MAUREEN P. KELLY, Chief Magistrate Judge.
Darryl William Anderson ("Petitioner") filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, (the "Petition"), claiming Respondents are improperly calculating his multiple sentences for different convictions and violations of probation. ECF No. 4. At the time of the filing of the Petition, Petitioner was apparently housed in the Allegheny County Jail. In the Petition, Petitioner claims that he never received a credit of 77 days against any of his sentences. Upon review, Respondents have definitively established that Petitioner did receive the credit of 77 days against one of his multiple sentences. Because Petitioner's factual premise is incorrect, the Petition will be dismissed and a certificate of appealability will be denied.
Petitioner is proceeding in forma pauperis, ECF No. 3, and filed his original Petition, ECF No. 4. Petitioner then filed a "Supplement" to the Petition wherein he explicitly states that the "time frame I'm requesting is from 12/13/16-3/1/17. Approximately 76-78 days detained at CC 20091489-200914853." ECF No. 7 at 1. Utilizing the method of counting provided for in Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, we calculate this period of time between December 13, 2016 and March 1, 2017 to be 77 days.
On November 24, 2017, Petitioner filed a Notice of Change of Address, indicating that he was no longer being incarcerated but was apparently released to a private residence. ECF No. 16.
On December 1, 2017, Respondents filed an Answer, indicating that Petitioner was not entitled to any relief in these proceedings as Petitioner was given 78 days
The Court ordered Petitioner to file a Response to the Respondents' Answer, ECF No. 19, and Petitioner complied (the "Response"). ECF No. 21.
All parties have consented to have the Magistrate Judge exercise plenary jurisdiction. ECF Nos. 2 and 10.
We note that Petitioner's convictions and sentences are presumed to be constitutional and valid.
Petitioner claims entitlement to credit for time served from December 13, 2016 until March 1, 2017 against his 2009 Robbery Sentences. ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 14-15; ECF No. 7 at 1 ("the time frame I'm requesting is from 12/13/16-3/1/17, approximately 76-78 days detained at cc 200914849-200914853"); ECF No. 8. Respondents definitively established that Petitioner received credit against his 2015 Driving Case for the period of December 14, 2016 to March 1, 2017, a period of 78 days as calculated by the state court.
In the Response to the Answer, Petitioner does not dispute that he in fact received credit for the period of December 14, 2016 until March 1, 2017 against his 2015 Driving Case. Instead, Petitioner merely argues that he did not know of this credit and that he was not informed of this credit when he was sentenced by the state court on the 2015 Driving Case. ECF No. 21 ¶ 17 ("The first time the Petitioner was made aware of 78 days credit being applied to cc 2015-03525 was on or about December 20, 2017, in the Districts [sic] Attorney's Answer.").
We note that Petitioner's claim of ignorance is of no significance as to whether his sentences were properly calculated or not. We find it not credible that Petitioner never received a copy of the March 1, 2017 Sentencing Order in his 2015 Driving Case. Not only is it not credible but it is quite beside the point given that Petitioner does not deny that his attorney received the March 1, 2017 Sentencing Order because delivery to the agent is delivery to the principal and knowledge by the agent is imputed knowledge by the principal.
We further take note of the fact that the public docket in Petitioner's 2015 Driving Case clearly states that Petitioner received credit of 78 days against his 2015 Driving Case sentence. Given that Petitioner was in fact credited with the time he sought credit for but was given this credit against his 2015 Driving Case instead of his 2009 Robbery Sentences, we find the factual premise of his claim in these habeas proceedings to be factually incorrect.
Further, Petitioner does claim, in the Response to the Answer, entitlement to a double credit, i.e., that he should receive credit for the 78 days against both his 2015 Driving Case and his 2009 Robbery Sentences, asserting that the probation terms for the 2009 Robbery Sentences and the probation term for the 2015 Driving Case were run concurrently, and therefore, the "violations should also run concurrent" and, "[a]s such the credit time should be run concurrently." ECF No. 21 ¶¶ 24-25. Petitioner cites nothing in support of this contention and, indeed, Petitioner is clearly not entitled to such double credits under state law.
Moreover, we find that the March 1, 2017 Sentencing Order that Petitioner receive the 78 days of credit against his 2015 Driving Case to be a sufficiently clear intent on the part of the sentencing judge that Petitioner receive credit only against the 2015 Driving Case and not also against the 2009 Robbery Sentences.
Furthermore, even if the March 1, 2017 Sentencing Order in Petitioner's 2015 Driving Case was not sufficiently clear as to the sentencing court's intent with respect to crediting of Petitioner's 2009 Robbery Sentences, the sentencing court's intent was made absolutely clear in its two July 6, 2017 sentencing orders for the 2009 Robbery Sentences. In the two July 6, 2017 sentencing orders, the sentencing court made clear that Petitioner was not to be given credit against those two 2009 Robbery Sentences for the period between December 14, 2016 and March 1, 2017, and that only the two 2009 Robbery Sentences were, in fact, to run concurrent with each other. Contrary to Petitioner's suggestion, the sentencing court did not direct that the 2009 Robbery Sentences were to run concurrent with the 2015 Driving Case sentence. ECF No. 18 at 4-6.
In light of the fact that Petitioner fails to show that his sentences were not properly credited, Petitioner fails to carry his burden herein to show entitlement to federal habeas relief. Accordingly, the Operative Petition is dismissed and a certificate of appealability is denied as jurists of reason would not find the foregoing debatable.