NORA BARRY FISCHER, District Judge.
This case arises from Plaintiff Damon M. Myers' allegations that his former employer, Defendant AutoZoners, LLC ("AutoZone"), discriminated against him because of his race and retaliated against him in violation of Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. Immediately following the case management conference, the parties engaged in settlement negotiations. Although the parties agree that they entered into a valid and enforceable settlement agreement that day, they vigorously dispute whether Mr. Myers agreed to a general release as part of the settlement. AutoZone contends that he did; but, Mr. Myers is adamant that he authorized his attorney to settle this case only if the settlement did not affect a wrongful discharge claim that he was concurrently pursuing in the EEOC.
Now pending before the Court is AutoZone's motion to enforce settlement agreement, wherein it seeks an order from the Court requiring Mr. Myers "to execute the Release agreed to by the parties and abide by the terms of the settlement agreement [] which are contained in the Release." (Docket Nos. 42, 42-1). After the filing of AutoZone's motion, Mr. Myers' counsel withdrew his appearance and Mr. Myers has since been proceeding pro se. Mr. Myers has also filed a motion that is pending before the Court, entitled "Motion @ Appeal & Plea to Judge [Fischer]," which, among other things, does not oppose the Court enforcing the parties' agreement to settle this case but requests that the Court order that the settlement does not include the wrongful discharge claim that he was concurrently pursuing in the EEOC. (Docket No. 67). The Court has carefully considered the parties' legal memoranda and has held two hearings/arguments in connection with this dispute. At those hearings, AutoZone did not offer any evidence to support its position that Mr. Myers agreed to a general release. Mr. Myers, in contrast, provided his own sworn statements and testimony to support his position.
For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that Mr. Myers did not agree to release the wrongful discharge claim that he was concurrently pursuing in the EEOC when the parties settled this case. Therefore, AutoZone's motion to enforce [42] will be GRANTED, insofar as it seeks to have the Court order enforcement of the settlement, but DENIED insofar as it seeks to have Mr. Myers execute its general release; and, Mr. Myers' motion [67] will be GRANTED, to the extent that he seeks to have the Court order that the parties' settlement does not include the wrongful discharge claim.
Mr. Myers is a 54 year-old, African-American male. He attended and graduated from McKeesport High School. After high school, Mr. Myers earned an associate's degree from the Los Angeles Community College and also obtained a medical transcription certificate. At the time of the July 10, 2017 hearing, Mr. Myers was working as a patient-sitter at the VA Hospital and also working as a security guard at the Convention Center.
Relevant here, Mr. Myers began working for AutoZone on a part-time basis in November 2011 as a Commercial Driver. After working there for approximately18 months, he sought to be promoted to a full-time position. Although his request for full-time employment was denied, he asserts that at least ten other newly-hired part-time Caucasian employees were promoted to full-time employment status and/or provided with the benefits that he had requested during the same time period. Consequently, on February 21, 2014, Mr. Myers filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC for AutoZone's purported failure to promote him to a full-time position. According to Mr. Myers, AutoZone began to scrutinize his work and started taking retaliatory disciplinary actions against him over the next several months, which ultimately led to his termination in November 2014. AutoZone informed Mr. Myers that it was firing him for being rude and using profane language when speaking to a customer. Mr. Myers denies this conduct and instead claims that AutoZone terminated him in retaliation for filing an EEOC charge.
Altogether, Mr. Myers filed three charges of discrimination against AutoZone in the EEOC. He filed the first two charges while he was still working for AutoZone, the first being filed on February 21, 2014, at Charge Number 533-2014-519, wherein he asserted that AutoZone's failure to promote him to a full-time position was discriminatory. See (Docket No. 60-1 at 5).
Thereafter, in November 2014, AutoZone terminated Mr. Myers' employment. In a letter dated December 11, 2014, Mr. Myers notified the EEOC that his employment with AutoZone had ended because AutoZone accused him of swearing at a customer, which Mr. Myers denied, but stated that he was moving on with his career, having secured a position with FedEx. (Id. at 71). In January and February 2015, Mr. Myers sent the EEOC documents from his unemployment compensation proceedings, (Id. at 69-70, 73-77, 88), and on March 11, 2015, he requested a continuance of the EEOC investigation, asserting, among other things, that AutoZone's claimed reasons for terminating him were false. (Id. at 86).
