OPINION

CONTI, Chief District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Myrna Cohen ("Cohen") appeals from the bankruptcy court's May 19, 2015 memorandum opinion and order denying her motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) ("Rule 60(b)").1 (ECF Nos. 57, 58.)2 The bankruptcy court's May 19, 2015 order denied Cohen relief from an order granting the discharge of a debtor Jeffery Abramowitz ("Abramowitz") that extinguished the personal liability of Abramowitz with respect to, among other things, a civil judgment and legal malpractice claim against him, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727. (ECF Nos. 57, 58.)

Having been fully briefed, this bankruptcy appeal is ripe for disposition. Because the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cohen's Bankruptcy Rule 9024 motion, the court will affirm the bankruptcy court's May 19, 2015 order.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Abramowitz's bankruptcy petition

On July 31, 2014, Abramowitz voluntarily filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the bankruptcy court. (ECF No. 1.) In "Schedule F" of his petition, Abramowitz listed Cohen as an unsecured creditor with respect to a $64,530.00 "[p]ersonal loan" to him. (Id. at 18.) In the "Statement of Financial Affairs" section of his petition, Abramowitz listed, without detail, a judgment entered against him in favor of Cohen in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania. (Id. at 28.) In his petition, Abramowitz did not list any pending lawsuit filed against him by Cohen.

B. Deadline to object to the debtor's discharge or to challenge the dischargeability of certain of the debtor's debts

On August 1, 2014, the bankruptcy court entered an order captioned: "Notice of Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Case, Meeting of Creditors, [and] Deadlines." (ECF No. 10.) This order established November 7, 2014 as the "[d]eadline to [o]bject to [Abramowitz's] [d]ischarge or to [c]hallenge [d]ischargeability of [c]ertain [d]ebts" (the "Objection Deadline"). (Id.) Specifically, the order provided, in relevant part, that

(Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).)

On September 9, 2014, the meeting of creditors was held. (ECF No. 13.) Due to a change of address, Cohen did not receive notice of Abramowitz's July 31, 2014 bankruptcy petition until October 3, 2014. Consequently, Cohen did not attend or participate in the September 9, 2014 meeting of creditors.

C. Cohen's pre-complaint motions

For clarity's sake, the court describes Cohen's two pre-complaint motions in turn, though they were filed by Cohen and decided by the bankruptcy court within the same time frame.

1. Cohen's November 6, 2014 Automatic Stay Motion

On November 6, 2014 — one day before the Objection Deadline — Cohen filed a motion in the bankruptcy court captioned: "Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay" (the "Automatic Stay Motion"). (ECF No. 17.) In the Automatic Stay Motion, Cohen argued for relief from the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) and Bankruptcy Rule 4001, on grounds that:

On November 7, 2014 — i.e., the Objection Deadline — the bankruptcy court entered a text order requiring Cohen to take corrective action with respect to her Automatic Stay Motion by November 17, 2014. (ECF No. 19.) In relevant part, the text order provided that

(Id.)

Cohen did not refile or self-schedule her Automatic Stay Motion by November 17, 2014, as ordered. On November 18, 2014, the bankruptcy court denied Cohen's Automatic Stay Motion without prejudice because Cohen "fail[ed] to revise [it] in accordance with" the November 7, 2014 text order. (ECF No. 25.)

On January 12, 2015 — nearly two months after the bankruptcy court denied Cohen's first Automatic Stay Motion on November 18, 2014 — Cohen refiled a second identical Automatic Stay Motion. (ECF No. 33.) On January 13, 2014, the bankruptcy court again entered a text order requiring Cohen to take corrective action, as Cohen failed to self-schedule her second Automatic Stay Motion and file it as a text-searchable PDF document. (ECF Nos. 36, 37.) The text order granted Cohen until January 21, 2015 to refile the motion in compliance with local rules. (ECF No. 37.)

Once again, Cohen did not refile or self-schedule her Automatic Stay Motion by January 21, 2015, as ordered. On January 22, 2015, the bankruptcy court denied Cohen's second Automatic Stay Motion without prejudice, as Cohen "fail[ed] to revise [it] in accordance with" the January 13, 2015 text order. (ECF No. 39.)

Cohen did not attempt to refile her Automatic Stay Motion after the bankruptcy court denied it without prejudice for a second time on January 22, 2015. Both iterations of Cohen's Automatic Stay Motion contained allegations relating solely to the 8424 Action against Abramowitz; the motion did not contain allegations about any judgment against Abramowitz in favor of Cohen.

2. Cohen's November 7, 2014 Extension Motion

On November 7, 2014 — i.e., the Objection Deadline and one day after Cohen filed her first Automatic Stay Motion — Cohen filed a motion in the bankruptcy court captioned: "Motion for Extension of Time to File a Complaint Objecting to Discharge Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 4004(b) and Motion to Reconvene Meeting of Creditors" (the "Extension Motion"). (ECF No. 21 (emphasis added).) In her Extension Motion, Cohen argued that cause existed "pursuant to [Bankruptcy] Rule 4004(b)" for a thirty-day extension "within which [to] file a complaint objecting to [Abramowitz's] discharge," on grounds that:

Cohen's Extension Motion contained allegations relating solely to the 13418 Judgment against Abramowitz; the motion did not contain allegations about the 8424 Action against Abramowitz. Cohen's Extension Motion solely discussed her request to file a complaint "objecting to [Abramowitz's] discharge" in general; the motion did not request an extension to file a complaint challenging the dischargeability of certain of Abramowitz's debts.

