LISA PUPO LENIHAN, United States Chief Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff, Miami Dolphins, Ltd. (hereafter the "Club" or "Dolphins"), filed — on August 30, 2010 — a "Complaint to Enforce Arbitration" in Federal Court against an employee football player, Kendall Newson (hereafter "Newson"). Newson had been participating in the relevant contract-interpretation arbitration since said arbitration was filed by the NFL Management Council (hereafter the "NFLMC") on October 3, 2008 (ECF No. 1). The Club has asked this Court to order Newson to discontinue a Pennsylvania Bureau of Workers' Compensation claim which has been proceeding since August 15, 2008 (hereafter the "PaWC Claim") See Complaint to Enforce Arbitration (ECF No. 1 at Count 1). It has also asked this Court, in its September 2, 2010 Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 2), and again in its overlapping September 9, 2010 Motion to Stay (ECF No. 9), to order presiding Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Judge Briston to dismiss that State benefit proceeding or to enter a stay. On September 21, this Court granted the Motion to Intervene filed by the NFL Players Association (hereafter the "NFLPA"), and a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint is also pending (ECF No. 18).
The Court, on careful consideration, finds no basis for issuance of an injunction or "stay" of the PaWC Claim in the authorities cited by Plaintiff. It further observes that the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, and related principles of comity bar Plaintiff's requested intrusion on the primary jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Court. And it concludes that as Plaintiff has no present claim in this forum to any relief sought through its Complaint, e.g. "enforcement" of arbitration or intrusion on the PaWC Claim, the Complaint should be dismissed.
In so holding, the Court notes that the questions of contractual interpretation underlying the parties' dispute — including, e.g., the existence of any contractual waiver of entitlement to Pennsylvania (or other non-Florida) workers' compensation benefits and/or a Pennsylvania Bureau of Workers' Compensation forum
Newson, a Georgia resident, initially entered into a contract of employment with the Club, a Florida football team, on or about February 28, 2003 for two football seasons. On February 2, 2005, Newson entered into a second contract with the Dolphins for an additional season, i.e., March 1, 2005 to February 28, 2006. On August 20, 2005, while playing in a professional football game for the Dolphins at Heinz Field in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Newson sustained an injury to his right knee.
Newson, as a football player employed by a member club of the National Football League (hereafter the "NFL") is represented by the NFLPA, the exclusive bargaining representative of employee players in the NFL. The terms and conditions of Newson's employment are therefore governed by the collective bargaining agreement (hereafter the "CBA") entered into between the NFLMC and the NFLPA. Under Article IX of the CBA, disputes regarding interpretation, application, or compliance with any of its provisions — or those of the individual player's contract — are to be resolved through the stipulated arbitration procedure. And Article LIV of the CBA requires that in any state where workers' compensation coverage is not mandatory or where a club is excluded from coverage (such as Florida), the club must either voluntarily obtain coverage under the compensation laws of that state or otherwise guarantee equivalent benefits to its players. The benefits to a player who qualifies under this section "will be equivalent to those benefits paid under the compensation law of the state in which his club is located" and determined under the non-injury grievance ("NIG") procedures of Article IX.
The NFLMC and NFLPA are also parties to a December, 1985 Implementation Agreement further providing — with regard to Dolphins' players' entitlement to workers' compensation rights and benefits equivalent to those set forth for other employees under Florida's Workers' Compensation Law — that (1) claims will be processed through a service agent, and (2) disputes that cannot be resolved between said agent and the player will be heard by a member of a three-arbitrator local panel established by the parties to hear said claims, with appeal available under Article IX of the CBA. Under the Implementation Agreement, (1) players may make a claim for benefits within the statute of limitations set forth in Florida's Workers' Compensation Law; (2) rulings and decisions issued by the arbitrators appointed under the Agreement are applicable only to Florida workers' compensation claims arising under the specified CBA provisions; and (3) the NFLPA, for its players and in consideration for the provision of such benefits, grants the Dolphins the same immunities from suit that other employers in Florida enjoy with respect to suits on account of coverage under Florida Workers' Compensation Law.