More than a year later, on June 30, 2016, Mr. Myers filed a third charge of discrimination, at Charge Number 533-2014-973 (Amended), which amended his second charge to include additional allegations of race discrimination and retaliation that allegedly occurred between filing his second charge in July 2014 and his termination in November 2014. (Id. at 3-4). The next day, on July 1, 2016, EEOC Investigator John Wozniak sent AutoZone's counsel the third charge of discrimination, with a letter stating:
(Id. at 1).
Mr. Myers initiated his case in this Court on August 26, 2016 through his then-counsel, Darren K. Parr, Esq. ("Attorney Parr"). (Docket No. 1). Although the original complaint was organized as asserting only one count for "Racial Discrimination in violation of Title VII and PHRA," it included allegations relating to disparate treatment (unequal pay and benefits, failure to promote) and hostile work environment. (Id. at ¶¶ 26-31). The complaint characterized Mr. Myers' termination as "unlawful" but did not explicitly allege that AutoZone fired him because he was black, (Id. at ¶ 5), and it suggested, but did not specifically assert, that AutoZone's termination of Mr. Myers was retaliatory. (Id. at ¶ 15). In addition, it alleged that Mr. Myers had satisfied all relevant procedural and administrative requirements under Title VII. (Id. at ¶ 4).
Approximately two months later, AutoZone responded to the complaint by filing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Rule 12(f) motion to strike, and/or Rule 12(e) motion for more definite statement, and brief in support. (Docket Nos. 11, 12). Therein, AutoZone argued that the complaint: (1) failed to state a PHRA claim for failing to allege facts relative to exhaustion and that the EEOC charge referenced in the complaint only discussed failure to promote, not unequal pay; (2) failed to state a claim for hostile work environment under both Title VII and the PHRA; and (3) to the extent that the complaint was asserting a claim for retaliation, such claim should either be stricken or Plaintiff should be ordered to clarify what claims he is asserting. (Id.).
In response to AutoZone's motion, Mr. Myers, through Attorney Parr, filed a first amended complaint on November 15, 2016, (Docket No. 16), resulting in AutoZone's motion being terminated as moot. (Docket No. 17). Like the original complaint, the first amended complaint contained allegations referencing failure to promote, unequal pay, and hostile work environment under the single heading, "Racial Discrimination in violation of Title VII." (Docket No. 16 at ¶¶ 16-22). The first amended complaint again characterized Mr. Myers' termination as "unlawful" and further alleged that AutoZone's decision to terminate Mr. Myers' employment was retaliatory and based on Mr. Myers' filing of the first charge of discrimination with the EEOC. (Id. at ¶ 20). According to the first amended complaint, Mr. Myers had satisfied all procedural and administrative requirements of Title VII and the PHRA with respect to all claims set forth therein prior to filing suit. (Id. at ¶ 4).
AutoZone responded to the first amended complaint by filing another motion under Rules 12(b)(6), 12(e), and/or 12(f), and a brief in support. (Docket Nos. 18, 19). AutoZone reasserted that, given the way that the first amended complaint was organized, it remained unclear if Mr. Myers was alleging claims for: (1) retaliatory discharge or (2) hostile work environment. (Id.). If so, AutoZone argued that Mr. Myers failed to state plausible claims for those causes of action. (Id.). In the alternative, AutoZone sought to have Mr. Myers provide a more definite statement and clarify what claims he was asserting against it. (Id.).
Pursuant to the Court's standing order on motions practice, Mr. Myers' response to AutoZone's motion was due on December 20, 2016. (Docket No. 13). Attorney Parr, however, did not respond to the motion on behalf of Mr. Myers; instead, he informed the Court on January 3, 2017 that there was no opposition to it. Accordingly, on January 3, 2017, the Court signed AutoZone's proposed order that was attached to its motion, adding handwritten language reflecting the Court's discussion with Attorney Parr. (Docket No. 20). Said order dismissed Mr. Myers' hostile work environment claims, with prejudice, and struck all allegations relating to same, including paragraphs 18 and 19 of the first amended complaint.
