OPINION BY WECHT, J.:
In this consolidated appeal,
In King's direct appeal, we quoted the trial court's recitation of the Commonwealth's evidence in this case as follows:
Commonwealth v. King, 959 A.2d 405, 407-09 (Pa.Super.2008) (citing Trial Court Opinion, 7/18/07, at 1-5).
King called Khalief Alston ("Alston") as a defense witness. Alston, a friend and gang colleague of both King and Haskins, presented a different version of events than that relayed by S.T. and F.J. Alston testified that King and Haskins did not murder the victim. Alston rejected the claim, advanced by S.T. and F.J., that Alston spoke with the victim outside of the Chinese store on the night in question. N.T., 6/21/06 at 144. Rather, Alston claimed that he was walking down the street with Ernest "Ezel" Cannon when they first noticed the victim. Cannon, knowing that the victim was a "snitch," walked up to the victim and shot him in the head from six to eight feet away with a nine millimeter handgun. N.T., 6/21/06 at 103-05, 138-39. Alston testified that, after the shooting, Cannon turned and ran back towards 26th Street, while Alston continued walking towards 25th Street. N.T., 6/21/06 at 105. According to Alston, King and Haskins had no role in the victim's murder. N.T., 6/21/06, at 230, 237-38.
At the time of his trial, Alston also had been charged in two unrelated homicide cases, one attempted homicide case, and two robbery cases. On March 11, 2005, Alston and Cannon were arrested for their joint role in one of those homicide cases. On that date, Alston was interrogated by the police. During that interrogation, the police informed Alston that Cannon had identified him as the actor in at least two murders. After hearing this, Alston identified Cannon as the perpetrator of the murder in the instant case. The Commonwealth seized this opportunity to attack Alston's credibility at trial. The Commonwealth extensively cross-examined Alston regarding his motive to fabricate a story accusing Cannon, a man whom Alston believed lied about Alston's participation in unrelated murders. N.T., 6/21/06, at 228-237. The Commonwealth was able to develop an impression for the jury that Alston created the story implicating Cannon only after learning that Cannon turned on Alston. As the trial court put it, "[a]fter extensive cross-examination on this point, confidence in Alston's story was destroyed and a substantial implication arose that he had merely lied to police and told them Cannon was the shooter in an effort to get back at Cannon." Trial Court Opinion ("T.C.O.(Haskins)"), 11/10/11, at 11.
On June 23, 2006, King and Haskins both were convicted of first-degree murder
Both men appealed to this Court. This Court affirmed King's judgment of sentence, in a published opinion. King, supra. King did not seek allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Haskins' judgment of sentence was affirmed in an unpublished memorandum. Commonwealth v. Haskins, No. 3303 EDA 2006, slip op., 953 A.2d 599 (Pa.Super. March 12, 2008). Unlike King, Haskins filed a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The petition was denied on September 9, 2008. Commonwealth v. Haskins, No. 197 EDA 2008, 598 Pa. 763, 956 A.2d 432 (Sept. 9, 2008) (per curiam).
On October 9, 2009, King filed a timely pro se PCRA petition.
While King's PCRA proceedings were progressing, Haskins independently was seeking PCRA relief as well. Haskins initiated his post-conviction proceedings by filing a timely pro se PCRA petition on November 9, 2009.
In the letter, Alston wrote that "cousin Ezel rocked Nate for snitching on lem too."
While his proceedings were ongoing, King learned that Haskins had raised this Brady claim. On April 28, 2011, before his PCRA petition could be dismissed, King filed a supplemental amended petition, asserting the same Brady issue raised by Haskins. Following additional filings, including two joint filings from King and Haskins briefing the alleged Brady violation, a hearing was scheduled for July 5, 2011, for both cases. No testimony was taken at the hearing. Instead, the PCRA court only heard argument from each party.
