TERRENCE F. McVERRY, Senior District Judge.
Pending before the Court is a MOTION IN LIMINE (ECF No. 91) filed by Defendant Andre Dwayne Ruffin with a brief in support (ECF No. 92). The government has filed a response in opposition (ECF No. 98). Accordingly the motion is ripe for disposition.
On May 7, 2013, a federal grand jury sitting in the Western District of Pennsylvania returned a one-count Indictment against Ruffin which charged him with the crime of Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon on or about April 22, 2013 in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e). On October 15, 2013, the government filed a Superseding Indictment which charged Ruffin with the crime of Possession of Firearms and Ammunition by a Convicted Felon on or about April 22, 2013 in violation of the same federal statutes.
The charges against Ruffin stem from a series of events that unraveled after his so-called common-law wife, Leicia Jackson, died intestate on May 18, 2012. Prior to her death, Leicia and Ruffin shared a home located in the Munhall Borough at 704 East 14
On April 11, 2013, Loretta was shot and killed inside of her home. Officers from the West Mifflin Police Department were dispatched to the residence after the activation of an alarm system and the receipt of a 9-1-1 call from an unidentified woman inside the home. Upon their arrival, police officers found one woman inside the residence in a locked bedroom as well as Loretta inside a second bedroom with multiple gunshot wounds to her head and body. The same day, the West Mifflin Police Department requested investigative assistance from the Allegheny County Police Department's Homicide Section. The homicide investigation remains ongoing.
On April 12, 2013, Detective Scott Towne of the Homicide Section went to 704 East 14
On April 15, 2013, Detective Towne interviewed Ruffin who claimed that he was at home with Hamlin on the evening of Loretta's murder. One week later, on April 22, 2013, West Mifflin Police Officers and members of the Allegheny County Police Department, Homicide Section executed a search warrant at the residence of Ruffin and Hamlin to recover the video recordings and corroborate or disprove his alibi defense.
Immediately prior to the execution of the search warrant, Officer Jamie Caterino of the Munhall Police Department observed Ruffin exit the residence and depart in his vehicle. Upon learning this information, Detective Michael Feeney of the Allegheny County Police Department and several other officers conducted a car-stop of Ruffin who stated that his residence was unoccupied. Detective Feeney relayed this information to the officers who were executing the search warrant, which included Allegheny County Homicide Detective Lane Zabelsky.
Detective Zabelsky and Officer Caterino soon approached the residence and announced their presence at which time Hamlin opened the door. Based on the apparent contradiction between Ruffin's statements and Hamlin's presence, Detective Zabelsky performed a protective sweep of the residence. In a second-floor bedroom, Detective Zabelsky first observed one firearm in an open dresser drawer (later determined to be a starter pistol). In another second-floor bedroom, Detective Zabelsky observed a second firearm in a safe which had an ajar door.
Law enforcement officers then applied for and obtained a second search warrant on April 22, 2013 to search for and seize the firearms and any other weapons in the residence. Officers later recovered, inter alia, (1) a Rock River Arms pistol, Model LAR-PPS, caliber 5.56, bearing serial number BA003375; (2) a Spike's Tactical Receiver, Model ST15, bearing serial number SBR-09005; and (3) multiple rounds of .223 caliber and 7.62 × 39 caliber ammunition—the firearms and ammunition charged in the Superseding Indictment. According to the Superseding Indictment, Ruffin is prohibited from possessing firearms and ammunition due to his prior felony convictions.
A later law enforcement investigation and review of the seized firearms revealed that they had been purchased by Hamlin. Agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearm and Explosives ("ATF") interviewed Hamlin who allegedly indicated that she "straw purchased" these firearms for Ruffin at his request. The government charged Hamlin with two counts of falsification of firearms purchase form. See United States v. Hamlin, 2:13-cr-00138-TFM (W.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2013). Hamlin has since pleaded guilty to these offenses and has been sentenced.
A jury trial is scheduled to commence on the instant Superseding Indictment on Monday, February 23, 2015. In anticipation of trial, the government has provided notice of its intention to present the following prior act evidence at trial pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b):
(ECF No. 89). The notice also indicates that the government does not intend to use, as Rule 404(b) evidence, any information regarding Ruffin's prior criminal convictions unless noted above. The instant motion followed.