Mr. Myers, through Attorney Parr, filed the second amended complaint on January 23, 2017. (Docket No. 21). The second amended complaint not only asserted a claim for failure to promote, but also asserted claims for retaliation and hostile work environment, which the Court had just dismissed, with prejudice. (Id.). As such, on February 3, 2017, AutoZone filed another motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and brief in support. (Docket Nos. 23, 24). In addition to seeking dismissal of the retaliation and hostile work environments claims, AutoZone contended that the Court should dismiss "any potential race discrimination claims based on . . .
Given the nature of the issues and repeated motions practice, the Court scheduled oral argument on the motion to be combined with a case management conference set for March 28, 2017. (Docket Nos. 28, 29). Thereafter, Mr. Myers, through Attorney Parr, responded to AutoZone's motion to dismiss on March 2, 2017, conceding the dismissal of the retaliation and hostile work environment counts and confirming that "the primary and now limited issue pending before this Court is whether the Defendant's consistent failure to promote the Plaintiff to a full time, non-management position for which he was clearly qualified was based upon the Plaintiff's race and thus a Title VII violation." (Docket No. 30 at ¶¶ 5, 6). Based on Mr. Myers' response, the Court entered an order on the same date dismissing the retaliation and hostile work environment claims in the second amended complaint, with prejudice. (Docket No. 32). Notably, however, the Court did not enter AutoZone's proposed order dismissing all of Mr. Myers' unasserted claims, including the wrongful discharge claim, with prejudice. Nevertheless, the parties stated in their Rule 26(f) Report dated March 13, 2017 that "the only issue that remains is whether Plaintiff's Title VII failure to promote race discrimination claims are limited to promotion decisions within 300 days of when he filed his EEOC charge." (Docket No. 33 at ¶ 5).
The Court held the combined motion hearing/case management conference on March 28, 2017. (Docket No. 36). At this proceeding, the Court took AutoZone's motion under advisement but informed the parties that it was likely to deny the motion. (Id.). The Court then proceeded to enter a case management order and an order referring the parties to participate in a mediation with the Hon. Eugene F. Scanlon, Jr. (Dockets Nos. 38, 39). Later that day, AutoZone's counsel, Tracy E. Kern, Esq., informed the Court that the parties reached a verbal agreement to settle the case and that she would inform the Court as soon as the agreement is signed. (Staff Note from 3/28/2017). In any event, on March 31, 2017, the Court issued its Memorandum Opinion & Order denying AutoZone's motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 40). Therein, the Court noted that Mr. Myers' "sole remaining claim" — that is, Count I of the second amended complaint for failure to promote — needed to be developed through discovery. (Id.).
On April 6, 2017, the Court administratively closed the case because counsel for the parties contacted the Court and advised that the case was resolved. (Docket No. 41).
Consequently, on May 26, 2017, AutoZone filed the pending motion to enforce settlement and brief in support. (Docket Nos. 42, 43). On June 12, 2017, Attorney Parr filed a response to the motion to enforce on Mr. Myers' behalf, (Docket No. 45), and AutoZone filed a reply on June 19, 2017. (Docket No. 47). On July 10, 2017, the Court held a hearing and oral argument on AutoZone's motion to enforce. (Docket No. 56). At this hearing, AutoZone's counsel, with permission from the Court, appeared telephonically. AutoZone presented no evidence. Mr. Myers, however, stated under oath that he explicitly informed Attorney Parr that he would settle this case only if it did not affect his wrongful discharge claim that was pending in the EEOC. (Hr'g Tr. from 7/10/2017 at pp. 13-14).
On August 14, 2017, the Court ordered that the parties forward it a copy of Mr. Myers' EEOC file, as the EEOC representative advised that he was not authorized to provide same directly to the Court. (Docket No. 58). The next day, AutoZone filed a copy of Mr. Myers' third charge of discrimination and AutoZone's response to same. (Docket No. 59). Additionally, on August 21, 2017, Mr. Myers had his EEOC file docketed by the Clerk's Office;
On September 1, 2017, the Court held an in camera telephonic status conference with Mr. Myers and Attorney Parr regarding the text messages issue. (Docket No. 63). Following the conference, the Court entered an order requiring that AT&T produce the relevant text message communications between Mr. Myers and Attorney Parr for the Court's in camera review. (Docket No. 63-1).
