DONETTA W. AMBROSE, Senior District Judge.
Pending before the Court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. [ECF Nos. 9 and 13]. Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. [ECF Nos. 10 and 14]. After careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth below, I am granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 9] and denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. [ECF No. 13].
Plaintiff has brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and under Title II of the Social Security Act (the "Act") and for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Act. Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI on or about September 17, 2013. [ECF No. 7-7 (Exs. B3D, B4D)]. In her applications, she alleged that since November 5, 2012, she had been disabled due to depression, anxiety disorder, sinus problems, back pain, pain in both hips, sleep problems, fungus on toes, pollen/grass/weed allergies, vitamin d deficiency, possible rheumatoid arthritis, and problem with left arm. [ECF No. 7-8 (Ex. B3E)]. Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Michael S. Kaczmarek held a hearing on November 19, 2015, at which Plaintiff was represented by counsel. [ECF No. 7-3, at 43-74]. Plaintiff appeared at the hearing and testified on her own behalf.
The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. [ECF Nos. 9 and 13]. The issues are now ripe for my review.
The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Commissioner's decision.
To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that she cannot engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(A);
The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use when evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The ALJ must determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment, whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1; (4) if the impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant's impairments prevent her from performing her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of performing her past relevant work, whether she can perform any other work which exists in the national economy, in light of her age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by medical evidence that she is unable to return to her previous employment (steps 1-4).
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing.
At Step Two of his analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder. [ECF No. 7-2, at 25-26]. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except that Plaintiff must avoid concentrated exposure to extremes of heat and cold and all hazards such as inherently dangerous moving machinery and unprotected heights; she is limited to performing routine, repetitive tasks at the SVP 1 to 2 level; she must work in a static low stress environment involving only simple decisions and infrequent changes, and those changes that did occur would be explained and/or demonstrated and could be learned in 30 days or less; her work must be fast paced or have strict production or time quotas; and she can have only occasional interaction with others. [ECF No. 7-2, at 28-34]. The ALJ concluded that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, including retail marker, photocopy machine operator, and folding machine operator.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred when weighing the medical opinion evidence in determining her mental RFC. [ECF No. 10, at 12-19]. The amount of weight accorded to medical opinions is well-established. Generally, the opinions of a claimant's treating physicians are entitled to substantial and, at times, even controlling weight. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c).
Here, Plaintiff first contends that the mental RFC finding is inconsistent with the ALJ's evaluation of the opinions of treating physician Max Lockward, M.D., who completed a Psychiatric/Psychological Impairment Questionnaire on or about August 20, 2013, in which he opined,
The ALJ gave Dr. Lockward's opinion "partial weight" because the moderate limitations described above were "generally consistent with the evidence of record." [ECF No. 7-2, at 32-33]. The only portions of Dr. Lockward's opinion with which the ALJ expressly disagreed were his separate assertions that Plaintiff experienced episodes of deterioration or decompensation in work or work-like settings and/or would miss three days of work per month.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's mental RFC finding is inconsistent with his acceptance of Dr. Lockward's moderate limitations. [ECF No. 10, at 13-14]. After careful consideration, I agree that remand is necessary on this issue. As Plaintiff notes, while the ALJ appears to have accepted all of Dr. Lockward's moderate limitations, it is not apparent from the face of the opinion that he incorporated each of those limitations into the RFC. Although the RFC plainly accounts for some of the moderate limitations such as those related to following detailed instructions and interacting with others, it is unclear whether it incorporates other limitations, including those concerning Plaintiff's ability to carry out simple instructions, perform activities within a schedule and maintain regular attendance,
Plaintiff also takes issue with the ALJ's evaluation of the opinion of SSA consultative examiner Lanny Detore, Ed. D. who conducted a psychological examination of Plaintiff on or about November 20, 2013. [ECF No. 7-14 (Ex. B8F)]. Dr. Detore opined,
Arguing that the ALJ erred in assigning little weight to Dr. Detore's opinion, Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ's suggestion that Dr. Detore based his opinions solely on Plaintiff's subjective complaints. [ECF No. 10, at 17-19]. After careful review, I concur that the ALJ mischaracterizes Dr. Detore's report in this regard. As plainly set forth in the report, Dr. Detore also relied on,
Plaintiff also criticizes the ALJ's partial reliance on the opinions of state agency non-examining psychologists, Douglas Schiller and Valorie Rings. [ECF No. 7-2, at 33-34]. Plaintiff's arguments in this regard, however, primarily center on the contention that the ALJ should have given greater weight to Plaintiff's treating specialists than to non-treating sources. [ECF No. 10, at 14-15]. In light of my findings above, the ALJ must re-evaluate all of the medical evidence on remand. On this issue, I note that Plaintiff is incorrect to the extent she argues that the ALJ erred simply because he gave greater weight to a non-treating physician than a treating provider. As set forth above, where there is a conflict between the opinion of a treating physician and a non-treating, non-examining physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit and may reject the treating physician's assessment if such rejection is based on contradictory medical evidence. Moreover, it is well-established that State agency opinions merit significant consideration.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's credibility determination is not supported by substantial evidence. [ECF No. 10, at 19-21]. To be clear, it is well-established that the ALJ is charged with the responsibility of determining a claimant's credibility.
In determining the limits on a claimant's capacity for work, the ALJ will consider the entire case record, including evidence from the treating, examining, and consulting physicians; observations from agency employees; and other factors such as the claimant's daily activities, descriptions of pain, precipitating and aggravating factors, type, dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medications, treatment other than medication, and other measures used to relieve pain. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c), 416.929(c); S.S.R. 96-7p. The ALJ also will look at inconsistencies between the claimant's statements and the evidence presented. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4), 416.929(c)(4). Inconsistencies in a claimant's testimony or daily activities permit an ALJ to conclude that some or all of the claimant's testimony about her limitations or symptoms is less than fully credible.
In general, I find that the ALJ here considered the factors set forth above and adequately explained the reasoning behind his credibility determinations. [ECF No. 7-2, at 29-32]. A claimant's course of treatment and activities of daily living as well as inconsistencies in the record are appropriate bases on which to evaluate credibility. Moreover, the ALJ here did not reject Plaintiff's allegations entirely. Rather, he incorporated numerous limitations related to Plaintiff's mental health complaints in his RFC finding. The ALJ's credibility findings, however, also rest on his analysis of the medical records and opinion evidence. Because I have found that the ALJ inadequately assessed the medical evidence in this case, the ALJ must reevaluate Plaintiff's credibility accordingly on remand.
Under the Social Security regulations, a federal district court reviewing the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits has three options. It may affirm the decision, reverse the decision and award benefits directly to a claimant, or remand the matter to the Commissioner for further consideration. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (sentence four). In light of an objective review of all evidence contained in the record, I find that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence because, in discussing his RFC and credibility findings, the ALJ failed to address adequately the opinion evidence regarding Plaintiff's mental health. The case therefore is remanded for further consideration in light of this Opinion. In remanding on the points herein, I make no findings as to whether Plaintiff is or is not disabled. I simply find that I cannot properly evaluate the ALJ's opinion on the record before me. For these and all of the above reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted to the extent set forth herein, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied to that same extent. An appropriate Order follows.
AND NOW, this 30
