NORA BARRY FISCHER, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Suppress Title III Intercepts filed by Waverly Primm (Docket No. 168) and joined by Marlin Scott (Docket Nos. 215 and 216).
This case is the result of a long-term Title III wiretap investigation conducted by the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ("ATF") concerning crack cocaine trafficking in the area of New Castle, Pennsylvania. (See Docket No. 221, ¶ 1). The investigation revealed that Primm, Scott and other co-conspirators allegedly obtained cocaine in Buffalo, New York and transported it to the Western District of Pennsylvania, where members of the drug trafficking organization distributed substantial quantities of crack cocaine in the New Castle area. Id.
In addition to a number of traditional investigative methods, the investigation involved Title III authorized interceptions of five cellular telephones (the "Target Telephones" or "TT") used by members of the organization. Authorization to intercept calls and text messages over the Target Telephones was received via five applications between May 2015 and August 2015. The applications are sealed and docketed at Misc. Nos. 15-360 and 15-360(a)-(d). (See Docket No. 221, ¶¶ 2-6). The materials supporting the applications are extensive, consisting of hundreds of pages of documents. In approving each application, the presiding judicial officers, the Hon. Joy Flowers Conti and the Hon. David David S. Cercone, found, inter alia, that there was probable cause to believe that the target subjects were involved in felony drug trafficking offenses; probable cause to believe that particular wire and electronic communications of those individuals concerning such offenses would be obtained through the interceptions; and, that it was "adequately demonstrated that normal investigative procedures have been tried with limited success, reasonably appear unlikely to further succeed if continued, or or are too dangerous to attempt." (See e.g., Misc. No. 15-360(c), Order of 7/16/15, ¶¶ 3-5; Misc. No. 15-360(d), Order of 8/12/15, ¶¶ 3-5).
The initial Order at Misc. No. 15-360 entered on May 27, 2015, authorized the interception of TT#1 and TT#2. (See Docket No. 221, ¶ 2). The subsequent applications involved the following:
(See id., ¶¶ 3-6). DEA Special Agent Melissa Laukaitis, who has conducted and participated in numerous federal drug trafficking investigations during her 12 years of employment with the DEA, completed the Affidavit in support of the Application at Misc. Nos. 15-360(c) and 15-360(d) (hereinafter, the "15-360(c) Aff." and the "15-360(d) Aff."). As is generally the case with these types of investigative materials, the subsequent affidavits build on the earlier ones, providing additional information obtained from the intercepted communications pursuant to the prior applications as support for the requested extension or initiation of intercepts on a new phone. (See generally, 15-360(c) Aff., ¶ 7; 15-360(d) Aff., ¶ 7).
The investigation ultimately resulted in an indictment against Primm, Scott and co-defendants Wilbon, Stokes and Lewis charging them with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribute 280 grams or more of crack cocaine from in and around January 2015, until in and around August 2015, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. (See Docket No. 1).
On August 12, 2016, Primm, joined by Scott, moved to suppress the interceptions obtained pursuant to the 15-360(c) Order involving TT#4 and TT#5, and those obtained pursuant to the 15-360(d) Order involving TT#5.
Primm contends that suppression of the wiretap interceptions is warranted because the Affidavits supporting the Applications "fail[ ] to allege with requisite specificity the necessity of the interceptions."
United States v. Garvey, 588 F. App'x 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2014). "When a warrant is later challenged, a deferential standard of review is applied in determining whether the issuing judge had a `substantial basis' for issuing the warrant." United States v. Gilliam, No. 02:12-CR-93, 2015 WL 5178197, at *14 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2015) (citing United States v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 1205 (3d Cir. 1993); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 237 (1983)). Further, where, as here, a motion challenges the four corners of an affidavit and application, an evidentiary hearing is not required. Gilliam, 2015 WL 5178197, at *14.
The Court of Appeals has made clear that "18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) does not require the government to exhaust all other investigative procedures before resorting to electronic surveillance." United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411, 418 (3d Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Rivera, 532 F. App'x 304, 307 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting same).
Williams, 124 F.3d at 418.
After careful consideration of the parties' positions, it is this Court's opinion that Primm and Scott have failed to demonstrate that the wiretap interceptions should be suppressed under the prevailing law governing same.
Initially, the Court holds that the judicial findings by her colleagues as to the existence of probable cause and the necessity of the wiretaps under 18 U.S.C. § 2518 are entitled to deference and otherwise have not been undermined by the arguments advanced by Defendants. See Gilliam, 2015 WL 5178197, at *14. As stated, Defendants generally assert that the Government had been successful in obtaining some information through traditional investigative methods, thus it was just seeking a "shortcut" by resorting to the wiretap interceptions. (See Docket No. 168, ¶¶ 14, 25, 26, 29, 31). Contrary to Defendants' position, however, the Government simply is not required to exhaust all potential investigative methods before obtaining a wiretap. See Williams, 124 F.3d at 418. The Court of Appeals has succinctly addressed this issue:
United States v. Bailey, 840 F.3d 99, 116 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Here, the information provided by Special Agent Laukaitis in the Affidavits makes clear that the Government did not seek to shortcut its investigation by using wiretaps, despite Defendants' assertion to the contrary. The Affidavits precisely describe the traditional investigative methods law enforcement had utilized, as well as the limitations associated with each, and further explain why certain methods would prove fruitless or were too dangerous to attempt. Although the Affidavits detail some limited success through the use of traditional methods, they clearly articulate that those methods would not enable law enforcement to ascertain the full scope of the drug trafficking organization or the identity of its members. Specifically, the Affidavits indicate the following:
As the foregoing illustrates, the Affidavits provide a detailed and comprehensive explanation of the investigative methods that had been used and the limitations of each, thus demonstrating conclusively the necessity of the Title III wiretap interceptions. See Bailey, 840 F.3d at 115 ("[f]ar from being inadequate to justify authorization of a wiretap, the government's application here is a textbook model of care and thoroughness . . .").
In sum, upon reviewing the Affidavits in question, Judge Conti, who was the presiding Judicial Officer, approved the Title III interceptions, and expressly found that the necessity requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) had been satisfied. (See 15-360(c) Order, ¶ 5; 15-360(d) Order, ¶ 5) (concluding the Government "adequately demonstrated that normal investigative procedures have been tried with limited success, reasonably appear unlikely to further succeed if continued, or are too dangerous to attempt."). That finding is entitled to deference by this Court and it otherwise appears that the decision was appropriate and consistent with the prevailing law. See, e.g., Rivera, 532 F. App'x at 306 ("[T]he utility of other methods of investigation to obtain some information does not foreclose the possibility that a wiretap is necessary to obtain other information."); Garvey, 588 F. App'x at 191 (affirming district court's finding of necessity where affidavit was prepared in detail and recounted several examples of investigative methods that were or could be attempted and why they were or would be ineffective). All told, the Government laid a sufficient factual predicate to justify the necessity of the Title III interceptions. See McGlory, 968 F.2d at 345 ("The government need only lay a `factual predicate' sufficient to inform the judge why other methods of investigation are not sufficient."); Bailey, 840 F.3d at 116 ("As long as the wiretap affidavit is prepared in detail, recounting the investigative methods that were attempted and why other methods would prove ineffective, as they were here, we have no difficulty concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the affidavit supported a finding of necessity."). Accordingly, Defendants' necessity argument is without merit, and suppression of the Title III intercepts is not warranted.
Based on the foregoing, the Motion to Suppress Title III Intercepts filed by Primm and joined by Scott is DENIED. An appropriate Order follows.