companion, and the would-be victim gave police a description of the gunman that matched Father's physical characteristics, Mother refused to cooperate with the police investigation. Id. at 190-192. Based on the July 2010 episodes, Mother's continued attempts to deceive the agency, and her utter disregard for K.M.'s safety, CYS obtained an August 2010 court order that permitted it to suspend all visitations with Mother for safety reasons. Id. at 81-82, 122. Although Mother could have petitioned the juvenile court for a hearing to reinstitute visitation, Mother has not had any contact with her son since July 2010. Id. at 55-56.

On March 25, 2011, CYS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b). Counsel was appointed and, following three non-consecutive days of testimony, the orphans' court entered the above-referenced order terminating Mother's parental rights to K.M. pursuant to § 2511(a)(8) and (b). This timely appeal followed. Mother complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) by filing a statement of errors complained of on appeal concurrent with her notice of appeal.

Mother raises the following issues on appeal:

Mother's brief at i-ii.

We review an order terminating parental rights in accordance with the following standard:

In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa.Super.2009) (quoting In re S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa.Super.2005)). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that its asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. Id. Moreover, we have explained that:

Id. (quoting In re J.L.C. & J.R.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa.Super.2003)). The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super.2004). If competent evidence supports the trial court's findings, we will affirm even if the record could also support an opposite result. In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super.2003). This Court may affirm the trial court's termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section § 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super.2004) (en banc).

Mother's first issue challenges the orphans' court's decision to deny her motion to appoint counsel on K.M.'s behalf during the contested termination proceedings pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a). The following facts are relevant to our review. At the outset of the August 2011 evidentiary hearing, Mother made an oral motion for the appointment of legal counsel to represent K.M.'s legal interests during the termination proceedings. N.T., 8/2/11, at 6. After the orphans' court indicated that an attorney, John A. Bellino, Esquire, had been appointed as K.M.'s guardian ad litem during the dependency proceedings, served as guardian ad litem during the orphans' court's prior termination hearings concerning Father, and continued to serve in that capacity, Mother posited that the plain language of § 2313 mandated the appointment of counsel in the case at bar even though an attorney already represented her son as guardian ad litem.2 Id. at 6-8. Mother reasoned that while the guardian ad litem, is charged with representing K.M.'s best interest, counsel must be appointed in order to represent the child's legal interest. Id. at 7. The orphans' court rejected Mother's argument, concluding, "it's not necessary to appoint both a guardian ad litem, who is an attorney, and also have an attorney appointed." Id. at 8.

As noted, the crux of Mother's position is that the appointment of counsel is mandatory pursuant to § 2313(a) and that "a Guardian ad Litem cannot play a dual role acting both as legal representation for the child and as guardian ad litem[.]" Appellant's brief at 21-22. Mother argues that innate differences exist between the two roles that preclude one attorney from serving a child in both capacities. Id. For the following reasons, we reject Mother's argument that the appointed guardian ad litem, Attorney Bellino, cannot also serve as K.M.'s legal counsel.

The pertinent statutory provision provides as follows:

23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a). The purpose of § 2313(a) "is to protect the interests of the child. Implicit in this appointment of counsel is a recognition that the interests of the child may be very different than or diverge from the interests of the other parties to the proceedings." In re Adoption of J.L., 769 A.2d 1182, 1185 (Pa.Super.2001).

We must interpret § 2313(a) to resolve Mother's complaint. As statutory interpretation implicates a question of law, our scope of review is plenary and our standard of review is de novo. D.R.C. v. J.A.Z., 612 Pa. 519, 31 A.3d 677, 681 (2011); Sayler v. Skutches, 40 A.3d 135, 139 (Pa.Super.2012). In In re D.S., ___ Pa. ___, 39 A.3d 968 (2012), our Supreme Court recently outlined the proper inquiry as follows:

Although § 2313(a) mandates that the orphans' court appoints counsel in all cases where involuntary termination of parental rights is contested, the plain language of § 2313(a) is not clear and free from ambiguity when applied to a scenario where, as here, the orphans' court appointed an attorney to serve as the child's guardian ad litem. The complexity is highlighted by the provision's first two sentences. While the first sentence of § 2313(a) directs that counsel shall be appointed in all cases where involuntary termination is contested, the second sentence addresses a situation where a trial court has discretion to appoint counsel or a guardian ad litem. While the case at bar does not fall within the latter scenario, the legislature's use of a disjunctive conjunction in the provision illustrates its recognition that in most cases it would be superfluous to appoint both counsel and an attorney serving as guardian ad litem. The official comment explaining the prospective application of § 2313 further illuminates the legislature's perspective.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2313, Joint State Government Committee Comment — 1970 (emphases added). Thus, reading § 2313 in pari materia with the official comment, it is not clear and free from all ambiguity that the legislature intended to require the superfluous appointment of counsel under the scenario where, as here, an attorney is serving as guardian ad litem. Tellingly, while the legislature's comment identified a situation where a non-lawyer guardian ad litem could request that counsel be appointed to represent a child's legal interest, there is no reciprocal requirement, either expressed in § 2313 or suggested by the official comment, that precludes an attorney serving as guardian ad litem from also serving as legal counsel.3