On November 25, 2014, the bankruptcy court held a hearing concerning Cohen's Extension Motion. (ECF No. 27.) Finding cause, the bankruptcy court granted Cohen's Extension Motion pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 4004(b), providing Cohen until December 25, 2014 (i.e., thirty days) to "file a [c]omplaint [o]bjecting to [Abramowitz's] [d]ischarge." (ECF Nos. 27, 28 (emphasis added).) The bankruptcy court, however, denied Cohen's request to reconvene the meeting of creditors. (Id.) In granting Cohen's Extension Motion, the bankruptcy court did not address or rule upon Cohen's right to file a complaint challenging the dischargeability of certain of Abramowitz's debts under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 4007.

D. Cohen's Complaint

After the bankruptcy court granted Cohen's Extension Motion to object to discharge pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 4004(b), Cohen attempted to file a complaint against Abramowitz.

On December 24, 2014, Cohen filed a document in the bankruptcy court captioned: "Complaint Objecting to [Abramowitz's] Discharge and/or to Challenge Dischargeability of Certain Debts" (the "Complaint"). (ECF No. 30 (emphasis added).) In the Complaint, Cohen contended Abramowitz obtained loans from her through false pretenses and representations, culminating in litigation and the 13418 Judgment against Abramowitz. (Id.) Because of Abramowitz's alleged false dealings, Cohen in the Complaint requested that the bankruptcy court:

(Id. at 6 (emphasis added).)

On December 29, 2014, the bankruptcy court entered a corrective entry ordering that Cohen's first Complaint "BE REFILED, BY ATTORNEY, AS AN ADVERSARY PROCEEDING," in accordance with the Bankruptcy Rules.7 (ECF Nos. 30, 32.)

In response to the bankruptcy court's December 29, 2014 corrective entry, plaintiff filed a second document on January 12, 2015 captioned: "Complaint Objecting to [Abramowitz's] Discharge and/or to Challenge Dischargeability of Certain Debts." (ECF No. 35 (emphasis added).) Cohen's second Complaint was identical in all respects to her first Complaint.

On January 13, 2015, the bankruptcy court entered a corrective entry concerning Cohen's second Complaint stating: "INCORRECT DOCKET EVENT USED. ENTRY MUST BE REFILED, BY ATTORNEY. THIS ENTRY MUST BE FILED UNDER THE ADVERSARY DOCKET EVENT." (ECF No. 38.)

After the bankruptcy court entered its January 13, 2015 corrective order, Cohen did not attempt to refile her Complaint. Both iterations of Cohen's Complaint contained identical allegations relating solely to the 13418 Judgment; neither Complaint contained allegations about the 8424 Action against Abramowitz. Cohen's Complaint was the first filing in which she challenged the "dischargeability" of certain of Abramowitz's debts under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). As stated previously, Cohen's Extension Motion to file a complaint after the Objection Deadline discussed only her "objection to discharge" in general, citing Bankruptcy Rule 4004(b).

E. The bankruptcy court's Discharge Order

By February 19, 2015 — i.e., more than one month after the bankruptcy court rejected Cohen's second Complaint on January 13, 2015 — Cohen had yet to comply with: (1) the bankruptcy court's January 13, 2015 order that she refile her Complaint by way of an adversary proceeding; and (2) the bankruptcy court's January 22, 2015 order that she refile and self-schedule her Automatic Stay Motion. "[W]ithout a properly filed complaint objecting to [Abramowitz's] discharge" or a properly-filed Automatic Stay Motion, the bankruptcy court entered an order on February 19, 2015 granting Abramowitz discharge in full pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727 (the "Discharge Order"). (ECF No. 40.) The Discharge Order encompassed the 13418 Judgment and 8424 Action against Abramowitz.

F. Cohen's Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion

On March 5, 2015, Cohen filed a motion for relief from the bankruptcy court's Discharge Order pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9024 and Rule 60 (the "Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion"). (ECF No. 42.) On March 6, 2015, the bankruptcy court entered a text order requiring Cohen to take corrective action related to her Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion:

(ECF No. 43.)

On March 6, 2015, Cohen corrected and refiled her Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion. (ECF No. 44.) In her Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion, Cohen requested that the court:

(Id. ¶ 2.)

In her Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion, Cohen contended that Abramowitz consented to lifting the automatic stay to permit the continuation of the 8424 Action provided he would not be "personally liable for any resulting damages," which would be limited to proceeds available "from [Abramowitz's] malpractice insurance provider." (Id. ¶ 6.) In support of her consent argument, Cohen attached to her Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion an email dated November 12, 2014 — i.e., five days after Cohen filed her Extension Motion and more than three months before the Discharge Order — in which Abramowitz's bankruptcy counsel8 stated to Cohen's counsel:

(ECF No. 44-1 (emphasis added).)

The bankruptcy court scheduled a hearing for March 31, 2015 on Cohen's Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion. (ECF No. 45.)

On March 24, 2015, Abramowitz filed a response to Cohen's Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion. (ECF No. 48.) In his response, Abramowitz stated, in relevant part, that he "w[ould] consent to the relief requested [in Cohen's Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion] as long as ... recovery [is] limited to the applicable insurance coverage." (Id.)