Evidence of a criminal defendant's uncharged conduct, including crimes, wrongs or other acts, may be admissible if the evidence is intrinsic to the charged offense; or the evidence is extrinsic to the charged offense but is offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b). See United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 245 (3d Cir. 2010). In United States v. Green, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that the "intrinsic label" is limited to "two narrow categories of evidence": evidence that "directly proves the charged offense," and evidence of "uncharged acts performed contemporaneously with the charged crime" that "facilitate the commission of the charged crime." Id. at 248-49 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This type of evidence is admissible without the need for the prosecution to provide notice to the defendant before trial or for the court to provide limiting instructions to the jury during trial. Id. at 247. Thus, as a practical matter, "[a]ll that is accomplished by labeling evidence `intrinsic' is relieving the Government from providing a defendant with the procedural protections of Rule 404(b)." Id. at 248.
If the evidence is not intrinsic, it "must be analyzed under 404(b)." Id. at 249. Under Rule 404(b)(1), "[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character." Such evidence may be admissible for another relevant purpose, "such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident." Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recently explained that "Rule 404(b) is a rule of general exclusion, and carries with it `no presumption of admissibility.'" United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 276 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting 1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 4:28, at 731 (4th ed. 2013)). Thus, the "permitted uses" should be treated as "exceptions" to the general rule, and "[a]s is generally the case with exceptions," the burden of establishing that the evidence is admissible falls on the proponent of the evidence—in this case, the government. Id.
Further, because of the highly prejudicial nature of other-acts evidence, the rule "requires care from prosecutors and judges alike." United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 442 (3d Cir. 2013). The Court must follow a four-part framework in deciding the whether evidence should be admitted under Rule 404(b): prior act evidence is inadmissible unless the evidence is (1) offered for a proper non-propensity purpose that is at issue in the case; (2) relevant to that identified purpose; (3) sufficiently probative under Rule 403 such that its probative value is not outweighed by any inherent danger of unfair prejudice; and (4) accompanied by a limiting instruction, if requested. Id. at 441 (citations omitted).
The first step requires the Court to determine "whether the evidence is probative of a material issue other than character." United States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 187 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). To determine whether an "identified purpose is `at issue,' courts should consider the `material issues and facts the government must prove to obtain a conviction.'" Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 276 (quoting United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 888 (3d Cir. 1992)). While "the burden on the government is not onerous," Sampson, 980 F.2d at 887, our court of appeals has "stress[ed] that `a proponent's incantation of the proper uses of [prior act] evidence . . . does not magically transform inadmissible evidence into admissible evidence," Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 276 (quoting United States v. Morley, 199 F.3d 129, 133 (3d Cir. 1999)). Rather, the specific purpose must be "`of consequence in determining the action.'" Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 401(b)).
At the second step of the analysis, the government must "explain how the evidence is relevant" to, or how it tends to establish, the identified non-propensity purpose. Id. "This step is crucial." Id. The government "must clearly articulate how that evidence fits into a chain of logical inferences, no link of which can be the inference that because the defendant committed . . . [such an act] before, he therefore is more likely to have committed this one.'" United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 186 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Sampson, 980 F.2d at 887) (emphasis added). If the government fails "to articulate this chain of inferences," the Court must exclude the proffered evidence. Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 277 (citing Sampson, 980 F.2d at 888).
The Court's task is not over even "once it finds the proponent has shown that the evidence is relevant for a proper, non-propensity purpose." Id. The Court must then proceed to decide, under Rule 403, "whether the evidence is sufficiently probative, such that its probative value is not outweighed by the inherently prejudicial nature of prior bad act evidence." Id. (citing Sampson, 980 F.2d at 889). The Rule 403 balancing takes on special significance when dealing with Rule 404(b) evidence because "`few categories of evidence bring greater risk of prejudice to the accused . . . .'" Id. (quoting Mueller, Federal Evidence § 4:28, at 731). If the Court determines that the evidence survives the Rule 403 balancing test, then it must still provide a limiting instruction to the jury at the time the evidence is admitted if so requested by the defendant. Id.