In addition, the case law that Mother cites in an attempt to bolster her position is unconvincing. Neither our Supreme Court nor this Court has addressed the precise issue raised in this appeal in a published writing, and the cases that Mother invokes in support of her proposed application of § 2313(a) fail to indicate whether the trial court had previously appointed an attorney to serve as guardian ad litem. See In re Adoption of N.A.G., 324 Pa.Super. 345, 471 A.2d 871 (1984) (realizing error after the fact, trial court appointed counsel, directed counsel to review record, interview children and conduct investigation); In re E.F.H., 751 A.2d 1186 (Pa.Super.2000) (trial court did not appoint counsel as required); see also In re M.T., 414 Pa.Super. 372, 607 A.2d 271 (1992); In re Adoption of J.L., supra (noting court-appointed counsel). Hence, although the cases stand for the well-established principle that § 2313 is mandatory, none of the cases identifies whether the trial court had previously appointed an attorney to serve as guardian ad litem. Thus, they do not control the issues in the case at bar. Accordingly, mindful of the forgoing discussion, we conclude that the orphans' court did not err in denying Mother's motion to appoint counsel to represent K.M. in addition to the legal counsel Attorney Bellino provided as the guardian ad litem.

Next, we address collectively Mother's remaining contentions regarding whether CYS demonstrated the statutory grounds to terminate her parental rights pursuant to 2511(a)(8) and (b) and whether CYS made a good faith effort to promote reunification. Initially, we find that the certified record supports the trial court's conclusion that CYS adduced clear and competent evidence to establish the statutory grounds to terminate Mother's parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(8).

Section 2511 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) and (b).

We have explained this Court's review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the involuntary termination of a parent's rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(8), as follows:

In Re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-1276 (Pa.Super.2003). Thus, in order to satisfy the requirements of § 2511(a)(8) in the case at bar, CYS must produce clear and convincing evidence that: (1) K.M. has been removed from Mother for at least twelve months; (2) the conditions which led to K.M.'s removal continue to exist; and (3) involuntary termination of parental rights would best serve K.M.'s needs and welfare. See In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502 (Pa.Super.2006). "Notably, termination under Section 2511(a)(8), does not require an evaluation of Mother's willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led to placement of her children." Id. at 511 (emphasis in original).

Herein, the record supports the trial court's determination that clear and convincing evidence existed to involuntarily terminate Mother's parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(8). First, we observe that K.M. has been in CYS care since summer 2009. Hence, CYS satisfied the threshold requirement that K.M. has been removed from Mother for at least twelve months.

Likewise, the certified record establishes that the conditions that led to K.M.'s removal continue to exist and that the involuntary termination of Mother's parental rights would best serve K.M.'s needs and welfare. During the evidentiary hearing, one of K.M.'s CYS caseworkers, Amy Thomas, was qualified as an expert in social work. N.T., 8/2/11, at 27. Ms. Thomas, who has been with CYS for more than two years, has supervised K.M.'s case since April 2010. Id. at 28. She outlined the issues that led to K.M.'s placement, including Mother's parenting deficit and drug use during pregnancy, and highlighted the lack of maturity Mother displayed during the July 2010 episode that spoiled Mother's previous efforts to reunite with K.M. and eventually led CYS to suspend visitation. Id. at 33, 42-54.

Ms. Thomas indicated that even though CYS had obtained a court order to suspend visitations in August 2010, the agency continued to offer Mother services and attempted to refer her to outside resources. Id. at 71. Ms. Thomas testified that on February 17, 2011, the juvenile court adopted a revised family service plan ("FSP") that included the following parenting goals: 1) participate in mental health counseling; 2) undergo a drug and alcohol treatment evaluation and comply with recommended treatment; 3) submit random drug testing; 4) complete recommended parenting programs; 5) maintain suitable housing; and 6) cooperate with CYS's scheduled and unannounced visits to evaluate her home. Id. at 62-64. Unfortunately for Mother, she failed to comply with the revised FSP. Mother did not submit the initial urine screen or provide CYS with the required release to participate in outside services, and she continued to lie to the agency unabashedly. Id. at 64-66. For instance, during the February 2011 FSP hearing, Mother advised CYS that she resided with her uncle in Hanover Village. However, after Mother failed to comply with the juvenile court's directive to stay at that location until CYS could obtain a home evaluation, CYS discovered that Mother never resided at that address and that her uncle did not know Mother's whereabouts. Id. at 64-65. The juvenile court eventually found Mother in contempt for her utter failure to comply with the FSP. Id. at 67-68. Thus, despite CYS's concerted efforts to remedy Mother's immaturity, poor parenting, and disregard for K.M.'s general safety, these conditions continued to exist.

As it relates to the third prong of § 2511(a)(8), Ms. Thomas testified that terminating Mother's parental rights would have a positive effect upon K.M. because it would permit him to enjoy a normal childhood with his pre-adoptive family that has cared for him since birth. N.T., 11/2/11, at 20-21. Foster Parents are the only family that K.M. has known. Id. at 23. Ms. Thomas continued that K.M. is fully assimilated into his foster family and is unaware that he has different biological parents. Id. at 22. Moreover, Ms. Thomas indicated that when CYS suspended Mother's visitation during August 2010, K.M. exhibited no negative effects, and his physical health began to improve. Id. at 23.