The bankruptcy court found the "intent of" Abramowitz's response to Cohen's Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion "unclear" and "sought clarification" from the parties at the March 31, 2015 hearing. (ECF No. 51.) After the hearing, the bankruptcy court issued an order dated April 8, 2015, concluding that Abramowitz's "consent" to Cohen's Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion "[was] lacking" because the

(Id. ¶¶ 7, 8.) With respect to any private agreement between Cohen and Abramowitz about the continuation of the 8424 Action, the bankruptcy court stated that

(Id. at 4 n.3 (emphasis added).)

On April 8, 2015, Abramowitz submitted a supplemental response toCohen's Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion, stating that

(ECF No. 52 (emphasis added).)

In response to the bankruptcy court's April 8, 2015 order, the parties filed additional briefing related to Cohen's Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion. (ECF Nos. 53, 54, 55, 56.) After the bankruptcy court's April 8, 2015 order, the parties did not file a consent motion or other confirmation evidencing a private agreement that the 8424 Action continue after the Discharge Order.

G. The bankruptcy court's May 19, 2015 order and Cohen's appeal

On May 19, 2015, the bankruptcy court issued a memorandum opinion and order denying Cohen's Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion for relief from the Discharge Order. (ECF Nos. 57, 58.) In its memorandum opinion, the bankruptcy court concluded that

On June 2, 2015, Cohen filed a notice of appeal with respect to the bankruptcy court's May 19, 2015 order denying her Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion. (15-751, ECF No. 59.) On June 8, 2015, this court received and docketed Cohen's notice of appeal. (Civ. No. 15-751, ECF No. 1.) On August 30, 2015, Cohen filed a brief supporting her appeal. (Civ. No. 15-751, ECF No. 6.) On November 11, 2015, Abramowitz filed a brief opposing Cohen's appeal. (Civ. No. 15-751, ECF No. 7.) On December 4, 2015, Cohen filed a reply to Abramowitz's brief in opposition. (Civ. No. 15-751, ECF No. 10.)

III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Jurisdiction

This court has jurisdiction over this bankruptcy matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).

B. Standard of review on appeal

Cohen appeals from the bankruptcy court's May 19, 2015 denial of her Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion. Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9024, the bankruptcy court may, in its discretion, relieve a party from a "final order" under the particular circumstances enumerated in Rule 60(b). FED. R. BANKR. P. 9024 ("Rule 60 ... applies in cases under the [Bankruptcy Code]...."); see In re Scheib, 620 Fed. Appx. 77, 78 (3d Cir.2015).

Relief under Bankruptcy Rule 9024 and Rule 60(b) is an "extraordinary remedy," and a bankruptcy court's grant or denial of a Bankruptcy Rule 9024 motion "may be reviewed [on appeal] only for an abuse of discretion."9 COLLIER ¶ 9024.05 (citing decisions).

In re Jersey Integrated Health-Practice, Inc., No. 07-3795, 2008 WL 305739, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2008) (citing Barnes Found. v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 242 F.3d 151, 167 (3d Cir.2001)). In sum, "[a]n abuse of discretion may occur as a result of an errant conclusion of law, an improper application of law to fact, or a clearly erroneous finding of fact." McDowell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 423 F.3d 233, 238 (3d Cir. 2005).

C. Rule 60(b)(6) standard

Rule 60(b) — which applies to bankruptcy proceedings under Bankruptcy Rule 9024 — provides, in relevant part:

In the bankruptcy court, Cohen premised her Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion on Rule 60(b)(6). (ECF No. 53 at 10-11.) "Rule 60(b)(6) is a catch-all provision that authorizes [the bankruptcy] court to grant relief from a final [order] for `any ... reason' other than those listed elsewhere in [Rule 60(b)(1)-(5)]." Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 120 (3d Cir.2014) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6)).

In general, Rule 60(b)(6) "provides `a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular case.'" Id. at 122 (quoting Hall v. Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., 772 F.2d 42, 46 (3d Cir.1985)). The bankruptcy court is, however, to "dispense [its] broad powers under [Rule] 60(b)(6) only in `extraordinary circumstances where, without such relief, an extreme and unexpected hardship would occur.'" See id. at 120 (quoting Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 140 (3d Cir.1993)) (emphasis added). "This `hardship' requirement may sometimes be satisfied when the judgment `precluded an adjudication on the merits.'" Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 255 (3d Cir.2008) (quoting Boughner v. Sec'y of Health, Ed. & Welfare, 572 F.2d 976, 976 (3d Cir.1978)).

"[E]xtraordinary circumstances," however, "rarely exist when a party seeks relief [under Rule 60(b)(6)] from a judgment that resulted from the party's deliberate choices." Id. (quoting Coltec Indus., Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262, 273 (3d Cir.2002) ("[C]ourts have not looked favorably on the entreaties of parties trying to escape the consequences of their own counseled and knowledgeable decisions." (internal quotation marks omitted))). "`[N]either ignorance nor carelessness by a party or his attorney is a proper basis for [Rule 60(b)(6)] relief....'" See In re Slomnicki, 243 B.R. 644, 655 (Bankr. W.D.Pa.2000) (quoting Smith v. Widman Trucking & Excavating, Inc., 627 F.2d 792, 795-96 (7th Cir.1980)); accord Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1017 (9th Cir.1998) ("[A Rule 60(b)(6) movant must show] both injury and that circumstances beyond its control prevented timely action to protect its interests[;] [n]eglect or lack of diligence is not to be remedied through Rule 60(b)(6).").

