U.S. v. SHEPPARD, 13-278. (2015)
Court: District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
Number: infdco20150616b54
Visitors: 8
Filed: Jun. 15, 2015
Latest Update: Jun. 15, 2015
Summary: ORDER CATHY BISSOON , District Judge . The government's Motion ( Doc. 52 ) for the Court to make findings regarding the Speedy Trial Act is GRANTED . Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(7), the period of delay from April 25, 2015, until November 16, 2015, is excludable for the purposes of computing the time within which trial must commence. The Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting this continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and Defendant to a speedy trial. Aft
Summary: ORDER CATHY BISSOON , District Judge . The government's Motion ( Doc. 52 ) for the Court to make findings regarding the Speedy Trial Act is GRANTED . Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(7), the period of delay from April 25, 2015, until November 16, 2015, is excludable for the purposes of computing the time within which trial must commence. The Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting this continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and Defendant to a speedy trial. Afte..
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ORDER
CATHY BISSOON, District Judge.
The government's Motion (Doc. 52) for the Court to make findings regarding the Speedy Trial Act is GRANTED. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7), the period of delay from April 25, 2015, until November 16, 2015, is excludable for the purposes of computing the time within which trial must commence. The Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting this continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and Defendant to a speedy trial. After carefully weighing all of the relevant factors, the Court concludes that the ends of justice require allowing Defendant and his counsel a full and fair opportunity to prepare for trial in this complex matter, and to prevent the potential miscarriage of justice that could result from the inability to adequately prepare. The delay independently is excusable under § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv), based on Defendant's repeated Motions to withdraw the representation of his current counsel, because the failure to grant a continuance would deny Defendant a reasonable time to obtain counsel and/or would threaten his continuity of counsel.
For these reasons, and for all of the other reasons stated in the government's Motion, the period of time between April 25, 2015 until November 16, 2015 is excludable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Source: Leagle