On September 14, 2017, AT&T contacted the Court to obtain their phone numbers, which the Court forwarded to AT&T that same day. (Docket No. 65). AT&T then responded to the Court's order on September 22, 2017. The production, however, was incomplete, as AT&T did not provide the content of the messages but rather only listed the date and time of each text message and call between Mr. Myers and Attorney Parr. (Docket No. 66). The Court held another in camera telephonic status conference with Mr. Myers and Attorney Parr on October 5, 2017 to discuss AT&T's incomplete production and informed them that, there appearing to be no other means to retrieve the lost text messages, the Court would proceed without same in resolving the dispute between AutoZone and Mr. Myers. (Docket No. 71).
In the interim, on September 25, 2017, Mr. Myers filed a pro se motion, entitled "Motion @ Appeal & Plea to Judge [Fischer]," which is also pending before the Court. (Docket No. 67). In this motion, Mr. Myers seeks, among other things, to have the Court order that the wrongful discharge claim he was pursuing in the EEOC was "separate" from the settlement in this case. (Id.). Mr. Myers also attached the EEOC's determination letter from August 31, 2017 to the motion, wherein the EEOC concluded that AutoZone's termination of Mr. Myers was because of his race and retaliatory. (Docket No. 67-1). AutoZone responded to the motion on September 29, 2017. (Docket No. 69). Thereafter, Mr. Myers mailed the Court an EEOC notice of conciliation failure and a right-to-sue letter, both dated September 28, 2017. At the in camera telephonic status conference held on October 5, 2017, Mr. Myers confirmed that he intended for this document to be filed on the Court's docket as a supplement to his pending pro se motion, which the Court filed the following week. (Docket Nos. 71, 72). Neither AutoZone nor Mr. Parr filed a response to this document.
On October 26, 2017, the Court held another telephonic hearing and oral argument, as a continuation of the July 10, 2017 proceeding. (Docket No. 74). Like the first proceeding, AutoZone presented no evidence and Mr. Myers testified under oath that he did not agree to the general release that AutoZone is seeking to enforce. (Id.); see also (Hr'g Tr. from 10/26/2017, Docket No. 75 at pp. 23-24). Attorney Parr, having since withdrawn as Mr. Myers' counsel, listened to the proceeding but did not participate. (Id. at p. 4). At the conclusion of the proceeding, Mr. Myers and AutoZone declined to submit supplemental briefing. (Id. at p. 39). Accordingly, both motions are fully briefed and are ripe for disposition.
A motion to enforce settlement is analyzed under the same standard as a motion for summary judgment because the central issue is whether there is any disputed issue of material fact as to the validity of the settlement agreement. Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1031-32 & n. 5 (3d Cir. 1991). "This is not a mere coincidence. The stakes in summary enforcement of a settlement agreement and summary judgment on the merits of a claim are roughly the same — both deprive a party of his right to be heard in the litigation." Id. Given same, the Court must "view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2007). The Court "shall grant summary [enforcement] if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to [enforcement] as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). See also Pearson v. Prison Health Svc., 850 F.3d 526 (3d Cir. 2017) ("Material facts are those that affect the outcome of the proceeding, and a dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party." (internal marks and citations omitted)). A court must hold an evidentiary hearing when material facts concerning the terms of a settlement agreement are disputed by the parties. Tiernan, 923 F.2d at 1031. (quoting Callie v. Near, 829 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1991)). Moreover, because Mr. Myers is proceeding pro se, the Court must liberally construe his filings, Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), which this Court has done, and has afforded him leeway in these enforcement proceedings. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, n. 2 (3d Cir. 1993).
The validity and enforceability of settlement agreements is governed by state contract law. Shell's Disposal & Recycling, Inc. v. City of Lancaster, 504 F. App'x 194, 200 (3d Cir. 2012). Because all of the transactions leading to this dispute occurred in Pennsylvania, the Court applies Pennsylvania law. Id. at n. 10 (citing Tiernan, 923 F.3d at 1033).