Under all circumstances, the "movant... bears the burden of establishing entitlement to [Rule 60(b)(6)] equitable relief...." Cox, 757 F.3d at 122.

IV. DISCUSSION

The record in this case demonstrates that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cohen's Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion for relief from the Discharge Order. The court will affirm the bankruptcy court's May 19, 2015 order on three grounds:

The court explains these three grounds in detail below.

A. Abramowitz's consent to Cohen's request to proceed with the Complaint seeking to impose personal liability upon him

In its May 19, 2015 memorandum opinion, the bankruptcy court concluded that Abramowitz did not consent to Cohen's request in her Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion to proceed with her Complaint against Abramowitz challenging the dischargeability of the 13418 Judgment and objecting to Abramowitz's discharge in general. (ECF No. 57 at 4 ("There is no indication that [Abramowitz] consented to [Cohen's] request to proceed with the Complaint after the [Objection Deadline] passed and after the Discharge Order was entered.").) The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in reaching this conclusion.

The record demonstrates that Abramowitz did not consent, at any time, to any request by Cohen that would result in the imposition of personal liability upon him. The filings in which Abramowitz discussed his alleged consent make clear that he would agree to Cohen's requests for relief only if he was assured he would be liable solely through his malpractice insurance proceeds.10 Nothing in the record shows that Abramowitz received such assurance from Cohen. In seeking to proceed with her Complaint challenging the dischargeability of the 13418 Judgment and discharge in general, Cohen inherently sought to hold Abramowitz personally liable for that judgment, in violation of Abramowitz's stated condition of consent that he be liable solely through his insurance proceeds. Cf. Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 85 n. 5, 111 S.Ct. 2150, 115 L.Ed.2d 66 (1991) ("A bankruptcy discharge extinguishes `the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt.'" (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1) (emphasis removed))). Cohen did not demonstrate — or attempt to demonstrate — to the bankruptcy court or to this court that Abramowitz's insurance coverage extends to the 13418 Judgment against him.

In light of Abramowitz's repeated conditional statements that he would consent to Cohen's requests for relief only if assured he would not be personally liable, Cohen's contention that Abramowitz consented to allowing her Complaint to proceed against him — either before or after the Discharge Order — is unreasonable. The bankruptcy court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Abramowitz did not consent to Cohen's request in her Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion that her Complaint proceed against Abramowitz challenging the dischargeability of the 13418 Judgment and discharge in general. See In re Jersey Integrated, 2008 WL 305739, at *4 (a bankruptcy court abuses its discretion only if it acted in an "arbitrary, fanciful[,] or unreasonable manner" (citing Barnes Found., 242 F.3d at 167)).

B. Abramowitz's consent to Cohen's request to permit the continuation of the 8424 Action against him

Cohen contends the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in concluding that Abramowitz did not consent to lifting the automatic stay to permit the continuation of the 8424 Action seeking recovery from Abramowitz's insurance proceeds. In other words, Cohen contends Abramowitz consented to the relief she requested in her Automatic Stay Motion.

Specifically, Cohen argues Abramowitz consented to allowing the 8424 Action to continue against him on two occasions, before and after the Discharge Order. First, Cohen claims Abramowitz consented in the November 12, 2014 email between counsel, in which Abramowitz's then-attorney stated that

(ECF No. 44-1 (November 12, 2014 email attached to Cohen's Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion).) Second, Cohen claims Abramowitz consented in his first response to Cohen's Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion, in which Abramowitz stated he "w[ould] consent to the relief requested as long as ... recovery [is] limited to the applicable insurance coverage." (ECF No. 48.)

The record in this case demonstrates that:

The court explains its reasoning below.

1. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Abramowitz did not consent to the continuation of 8424 Action.

The bankruptcy court's reluctance to conclude that the parties agreed to the continuation of the 8424 Action was reasonable under the circumstances. In ruling on Cohen's Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion, the bankruptcy court: (1) reviewed the November 12, 2014 email attached to Cohen's motion; (2) reviewed Abramowitz's first response in opposition to the motion; and (3) held a hearing on March 31, 2015 to clarify the nature of Abramowitz's purported consent. Still not satisfied that the parties agreed to the continuation of the 8424 Action after the hearing, the bankruptcy court cautiously concluded on April 8, 2015 that

(ECF No. 51 at 4 n.3 (post-hearing April 8, 2015 order) (emphasis added).)

Between April 8, 2015 and May 19, 201511 — i.e., over the course of nearly six weeks — the parties did not file a consent motion or other confirmation evidencing a private agreement to permit the 8424 Action to proceed against Abramowitz in any manner. Without confirmation of such an agreement after nearly six weeks — and in light of Abramowitz's supplemental response attempting to retract his alleged consent to any of Cohen's requests for relief — the bankruptcy court reasonably concluded that the parties did not agree to permit the continuation of the 8424 Action against Abramowitz. (ECF No. 57 at 4 ("[C]onsent is lacking[.]").)

Under these circumstances — and because Cohen fails to point to action by the bankruptcy court in the record demonstrating otherwise — the court cannot conclude that the bankruptcy court "act[ed] in an arbitrary, fanciful[,] or unreasonable manner" in concluding that Abramowitz did not consent to the continuation of the 8424 Action, as required to show an abuse of discretion. In re Jersey Integrated, 2008 WL 305739, at *4 (citing Barnes Found., 242 F.3d at 167).