As to Newson's individual contract documents, his NFL Player Contract provides that it is made under and governed by Florida law and that any disputes involving interpretation or application of its provisions will be arbitrated in accordance with the CBA. In addition, a 2005 Contract Addendum provides, under Section 6, Choice of Law, that Florida law governs any dispute, claim or cause of action concerning
On August 15, 2008, Newson filed the PaWC Claim. Through said claim, Newson sought workers' compensation benefits for the employment-related injuries he sustained in Pennsylvania. On September 16, 2010 (i.e., approximately two weeks after the Club first sought this Court's intervention in a two-year-old State Court proceeding), Judge Briston entered an Interlocutory Order noting that the claim had been "continuously delayed over the past two years" on request of counsel, with multiple unsuccessful mediations. See Judge's Interlocutory Order (noting that seven hearings were scheduled, and four held; at least three mediations were conducted; and numerous continuances were granted).
Furthermore, Judge Briston expressly held that, under Pennsylvania law, the Commonwealth's statutory workers' compensation provisions apply to all work-related injuries incurred in Pennsylvania and that this benefit is protected against/immune from private contract waiver by an employee or his union. See Judge's Interlocutory Order at ¶ 13, 14 (noting that "the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act provides that the Act is applicable to all injuries occurring within Pennsylvania" and that "in Pennsylvania one cannot contract away their rights to workers' compensation, nor can the union or the employer do so"); Section 101, 77 P.S. § 1; McIlvaine Trucking Inc. v. WC Appeal Board, 570 Pa. 662, 810 A.2d 1280 (2002) (employment contract specifying West Virginia forum/choice of law for workers' compensation claims held unenforceable and employee could file for Pennsylvania workers' compensation benefits under Pennsylvania law). Judge Briston accordingly concluded that the Implementation Agreement did not preclude Newson's Pennsylvania workers' compensation claim and that she had jurisdiction over the work injuries he sustained. See Judge's Interlocutory Order at ¶ 15.
The football management and football players' associations have arbitrated their disputes regarding their contractual understandings and undertakings as to players' entitlements to workers' compensation benefits for many years. See, e.g., Affidavit of Adam Kaiser, Counsel to NFLPA (providing as Exhibits arbitration disputes regarding CBA and contract workers' compensation provisions). Despite undertakings to resolve their differences and execute a comprehensive, unambiguous contractual understanding,
Plaintiff's Complaint to Enforce Arbitration asserts, under Count I, that it is entitled to relief under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (hereafter the "LMRA") because Newson's PaWC Claim is a breach of his contract and subject to arbitration, and, under Count II, that it is entitled to relief under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Section 4.
Plaintiff has asked this Court to order Judge Briston to dismiss or enter a stay in the PaWC Claim proceedings because Newson's pursuit of this claim is in breach of contract provisions mandating arbitration of workers' compensation disputes and providing exclusive jurisdiction.
Plaintiff has also suggested that this Court should "stop [Defendant] from proceeding with his Pennsylvania claim "until the arbitration proceeding ... can determine whether he violated the contract by seeking benefits under Pennsylvania law."
As Arbitrator Clarke has nicely summarized, the Supreme Court has made clear that a union may, through "clear and unmistakable" waiver — and only "clear and unmistakable waiver" — forego its employees' rights to bring a Federal statutory claim in a judicial forum. See Storm-Brache Decision at 42 (discussing Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 119 S.Ct. 391, 142 L.Ed.2d 361 (1998)); see also 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 129 S.Ct. 1456, 173 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009). And although the right to file a workers' compensation claim is State, rather than Federal, in nature, it seems "unlikely that Congress ... intended minimum state statutory allowance programs to be treated differently than Federal statutory rights." Id. at 42 n. 65 (also citing Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp. v. Massey, 373 F.3d 530 (4th Cir.2004) (applying Wright to allegation that union had waived state statutory claims)). As any preemption of State court jurisdiction in favor of an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims requires a "clear and unmistakable waiver" of the employee's right, that right is not preempted while this contract-interpretation arbitration proceeds. See Storm-Brache Decision at 42-43 (observing that none of the agreements in question "clearly and unmistakably waives any right covered employees might have to file workers' compensation claims in states other than Florida" and "[a]bsent such clarity, any attempted waiver must fail"); Cincinnati Bengals, 2010 WL 1857270 at *10-11 (concluding that players could seek workers compensation benefits in State Court while arbitration as to meaning of contract provisions was pending).
Plaintiff's Motions for Preliminary Injunction and/or "Stay" raise serious prudential concerns and, indeed, are precluded by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (hereafter the "AIA"). The AIA prohibits any federal court from issuing an injunction against proceedings in any state court, except within three (3) specifically defined exceptions: where "expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." Id.
