CARLOTA M. BÖHM, Bankruptcy Judge.
The matter before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment ("Motion") filed by Craig Devon Murphy in the above-captioned case and adversary proceeding.
Most of the relevant background and procedural history is set forth in this Court's Memorandum Opinion dated April 7, 2016 ("April 7th Opinion") and will not be restated herein. The Court writes primarily for the parties who are familiar with the bankruptcy case and related adversary proceeding.
By Order dated April 7, 2016 ("April 7th Order"), for the reasons expressed in the April 7th Opinion, this Court denied Mr. Murphy's (1) motion to recuse and (2) request to reopen the bankruptcy case to enable him to pursue an untimely appeal. Accordingly, the bankruptcy case and adversary proceeding remain closed.
Within the Motion, Mr. Murphy seeks reconsideration and alteration and amendment of the Court's April 7th Order pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59, made applicable to bankruptcy cases by Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9023. In order to obtain relief pursuant thereto, Mr. Murphy must rely upon one of the following: "(1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice." Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)). Mr. Murphy contends that his arguments fall within the first and third categories.
In support of his request for reconsideration, Mr. Murphy first asserts that Fed.R.Bankr.P. 8002(a)(1), which provides a fourteen-day period within which to file a notice of appeal, does not speak in jurisdictional terms. Therefore, he concludes that a court is not deprived of authority to hear a case based on the deadline provided. To the contrary, as set forth in the April 7th Opinion, the Third Circuit held that the time to file a bankruptcy appeal is jurisdictional. See In re Caterbone, 640 F.3d 108 (3d Cir. 2011).
Despite Mr. Murphy's argument to the contrary, while addressing the applicability of the Third Circuit's holding in Caterbone in the April 7th Opinion, this Court did not assume the role of an appellate court. The matter before the Court was a motion to reopen the bankruptcy case. The timeliness of the appeal was considered within that context; specifically, the Court considered whether reopening the case would be futile and a waste of judicial resources. There has been no violation of Mr. Murphy's rights. Furthermore, the Court noted within the April 7th Opinion that, if Mr. Murphy disagrees with the decision, he may file an appropriate appeal.
In addition, Mr. Murphy raises arguments that he previously raised. While it is clear that Mr. Murphy disagrees with the reasoning set forth in the April 7th Opinion and the entry of the April 7th Order, he failed to establish that relief pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 is appropriate. Mr. Murphy did not demonstrate an intervening change in controlling law, new evidence, or a need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. As no basis for reconsideration under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 has been established, the Motion must be denied.
Based upon the foregoing, there being no basis for reconsideration, the Motion is denied. An Order will be entered consistent with this Memorandum Opinion. Nevertheless, the Clerk will transmit the Notice of Appeal.