At the outset, the Court notes that both AutoZone and Mr. Myers agree that they entered into a valid and enforceable settlement agreement in this case on March 28, 2017.
Aside from asking the Court to take judicial notice of the parties' Rule 26(f) report, AutoZone presented no evidence on this issue,
While Attorney Parr has indeed taken the position that a valid settlement agreement was reached between the parties on March 28, 2017, he also contends that the parties did not have a "full meeting of the minds" with respect to the issue of whether Mr. Myers released his wrongful discharge claim. (Hr'g Tr. from 7/10/2017 at pp. 8-9). Attorney Parr claims that during the settlement negotiations, Mr. Myers "refused to forgo or sign away his right to pursue a pending wrongful discharge claim," and that Attorney Parr relayed this information to AutoZone and its counsel. (Docket No. 45 at ¶¶ 3-4). However, Attorney Parr also denies knowing that Mr. Myers was pursuing the wrongful discharge claim in the EEOC concurrently with this litigation, and claims that he believed that Mr. Myers was actually referring to and refusing to release the retaliation claim that the Court already dismissed. (Id. at ¶ 4); (Hr'g Tr. from 7/10/2017 at pp. 7-8). According to Attorney Parr, the parties then "came to a resolution" and Attorney Parr "indicated to Mr. Myers that that resolution was for the case that was pending before the Court." (Hr'g Tr. from 7/10/2017 at pp. 7-8) (emphasis added). Despite the apparent miscommunication between Mr. Myers and Attorney Parr (and possibly between Attorney Parr and AutoZone's counsel), Attorney Parr denies that Mr. Myers agreed to release his wrongful discharge claim but then later had a "change of heart," as AutoZone asserts, and has stated multiple times that the parties did not have a meeting of the minds on this term. (Docket No. 45 at ¶¶ 1, 2); (Hr'g Tr. from 7/10/2017 at p. 8). In sum, AutoZone presented no evidence in support of its position that Mr. Myers agreed to a general release.
On the other hand, Mr. Myers was administered an oath at both hearings and offered his own sworn statements and testimony to support his position. (Hr'g Tr. from 7/10/2017 at p. 12); (Hr'g Tr. from 10/26/2017, Docket No. 75 at p. 13). Shortly after he was duly sworn at the July 10, 2017 hearing, the following exchange occurred between the Court and Mr. Myers:
(Hr'g Tr. from 7/10/2017 at pp. 13-14). Mr. Myers also maintained this position later in the hearing relative to Attorney Parr's motion to withdraw as Mr. Myers' counsel. (Id. at pp. 32, 43).
At the October 26, 2017 telephonic hearing, Mr. Myers similarly testified under oath that he did not agree to release the wrongful discharge claim when he authorized settlement of the case, as follows:
(Hr'g Tr. from 10/26/2017 at p. 24). AutoZone then conducted a brief cross-examination of Mr. Myers. (Id. at pp. 25-27). The cross-examination did not, however, challenge Mr. Myers' position that he refused to release the wrongful discharge claim as part of the settlement. (Id.).
When a district court holds a hearing on a motion to enforce settlement, it has the authority to make factual findings and credibility determinations based on the evidence presented by the parties. Tiernan, 923 F.2d at 1031 n. 5; DeHainaut v. California Univ. of Pa., 490 Fed. App'x 420, 422 (3d Cir. 2012). Having observed Mr. Myers in person at the July 10, 2017 hearing and having listened to Mr. Myers' testimony during the October 26, 2017 telephonic hearing, the Court finds that Mr. Myers was credible and forthright when he repeatedly stated that he refused to release his wrongful discharge claim in the third charge when he agreed to settle this case for $3,500. Given that Mr. Myers' testimony on this issue is unrefuted and AutoZone has presented no evidence to the contrary, AutoZone has failed to carry its burden in establishing that the general release that it seeks to enforce was a term of the parties' agreement. See Shell's Disposal, 504 Fed. App'x at 201 (affirming the district court's factual findings because they were supported by uncontradicted evidence).
