OPINION BY MUNDY, J.:

Appellant, Jeffery Williams, appeals from the July 18, 2014 aggregate judgment of sentence of 90 days to 6 months' imprisonment, imposed after he was found guilty of four counts of DUI and one count of possession of marijuana.1 After careful review, we affirm.

We summarize the relevant factual and procedural history of this case as follows. On October 6, 2012, Officer Alvina McClain of the Philadelphia Police Department was on a patrol around 600 Stenton Avenue. N.T., 4/11/13, at 5. Officer McClain observed a vehicle traveling northbound on Stenton with its trunk open. Id. at 6. Specifically, "the trunk was bouncing up and down." Id. Officer McClain believed she was in a high-crime area and she was not "sure whether or not a crime had occurred and the person didn't get [a] chance to close the trunk or if he maybe hit the trunk open button and didn't realize it[.]" Id. Officer McClain pulled the vehicle over. Upon effectuating the stop, Officer McClain saw that Appellant was the driver and noticed he had alcohol on his breath and his eyes were both watery and bloodshot. Id. at 7-8. The police eventually found marijuana hidden in Appellant's left sock. Id. at 9.

Appellant was arrested and subsequently charged with the above mentioned offenses in the Philadelphia Municipal Court.2 Appellant made a motion to suppress in the municipal court on the grounds that the seizure of his vehicle by the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights. After a suppression hearing, the municipal court granted Appellant's motion on April 6, 2013. The Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal to the trial court on May 6, 2013. On August 26, 2013, after hearing argument, the trial court reversed the municipal court's grant of suppression, and remanded the case to the municipal court for trial.

Appellant proceeded to a stipulated trial in the municipal court on March 10, 2014, at the conclusion of which the municipal court found Appellant guilty of all charges. On April 25, 2014, the municipal court imposed an aggregate sentence of 90 to 180 days' imprisonment, to be followed by 18 months' probation. On May 6, 2014, Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the trial court for a trial de novo. Appellant proceeded to another stipulated bench trial in the trial court on July 18, 2014, at the conclusion of which the trial court found Appellant guilty of all charges, and imposed an immediate sentence of 90 days to 6 months' imprisonment. Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion. On July 31, 2014, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.3

On appeal, Appellant raises two issues for our review.

Appellant's Brief at 3.

In Appellant's first issue, he argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the Commonwealth's appeal of the municipal court's order granting his suppression motion. Id. at 10. Specifically, Appellant argues that Philadelphia Rule of Criminal Procedure 630(J) requires all Commonwealth appeals from grants of suppression be filed within 15 days. Id. The Commonwealth acknowledges that it filed its notice of appeal 21 days after the municipal court's order, but argues that it had 30 days to appeal under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1005(C), which rendered its appeal timely.4 Commonwealth's Brief at 10.

The Commonwealth also argues that Appellant has waived this issue as he is raising it for the first time in his brief to this Court. Id. at 9. Appellant acknowledges that he did not raise this issue in the trial court or in his Rule 1925(b) statement. Appellant's Brief at 11 n. 2. This would generally result in waiver. See generally Commonwealth v. Hill, 609 Pa. 410, 16 A.3d 484, 494 (2011); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), 1925(b)(4)(vii). However, Appellant correctly observes that this presents a non-waivable jurisdictional issue. Appellant's Brief at 11 n. 2. It is axiomatic that the timeliness of an appeal is jurisdictional and non-waivable. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Menezes, 871 A.2d 204, 207 (Pa.Super.2005) (stating, under Pennsylvania Rule 1006(1)(A), "[a]s a general rule, the Court of Common Pleas has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari to a petitioner who files his petition for a writ after thirty days following his conviction[]") (emphasis added), appeal denied, 586 Pa. 724, 890 A.2d 1057 (2005). It would be an anomaly for this Court to conclude that timely notices of appeal by the defendant are jurisdictional, but notices of appeal by the Commonwealth are not. See id. Therefore, Appellant's issue regarding the Commonwealth's alleged untimely appeal is not subject to waiver. We therefore proceed to address the question on its merits.

In general, although the local courts have broad authority to promulgate local rules of procedure, "[l]ocal rules shall not be inconsistent with any general rule of the Supreme Court or any Act of Assembly." Pa.R.Crim.P. 105(B); see also Commonwealth v. Reyes, 531 Pa. 72, 611 A.2d 190, 193 (1992) (stating, "local rules cannot be construed so as to be inconsistent with the prevailing state-wide rules[ ]") (citation omitted). In construing the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as the ultimate promulgator of said Rules, it is the intent of our Supreme Court that controls. Commonwealth v. Baker, 547 Pa. 214, 690 A.2d 164, 167 (1997). In performing our task, we also look to the tools of statutory construction. Id. In analyzing the intent of our Supreme Court, "the best indication of [said] intent is the plain language of a [rule]." Commonwealth v. Wilson, 111 A.3d 747, 751 (Pa.Super.2015) (citations omitted). "In pursuing that end, we are mindful that `[w]hen the words of a [rule] are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.'" Id., quoting 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b). In addition, "`[w]ords and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage,' while any words or phrases that have acquired a `peculiar and appropriate meaning' must be construed according to that meaning." Id., quoting 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(a). Also, we presume that our Supreme Court "does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable." 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922(1). We note that whether a statewide rule and local rule conflict is a pure question of law; therefore our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Baker, supra at 165 n. 3.