In his motion in limine, Ruffin contends that the prior act evidence identified by the government is inadmissible under the Rule 404(b) framework. The Court now turns to these issues.
The government seeks to introduce evidence of a May 2010 firearms arrest, a witness tampering incident, straw purchases of firearms by Ruffin, and his previous destruction of firearms. The facts surrounding those incidents, as alleged by the government, are as follows: On May 26, 2010, Ruffin was arrested at his home at 704 East 14
Law enforcement officers then interviewed Ruffin who claimed that the seized firearm belonged to his "Uncle John," later identified as John Jackson. Further, Ruffin told the officers that he took the firearm from Uncle John so that he would not use it in a retaliatory shooting. During the interview, the officers apparently explained the concept of "constructive possession" to Ruffin who admitted that he did in fact constructively possess the firearm, but he denied any knowledge of the ammunition found in the safe even though he provided the combination.
Ruffin was later prosecuted for possessing the firearm, ammunition, and stolen motorcycle parts. While incarcerated in the Allegheny County Jail, Ruffin spoke with Leicia on the jail's telephone which recorded their conversation. In the recordings, Ruffin repeatedly asks Leicia to find Uncle John and convince him to complete a false affidavit disavowing any knowledge between Ruffin and the firearm, which he could then present at his preliminary hearing. Other phone calls reflect that Uncle John completed the affidavit, had it notarized, and provided it to Ruffin's attorney. The recorded phone calls also indicate that Leicia and Ruffin's associates, which included his brother, "stood guard" over Uncle John to ensure that he attended the preliminary hearing in a condition suitable for a court appearance. For some reason, the charges against Ruffin were dropped and the preliminary hearing was never held.
ATF agents later conducted a series of interviews with Uncle John who provided recorded statements in which he admitted that he provided Ruffin with the seized firearm and body armor. Uncle John also admitted to previously "straw purchasing" firearms for Ruffin at his request and to signing the false affidavit. ATF agents then requested that Uncle John retrieve any firearms from Ruffin. Within days, Uncle John recovered from Ruffin a handgun and a rifle that had been cut into several pieces.
Here, the government submits that this evidence is admissible to demonstrate Ruffin's knowledge, lack of mistake, and consciousness of guilt.
(ECF No. 98 at 14). The government makes a comparable argument regarding the alleged witness tampering, straw purchases, and firearms destruction:
(ECF No. 98 at 15) (emphasis added). The Court finds that this evidence is not admissible into evidence at trial under Rule 404(b).
"[T]he Government may introduce Rule 404(b) evidence only if it is offered for a non-propensity purpose that is probative of one of the elements essential for a conviction." United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 278, 292 (3d Cir. 2014). Unlawful possession of a firearm by convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), "requires proof that: `(1) the defendant has been convicted of a crime of imprisonment for a term in excess of one year; (2) the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm; and (3) the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.'" Id. at 291-92 (quoting United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 596 (3d Cir. 2012)). "The government can prove possession of a firearm [or ammunition] for purposes of § 922(g)(1) in two ways: (1) by showing that the defendant exercised direct physical control over the weapon [or ammunition] (actual possession), or (2) by showing that he exercised dominion or control over the area in which the weapon [or ammunition] was found (constructive possession)." Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 278 (citing United States v. Jones, 484 F.3d 783, 788 (5th Cir. 2007)).
In a constructive possession case, such as this one, "[e]vidence of knowledge is critical . . . as a defendant will often deny any knowledge of a thing found in an area that is placed under his control (e.g., a residence, an automobile) or claim that it was placed there by accident or mistake." Brown, 765 F.3d at 292 (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted). But the government must do more than "merely identify a valid non-propensity purpose under Rule 404(b)(2)." Id.
"Crucially, the Government must also show that the evidence is relevant to that purpose" by "clearly articulat[ing] how that evidence fits into a chain of logical inferences, no link of which can be the inference that because the defendant committed [the proffered prior offense], he therefore is more likely to have committed [the charged offense]." Id. at 292-93 (citation omitted and alterations in original). At this step, the government misses the mark.