2. Even if Abramowitz consented to the continuation of 8424 Action, Cohen failed to file a timely, procedurally-proper motion requesting such relief.

Even if Abramowitz agreed, off the record and before the Discharge Order, to lift the automatic stay to permit the continuation of the 8424 Action against Abramowitz's insurance proceeds, Cohen failed to file a procedurally-proper motion requesting that relief and evidencing an agreement.

As stated, the only pre-Discharge-Order filing in which Cohen referenced the 8424 Action — i.e., the Automatic Stay Motion — was denied twice without prejudice because Cohen failed to adhere to local rules requiring her to self-schedule her motion and file it as a text-searchable PDF document. Because Cohen did not refile a proper Automatic Stay Motion after the bankruptcy court rejected it twice, Abramowitz was not required to — and did not — respond to Cohen's request that the bankruptcy court lift the automatic stay over the 8424 Action. Without Abramowitz's response to a properly-filed Automatic Stay Motion, the motion was not yet ripe for disposition when the bankruptcy court entered the Discharge Order. Under those circumstances, the bankruptcy court reasonably concluded that

(ECF No. 57 at 10 n.10.)

Given Cohen's failure to refile a proper Automatic Stay Motion on two occasions, the court cannot conclude that the bankruptcy "act[ed] in an arbitrary, fanciful[,] or unreasonable manner" in declining to consider that motion, as required to show an abuse of discretion. In re Jersey Integrated, 2008 WL 305739, at *4 (citing Barnes Found., 242 F.3d at 167).

Cohen's argument on appeal that the bankruptcy court elevated technical considerations over substantive justice in declining twice to hear her Automatic Stay Motion based upon her violation of local bankruptcy rules is without merit.

Local rules "`play a vital role in the ... courts' efforts to manage themselves and their dockets.'" Knoll v. City of Allentown, 707 F.3d 406, 411 (3d Cir.2013) (quoting Smith v. Oelenschlager, 845 F.2d 1182, 1184 (3d Cir.1988)). Local rules "`facilitate the implementation of court policy, both by setting norms and putting the local bar on notice of their existence,"" and they "`serve to impose uniformity on practice within a district.'" Id. (quoting Oelenschlager, 845 F.2d at 1184). Especially relevant here, local rules "facilitate the court's acquisition of the materials necessary for the efficient processing of the matters on its docket." Hewlett v. Davis, 844 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir.1988). In sum, the local rules that Cohen violated are important and binding, and the bankruptcy court had authority "to provide for the ultimate sanction of dismiss[ing]" her Automatic Stay Motion for "noncompliance" with them. Id. (citing Oelenschlager, 845 F.2d 1182).

Cohen does not challenge the validity of the local bankruptcy rules in issue on appeal. Those rules are, in any event, facially required, not permissive. See W. PA. LBR 5005-13(a), (d) ("All documents filed through the CM/ECF System shall be [fully-text searchable PDF documents]...." (emphasis added)). While the bankruptcy court had power to "modify the applicability of any [local rule]" to "accomplish substantial justice" — see W. PA. LBR 1001-2 — Cohen failed to argue for a modification in the bankruptcy court and cannot argue for one now, in the first instance, on appeal. See, e.g., In re Natale, 280 Fed.Appx. 227, 231 (3d Cir.2008) (arguments not raised in the bankruptcy court are waived on appeal). Consequently, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in applying facially-required local rules to reject, without prejudice, Cohen's Automatic Stay Motion twice, especially in the absence of any timely objection to those dismissals by Cohen. See In re Jersey Integrated, 2008 WL 305739, at *4 (a bankruptcy court abuses its discretion where "it uses improper legal standards, criteria[,] or procedures" (citing Barnes Found., 242 F.3d at 167) (emphasis added)).

Even if Cohen would have challenged the applicability of the local rules in the bankruptcy court, relief under Rule 60(b)(6) would not have been appropriate in this case. The record shows that Cohen's own "ignorance" of the local rules and "carelessness" resulted in dismissal of her Automatic Stay Motion, twice. A party's "`ignorance'" or "`carelessness ... is [not] a proper basis for [Rule 60(b)(6)] relief.'" Slomnicki, 243 B.R. at 655 (quoting Smith, 627 F.2d at 795-96). Cohen was capable of filing text-searchable PDF documents on the bankruptcy court's docket. Following the bankruptcy court's November 7, 2014 corrective entry instructing Cohen to refile her first Automatic Stay Motion, Cohen electronically filed several text-searchable PDF documents on the docket — yet she failed to do so in filing her second Automatic Stay Motion. Compare (ECF Nos. 30, 31, 42, 44, 53 (text-searchable PDFs)), with (ECF No. 33 (Cohen's second, non-searchable-PDF Automatic Stay Motion).) In both corrective entries ordering Cohen to refile her Automatic Stay Motion — dated November 7, 2014 and January 13, 2015 — the bankruptcy court warned Cohen conspicuously that it would dismiss her motion without prejudice if she failed to refile it in the proper format by two dates certain. See (ECF Nos. 19, 37 (both corrective orders granting Cohen more than one week to refile).) Cohen, however, failed to comply with the orders twice, notwithstanding that she had ample time (i.e., more than two months) and ample opportunity (i.e., both dismissals were without prejudice) to refile and self-schedule her motion in accordance with the local rules. See (ECF Nos. 25, 39.) In light of Cohen's own conduct, the bankruptcy acted reasonably in declining to consider, under Bankruptcy Rule 9024, Cohen's Automatic Stay Motion — i.e., the only pre-Discharge-Order filing in which she referenced the 8424 Action against Abramowitz.