During the hearing, the Commonwealth revealed that the assistant district attorney ("ADA") in King's and Haskins' case learned before trial that a search warrant was executed on Alston's residence. Aware that Alston would be a defense witness in King's and Haskins' trial, the prosecution requested that the ADA and police officers who were assigned to Alston's
At the PCRA hearing, the Commonwealth admitted that the ADA should have given the letter to the defense. However, the Commonwealth contended that the failure to do so was an oversight, and that the ADA overlooked the significance of the timing of the seizure of the letter as it related to when Alston first claimed Cannon committed the murder. N.T., 7/5/11, at 8. Despite admitting that the letter should have been disclosed, the Commonwealth nonetheless argued that the letter was discoverable by the defense because Alston was a defense witness. N.T., 7/5/11, at 8-9. Moreover, the Commonwealth maintained that the letter was not material for Brady purposes. Id. at 17-21.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the PCRA court concluded that the Commonwealth's failure to disclose Alston's letter constituted a material Brady violation, particularly because the ADA argued to the jury that Alston fabricated the claim that Cannon committed the murder only after finding out that Cannon blamed him for other murders. N.T., 7/5/11, at 26. Consequently, the court ordered a new trial for both King and Haskins. Id.
On July 22, 2011, the Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal in each case. On the same date, the Commonwealth filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On November 8, 2011, the PCRA court filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) rejecting the Commonwealth's assignment of error.
The issue that the Commonwealth asks us to review is stated identically for both King and Haskins:
Brief for the Commonwealth (King) at 2; Brief for the Commonwealth (Haskins) at 2.
In PCRA cases, our scope and standard of review are well-settled. We are limited to examining whether the court's findings of fact are supported by the record and whether its legal conclusions are free of error. Commonwealth v. Weiss, 604 Pa. 573, 986 A.2d 808, 814 (2009).
In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that "suppression by the prosecution of favorable evidence to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment...." Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. Brady's mandate is not limited to pure exculpatory evidence; impeachment evidence also falls within Brady's parameters and therefore must be disclosed by prosecutors. U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 677, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). However, "the prosecutor is not required to deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose
As referenced supra, to establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate that: (1) the evidence was suppressed by the Commonwealth, either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant; and (3) the evidence was material, in that its omission resulted in prejudice to the defendant. Dennis, 17 A.3d at 308. The burden rests with the defendant to "prove, by reference to the record, that evidence was withheld or suppressed by the prosecution." Commonwealth v. Paddy, 609 Pa. 272, 15 A.3d 431, 451 (2011). The withheld evidence must have been in the exclusive control of the prosecution at the time of trial. No Brady violation occurs when the defendant knew, or with reasonable diligence, could have discovered the evidence in question. Similarly, no violation occurs when the evidence was available to the defense from a non-governmental source. Id.
To demonstrate prejudice, "the evidence suppressed must have been material to guilt or punishment." Commonwealth v. Gibson, 597 Pa. 402, 951 A.2d 1110, 1126 (2008). Evidence is material under Brady when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the trial could have been different. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). "The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial does not establish materiality in the constitutional sense." Commonwealth v. McGill, 574 Pa. 574, 832 A.2d 1014, 1019 (2003) (quoting U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)). The relevant inquiry is "not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555. To prove materiality where the undisclosed evidence affects a witness' credibility, a defendant "must demonstrate that the reliability of the witness may well be determinative of [the defendant's] guilt or innocence." Commonwealth v. Johnson, 556 Pa. 216, 727 A.2d 1089, 1094 (1999).
"A reviewing court is not to review the evidence in isolation, but, rather, the omission is to be evaluated in the context of the entire record." Dennis, 17 A.3d at 309 (citing Commonwealth v. Small, 559 Pa. 423, 741 A.2d 666, 675-76 (1999)). When conducting this analysis in the PCRA context, a defendant must establish that the alleged Brady violation "so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place." 42 Pa. C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(i); Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 553 Pa. 285, 719 A.2d 242, 259 (1998).
Initially, the Commonwealth argues that no Brady violation occurred. First, because Alston was a defense witness, the Commonwealth posits that reasonable diligence requires defense counsel to ask Alston basic questions, such as, "Did you tell anyone else that Cannon was the shooter?" Brief for the Commonwealth (Haskins) at 16; Brief for the Commonwealth (King) at 16. Had counsel performed this minimal amount of diligence, the letter would have been discovered. The Commonwealth explains that, because this did not happen, no Brady violation occurred. Id. Second, the Commonwealth observes that the letter was not in the exclusive control of the Commonwealth. Indeed, the ADA assigned to Alston's murder case turned the letter over to Alston's defense attorney.
