OPINION BY STABILE, J.:

Melinda Hinkal ("Appellant") appeals from the January 7, 2014 order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Union County granting summary judgment in favor of Gavin Pardoe ("Pardoe"), Gold's Gym, Inc. ("Gold's Gym"), Gold's Gym International, Inc. and TRT holdings, Inc. (collectively "Appellees"). Following review, we affirm.

In this appeal, Appellant challenges whether agreements she signed for membership at Gold's Gym released Appellees from liability for injuries she alleged she sustained while under the direction of Pardoe, a personal trainer, at Gold's Gym. In her Second Amended Complaint, Appellant asserted claims of negligence against Pardoe, and negligence against Gold's Gym premised upon respondeat superior liability. In its 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained:

Trial Court Opinion ("T.C.O."), 1/7/14, at 1-2.

The trial court concluded that the waiver language set forth in Gold's Membership Agreement was valid and enforceable. T.C.O., 1/7/14, at 10. The trial court determined:

Id.

Appellant filed a timely appeal to this Court. A divided panel reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Following the grant of reargument, the case now comes before this Court en banc.

In her Amended Brief filed with this Court, Appellant presents three issues for our consideration:

Appellant's Amended Brief at 4.

Our standard and scope of review from the grant of summary judgment are as follows:

Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, L.P., 607 Pa. 1, 2 A.3d 1174, 1182 (2010).

With respect to Appellant's first issue, questioning whether the guest card covering Appellant's six-day trial period expired before the Appellant's injury occurred, we observe that Appellant did not address this issue in the Argument section of her brief. We therefore, may find this issue waived. Pa.R.A.P. 2119; Harvilla v. Delcamp, 521 Pa. 21, 555 A.2d 763, 764, n. 1 (1989). Nonetheless, even if this issue were not considered waived, the guest card is of no consequence in this case. Appellant received the guest card on June 20, 2010 when she first visited Gold's Gym. At the conclusion of the six-day guest period, Appellant signed a membership agreement that included the provisions in effect on August 24, 2010, the date Appellant alleges she was injured due to Appellees' negligence. It was those provisions, not any guest card, which govern the relevant time here, and upon which the trial court granted summary judgment.

In her second issue, Appellant questions whether the waiver on the back page of her membership agreement is valid and enforceable. The language on the back page of the agreement reads in pertinent part as follows:

Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment, 8/16/13, at Exhibit C. The Gold's Gym Membership Agreement signed by Appellant further instructs:

Id. The signature line follows immediately and the words "Notice: See other side for important information" appear in bold typeface below the signature line. Id.

In its thorough and well-reasoned opinion, the trial court reviewed the language of the waiver and conducted a review of case law addressing exculpatory clauses, recognizing:

T.C.O., 1/7/14, at 4-5.1

The trial court concluded that the exculpatory language at issue cannot be said to violate public policy because it was an agreement between a private individual and entities, and because it did not address matters of interest to the public or the state. Therefore, the first two prongs of the Topp Copy/Employers Liability standard were satisfied. Id. at 5. The trial court further determined that the membership agreement did not constitute a contract of adhesion. Id. at 6. "[Appellant] was under no compulsion to join Gold's Gym as a member and execute the Membership Agreement. Exercising at a gym with equipment and availing oneself of the expertise of a personal trainer is purely voluntary recreational activity." Id. at 7. Therefore, the third prong of the Topp Copy/Employers Liability standard also was satisfied.

Persuaded that all conditions for evaluating the validity of an exculpatory clause were met, the trial court concluded that the "Waiver of Liability; Assumption of Risk" provision of the membership agreement was valid. Id. The trial court then considered whether the provision spelled out the intention to release Pardoe and Gold's Gym from liability for negligence. The trial court stated:

Id. at 9-10.