The government fails to explain how Ruffin's previous arrest for constructive possession of a firearm, attempt to tamper with a witness, use of Uncle John as a straw purchaser and destruction of a rifle tends to prove that he knowingly possessed the firearms found in this case. Rather, the government's position appears to rest on the flawed assumption that Defendant's understanding (or lack thereof) of the law has any relevance to whether he knowingly possessed a firearm and/or ammunition in this case. It does not.
As to the "knowing possession" element, the government must only prove "the defendant's awareness that he possessed the firearm; the government need not demonstrate that the defendant possessed the firearm with an intent to cause harm, or with knowledge that such possession was unlawful." United States v. Dodd, 225 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2000). See also United States v. Davis, 328 F. App'x 138, 143 (3d Cir. 2009) ("Section 922(g) is not a specific intent statute . . . . The government need only prove that [the defendant] knowingly possessed a firearm—that the possession was not an accident or mistake.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Against this backdrop, none of the evidence proffered by the government "would [ ] materially advance the prosecution's case." Brown, 765 F.3d at 291.
Moreover, the evidence fails to shed any light on whether Ruffin knew about the existence of the firearms and ammunition in this case. In the mind of a juror, the evidence would instead offer little more than an improper propensity link between the past and present. As Brown instructs, this Court must ask "How, exactly, does Ruffin's admission to ATF agents that he constructively possessed a firearm in 2010 suggest that he had knowledge of the firearms and ammunition found in his residence on April 22, 2013?" This question remains unanswered by the government to the satisfaction of the Court. As for the witness tampering, straw purchases from Uncle John, and the destruction of the rifle—events also three years removed from this case—the evidence similarly tends only to show Ruffin's propensity to commit firearms-related crimes. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendant's motion in limine as to the May 2010 firearms arrest, the witness tampering incident, straw purchases of firearms from Uncle John, and the destruction of the rifle.
In addition, the government seeks to introduce certified business records from fourteen different businesses reflecting the delivery of a variety of firearms accessories to Ruffin's residence. These purchases include a lower and upper receiver, an AR-15/M16 upper barrel, a Ruger 32-round and 20-round magazine, a red laser sight, a night vision riflescope and a tactical vest. All of these items were sold, billed and/or shipped to "Andre Ruffin" at "704 East 14
Assuming the purported purchase of the firearms accessories by Ruffin constitutes "other acts" evidence under Rule 404(b)—the government persuasively argues that it does not—the Court finds that it is admissible.
The government also seeks to admit evidence that Ruffin obtained firearms through straw purchases made by Uncle John in September 2010, February 2011, and January 2012 and by Hamlin in September 2011 and April 2012. As to Ruffin's prior use of Uncle John as a straw purchaser, the Court finds that this evidence is not admissible.
The government once again relies on a propensity-laced argument in its attempt to articulate a chain of inferences:
(ECF No. 98 at 20). As in Brown, this evidence would instead "require the jury to conclude that because he used a straw purchaser in the past, he must therefore have used a straw purchaser here. This is propensity evidence, plain and simple."
The two straw purchases made by Hamlin will, however, be admissible as intrinsic evidence. The government alleges that Hamlin (who has since pleaded guilty to these offenses) straw purchased for Ruffin the two firearms that he is charged with unlawfully possessing: a Rock River Arms pistol, model LAR-PPS, caliber 5.56, bearing serial number BA003375; and a Spike's Tactical Receiver, Model ST15, bearing serial number SBR-09005. Our court of appeals confronted a nearly identical scenario in United States v. Hynson, holding that "the evidence pertaining to [Defendant's] straw purchasing scheme was not propensity evidence—it was intrinsic evidence of the crimes charged. 451 F. App'x 91, 95 (3d Cir. 2011). The Hynson Court went on to emphasize that "[i]n fact, one of the guns purchased by [Defendant's] former girlfriend was the basis for the illegal possession charge against [him]." Id.
While this evidence could be substantially prejudicial, the Court "ha[s] no discretion to exclude it because it is proof of the ultimate issue in the case." United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 216-18 (3d Cir. 1999) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, the Court will admit at trial Ruffin's use of straw purchases as they relate to Hamlin.
