First, the Court finds no merit in Plaintiff's contention regarding the ALJ's decision not to give controlling weight to the opinion rendered by Dr. Huang, Plaintiff's treating psychiatrist. It is well-established that "[t]he ALJ — not treating or examining physicians or State agency consultants — must make the ultimate disability and RFC determinations." Chandler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(1), 404.1546(c)). "The law is clear . . . that the opinion of a treating physician does not bind the ALJ on the issue of functional capacity." Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 197 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011). A treating physician's opinion is only entitled to controlling weight if it is "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the claimant's] case record." Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 43 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)). "If, however, the treating physician's opinion conflicts with other medical evidence, then the ALJ is free to give that opinion less than controlling weight or even reject it, so long as the ALJ clearly explains her reasons and makes a clear record." Salles v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 229 Fed. Appx. 140, 148 (3d Cir. 2007). A treating physician's opinion on the ultimate issue of disability is not entitled to any "special significance," and an ALJ is not required to accept it since the determination of whether an individual is disabled "is an ultimate issue reserved to the Commissioner." Smith v. Comm'r of Social Sec., 178 Fed. Appx. 106, 112 (3d Cir. 2006).

The Court finds that the ALJ did not, as Plaintiff alleges, substitute his own lay judgment for the judgment of Dr. Huang. Rather, the ALJ fulfilled his duty as fact-finder to evaluate Dr. Huang's opinion, considering a number of factors, and in light of all the evidence presented in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927 (factors to consider include the length of the treatment relationship, the frequency of examination, and the opinion's consistency with the record as a whole). In reviewing Dr. Huang's opinion, the ALJ initially noted that, in April, 2012, "two months after beginning professional mental health treatment," Dr. Huang completed a mental RFC questionnaire for Plaintiff. (R. 23). The ALJ specified that, since Dr. Huang was only seeing Plaintiff once every two months, then after two months of treatment, Dr. Huang had had, at most, two appointments with Plaintiff when she made her conclusions. (R. 23). Nevertheless, Dr. Huang reported, among other findings, that Plaintiff had "significant anxiety and depression, which were not responding to treatment." (R. 23). The ALJ concluded that "[t]he fact that this treatment only recently began fails to support an allegation of disability since the alleged disability onset date." (R. 23). After extensive consideration of all the evidence presented, including evidence of the activities in which Plaintiff engaged, the ALJ ultimately gave little weight to Dr. Huang's findings "because they [were] inconsistent with the other evidence of record, including the claimant's reported activities." (R. 23).

Second, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision to give significant weight to the opinions of the state agency examiners over the opinion of Dr. Shetty, Plaintiff's treating primary care physician. Throughout his discussion in this case, the ALJ clearly considered the relevant medical evidence in the record, provided discussion of the evidence to support his evaluation, and ultimately concluded that the final opinion of Dr. Shetty was not supported by the evidence as a whole. (R. 18-22). For example, after detailing Plaintiff's overall treatment history, the ALJ described a form completed by Dr. Shetty in November, 2009, in which Plaintiff was described as being "capable of light exertion work with essentially good functioning in all areas." (R. 21). The ALJ stated that he gave this opinion of Dr. Shetty "great weight because it is supported by the evidence at that time." (R. 21). He also explained that Dr. Shetty completed another form (along with federal student loan discharge papers) on Plaintiff's behalf in May, 2011, in which she listed Plaintiff's various impairments. (R. 22). He noted, however, that this report was "inconsistent with the treatment records, including Dr. Shetty's reports." (R. 22). Additionally, Dr. Shetty made no referral for more specialized treatment or for pain management, nor did Plaintiff have any hospitalizations or emergency treatments, and Dr. Shetty was, in fact, "able to control these impairments despite infrequent medical appointments." (R. 22). The ALJ thus accorded this second report "little weight in assessing the claimant's level of functioning from the alleged disability onset date through the date of" his decision. (R. 22).

The record contained additional opinion evidence to which the ALJ gave great weight. In March, 2011, Dr. Christo, a consultative physician, evaluated Plaintiff, noted her various complaints, reviewed her history, and conducted his own examination of Plaintiff. (R. 21). He indicated, based upon his examination and interview with Plaintiff, that she "could lift and carry up to 25 pounds frequently and has no limitations in standing, walking, sitting, pushing, pulling, or in postural activities such as bending, kneeling, stooping, crouching, balancing and climbing." (R. 21). The ALJ afforded Dr. Christo's report "great weight" in formulating his determination, and he ultimately found that Plaintiff had further limitations than Dr. Christo provided. (R. 21). Also in March, 2011, Dr. Mortimer, a state reviewing physician, examined Plaintiff's records, noted her impairments and her activities of daily living, and found that Plaintiff could perform light exertion work. (R. 21). The ALJ stated that he also gave Dr. Mortimer's opinion "great weight" and incorporated it into Plaintiff's RFC. (R. 21). Additionally, in March, 2011, Dr. Ondis, a state reviewing psychologist, evaluated Plaintiff's records and found no severe mental health impairments. (R. 22). The ALJ observed that Dr. Ondis "noted the claimant did not receive professional mental health treatment," and he "indicated that at most, her mental impairments cause her no more than mild limitations in her work-related functioning." (R. 22). Again, the ALJ gave the report "significant weight," yet he eventually assessed Plaintiff as having greater limitations than those identified by Dr. Ondis. (R. 22). Upon review, the Court therefore finds that the ALJ properly discharged his duty to address not just Dr. Shetty's opinion, but also the other opinions presented in the record. The Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's evaluation of the opinion evidence and his decision not to give controlling eight to the opinion of Dr. Shetty in making his ultimate determinations.