In her brief, Appellant does not contend that the trial court's analysis is legally deficient. Rather, she simply asserts that her claim is not barred by the "exclusion clause" on the back of the membership agreement. Appellant's Amended Brief at 15-20. Her argument does not focus on aspects of validity of exculpatory clauses, such as whether the membership agreement clause contravenes public policy or constitutes a contract of adhesion. Nor does she contend that the language fails to relieve Appellees from liability. Further, Appellant ignores the Topp Copy/Employers Liability standard as well as the language in the agreement relieving Appellees from liability. Relying primarily on Beck-Hummel v. Ski Shawnee, Inc., 902 A.2d 1266 (Pa.Super.2006), Appellant contends the waiver is invalid because the waiver language appeared on the back of the agreement, she never read or was told to read the back of the agreement, and the clause was not "brought home" to her in a way that could suggest she was aware of the clause and its contents. Id. However, as the trial court recognized, Appellant admitted she did not read the agreement prior to signing it. T.C.O., 1/7/14, at 9. She did not allege fraud or a confidential relationship. Id. Although she was ostensibly attacking the validity of the waiver, Appellant did not present any basis for finding the waiver provisions invalid or unenforceable. Her failure to read her agreement does not render it either invalid or unenforceable. "The law of Pennsylvania is clear. One who is about to sign a contract has a duty to read that contract first." Schillachi v. Flying Dutchman Motorcycle Club, 751 F.Supp. 1169, 1174 (E.D.Pa.1990) (citations omitted). As this Court has stated:

In re Estate of Boardman, 80 A.3d 820, 823 (Pa.Super.2013).

With an unambiguous directive not to sign the agreement until reading both sides, a clear pronouncement that the terms on both sides of the form are part of the agreement, and a straightforward statement that the agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties, the signed Gold's Gym membership agreement cannot be compared in any way to the unread and unsigned disclaimer on a ski facility ticket in Beck-Hummel.

Beck-Hummel concerned the enforceability of a release provision printed on the back of a tubing ticket purchased at Ski Shawnee, Inc. (Shawnee). Plaintiff's husband had purchased four tubing tickets. Neither the plaintiff nor her husband read the exculpatory language on the tubing tickets and neither of them was informed by any employee of Shawnee that they were entering into a contractual agreement with Shawnee. The release language was printed above a dotted line in the center of the ticket where the ticket presumably was to be folded. Plaintiff fractured her ankle when she ran into a wall in the run-out area. She sued Shawnee for negligence. The issue on appeal was whether the release contained on the tubing ticket was enforceable. The resolution of this issue was dependent upon whether there was a meeting of the minds to establish the existence of a contract.

On appeal to this Court, we concluded there was no agreement as to this unsigned and unread disclaimer. Drawing upon Section 469B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, we found that for there to be an effective express agreement to assume a risk, it must appear the plaintiff had given assent to the terms of the agreement. In particular, where the agreement was drawn by the defendant, and the plaintiff's conduct was merely that of a recipient of the agreement, it had to appear that the terms of the release were in fact understood and "brought home" to the plaintiff to find that the agreement had been accepted. Shawnee attempted to argue the ticket was so conspicuous that it put plaintiff on notice of the release provision such that an agreement could be found. In finding that the release on the ticket was not sufficiently conspicuous, we looked to caselaw addressing Article 2 of Pennsylvania's Uniform Commercial Code (PUCC), 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 2101 et seq., relating to enforcement of warranty disclaimers, to determine whether a reasonable person should have noticed the release provision. Beck-Hummel, 902 A.2d at 1274. We were careful to recognize, however, that while Article 2 of the PUCC applied only to the sale of goods, we nonetheless found it useful for providing guidance in that case. Id. at 1274 n. 12. Since neither the plaintiff nor her husband ever read the ticket's language and the language was not so conspicuous as to, without more, put the user/purchaser on notice, we could not conclude as a matter of law that the release on the ticket was enforceable.