Pennsylvania Rule 1005 provides as follows.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 1005 (emphasis added). Conversely, Philadelphia Rule 630 provides as follows.

Phila.R.Crim.P. 630 (emphasis added).

Pennsylvania Rule 1000(A) notes that all rules in Chapter 10 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure "govern all proceedings in the Philadelphia Municipal Court, including summary cases; Municipal Court cases, as defined in Rule 1001(A); the filing of appeals from Municipal Court cases; the filing of petitions for writs of certiorari; and the preliminary proceedings in criminal cases charging felonies[.]" Id. at 1000(A) (emphasis added). Pennsylvania Rule 1000(B) states that "[a]ny procedure that is governed by a statewide Rule of Criminal Procedure that is not specifically covered in Chapter 10 or by a Philadelphia local rule authorized by these rules and adopted pursuant to Rule 105 shall be governed by the relevant statewide rule." Id. at 1000(B).

Appellant argues that Pennsylvania Rule 1005 and Philadelphia Rule 630(J) do not conflict as Pennsylvania Rule 1005(C), which gives the Commonwealth 30 days to appeal "from the date of the decision on the pretrial application[,]" does not apply to suppression motions. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1005(C); Appellant's Brief at 11-12. In Appellant's view, because Pennsylvania Rule 1005(A)'s text refers to "[a]ll pretrial applications for relief including those for suppression of evidence" but Pennsylvania Rule 1005(C)'s text only refers to "pretrial application[s,]" Pennsylvania Rule 1005(C)'s filing period does not apply to Commonwealth appeals from suppression orders. Therefore, Appellant argues, Philadelphia Rule 630(J) is permitted to fill in this gap. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1005(A), 1005(C); Appellant's Brief at 14. The Commonwealth counters that it would have been superfluous for our Supreme Court to state that suppression orders are included in Pennsylvania Rule 1005(C)'s filing deadline when it defined "pretrial applications" as including suppression orders in Pennsylvania Rule 1005(A).5 Commonwealth's Brief at 11.

After careful consideration, we conclude Pennsylvania Rule 1005(C) controls. As noted above, Pennsylvania Rule 1005(A) frames its subject matter as "pretrial applications for relief including those for suppression of evidence[.]" Pa.R.Crim.P. 1005(A). We agree with the Commonwealth that the common sense reading is that our Supreme Court intended for suppression motions to be included in the term "pretrial applications" for the purposes of Pennsylvania Rule 1005 in its entirety. Essentially, Pennsylvania Rule 1005(A)'s text operates as a definition in this regard. Once Rule 1005(A) established said definition, it was unnecessary for our Supreme Court to repeat in subsections (B) and (C) the term "pretrial applications for relief including those for suppression of evidence[.]" Id. To do so would have been superfluous. See generally Wilson, supra. Therefore, we hold that Philadelphia Rule of Criminal Procedure 630(J) is void and unenforceable.6 As a result, the Commonwealth's appeal was timely, and the trial court did have jurisdiction to consider its appeal from the municipal court's suppression order. Appellant is accordingly not entitled to relief on his first issue.

In Appellant's second issue, he argues that the trial court erred in reversing the municipal court's suppression order. Specifically, he avers the police lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code to stop his car. Appellant's Brief at 21. However, before we may address the merits of this argument, we must first consider the Commonwealth's argument that Appellant waived this issue when he filed an appeal for a trial de novo instead of a petition for a writ of certiorari in the trial court. Commonwealth's Brief at 6-8.

As noted above, Rule 1006 states that a defendant has the right "to file a petition for a writ of certiorari within 30 days without costs or to appeal for trial de novo within 30 days without costs[.]" Pa. R.Crim.P. 1006(1)(a). Our cases have unequivocally stated that a defendant may not seek both a writ of certiorari and a trial de novo. Commonwealth v. Beaufort, 112 A.3d 1267, 1269 (Pa.Super.2015). This Court has recently explained the difference between the two methods of appeal from the municipal court.

Id. This Court held in Coleman, that a defendant is legally required to raise all claims in a writ of certiorari pertaining to the proceedings in the municipal court, or they will be considered waived on appeal. See Coleman, supra (concluding that the defendant waived his claim that the evidence was insufficient in the municipal court for conviction where he failed to raise said claim in a certiorari petition in the trial court).