In sum, the certified record reveals that Mother's parenting deficits, characterized by immaturity and dishonesty, and her failure to appreciate K.M.'s safety impaired her ability to care for K.M.; thus, statutory grounds exist to terminate her parental rights. As highlighted by Ms. Thomas's testimony during the evidentiary hearings, CYS presented clear and convincing evidence that K.M. has been removed from Mother for at least twelve months; the conditions that led to K.M.'s removal continue to exist; and involuntary termination of parental rights would best serve K.M.'s needs and welfare. Accordingly, we find that the record supports the trial court's conclusion that CYS satisfied the statutory requirements to terminate Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8). See In re Adoption of R.J.S., supra.

Next, having found that the orphans' court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that CYS proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights was warranted pursuant to section 2511(a)(8), we next address whether the involuntary termination of parental rights would best serve K.M.'s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to subsection 2511(b). Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of a child. In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 587 Pa. 705, 897 A.2d 1183 (2006). The trial court also must discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id. The extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends upon the unique facts and circumstances of the particular case. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763 (Pa.Super.2008).

We observe that an orphans' court is not required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding evaluation by an expert. In re K.K.R.S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa.Super.2008). Indeed, in assessing the parental bond, the orphans' court is permitted to rely upon the observations and evaluations of social workers. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super.2010). Moreover, the mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the termination of parental rights. As we explained in In re A.S., supra at 483,

Herein, Ms. Thomas opined that terminating Mother's parental rights would not be detrimental to K.M. because he no longer shares a bond with Mother. N.T., 11/2/11, at 20-21. She explained that while K.M. had fashioned a bond with Mother initially, he has not seen her in more than one year and would no longer recognize her. Id. at 19, 21. Indeed, Ms. Thomas testified that K.M.'s primary relationship is with Foster Parents, whom he refers to as "mom [and] dad." Id. at 20. She continued, "He is very attached to them ... It's very appropriate and very obvious that the bonds are extensive and that it's a parent/child bond." Id.

Moreover, K.M. is thriving in Foster Parents' care, and they are satisfying all of his developmental, physical, and emotional needs. Id. at 16-17. Ms. Thomas stated that Foster Parents work with K.M. frequently, using age-appropriate play to address his developmental needs. Id. at 17. Similarly, Foster Parents enrolled K.M. in a part-time preschool program and music lessons for toddlers. Id. at 16. Ms. Thomas also noted that Foster Parents dress K.M. appropriately, provide proper nutrition, and maintain his medical appointments and inoculations. Id. Most importantly, Foster Parents shower K.M. with love and affection and provide him with the appropriate attention that he deserves. Id. at 16-17. We note that whether a child's primary emotional attachment is with a foster parent rather than a birth parent is a significant factor in evaluating the child's developmental and emotional needs and welfare. See In re K.Z.S., supra at 764 ("the bond between [the child] and [foster mother] is the primary bond to protect, given [the child's] young age and his very limited contact with Mother").

Thus, mindful that the needs and welfare analysis is reviewed on a case-by-case basis with consideration of intangible factors such as K.M.'s bonds with Foster Parents, we find sufficient evidence in the certified record to support the orphans' court's determination in this case that terminating Mother's parental rights best served K.M.'s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare.

Finally, we address Mother's assertion that CYS failed to make good faith efforts to promote her reunification with K.M. The following principles are relevant to Mother's complaint.

In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 507 (Pa.Super.2006) (emphasis, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).

Pointing to her initial success with CYS's intervention and the relationship she developed with her then-infant son, Mother complains that by suspending her visitations following the July 2010 ordeal, CYS failed to make a good faith effort to continue to promote reunification. Mother contends that the remaining services CYS provided to her were illusory insofar as her inability to visit K.M. was the definitive obstacle to their reunification. For the following reasons, we disagree that CYS interfered with Mother's ability to reunite with her son.

Simply stated, while CYS secured a court order permitting it to suspend Mother's visitations for safety reasons in August 2010, the agency continued to provide Mother reunification services and arranged referrals for her to participate in outside programs. In fact, CYS drafted a revised FSP outlining the precise components that Mother needed to address to resume her prior successes. Although Mother executed the FSP, which was entered as a court order, she failed to re-engage any of the services and was ultimately found in contempt of the juvenile court order adopting the FSP. Indeed, as noted supra, Mother not only refused to provide CYS with the releases required to participate in the outside programs, she also resumed her deceitful behavior — lying to the agency about details as benign as the location of her residence. Most telling, however, is that fact that Mother failed to petition the orphans' court to reinstate visitation with K.M. Hence, upon review of the certified record, it is clear that while Mother complains that CYS reneged meaningful reunification services following August 2010, in reality, Mother simply quit on her son. No relief is due.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the orphans' court's order terminating Mother's parental rights to K.M. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) and (b).

Order affirmed.