The distinguishing factor between Beck-Hummel and the instant matter that makes resort to Beck-Hummel inapposite is the nature of the respective agreements. In Beck-Hummel, the release provision was contained on the face of an entry ticket purchased for use of a ski facility. The ticket did not require a signature or an express acknowledgment that its terms were read and accepted before using the facility. Nothing about the ticket ensured that a purchaser would be aware of its release provision. The purchasers were mere recipients of the document. In short, there was not sufficient evidence to find conclusively that there was a meeting of the minds that part of the consideration for use of the facility was acceptance of a release provision. In stark contrast, here there is a written, signed and acknowledged agreement between the parties. Not only is the written contract signed by Appellant, but also, as previously stated, the contract contained an unambiguous directive not to sign the agreement until reading both sides, a clear pronouncement that the terms on both sides of the form are part of the agreement, and a straightforward statement that the agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties. Accordingly, there is no need here to resort to proof of notice, as in Beck-Hummel, to discern if assent to an agreement had been reached.

Appellant also looks to Beck-Hummel for its discussion of conspicuity. Appellant's Amended Brief at 18-19. As a general principle, minimum conspicuity standards are not a requirement to establish the formation of a contract. While it is true the legislature has prescribed conspicuity requirements for certain types of contracts,2 conspicuity per se is not an essential element of contract formation. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 17(1) (a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration). Sufficient proof of this exists by virtue of the law recognizing and enforcing oral contracts between parties. Nonetheless, in cases where the existence of a contract, or a meeting of the minds, cannot be determined as a matter of law, conspicuity has been resorted to as a means of proving the existence or lack of a contract. Such was the case in Beck-Hummel where there was no signed agreement between the parties. Conspicuity principles were borrowed from the PUCC in aid of determining whether the plaintiff was put on sufficient notice that a release was a part of the quid pro quo for use of the ski facility. The existence of a valid written contract, however, cannot be supplanted by imposing undefined conspicuity requirements as essential elements to all contract formations. To do so would substantially alter the landscape of contract formation and allow a properly executed contract to be set aside through one party's failure to do what the law requires: to read the contract before signing.

Here, without reading it, Appellant signed the membership agreement, which included an unambiguous directive not to sign before reading both sides, a clear pronouncement that the terms on both sides of the form are part of the agreement, and a straightforward statement that the agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Appellant, as we are constrained to do, we find no genuine issue as to any material fact or any error in the lower court's determination that the waiver was valid and enforceable. Appellant is not entitled to relief based on her second issue.

In the third issue set forth in Appellant's amended brief, she questions whether the membership agreement waiver encompasses reckless conduct. She suggests that Pardoe's actions, adding so much weight to a piece of exercise equipment, constituted indifference to the consequences of his actions rising to a level of recklessness outside the purview of the membership agreement waiver. Appellant's Amended Brief at 21-22. Appellees counter that the issue is waived because it was never raised before the trial court, either in response to the motion for summary judgment or at any other time. Appellees' Brief at 23. Further, Appellant did not allege reckless conduct as a basis for liability in her Second Amended Complaint. Appellees' Brief at 25.

"Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Raising the issue in her 1925(b) statement does not cure that defect. "A party cannot rectify the failure to preserve an issue by proffering it in response to a Rule 1925(b) order. A Rule 1925(b) statement of matters complained of on appeal is not a vehicle in which issues not previously asserted may be raised for the first time." Glenbrook Leasing Co. v. Beausang, 839 A.2d 437, 444 (Pa.Super.2003) (internal citations omitted).

Clearly, Appellant's claims of recklessness are waived, unless the allegations of her pleadings or assertions in opposition to Appellees' summary judgment motion can be read to encompass recklessness. Our review of the pleadings, Appellant's deposition, and her brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment leads us to conclude recklessness was not raised prior to the filing of Appellant's brief on appeal. All of Appellant's claims are centered on mere negligence.

In Tayar v. Camelback Ski Corp., Inc., 616 Pa. 385, 47 A.3d 1190 (2012), our Supreme Court explained:

Tayar, 47 A.3d at 1200-01.