However, the procedural posture of this case leads us to conclude that Appellant has not waived this issue. Here, Appellant litigated his suppression motion in the municipal court and the municipal court granted the same. However, the Commonwealth successfully appealed the municipal court's order to the trial court, which resulted in its reversal.7 Therefore, Appellant was legally prohibited from asking the trial court to overrule another judge of the same trial court. See generally Commonwealth v. Turner, 73 A.3d 1283, 1286 (Pa.Super.2013) (stating, "[j]udges of coordinate jurisdiction sitting in the same case should not overrule each other's decisions. This rule, known as the coordinate jurisdiction rule, is a rule of sound jurisprudence based on a policy of fostering the finality of pretrial applications in an effort to maintain judicial economy and efficiency[]") (citations omitted), appeal denied, 625 Pa. 649, 91 A.3d 162 (2014). In our view, it would be unfair to require a defendant to otherwise forfeit his right to a trial de novo in the trial court in order to ask the trial court to do something it unequivocally lacked the power to do. Based on these considerations, under the facts of this case, we hold that where the Commonwealth successfully appeals a municipal court order granting a motion to suppress in the trial court, the defendant, in order to preserve the issue for appellate review, is not required to re-raise the suppression issue in a petition for a writ of certiorari in the trial court. As a result, Appellant's claim is not waived and we may address it on the merits.

Our well-established standard of review over challenges to the denial of suppression motions is as follows.

Commonwealth v. Gary, 625 Pa. 183, 91 A.3d 102, 106 (2014) (citation omitted). In this case, as noted above, Appellant argues that the police lacked the reasonable suspicion of a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code or other criminal activity, rendering the seizure unconstitutional. Appellant's Brief at 21. The Commonwealth counters that because the officer observed Appellant's trunk unsecured, this alone provided a sufficient basis for the traffic stop; therefore, Appellant's constitutional rights were not violated. Commonwealth's Brief at 15.

Commonwealth v. Carter, 105 A.3d 765, 768 (Pa.Super.2014) (en banc), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 117 A.3d 295 (2015). Section 6308(b) of the Motor Vehicle Code requires that an officer have reasonable suspicion to support a traffic stop in order to gather information necessary to enforce the Motor Vehicle Code provision. Commonwealth v. Landis, 89 A.3d 694, 702 (Pa.Super.2014); accord 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b).

Carter, supra at 768-769.

Instantly, the Commonwealth argues that the traffic stop was justified under Section 4107(b)(2) of the Motor Vehicle Code, which provides as follows.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4107(b)(2). Furthermore, the Department of Transportation regulations that govern trunks of cars provide the following.

67 Pa.Code §§ 175.77(a), 175.80(a)(6)(iv).

In this case, Officer Alvina McClain of the Philadelphia Police Department testified that on October 6, 2012, at approximately 2:30 p.m., she was on a tour of duty that included the area around 600 Stenton Avenue. N.T., 4/11/13, at 5. Officer McClain was at the intersection of Stenton Avenue and Haines Avenue when she observed a vehicle traveling northbound on Stenton with its trunk open. Id. at 6. Specifically, "the trunk was bouncing up and down." Id. Officer McClain believed she was in a high-crime area and she was not "sure whether or not a crime had occurred and the person didn't get [a] chance to close the trunk or if he maybe hit the trunk open button and didn't realize it[.]" Id. Officer McClain pulled the vehicle over. Id. At the suppression hearing, Officer McClain identified Appellant as the driver. Id. at 5, 7-8.

After careful review of the certified record, we conclude Appellant is not entitled to relief. As summarized above, Officer McClain personally observed Appellant's vehicle driving down a street with its trunk "bouncing up and down." Id. at 6. In our view, this alone was sufficient for Officer McClain to suspect that the trunk lid was not in working order pursuant to Sections 175.77 and 175.80, as the latch may not have been working properly, this being "an unsafe condition." 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4107(b)(2). We stress that the Fourth Amendment did not require that Office McClain be correct or even certain in her suspicion. See Navarette v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1687, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014) (stating that reasonable suspicion "is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause[]") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, Officer McClain did have reasonable suspicion that a violation of Section 4107(b)(2) of the Motor Vehicle Code was occurring in her presence. As a result, Appellant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the traffic stop in this case.8 See Gary, supra.

To summarize, we hold that the requirement for the Commonwealth to file a timely notice of appeal to the trial court from a municipal court suppression order is jurisdictional in nature. However, we also hold that Philadelphia Local Rule of Criminal Procedure 630(J) is void and unenforceable as it conflicts with Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1005(C). In addition, we conclude that Appellant did not waive his suppression issue by not seeking a writ of certiorari to the trial court where the Commonwealth had already successfully appealed the same issue to the trial court. Finally, we also conclude that Appellant's underlying Fourth Amendment challenge is devoid of merit. Accordingly, for all of the aforementioned reasons, the trial court's July 18, 2014 judgment of sentence is affirmed.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.