MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOY FLOWERS CONTI, District Judge.

On December 5, 2016, defendant Denise Bonfilio ("defendant" or "Bonfilio") filed a motion for an order directing preparation of a new pre-sentence investigation report. (ECF No. 286.) Defendant claims that because the Third Circuit Court of Appeals remanded her restitution order to clarify that her restitution obligations are joint and several with co-defendant Deborah Kitay ("Kitay"), she is entitled to a full sentencing hearing. (Id.) Defendant requests that at this hearing the court apply commentary from the United States Sentencing Guidelines clarifying the "sophisticated means" enhancement in U.S.S.G § 2B1.1(b)(10)1 and refining the definition of "intended loss" in U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(ii).2 (Id.)

The court of appeals' directive to this court on remand was specific and limited. In United States v. Bonfilio, 611 F. App'x 758 (3d Cir. 2015), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated that they "accept the District Court's invitation to remand its restitution order to allow it to clarify that Bonfilio and Kitay's restitution obligations are joint and several." 611 F. App'x at 760-61.

Upon remand, "a trial court must implement both the letter and spirit of the [appellate court's] mandate, taking into account the appellate court's opinion and the circumstances it embraces." Bankers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 761 F.2d 943, 949 (3d Cir.1985). The district court has a duty to faithfully execute the mandate imposed by the court of appeals, and "the Supreme Court has `consistently held that an inferior court has no power or authority to deviate from the mandate issued by an appellate court.'" United States v. Kennedy, 682 F.3d 244, 252 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Briggs v. Pa. R. Co., 334 U.S. 304, 306 (1948)).

A similar issue was presented in Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 14 F.3d 848, 860 (3d Cir. 1994). In Casey, the Supreme Court had reversed the lower court's decision in part and "remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion, including consideration of the question of severability." Casey, 14 F.3d at 852. On remand, the district court reopened the record and permitted the parties to introduce new evidence. Id. On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court exceeded the Supreme Court's mandate, stating:

Id. at 860. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has applied this reasoning in the criminal context. United States v. Crim, 553 F. App'x 170, 173 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 2851 (2014); see United States v. Fisher, 219 F. App'x 142, 144 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding that the district court properly implemented the appellate court's mandate when, on remand, the district court refused to reopen defendant's sentencing hearing and instead limited its order to establishing a payment schedule for restitution, as ordered by the appellate court).

In Bonfilio's case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ordered this court to clarify that the restitution order imposed on defendant was to be joint and several with her co-defendant, Kitay. See Bonfilio, 611 F. App'x at 760-61. Like in Casey, the remand issued by the appellate court in defendant's case involves a discrete issue and mandate. In defendant's case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals provided explicit instructions about the scope of this court's decision upon remand — namely, that this court should clarify that defendant's restitution order is joint and severable with Kitay's restitution order. The court is instructed by precedential case law not to undertake a full sentencing hearing as requested in defendant's motion, and reopening the sentencing hearing would deviate from the appellate court's clear and limited mandate to this court. The court, therefore, will deny defendant's motion for a new sentencing hearing and pre-sentence investigation report as granting this motion would exceed the appellate court's mandate.

While this court need not examine the validity of defendant's arguments about the guidelines given that the appellate court remanded this case only for the limited purpose of clarifying that defendant's restitution order is joint and severable, it is worth noting that even if this court were to reopen defendant's sentencing hearing with respect to her restitution order or her sentence more broadly, there is no reason to believe that such a hearing would result in a different sentence. Neither of the objections defendant raised relates to restitution, the only matter at issue in the appellate court's remand. Defendant raised objections with respect to the "sophisticated means" enhancement in U.S.S.G § 2B1.1(b)(10) and "intended loss" under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(ii). The "sophisticated means" enhancement involved a two-level enhancement to defendant's base offense level, while the court's "intended loss" determination was a part of the court's total loss calculation, which resulted in a 16-level increase to defendant's base offense level. Both of these determinations involved defendant's term of imprisonment guidelines, and were in no way related to the restitution order at issue in the appellate court's remand.3

Because ordering a new sentencing hearing and pre-sentence investigation report would exceed the appellate court's mandate, the court will deny defendant's motion. An appropriate order will be entered.