Because Appellant did not assert claims of reckless conduct at any time prior to her appeal and because her claims of negligence cannot be read to encompass recklessness, Appellant's third issue does not afford her the right to any relief. Finding no error of law in the trial court's conclusion that there were no genuine issues as to material fact and that Appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.

Order affirmed.

P.J. GANTMAN, P.J.E. BENDER, J. BOWES, J. SHOGAN, J. OTT, and J. JENKINS join this Opinion.

J. LAZARUS files a Dissenting Opinion, in which J. PANELLA joins.

DISSENTING OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.:

As I disagree with the learned majority's analysis regarding the enforceability of the exculpatory clause at issue, I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that the clause was both valid and enforceable under the standard set forth in Topp Copy Products, Inc. v. Singletary, 533 Pa. 468, 626 A.2d 98 (1993) and Employers Liability Assurance Corp. v. Greenville Business Men's Association, 423 Pa. 288, 224 A.2d 620 (1966) (the "Topp Copy/Employers Liability" standard). While I agree with the structure of this analysis, I depart from the majority's conclusion because I believe: 1) an exculpatory clause in the context of a health club membership contravenes public policy; and 2) the contract language, construed strictly, is ambiguous with regard to whether personal training sessions are included within the standard health club membership.

Under the Topp Copy/Employers Liability standard, an exculpatory clause will not be given force unless it meets conditions for validity and enforceability. As a threshold matter, an exculpatory clause will be found valid where the following conditions are met:

Topp Copy Prods. v. Singletary, 533 Pa. 468, 626 A.2d 98, 99 (1993).

As stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, "[t]here is no general policy of the law which prevents the parties from agreeing that the defendant shall be under no such general or specific duty to the plaintiff." Restat. 2d of Torts, § 496B (2nd ed. 1979). Furthermore, "[w]here such an agreement is freely and fairly made, between parties who are in an equal bargaining position, and there is no social interest with which they interfere, it will generally be upheld." Id. (emphasis added).

Though exculpatory clauses are generally upheld, this Court has recognized that "lying behind these contracts is a residuum of public policy which is antagonistic to carte blanche exculpation from liability." Phillips Home Furnishings, Inc. v. Continental Bank, 231 Pa.Super. 174, 331 A.2d 840, 843 (1974) (rev'd on other grounds, 467 Pa. 43, 354 A.2d 542 (1976)). Thus, our case law has "developed the rule that these provisions would be strictly construed with every intendment against the party seeking their protection." Id. Furthermore, the evolution of "economic and social necessities" have led courts to find that "in certain situations and relations express agreements by which one party assumes the risk of another's conduct could not, in good conscience, be accepted." Id.

In Phillips, we identified several categories of situations and relations where contracts against liability have been found inimical to public policy, including: 1) employer-employee relationships; 2) where one party is charged with a duty of public service; 3) public utilities; 4) common carriers; 5) carriers; 6) hospitals; and 7) airports. Id. Additionally, "[c]ourts have been particularly sensitive to the public interest in considering contracts that involve health and safety." Leidy v. Deseret Enterprises, Inc., 252 Pa.Super. 162, 381 A.2d 164, 168 (1977).

In Leidy, this Court reversed the trial court's entry of judgment on the pleadings in an action filed against a spa for injuries alleged by one of its members. The plaintiff alleged that she had been referred to the spa for post-operative treatment and that injury resulted when the spa's therapist administered treatment contrary to her doctor's instructions. Id. at 166. The defendant spa sought dismissal of the case based on release language in the membership agreement signed by the plaintiff. Id. In remanding the case, this Court reasoned that the contract at issue "clearly concerned health and safety" and identified a public interest in "assuring that those claiming to be qualified to follow a doctor's orders are in fact so qualified, and accept responsibility for their actions." Id. at 168.

