MARK A. KEARNEY, District Judge.
The Supreme Court has long mandated corrections officers, like all public employees, cannot claim their public employers' disciplinary and termination processes against them violate procedural due process under a "class of one" theory. This principle rests upon the difference in public employers' necessary management of employees compared to interaction with the public. A corrections officer allegedly set up by inmates' statements against him resulting in a criminal resolution and temporary suspension cannot later argue his public employer supervisors deprived him of equal protection or due process as a class of one by investigating and reporting him to the police authorities. Had he received a favorable termination of his criminal charges, the corrections officer may have another claim under civil rights laws, but he cannot argue an investigation and report to appropriate authorities as required by the Department of Corrections' internal Policies falls outside his public employment context. We grant the Defendants' Motion for judgment on the pleadings in the accompanying Order.
Sargent David J. Black works as a corrections officer at State Correctional Institute-Fayette ("SCI-Fayette").
On October 20, 2013, during his regular 2:00 pm to 10:00 pm shift, Sargent Black worked in the control booth of the "F Block" of cells.
When Inmate Fulton made the request, Sargent Black believed an inmate occupant of cell FB1008 invited Inmate Fulton to the cell to share food.
Minutes after opening the cells, corrections officer Robert Moran told Sargent Black cell FB 1008 was unoccupied.
On October 22, 2013, Inmate Duncan filed a written complaint claiming Sargent Black opened cell FB 1008 "for the express purpose of allowing the inmates to fight in it" under a prearranged agreement between Sargent Black and Inmate Fulton.
OSII investigator Frarik J. Kamalich then interviewed Inmate Fulton, who stated Sargent Black did not know or suspect he planned to fight Inmate Duncan in cell FB1008.
While Investigator Kamalich conducted his investigation, Defendant Lieutenant Robert Jones conducted a "separate and unrelated investigation" into Sargent Black's relationship with Inmate Riccheem Barker.
Investigator Kamalich found Sargent Black violated several Department of Corrections ethical regulations for neither promptly nor accurately reporting the cell FB 1008 fight, for not reporting the injuries sustained by Inmate Duncan, and for not being truthful in the investigation.
Allegedly based on Investigator Kamalich's findings, the Commonwealth charged Sargent Black with recklessly endangering another person.
On March 7, 2014, the Commonwealth terminated him for alleged ethical violations.
The state court dismissed the criminal case against Sargent Black after a grant of his writ of habeas corpus.
Sargent Black sued Defendants for violating his right to procedural due process and conspiracy arising from the report to the police and eventual criminal resolution.
Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings arguing Sargent Black's class-of-one equal protection or procedural due process theory is not applicable in the public employment context.
Sargent Black claims Defendants violated his procedural due process or deprived him of equal protection under the class-of-one theory.
"[T]he class-of-one theory of equal protection-which presupposes that like individuals should be treated alike, and that to treat them differently is to classify them in a way that must survive at least rationality review-is simply a poor fit in the public employment context. To treat employees differently is not to classify them in a way that raises equal protection concerns. Rather, it is simply to exercise the broad discretion that typically characterizes the employer-employee relationship."
Sargent Black argues Defendants took his case outside the public employment context when they provided information gathered by internal investigations to law enforcement not under their employ. We need not address whether a public employer steps outside the employment relationship by referring criminal conduct by an employee during work hours to law enforcement. Here, the employment relationship is governed by Department of Corrections Policies. Those Policies define the roles and rights of employee corrections officers. The Department of Corrections Policy No. DC ADM 004, "applicable to all employees ... to ensure that all criminal acts committed by or to inmates are processed, investigated, referred to the appropriate law enforcement authority and disposed of, by prosecution and/or administrative action."
Because Sargent Black's criminal matter involved a crime against an inmate, it falls under DOC Policy No. DC ADM 004. As the matter fell under standard employment policy, the investigation and report to the appropriate law enforcement authority is within the context of Sargent Black's public employment. Under Engquist, class-of-one theories are barred in the public employment context. We dismiss Sargent Black's procedural due process claim based on the class-of-one theory.
As Defendants cannot deprive a public employee's equal protection rights based on a class-of-one theory, they cannot be legally found to have conspired.
In the accompanying Order, we grant Defendants' Motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismiss Sargent Black's §1983 equal protection and conspiracy claims.
"[W]here, as here, a motion for judgment on the pleadings asserts that plaintiff fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, the court considers the motion under the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion even where no motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) has been made." Atiyeh v. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 742 F.Supp.2d 591, 595 (E.D. Pa. 2010). "Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(2) provides that a defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted may be made by a motion for judgment on the pleadings." Id. at n.8 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2)). "A Rule 12(b)(6) motion requires the court to examine the sufficiency of the complaint." Atiyeh, 742 F. Supp. 2d at 595 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957) (abrogated in other respects by Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007))). "Except as provided in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9, a complaint is sufficient if it complies with Rule 8(a)(2), which requires `a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Atiyeh, 742 F. Supp. 2d at 596. Rule 8(a)(2) does "not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678. "A court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying allegations that, because they are mere conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679. "While legal conclusions can provide the complaint's framework, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678. "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. at 679.