In summary: (1) the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Abramowitz did not consent to allowing the continuation of the 8424 Action against him; and (2) even if Abramowitz did consent, Cohen failed to file a procedurally-proper motion in the bankruptcy court requesting that relief and evidencing an agreement with Abramowitz.

In the absence of Abramowitz's consent to the relief requested in Cohen's Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion, the bankruptcy court properly moved on to consider the merits of the motion. (ECF No. 57 at 4 ("As consent is lacking, [the bankruptcy court] considers whether [Cohen's Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion] should be granted.").)

C. Whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in denying Cohen relief from the Discharge Order

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cohen's Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion because the bankruptcy court reasonably concluded that Cohen failed to show extraordinary circumstances warranting relief from the Discharge Order under Rule 60(b)(6).

The court explains its reasoning in detail below. First, however, the court — as background for the analysis — will discuss the critical distinction between a creditor's objection to a debtor's discharge in general and a creditor's challenge to the dischargeability of certain debts of the debtor.

1. Objecting to discharge versus challenging dischargeability

The discharge of claims in bankruptcy "is of singular importance to the individual [debtor] in a chapter 7 [proceeding]" because it "enables the debtor to begin a new financial life" and "provides the debtor with a fresh start." COLLIER ¶ 1.02(1). In general, a discharge order "voids judgments pertaining to discharged debts" and "operates as an injunction against any act," including a lawsuit, "to collect a discharged debt" of the individual debtor. Id. ¶ 727.01(2) (citing 11 U.S.C § 524(a)). In sum, the "effect of the discharge is to relieve the [individual] debtor of all personal liability for discharged debts and to effectuate the debtor's `fresh start.'" Id.

Discharge, however, does not always and automatically result in "complete forgiveness" for individual debtors. See RICHARD I. AARON, BANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 517 (2015). Relevant to this case, the Bankruptcy Code provides methods: (1) to object to the debtor's discharge in its entirety; or (2) to seek to have excepted from the discharge order — i.e., to challenge the "dischargeability" of — certain debts of the debtor.

Under the first method, creditors seeking to object to an individual debtor's discharge in its entirety must file a timely complaint by way of an adversary proceeding, raising one or more of the twelve grounds enumerated in 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(1)-(12). See COLLIER ¶¶ 727(1)-(4) ("Other grounds may not be added to the list [in § 727(a).]"). If the creditor proves by a preponderance of the evidence at least one of the grounds set forth in §§ 727(a)(1)-(12), the bankruptcy court must deny the debtor's discharge, and "all claims against the debtor, regardless of their nature, will survive the bankruptcy...." In re Billings, 146 B.R. 431, 433 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1992) (emphasis in original); see COLLIER ¶¶ 727(1)-(4).

Bankruptcy Rule 4004 expressly governs the process by which a creditor must "object[] to [a] debtor's discharge" in its entirety. In relevant part, that rule provides that in a chapter 7 case, "a complaint ... objecting to the debtor's discharge shall be filed no later than [sixty] days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors...." FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a). "On motion of any party in interest" and "after notice and hearing," the bankruptcy court "may for cause extend the time to object to discharge." FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(B). "[O]n expiration of the times fixed for objecting to discharge," however, the bankruptcy court "shall forthwith grant the [debtor's] discharge...." FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(c) (emphasis added). Critically, the bankruptcy court "may enlarge the time for taking action under [Bankruptcy Rule] ... 4004(a) ... only to the extent and under the conditions stated in [that] rule...." FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(3).

Under the second method — in contrast — a creditor who does not object to the debtor's general discharge may seek to except from the discharge order — i.e., challenge the "dischargeability" of — a particular debt of the debtor. See COLLIER ¶ 4007.01 ("[Challenging the dischargeability of a debt] presupposes that a discharge will be entered and concerns which debts will be encompassed in that discharge."). To do so, the creditor must file a complaint by way of an adversary proceeding alleging that the particular debt in issue is disqualified from discharge because it falls within one or more of the specific categories set forth in 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(1)-(19). See id. ¶¶ 523.01, 523.02(1), 523.04, 727.15. If the creditor proves that the debt in issue falls within a category listed in §§ 523(a)(1)-(19), that particular debt is excluded from the discharge order, generally continuing the debtor's personal liability for it.

Bankruptcy Rule 4007 expressly governs the process by which a creditor must challenge the "dischargeability of any debt." In relevant part, that rule provides that in a chapter 7 case

FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c). As with Bankruptcy Rule 4004(a), the bankruptcy court "may enlarge the time for taking action under [Bankruptcy Rule] ... 4007(c)... only to the extent and under the conditions stated in [that] rule...." FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(3).