Like the spa membership in Leidy, the contract at issue in this case implicates health and safety concerns. By marketing and providing personal training services, the Appellees purport to provide for the physical health of Gold's Gym members. The public has an interest in assuring that those who hold themselves out to be qualified1 to provide these services, and profit therefrom, do not disregard their duty of care and cause harm to the people who rely on their professional services. An exculpatory clause in the context of a personal training agreement interferes with this public interest. Therefore, I would find this clause invalid as it contravenes public policy. Topp Copy, 626 A.2d at 99.

To support this public policy argument, we recognize the public interest manifested in Pennsylvania's Health Club Act (the "Act"), 73 P.S. §§ 2161-2177. Although the statute provides primarily economic protections to consumers, it also reflects a broader interest in providing access to health club facilities free from oppressive contract terms. The preamble to the Act states:

Act 1989, Dec. 21, P.L. 672, No. 87. The balance of the Act provides, inter alia, requisite contract provisions, limitations on contract duration and initiation fees, and various grounds for rendering membership contracts voidable. See 73 P.S. §§ 2163-2167.

While the Act aims to protect consumers from "deceptive and unscrupulous practices," at least one other state legislature has taken the extra step to specifically void exculpation clauses in the context of certain recreational establishments, including gyms and fitness centers. In New York, for example, membership and admission agreements for recreational activities are governed by the following:

N.Y. Gen. Oblig. § 5-326 (emphasis added). The language above reflects a public policy interest in protecting consumers of recreational activities from waiving the right to seek compensation for the negligence of the purveyors of such activities.

Although Pennsylvania's Act does not go so far as to automatically void liability waivers, the Act's purpose of protecting health club patrons from "deceptive and unscrupulous practices" could be read to encompass such a preclusion. In the absence of a clearer statement from our legislature, Pennsylvania courts are left to analyze exculpation clauses on a case-by-case basis under the framework of Topp Copy/Employers Liability. As stated previously, I would find the exculpatory clause at issue in this case invalid as it contravenes public policy to enforce such provisions in the context of a contract for personal training services at a gym. Assuming, arguendo, that the clause is valid, I would remand the case, nonetheless, because the terms of the waiver itself do not specifically apply to personal training services.

Under the Topp Copy/Employers Liability standard, a facially valid exculpatory clause will not be given effect unless it is found enforceable.

Topp Copy, 626 A.2d at 99. With these rules of interpretation in mind, I now turn to the exculpatory language at issue in the immediate matter.

The membership agreement signed by Appellant contained the following provision:

Plaintiff's Exhibit 2A, Membership Agreement dated 7/5/10 (emphasis added). The trial court analyzed this provision and found an express statement of intention "to bar all lawsuits arising out of the inherent risk of personal injury in using exercise equipment and machines and participating in an exercise program." Trial Court Opinion, 1/7/2014, at 9. I would be inclined to agree with this conclusion had the Appellant injured herself while working out alone, or even in the context of a group fitness program. However, I cannot agree that this waiver language, which we must construe strictly, clearly encompasses personal training services.

To participate in a personal training regimen, Appellant engaged a personal trainer and paid a significant amount of money for her training sessions, over and above what she paid for her membership. In fact, the personal training engagement required a distinct "Personal Training Agreement" including the following pertinent language:

Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, Personal Training Agreement dated 7/5/10, at 2. In choosing to work with a personal trainer, a client presumably relies on the health and safety training of the trainer who holds him or herself out as an expert in the field. Indeed, a novice trainee would understandably rely on the expertise of a trainer to avoid the "inherent risk of personal injury in using exercise equipment and machines."

From this perspective, I believe that a broad waiver of liability found on the reverse side of a general membership contract, with no specific reference to personal trainers or personal training, does not clearly encompass personal training services. At best, the exculpatory provision is ambiguous as it pertains to personal training and the provision must be construed against the party seeking immunity from liability. Topp Copy, 626 A.2d at 99.

Finding that the waiver of liability is against public policy and does not clearly encompass claims related to personal training services, I would reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Judge PANELLA joins this Dissenting Opinion.