The Commonwealth maintains that, because Alston was a defense witness, the defense could have learned of the letter's existence with minimal questioning and reasonable diligence. Neither the parties nor the PCRA court have identified any Pennsylvania cases addressing how far defense counsel must go in questioning its own witnesses to obtain information that is already in the Commonwealth's possession in order to satisfy Brady's diligence requirement. Our own research similarly has not yielded any Pennsylvania cases that are factually on-point.
In resolving this issue, the PCRA court relied upon Boss v. Pierce, 263 F.3d 734 (7th Cir.2001). While not binding on this Court, we find the case persuasive, and we adopt its rationale.
On habeas corpus review, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit weighed Boss' claim that the government committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose the investigator's report containing the exculpatory information. Because the information was derived from a defense witness, the prosecution, like the Commonwealth in the case sub judice, argued that the defense "had ample access to any information [the witness] possessed." Id. at 740. The court of appeals squarely rejected this argument. Because of the similarities in the arguments between Boss and the instant case, we reproduce the federal court's analysis on this point in full:
Id. at 740-41.
Instantly, the Commonwealth asks us essentially to require defense counsel to engage in the same "fishing expedition" and "mind-reading" that the Boss Court rejected. For the same compelling reasons enumerated in Boss, we decline to do so. Defense counsel cannot reasonably be expected to ask every conceivable question of its witnesses, particularly when there is no identifiable reason for counsel to know or believe that additional evidence exists. Instantly, defense counsel had no reason to believe that Alston possessed an unsent letter identifying Cannon as the murderer. Furthermore, counsel did not have cause to believe that anything relevant to King or Haskins' case was seized following the execution of a search warrant on Alston's residence. Reasonable diligence simply does not extend this far.
As to the Commonwealth's second argument, we note that, typically, no Brady violation occurs when the undisclosed evidence is discoverable or obtainable through a non-government source. See Paddy, supra; Commonwealth v. Tedford, 598 Pa. 639, 960 A.2d 1, 30 (2008). Here, the letter technically was available to the defense through a non-governmental source: Alston's trial lawyers. However, neither King, Haskins, nor their attorneys knew that the letter existed. As we did with respect to the Commonwealth's first argument, we conclude that it is unreasonable to place upon the defense the burden to obtain evidence that it did not know existed, from a source, even if a non-governmental source, that the defense did not know possessed the evidence. The fact that the Commonwealth turned the letter over to Alston's trial attorney did not relieve the Commonwealth of its burden to disclose it to King and Haskins in an unrelated case.
There is no doubt that the Commonwealth violated its Brady duty when it failed to turn Alston's letter over to the defense. The Commonwealth conceded that the letter was in its possession, that the ADA assigned to King's and Haskins' case read the letter, and that the ADA
At the PCRA hearing, the Commonwealth conceded that it should have turned the letter over, but maintained that this was an oversight due to the trial ADA's failure to recognize the significance of the timing of when the letter had to be written. Whether intentional or inadvertent, the violation permitted the ADA to create the false impression at trial that Alston fabricated the claim that Cannon murdered the victim only after learning that Cannon fingered him for at least two other murders. When constructing this narrative, the Commonwealth, having read the letter, knew or should have known that this line of attack on Alston's credibility could have been impeached by reference to the letter in its possession.
Deceitful as this trial tactic may have been, or as careless as the oversight may have been, King and Haskins are not automatically entitled to relief. We still must determine whether the letter was material, i.e., whether there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different had the Commonwealth properly discharged its duties. Kyles, supra. In this case, the materiality assessment requires consideration of whether, had the defense been in possession of Alston's letter at trial, Alston's credibility would have been rehabilitated to such a degree that the outcome of the trial would have been different. In conducting this analysis, we are mindful that "[i]f there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is already of questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create reasonable doubt." Copenhefer, 719 A.2d at 259 (Pa. 1998) (citing Commonwealth v. Green, 536 Pa. 599, 640 A.2d 1242, 1245 (1994)). In light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt in this case, we are constrained to conclude that the trial court committed an error of law in finding that the letter was material for Brady purposes.