It is well established that

See In re Pocius, 499 B.R. 472, 474 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2013); In re Billings, 146 B.R. at 433-35 (discussing in detail the distinctions between the two proceedings and concluding that "discharge under § 727 and dischargeability under § 523 refer to distinct concepts and cannot be used interchangeably" because they are "based on separate policies and are governed by distinct procedural rules").13

2. Cohen failed to show extraordinary circumstances warranting relief from the Discharge Order.

In this case, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Cohen failed to show extraordinary circumstances warranting relief from the Discharge Order, as required under Bankruptcy Rule 9024 and Rule 60(b)(6).14 The record in this case demonstrates that in seeking to object to discharge and to challenge the dischargeability of the 13418 Judgment, Cohen repeatedly engaged in dilatory conduct and failed to comply with the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Rules, local bankruptcy rules, and the bankruptcy court's orders. As stated previously, consequences caused by Cohen's own "`ignorance [and] carelessness'" do not justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6). In re Slomnicki, 243 B.R. at 655 (quoting Smith, 627 F.2d at 795-96).

The bankruptcy court issued an order on August 1, 2014 establishing November 7, 2014 as the original deadline (i.e., the Objection Deadline) for Abramowitz's creditors to file a complaint either:

(ECF No. 10 (emphasis in original).) The order was conspicuously captioned: "Deadline to Object to [Abramowitz's] Discharge or to Challenge Dischargeability of Certain Debts." (Id. (emphasis added).) The order explicitly distinguished between objections to discharge under "§ 727(a)" and challenges to dischargeability under "§ 523(a)." See (id.)

Cohen did not receive notice of Abramowitz's July 31, 2014 petition until October 3, 2014. But receiving notice on that date still gave Cohen more than one month until the Objection Deadline to decide whether she would seek an extension:

Additionally, Cohen had the option to seek an extension under both Bankruptcy Rules 4004(b) and 4007(c), to fully preserve her rights. See, e.g., In re Billings, 146 B.R. at 435 ("[A] creditor can move to extend the discharge date in accordance with [Bankruptcy Rule] 4004, or ... 4007, or both....").

When the Objection Deadline arrived, however, Abramowitz elected to file her Extension Motion expressly seeking additional time to file a complaint "objecting to [Abramowitz's] discharge pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 4004(b)." See (ECF Nos. 21, 21-1 (explicitly requesting an extension under Bankruptcy Rule 4004(b) to file a complaint objecting to discharge ten times) (emphasis added).) Cohen's Extension Motion described, in general terms, the existence and nature of the 13418 Judgment against Abramowitz. The Extension Motion made no mention of the 8424 Action against Abramowitz.15 The Extension Motion did not discuss any challenge to the "dischargeability" of the 13418 Judgment or any category for its potential disqualification from discharge under §§ 523(a)(1)-(23), e.g., false dealings under § 523(a)(2). The Extension Motion did not request or reference an extension under Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c) to file a complaint challenging the dischargeability of any of Abramowitz's debts. In sum, Cohen's Extension Motion could not have reasonably placed either Abramowitz or the bankruptcy court on notice that Cohen sought an extension to file a complaint challenging both Abramowitz's discharge in general and the dischargeability of the 13418 Judgment. Cf. In re Weinstein, 234 B.R. 862, 863-66 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1999) (finding that a creditor's extension motion mistakenly listing Bankruptcy Rule 4004(b) and referencing discharge in general put the debtor on notice that the creditor actually sought an extension under Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c) to challenge the dischargeability of a debt because the motion repeatedly and explicitly referenced specific fraud-related non-dischargeability categories in §§ 523(a)(2) and (a)(4)16).

Cohen had time and the opportunity to clarify her intent to the bankruptcy court and correct her error. Yet she did not do so. On November 25, 2014, the bankruptcy court held a hearing specifically on Cohen's Extension Motion. Cohen, however, failed to inform Abramowitz or the bankruptcy court at the hearing that she intended to file a complaint challenging the dischargeability of the 13418 Judgment under § 523(a). Consequently, the bankruptcy court — finding cause for an extension under Bankruptcy Rule 4004(b) — granted Cohen until December 25, 2014 to "file a complaint Objecting to [Abramowitz's] Discharge." (ECF No. 28 (emphasis added).)

Notwithstanding that the bankruptcy court granted Cohen an extension only to file a complaint objecting to discharge, Cohen filed her Complaint on December 24, 2015 "Objecting to [Abramowitz's] Discharge and/or ... Challeng [ing] Dischargeability of Certain Debts" of Abramowitz. See (ECF No. 30 (emphasis added).) The bankruptcy court reasonably concluded that Cohen's first Complaint was deficient for several reasons.

First, Cohen failed to file the first Complaint by way of an adversary proceeding, as required under the Bankruptcy Rules.17 The bankruptcy court properly rejected it for this reason. As a result, Abramowitz was not required to — and did not — respond to the first Complaint.

Second, even if the bankruptcy court would have accepted the first Complaint, the Complaint sought — for the first time — to challenge the dischargeability of the 13418 Judgment under § 523(a)(2), rendering that challenge untimely under Bankruptcy Rule 4007. When Cohen filed the first Complaint on December 24, 2014, the Objection Deadline to challenge the dischargeability of any of Abramowitz's debts had already passed; as explained, Cohen's Extension Motion did not request — and the bankruptcy court did not grant Cohen — an extension under Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c) to challenge the dischargeability of any of Abramowitz's debts after the Objection Deadline. (ECF No. 28 (granting Cohen's Extension Motion to "file a complaint Objecting to [Abramowitz's] Discharge." (emphasis added).) Consequently, the allegations in Cohen's first Complaint challenging the dischargeability of the 13418 Judgment under § 523(a)(2) were untimely — see FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c) — and Cohen conceded this point to the bankruptcy court. See (ECF No. 53 (Cohen's brief in support of her Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion stating "[t]here is no question that [Cohen] filed her [E]xtension Motion... under [Bankruptcy] Rule 4004 and not ... 4007[;] the 60-day deadline of [Bankruptcy] Rule 4007(c) expired on November 7, 2014," i.e., on the Objection Deadline).)