Even if it were appropriate to consider Plaintiff's injunction request on the merits, it is apparent that the issuance of an injunction is manifestly unwarranted in these circumstances.
The Court also notes that any assertion by Plaintiff of potential of harm by the State Court proceeding in the way of improper influence on the pending arbitration is in tension with whole premise of the FAA — that the Federal Court reposes confidence in the arbitrator to reach an appropriate decision based on the factors he looks to.
Finally, the Court observes that there is no basis to suppose that any public interest would be served by granting an injunction against a State Court proceeding designed to enforce its public policies regarding working conditions and work-related injury protections. See supra at 12 (citing Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 306 U.S. at 503, 59 S.Ct. 629 (observing that "[f]ew matters could be deemed more appropriately the concern of the State in which the injury occurs or more completely within its power")).
As stated above, Newson has participated in the relevant contract-interpretation arbitration (regarding the threshold question of whether Newson breached any contractual obligation by filing the PaWC claim) since said arbitration was filed by the NF LMC on October 3, 2008, and that arbitration is ongoing. Plaintiff's attempts to shoehorn this action into the LMRA or FAA notwithstanding, there is no basis for this Court to compel arbitration where an arbitration is proceeding, nor is there any basis for this Court to enforce arbitration where the Arbitrator has yet to issue his decision. There is simply no basis for this Court's intervention in either that arbitration (by way, e.g., of interpreting the contract properly before Arbitrator Das) or the State claim proceeding before Judge Briston these past two years regarding a
Compare AFL/Tampa Bay Storm v. AFLPA/Brache and Daniels (June 2008) (Arbitrator Wittenberg) (reversing her initial decision interpreting similar contract language, and holding that workers' compensation claims by Tampa Bay Storm players in California violated "clear and unequivocal" language of CBA and must be arbitrated in Florida) with AFL/Tampa Bay Storm v. AFLPA/Brache and Daniels (May 15, 2009) (hereafter "Storm-Brache Decision") (Arbitrator Clarke, on assuming authority over this arbitration, following Arb. Wittenberg's resignation) (deeming Arbitrator Wittenberg's self-reversal erroneous, and concluding that contract language failed to meet "clear and unmistakable" forum waiver requirements under 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 129 S.Ct. 1456, 173 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009)). Arbitrator Clarke further noted that (1) Florida workers' compensation laws afforded no coverage to football players; (2) as no employee had the statutory right to file a workers' compensation claim in Florida, no statutory right existed to be waived; and (3) the "equivalent benefit" rights created by the Implementation Agreement were required to be submitted to arbitration, but those contractual benefit provisions did not speak to workers' compensation benefits under other state statutes. Id. at 41-42. Cf. Brache v. Tampa Bay Storm, Workers' Compensation Appeal Board of California, Case No. ADJ 1908964 (Aug. 30, 2010) (holding that FAA did not apply to CBA; that players' contract required only arbitration of claims for "equivalent benefits" under CBA and not arbitration of other state workers' compensation claims; and that LMRA did not preempt players' rights to seek workers' compensation benefits in California, which were not substantially dependent on or inextricably intertwined with interpretation of CBA). Arbitrator Clarke's Storm-Brache Decision was confirmed by our sister Court for the Central District of California. See AFLPA v. Pigskin, LLC, No 8:10-CV-01062 (C.D.Cal. Oct. 13, 2010).
In his Cowboys/Texans Decision, Arb. Das concluded that the CBA did not incorporate Texas workers' compensation laws' more restrictive benefit election requirements and that under federal preemption doctrine, Texas law could not deprive players of rights to collectively bargained benefits exceeding state benefits (i.e., state statutes could not reduce employees' bargained benefits). He therefore issued a cease and desist order against the Clubs as to their issuance/requirement of restricted-benefit forms, but noted that he could not dictate how appropriate state authorities would treat forms previously executed by players. His Decision was confirmed by our sister Court for the Northern District of Texas in November, 2005. See Kaiser Affidavit Exs. H-I.
Because the Anti-Injunction Act bars this Court from granting the relief requested, the Court need not reach the Defendants' additional arguments raised under either (a) the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq., or (b) the Colorado River doctrine. See Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 18-21; Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-18, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). It notes, however, that much of Defendants' analysis — particularly that regarding (a) evidentiary burdens and requirements under the Norris-LaGuardia Act and (b) abstention from questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial import entrusted to state's specialized courts — is well-taken. See, e.g., Transcript of February 9, 2011 Oral Argument at 4, 32-33.