At trial, S.T. and F.J. testified that they were inside the Chinese store on the day of the victim's murder waiting for the food that they had ordered. From inside the store, and through a glass storefront, S.T. and F.J. both observed Alston talking to the victim on the street outside of the store. As this conversation was occurring, a dark vehicle appeared on Stillman Street. According to S.T. and F.J., the vehicle idled at a stop sign for an unusually long period of time. Eventually, the vehicle made a left turn onto Cambria Street. Shortly thereafter, two men appeared from the Cambria Street direction. While Alston was talking to the victim, these two men approached the victim from the rear. When the men appeared, Alston ran off.
One of the men yelled, "Shoot him. Shoot him." S.T. and F.J. observed the other man shoot the victim in the back of the head. The victim fell to the ground immediately. The shooter stood above him and shot him a second time. S.T. and F.J. watched the assailants run back towards Cambria Street, enter the same vehicle in which they arrived, and drive away.
S.T. and F.J., both disinterested witnesses without a discernible motive to be untruthful, identified King as the shooter and Haskins as the man who yelled, "Shoot him. Shoot him." On February 23, 2005, nearly three weeks after the murder, S.T. selected Haskins from a photo array. N.T., 6/19/06, at 217-18. On
F.J. initially refused to identify the actors that she observed murder the victim. F.J. testified that she declined to do so because she knew King from the neighborhood and was afraid to identify him. N.T., 6/20/06 at 57, 68, 82-84. However, like S.T., F.J. eventually identified King, Haskins, and Alston from various photo collections and arrays. N.T., 6/20/06, at 70-79. F.J. also identified King and Haskins at trial. N.T., 6/20/06, at 40, 71.
Bennett G. Preston, M.D., of the Philadelphia Medical Examiner's Office, performed an autopsy on the victim. N.T., 6/19/06, at 124. Dr. Preston examined the gunshot wound to the victim's head. Based upon the abrasions formed on the skin caused by burning gunpowder (stippling), Dr. Preston estimated that the gun that killed the victim was fired from within two feet of the victim's head. N.T., 6/19/06, at 131. Dr. Preston explained that this was a maximum distance between the gun and the head, but opined that "it was more than likely a lot closer than that, maybe a foot." N.T., 6/19/06, at 132. Dr. Preston's expert opinion corroborated S.T.'s testimony that King was close enough to touch the victim when King fired the gun. N.T., 6/19/06, at 190.
The Commonwealth also introduced evidence that both King and Haskins' were wearing "Stop Snitching" t-shirts in the neighborhood in the months following the murder. King even admitted that the shirt represented a threat, and that people who snitched on him ended up dead. N.T., 6/20/06, at 170-71, 175-79. While this evidence may be innocuous by itself, the shirts substantiated for the jury the motive ascribed to King and Haskins by the Commonwealth, which was that the victim was killed in retaliation for being an informant for the ATF.
Alston was the only witness presented by the defense. Alston testified to a series of events quite different from those testified to by S.T. and F.J. Alston testified that he was walking with Cannon on the side of the street opposite the spot where the victim was standing. Cannon walked over to the victim. Alston stated that Cannon, acting alone, walked up to the victim and shot him twice with a nine millimeter handgun. According to Alston, he and Cannon left the area on foot, not in a vehicle. Alston estimated that Cannon was six to eight feet away from the victim when he fired the fatal shots. N.T., 6/21/06 at 103-05, 138-39. Alston emphatically declared that King and Haskins were not the victim's murderers. N.T., 6/21/06, at 230, 237-38.
Reviewing the evidence in its totality, we cannot conclude that, had the Commonwealth turned the letter over to the defense, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted King and/or Haskins. Both men were unequivocally identified on more than one occasion by S.T. and F.J. Both knew the men from the neighborhood and were able to get a clear view of their faces as they executed the victim on the street. S.T. and F.J. testified that the two men arrived in a vehicle, parked it on Cambria Street, and
At the time of trial, Alston was facing two murder cases, an attempted murder case, and two robbery cases. Each case involved the violent use of a firearm. Alston was a member of the "Lemon Squad," a gang led by King. Haskins also was a member of the "Lemon Squad." Alston admitted his loyalty to King and Haskins. N.T., 6/21/06, at 228. His motive to fabricate his testimony was clear. Alston's testimony substantially differed from that of S.T. and F.J. Alston claimed there was only one actor near the victim when he was shot. S.T. and F.J. testified that two men approached the victim. Alston alleged that Cannon, after murdering the victim, fled on foot. S.T. and F.J. consistently testified that the actors fled to the vehicle in which they had arrived, and used that vehicle to flee the scene.