Third, even if the bankruptcy court would have accepted the first Complaint, the Complaint did not set forth a specific ground (or grounds) upon which Cohen objected to Abramowitz's general discharge under §§ 727(a)(1)-(12). The bankruptcy court granted Cohen's Extension Motion to object to Abramowitz's discharge in general, and Cohen timely filed her first Complaint objecting to discharge within the allotted extension-period. In support of her apparent objection to Abramowitz's discharge in general, however, the first Complaint vaguely referenced only "11 U.S.C. § 727(b)," which provides merely that debts falling within § 523 are non-dischargeable.18 (ECF No. 30 at 2, 4-5 ¶ 30.) As the bankruptcy court recognized, § 727(b) does not provide grounds to object to a debtor's general discharge. See COLLIER ¶ 727.01(1) ("Any grounds [for objection to discharge] that are not expressly included [in § 727(a)(1)-(12)] are excluded by implication." (citing decisions) (footnote omitted)); (ECF No. 57 at 7 ("[Cohen's] reliance on [§] 727(b) does not provide an independent basis for denial of [Abramowitz's] discharge.") (footnote omitted).) Cohen, in any event, conceded to the bankruptcy court that she intended, all along, to challenge the dischargeability of Abramowitz's debts to her — not Abramowitz's discharge in general. See (ECF No. 57 at 7 (noting that "[a]t the hearing held on March 31, 2015," Cohen "clarified" to the bankruptcy court "that denial of discharge under [§ 727(a)] would not be pursued [,] and relief was sought only under [§ 523(a)]" (emphasis added)).)

In summary, this court agrees with the bankruptcy court that:

Notwithstanding the first Complaint's deficiencies, Cohen — yet again — had time and the opportunity to correct her error. After the bankruptcy court rejected the first Complaint on December 29, 2014, Cohen needed only to refile it as an adversary proceeding, as ordered. Instead, Cohen elected to refile the identical Complaint in the main bankruptcy case on January 12, 2015, objecting to discharge in general and challenging the dischargeability of the 13418 Judgment. In accordance with the Bankruptcy Rules,19 the bankruptcy court — again — rejected Cohen's second Complaint on January 13, 2015, as it was not filed as an adversary proceeding. Abramowitz was not required to — and did not — respond to Cohen's second Complaint, which was identical to and deficient for the same reasons as her first Complaint.

Cohen did not attempt to refile her Complaint after the bankruptcy court rejected it for a second time on January 13, 2015. Thereafter, more than one month passed without any action by Cohen. Consequently, the bankruptcy court entered the Discharge Order on February 19, 2015, in accordance with the Bankruptcy Rules. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(c)(1)(B) ("In a chapter 7 case, on expiration of the times fixed for objecting to discharge [and in the absence of a complaint objecting to discharge],... the [bankruptcy] court shall forthwith grant the discharge." (emphasis added).) In light of Cohen's inaction and in accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 4004(c)(1)(B), the bankruptcy court acted reasonably in entering the Discharge Order.

In denying Cohen's Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion for relief from the Discharge Order, the bankruptcy court concluded that Cohen's own errors and delays precluded a finding of the "extraordinary circumstances" necessary to warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(6). That conclusion was reasonable under the circumstances presented in this case. As explained previously, "extraordinary circumstances rarely exist" under Rule 60(b)(6) when a party seeks relief from an order that "resulted from the party's deliberate choices." Budget Blinds, Inc., 536 F.3d at 255 (emphasis added); In re Slomnicki, 243 B.R. at 655 ("`[N]either ignorance nor carelessness by a party or [the party's] attorney is a proper basis for [Rule 60(b)(6)] relief....'" (quoting Smith, 627 F.2d at 795-96)). Based upon Cohen's repeated dilatory conduct and failure to comply with the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Rules, local bankruptcy rules, and the bankruptcy court's orders, this court cannot conclude that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in denying Cohen's Bankruptcy Rule 9024 Motion for relief from the Discharge Order. See Coltec Indus., Inc., 280 F.3d at 273 ("[C]ourts have not looked favorably on the entreaties of parties trying to escape the consequences of their own `counseled and knowledgeable' decisions." (quoting In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 840 F.2d 188, 195 (3d Cir. 1988))). Cohen failed to show — and the record does not otherwise establish — that the bankruptcy court acted "in an arbitrary, fanciful[,] or unreasonable manner," or that it "use[d] improper legal standards, criteria[,] or procedures" in this case. In re Jersey Integrated, 2008 WL 305739, at *4 (citing Barnes Found., 242 F.3d at 167)). For these reasons, the court will affirm the bankruptcy court's May 19, 2015 order.20

V. CONCLUSION

Because the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in this case, the court will affirm the bankruptcy court's May 19, 2015 order denying Cohen relief from the Discharge Order pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9024 and Rule 60(b)(6).

An appropriate order follows.