GREGORY L. TADDONIO, UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE.
This matter is before the Court upon the Trustee's Final Report (the "
The Debtor operated a tavern in Pittsburgh's North Side neighborhood on real property owned by its president, Trudy Schmitt.
On June 10, 2014, the Court authorized the sale of the Debtor's primary asset, its liquor license, for a purchase price of $66,000.
California objects to the Final Report, asserting that it held a security interest in the liquor license and thereby is entitled to be paid from the sale proceeds generated from the liquidation of its collateral. California claims it provided financing in September 2004 which enabled Ms. Schmitt to acquire the real property and allowed the Debtor to obtain the liquor license.
The trustee asks the Court to overrule the objection because California did not file a proof of claim or otherwise participate in the bankruptcy case. She also contends that California does not have a perfected, unavoidable security interest in the proceeds of the liquor license because a financing statement was not filed in compliance with the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted under Pennsylvania law ("
California counters that it could not timely file a proof of claim because it did not receive proper notice of the bankruptcy filing. According to its objection, California did not learn of the Debtor's pending bankruptcy case until July 2015, when it was asked for a payoff in connection with the sale of Ms. Schmitt's real property. Until that occurred, California claims it was unaware of the Court's June 11, 2014 Order
California contends that it was owed $50,640.05 as of August 2015.
In August 2015, California sent a letter to the chapter 7 trustee inquiring whether funds remain from the sale of the liquor license. It is undisputed that Trustee Crawford never responded to the letter and that California made no appearance in this case until it filed its initial objection on March 17, 2017.
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(A) and (B). Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1408.
The initial inquiry is whether California holds a secured claim against the proceeds generated from the sale of the liquor license. This Court previously held that a liquor license constitutes personal property upon which a security interest can attach.
Unless a security agreement provides otherwise, a security interest attaches to personal property serving as collateral "when it becomes enforceable against a debtor with respect to the collateral."
California appears to have satisfied these elements. It is undisputed that value was transferred to the Debtor in 2004, and the Debtor had an interest in the liquor license and other personal property identified on the executed security agreement. The Court may therefore conclude that California created a security interest in the liquor license.
The next step is to determine whether California's interest in the liquor license was properly perfected. The purpose of perfection is to "discourage and prevent the creation of secret liens" by putting the world on notice that the collateral has been encumbered.
In this case, California filed a UCC financing statement with the Allegheny County Recorder of Deeds on September 22, 2004. The financing statement was filed as a fixture filing and listed the liquor license, among other things, as collateral. At the hearing on this matter, California conceded that it did not file the financing statement with the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. While the Allegheny County filing may have perfected California's interest in certain fixtures, it was not operative with respect to the liquor license or other personal property.
An unperfected security interest is not superior to the rights of a chapter 7 trustee. Under section 9-317 of the UCC, an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected.
At best, California could be treated as a general unsecured creditor, but its failure to file a proof of claim precludes it from receiving a distribution. To be eligible to participate in a chapter 7 distribution, an unsecured creditor must timely file a proof of claim.
Because no proof of claim was ever submitted, California's allegation that it did not have notice of the bankruptcy until July 2015 is irrelevant. If California had filed a proof of claim upon learning of the case and sought treatment as a timely filed claim, the Court could then consider whether the creditor lacked actual knowledge of the case entitling it to a distribution with other timely filed claims pursuant to section 726(a)(2)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code. Instead, after learning of the case in July 2015, California took no action to protect its interests until it filed its objection to the Final Report over one and a half years later. As one Court explained:
California argued that it sent a letter to the chapter 7 trustee upon learning of the bankruptcy in an attempt to protect its interests but received no response. Regardless of whether the trustee responded to the letter, California still failed to file a proof of claim or take any other diligent action to alert the Court as to the existence of its claims.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that California neither holds a perfected security interest against the Debtor nor is it entitled to a distribution from the Debtor's estate as an unsecured creditor.
The objection to the Final Report is overruled. A separate Order will issue.
Although the August 12, 2015 letter to the chapter 7 trustee appears to satisfy the first three requirements for an informal proof of claim (a writing, demand by the creditor, and intent to hold debtor liable), it does not meet the fourth requirement of a timely submission to the bankruptcy court. According to the courts of this circuit, including this Court, an informal proof of claim must be filed before the bar date.
Notwithstanding any prior lack of notice, California admittedly became aware of the bankruptcy case in July 2015, yet it failed to diligently act. The letter was not filed with the Court when it was drafted. Instead, it was included within 24 pages of exhibits attached to California's original objection filed on March 17, 2017. A period of more than 550 days elapsed between the time the letter was sent and the day it arrived on the Court's docket. The August 12 letter also suggests that California intended to "promptly file a motion" to pursue the sale proceeds, but no such motion was ever filed. Ex. D, Dkt. No. 122-3, p. 1. California offers no explanation for its delay nor does it offer any other grounds that might justify a late filing of the claim under these circumstances.
Even if the letter had met all four requirements for an informal proof of claim, which it does not, the Court would not grant equitable relief for the reasons expressed in this memorandum.