Accordingly, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendant's motion in limine as to the straw purchases.
Further, the government seeks to admit evidence that Hamlin previously observed Ruffin cut into several pieces one of the firearms (the government does not specify which one) that he is charged with unlawfully possessing. As the government alleges, Ruffin destroyed the firearm after Hamlin attempted move out of their house following an argument but welded it back together after they reestablished their relationship. The Court finds that this evidence is admissible.
Unlike the destroyed rifle provided to Uncle John, the government offers this evidence to show that Ruffin knew he possessed (and in fact possessed) a firearm that he is charged with unlawfully possessing. C.f. Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 283 ("`If the prior possession was of a different gun, then its value as direct or circumstantial evidence of the charged possession drops and the likelihood that it is being used to show propensity to possess guns rises considerably.'") (quoting United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2012)). This evidence will corroborate anticipated witness testimony from Hamlin and is intrinsic to the crime charged in the Superseding Indictment. Therefore, the Court will deny Defendant's motion in limine as to the evidence surrounding the destruction of this firearm.
In 2002, Ruffin was arrested for being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm. While the charge was pending, Ruffin was released from custody on bond that his family members and associates had posted. Ruffin was later convicted of the offense, but it was reversed on appeal. The District Attorney's Office then dropped all charges.
During the search of his residence on April 22, 2013, law enforcement officers observed in the front bedroom a pile of papers related to his bond that was issued for the 2002 arrest. Affixed to the first page of the paperwork was a "post-it" note, allegedly bearing Ruffin's handwriting, that states "Conviction for having my gun. But in my wife's name." The government does not seek to admit into evidence the substance of the arrest, conviction and reversal or the nature of the underlying conduct, conceding that such information is unfairly prejudicial.
The government nevertheless contends that the post-it note and bond paperwork are admissible under Rule 404(b) for two reasons. First, the government maintains that the post-it note, "which is essentially an admission to a prior possession of a firearm, is probative of the defendant's knowledge that he can knowingly possess a firearm that is legal registered to (or belonging to) another person." (ECF No. 98 at 26). See also id. ("[T]his `post-it' note demonstrates that previously the defendant was arrested and faced criminal charges for possessing a gun belonging to his wife."). Second, the government argues that "[d]emonstrating that the defendant's important personal paperwork was found within [the front bedroom] demonstrates that he has control over the room and indicates not only his residence but occupation of that specific room." Id.
The Court finds that the evidence of the post-it note is not admissible. Although the government submits that the post-it note will rebut Ruffin's anticipated defense that the firearms belonged only to Hamlin, a jury instruction on joint possession would also take this issue into account without allowing the government to introduce evidence that only tends to show Ruffin's propensity to commit gun crimes. See United States v. Smith, 99 F. App'x 372, 375 (3d Cir. 2004) ("The joint possession instruction took into account the situation where the jury could believe that in fact Ealey was the owner of the gun, as defense counsel argued, but could also believe that Smith had some involvement in possessing it.").
The Court also finds that the evidence regarding the existence of Ruffin's personal paperwork in the front bedroom is admissible. There is relevant evidentiary value in demonstrating that documents relating to Ruffin were located in close proximity to the firearms and ammunition recovered from the safe. Any potential prejudice regarding these documents is limited by the government agreeing not to disclose the substance of the underlying arrest, conviction, and reversal or the nature of the underlying conduct. The Court may also issue a cautionary instruction to the jury if so requested.
Accordingly, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the motion in limine as to the 2002 arrest.
The government currently does not intend to introduce evidence of Ruffin's membership and position of leadership in the Ruff Life Motorcycle Club; prior shootings involving Ruffin; or the ongoing homicide investigation into the murder of Loretta Jackson.
For the reasons hereinabove stated, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendant's motion in limine. An appropriate Order follows.
AND NOW, this 13
Id. Nevertheless, Defendant's knowledge is "at issue" in light of the government's constructive possession theory. C.f. Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 279 ("Because the Government proceeded solely on a theory of actual possession, we hold that Caldwell's knowledge was not at issue in the case.").