Further, to the extent that AutoZone claims that it and Attorney Parr could bind Mr. Myers to a term that Mr. Myers explicitly refused, such a position is without merit. Initially, this assertion may be rejected simply because there is no evidence in the record that AutoZone and Attorney Parr agreed that the wrongful discharge claim would be released as part of the settlement. See Pisarz, 604 Fed. App'x at 200. But, more fundamentally, the law in Pennsylvania "is clear and well-settled that an attorney must have express authority in order to bind a client to a settlement agreement." Reutzel v. Douglas, 870 A.2d 787, 789-90 (Pa. 2005). "The rationale for this rule stems from the fact that parties settling legal disputes forfeit substantial legal rights, and such rights should only be forfeited knowingly." Id. at 90 (citing Starling v. West Erie Avenue Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 3 A.2d 387, 388 (Pa. 1939) ("apparent or implied authority does not extend to unauthorized acts which will result in the surrender of any substantial right of the client")). "As such, a client's attorney may not settle a case without the client's grant of express authority, and such express authority can only exist where the principal specifically grants the agent the authority to perform a certain task on the principal's behalf." Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 7 cmt. c (1958)). An attorney's mere assumption of his client's express authority does not satisfy this demanding legal standard. See Kennedy v. Glover, 2013 WL 11255024, *5 (Pa. Super. 2013) (finding that the trial court erred when it concluded that the client "did consent" to settle the action but the trial court "did not make the required finding of fact that [the client] had expressly authorized [the attorney] to settle the action on her behalf") (emphasis in original). In other words, AutoZone and Attorney Parr could not bind Mr. Myers to a settlement term that Mr. Myers explicitly refused even if they tried, based on the record before the Court.
The Court also rejects AutoZone's position that the Court already dismissed Mr. Myers' wrongful discharge claim, with prejudice, in this case and, consequently, Mr. Myers could not refuse to release that claim as part of the settlement.
In the same vein, the Court rejects AutoZone's argument relating to the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion. "Claim preclusion, formerly referred to as res judicata, gives dispositive effect to a prior judgment if a particular issue, although not litigated, could have been raised in the earlier proceeding." See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 276-77 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted). AutoZone contends that even if the Court has not already dismissed the wrongful discharge claim in this case, res judicata nevertheless prevents Mr. Myers from asserting such a claim against AutoZone in a future case because: (1) Mr. Myers "is the one who claimed that he exhausted his administrative remedies on all of his claims"; and, (2) Mr. Myers did not need to file the third charge with the EEOC because his wrongful discharge claim relates to his claim for retaliation and thus is properly exhausted. (Docket No. 47 at ¶¶ 5, 12); (Hr'g Tr. from 10/26/2017, Docket No. 75 at pp. 32-33, 37-38).
Based on the above, the Court finds that when the parties reached a settlement in this case, the settlement did not include a term requiring Mr. Myers to release his wrongful discharge claim that was pending in the EEOC via the third charge of discrimination. Although AutoZone bears the burden of proof, it has presented no evidence that Mr. Myers ever agreed to such a term, and its position that he did is directly contradicted by unsworn statements from Attorney Parr and sworn statements from Mr. Myers. Accordingly, AutoZone has failed to meet its burden that the general release that it seeks to enforce herein was a term of the settlement. Hence, the Court will enforce the parties' oral settlement agreement from March 28, 2017, which specifically provided that Mr. Myers would settle his claims in this case for failure to promote, unequal pay, retaliation, and hostile work environment in exchange for $3,500, and that this settlement did not include Mr. Myers' wrongful discharge claim as described in his third charge that was pending in the EEOC.
As AutoZone presented no evidence to support its position that Mr. Myers agreed to release his wrongful discharge claim that was pending in the EEOC when the parties settled this case, the Court holds that the parties' settlement agreement did not include such claim. Accordingly, in the Order that follows, AutoZone's motion to enforce settlement (Docket No. 42) will be granted, in part, and denied, in part; and Mr. Myers' pro so motion (Docket No. 67) will be granted, to the extent that Mr. Myers seeks to have the Court order that the parties' settlement does not include the wrongful discharge claim.
(Docket No. 16 at ¶¶ 18, 19).
(Id. at pp. 16-17). AutoZone again stated that it was not necessary to continue the telephonic hearing and elected to "proceed with this hearing now." (Id. at p. 18).
(Docket No. 47 at pp. 38).