Among the credibility issues readily apparent with Alston, and arguably the most damning, was his declaration that the shot was fired from six to eight feet away. Dr. Preston, an expert in forensic pathology, opined that, based on the forensic evidence left on the victim's head, the shot was fired from at most two feet away. However, Dr. Preston believed that it was more likely that the shot was fired from only one foot away. Alston's testimony was not only impeached by the divergence of his version of events from the versions of S.T. and F.J.; it also was contradicted by the forensic evidence in the case.
Based upon the consistency and strength of the Commonwealth's case, it is clear that, had the defense been in possession of the letter, Alston's credibility would not have been rehabilitated to the point of overcoming the clear and consistent testimony of the two disinterested witnesses and the supporting physical evidence. While the jury was given the impression that Alston fabricated the story against Cannon only after finding out that Cannon fingered Alston, the overwhelming evidence in this case compels our conclusion that the jury would not have reached a different verdict had Alston been rehabilitated with the letter, or if the Commonwealth never pursued that line of questioning.
Accordingly, Alston's letter was not material for Brady purposes. The PCRA court erroneously found otherwise. The PCRA court's order granting King and Haskins a new trial is reversed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
BOWES, J., files a Concurring Opinion.
CONCURRING OPINION BY BOWES, J.:
I agree with the distinguished majority that Appellees cannot establish actual prejudice and that the PCRA court erred in granting them a new trial. In addition, like the majority, I am distressed by the Commonwealth's disregard for the rules of discovery in failing to turn over the document in question and forwarding an argument during trial that it knew or reasonably should have known was disingenuous. However, I do not join the majority's adoption of Boss v. Pierce, 263 F.3d 734 (7th Cir.2001), under the precise facts of this case.
In Boss, the state's key witness testified that the defendants therein were part of a group that robbed and beat to death a fifty-two-year-old man. That same witness, however, had apparently admitted to committing the crime himself to a defense witness. That defense witness informed law enforcement of the admission four days before trial. The prosecution failed to disclose the investigative report containing
Instantly, the defense witness had written a letter before he had a motive to accuse a different individual of committing the murder and the letter was within the witness's attorney's possession. The critical issue presented, therefore, is whether Appellees' lawyers who were unaware of the letter, reasonably had access or could have discovered the letter where it was not in the exclusive control of the prosecution. The majority's holding finds it unreasonable for defense counsel to ask his own witness or that witness's counsel for evidence that supports the very testimony he will offer at trial and would counter any inference that the witness was offering the evidence to extract revenge on the person he was accusing of committing the crime.
Unlike Boss, the letter in question was directly related to the witness's role in the case, i.e., his testimony that another person committed the shooting and whether he had consistently maintained such a position. Additionally, the document itself, unlike the report in Boss, was available through a non-governmental source.
Appellees' attorneys specifically were calling the witness in question to identify another party as the killer and should have been aware of the potential that the Commonwealth intended to call that testimony into question by highlighting that the person he accused of committing the crime had identified him as a murderer in two other cases. Asking this witness about the testimony he was expressly being called to relate and whether he had continually asserted this position does not involve mind reading or a fishing expedition. Cf. Boss, supra at 741. Thus, I agree with the Commonwealth that such an inquiry was reasonable, and that since defense counsel for the witness had the letter in his possession, Appellees had access to the document from a non-governmental source. Accordingly, I cannot agree with the majority that we should adopt the rationale in Boss as applied to the facts in this matter. Phrased differently, since the withheld evidence was not within the exclusive control of the prosecution at the time of trial and Appellees could have discovered the evidence by exercising reasonable diligence, no Brady violation occurred.
With this caveat in mind, I join the learned majority in reversing the PCRA court's award of a new trial, and would strongly caution the Commonwealth against blatant disregard of the discovery rules.
Brief for the Commonwealth (Haskins) at 10; Brief for the Commonwealth (King) at 10-11.