MAUREEN P. KELLY, Magistrate Judge.
Michael Givens ("Petitioner") has filed what he entitled "Independent Action for Relief from Final Order, or, alternatively, Motion for Relief from Final Order Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 60(b)" (the "Motion"). ECF No. 19. For the reasons that follow, the Motion will be denied.
On May 4, 2000, Petitioner was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder in the shooting death of a teenager and related charges. As a consequence, on June 19, 2000, Petitioner was sentenced to, inter alia, life in prison without the possibility of parole for the conviction of first-degree murder. Twelve years later, Petitioner filed a Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (the "Petition") in May, 2012. ECF No. 6. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 9, asserting, inter alia, that the Petition was time barred. After granting Petitioner an extension of time to file his response to the Motion to Dismiss, Petitioner filed his Response. ECF No. 14. On March 18, 2013, the Court granted Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, finding all but one of Petitioner's claims were time barred under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). The sole claim not time barred was a claim of newly discovered evidence, which the Court found to have been procedurally defaulted. The Court denied a certificate of appealability. ECF No. 15. Petitioner appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied a certificate of appealability on August 8, 2013.
Petitioner waited until May 9, 2016, more than three years after this Court dismissed his Petition as time barred, to sign the Motion, which was not received by the Court until June 10, 2016. ECF No. 19.
Petitioner fails to carry his heavy burden to show entitlement to relief whether the Motion is treated as having been filed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) or as being an Independent Action.
Petitioner seeks to attack this Court's prior determination that his Petition was time barred as measured from the date his conviction became final, i.e., the Court determined that he did not file his Petition within one year of his conviction becoming final. Apparently, for the first time in these proceedings, Petitioner argues that rather than calculate the AEDPA statute of limitations from the date his conviction became final, the Court should calculate the start of the AEDPA statute of limitations from the date a state created impediment to the filing of the habeas petition was removed. ECF No. 19 at 6 - 7.
The state created impediment that Petitioner claims prevented him from filing the habeas Petition was that he was denied law library access in late January 2005, when he had a brief to prepare and file in the Pennsylvania Superior Court during the appeal of his Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") proceedings. Petitioner claims that this denial of access to the law library, over eleven years ago, caused him to fail to file his brief in the Superior Court, resulting in his appeal being dismissed for failure to file a brief. He then claims that "the State created impediment [to the filing of the brief in the Superior Court] snowballed into the trigger date in which Petitioner had until to file his writ petition." ECF No. 10 at 7 - 8.
There are several substantial deficiencies with Petitioner's arguments. First, Petitioner relies on Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6).
We find that Petitioner's waiting until May 9, 2016, more than three years after the judgment was entered on March 18, 2013, granting the Respondents' Motion to Dismiss is not a reasonable time, especially given that he had this argument available to him at least since January — March 2005 when he was denied library access for several days and when his appeal to the Superior Court was dismissed for failing to file a brief. He fails to explain why he did not raise this argument in response to the Respondents' Motion to Dismiss and/or why he waited until now to raise this argument.
Further, Petitioner has not shown "extraordinary circumstances" because a prisoner being denied access to a law library for several days is simply not an extraordinary occurrence in the context of prison life.
Petitioner also seemingly suggests that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations based upon him being actually innocent. ECF No. 19 at 10 - 13. But this was an argument that he made previously to the Court, which the Court rejected. ECF No. 15 at 12 - 21. Moreover, there is nothing in the Motion that persuades the Court of Petitioner's actual innocence claim now.
Even considering the current Motion as an Independent Action in Equity, Petitioner again fails to carry his heavy burden. An Independent Action in Equity is, as its name implies, an equitable remedy.
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is hereby DENIED whether treated as a Motion filed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) or as an Independent Action in Equity. To the extent one is necessary, a certificate of appealability is also denied as jurists of reason would not find the foregoing debatable.