DONETTA W. AMBROSE, Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff Melanie Lyn Stewart ("Stewart") seeks judicial review of the Social Security Administration's denial of her claim for a period of disability and for disability insurance benefits ("DIB").
Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decisions on disability claims is provided by statute. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3)(7). Section 405(g) permits a district court to review the transcripts and records upon which a determination of the Commissioner is based, and the court will review the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. § 706. When reviewing a decision, the district court's role is limited to determining whether the record contains substantial evidence to support an ALJ's findings of fact. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence has been defined as "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate." Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Determining whether substantial evidence exists is "not merely a quantitative exercise." Gilliland v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983)). "A single piece of evidence will not satisfy the substantiality test if the secretary ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing evidence. Nor is evidence substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence — particularly certain types of evidence (e.g., that offered by treating physicians)." Id. The Commissioner's findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979); Richardson, 402 U.S. at 390, 91 S.Ct. 1420.
Importantly, a district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner's decision, or re-weigh the evidence of record; the court can only judge the propriety of the decision with reference to the grounds invoked by the Commissioner when the decision was rendered. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998); S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-7, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 S.Ct. 1995 (1947). Otherwise stated, "I may not weigh the evidence or substitute my own conclusion for that of the ALJ. I must defer to the ALJ's evaluation of evidence, assessment of the credibility of witnesses, and reconciliation of conflicting expert opinions. If the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, I am bound by those findings, even if I would have decided the factual inquiry differently." Brunson v. Astrue, 2011 WL 2036692, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55457 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2011) (citations omitted).
As stated above, the ALJ denied Stewart's claim for benefits. More specifically, at step one of the five step analysis, the ALJ found that Stewart had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. (R. 19) At step two, the ALJ concluded that Stewart suffers from the following severe impairments: degenerative discogenic disorders of the spine; osteoarthritis of the bilateral knees; obesity; asthma; migraine headaches; fibromyalgia; anxiety; and depression. (R. 19-20) At step three, the ALJ concluded that Stewart does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. 20-22)) Between steps three and four, the ALJ found that Stewart has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work with certain restrictions. (R. 22-26) At step four, the ALJ found that Stewart is unable to perform her past relevant work. (R. 26) Ultimately, at the fifth step of the analysis, the ALJ concluded that, considering Stewart's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that she can perform. (R. 27-28)
As stated above, in formulating Stewart's residual functional capacity, the ALJ concluded that, with certain restrictions, she was able to perform light work with certain limitations. (R. 22-23) Specifically, the ALJ imposed the following limitations:
(R. 23) (emphasis in original) In arriving at this conclusion, the ALJ considered and accorded weight to medical opinions set forth in the record. Stewart contends that the RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence of record because the ALJ failed to properly assess the medical opinions.
The amount of weight to be accorded to medical opinions is well-established. Generally, the ALJ will give more weight to the opinion of a source who has examined the claimant than to a non-examining source. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1). In addition, the ALJ generally will give more weight to opinions from a treating physician, "since these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant's] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations." Id., § 404.1527(c)(2). The opinion of a treating physician need not be viewed uncritically, however. Rather, only when an ALJ finds that "a treating source's opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of [a claimant's] impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence [of] record," must he give that opinion controlling weight. Id. Unless a treating physician's opinion is given controlling weight, the ALJ must consider all relevant factors that tend to support or contradict any medical opinions of record, including the patient/physician relationship; the supportability of the opinion; the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; and the specialization of the provider at issue. Id., § 404.1527(c)(1)-(6). "[T]he more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight [the ALJ generally] will give to that opinion." Id., § 404.1527(c)(4).
In the event of conflicting medical evidence, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained:
Becker v. Comm'r. of Soc. Sec. Admin., 403 Fed. Appx. 679, 686 (3d Cir. 2010). The ultimate issue of whether an individual is disabled within the meaning of the Act is for the Commissioner to decide. Thus, the ALJ is not required to afford special weight to a statement by a medical source that a claimant is "disabled" or "unable to work." See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1), (3); Dixon v. Comm'r. of Soc. Sec., 183 Fed. Appx. 248, 251-52 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[O]pinions on disability are not medical opinions and are not given any special significance.").
Although the ALJ may choose whom to credit when faced with a conflict, he "cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason." Diaz v. Comm'r. of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 505 (3d Cir. 2009). The ALJ must provide sufficient explanation of his final determination to provide a reviewing court with the benefit of the factual basis underlying the ultimate disability finding. Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981). In other words, the ALJ must provide sufficient discussion to allow the court to determine whether any rejection of potentially pertinent, relevant evidence was proper. Johnson v. Comm'r. of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 203-04 (3d Cir. 2008).
Stewart's Brief contains a section devoted to "Physical Health Evidence." See ECF Docket No. 13, p. 14-15. Dr. Lillis is the only physician who submitted an opinion relating to physical impairments. (R. 596-99).
I disagree. In fact, the ALJ adopted several of Lillis' findings. For instance, the ALJ imposed a sit/stand option every 60 minutes. (R. 22) This is in line with Lillis' finding that Stewart could sit for no more than two-hours at a time, stand for no more than one-hour at a time and that she would need to shift positions. (R. 597) Further, the ALJ imposed greater restrictions in some respects than Lillis thought necessary. Indeed, the ALJ imposed postural and environmental restrictions, which Lillis found were not required, and, unlike Lillis, she limited Stewart to simple tasks, decisions and instructions with few changes in the work processes, or locations and few independent decisions. (R. 23) Additionally, the ALJ cited to other medical evidence of record concerning Stewart's physical impairments such as her ankle, back pain, knee pain, asthma, and multiple sclerosis. (R. 24, Ex. 10F/8, 25, Exs. 8F, 24F, 25, 433, 25, Exs. 25F, 31F, 25) As such, I find that the RFC is not contrary to law and that it is supported by substantial evidence of record. See Barnett v. Berryhill, Civ. No. 18-637, 2018 WL 7550259, at * 4-5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2018) (noting that, "when an ALJ is relying upon other evidence to conclude that the claimant can do less than a medical source opined, or when an ALJ fashions an RFC in the absence of any medical opinion evidence, courts have adopted a more pragmatic view and have sustained the ALJ's exercise of independent judgment based upon all of the facts and evidence.") (citations omitted). Consequently, I find no basis for remand with respect to the ALJ's assessment of the physical health opinion evidence.
Again, Stewart contends that the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence of record because the ALJ allegedly failed to properly weigh the opinion evidence regarding her mental impairments. Dr. McDonald provided a Mental Medical Source Statement. (R. 970-975) In assessing the mental aptitudes needed to do unskilled work, McDonald found that Stewart had an "unlimited or very good" ability to: ask simple questions or request assistance; accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; and get along with co-workers or peers without unduly distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes. (R. 972) He also found that Stewart had a "limited but satisfactory" ability to: remember work-like procedures; understand and remember very short and simple instructions; carry out very short and simple instructions; maintain regular attendance and be punctual within customary, usually strict tolerances; sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision; make simple work-related decisions; respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting; deal with normal work stress; and be aware of normal hazards and take appropriate precautions. (R. 972) However, he found Stewart was "seriously limited" with respect to her ability to: work in coordination with or proximity to others without being unduly distracted and perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods. (R. 972) He also found Stewart was "unable to meet competitive standards" with respect to the ability to complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and had "no useful ability to function" with respect to the ability to maintain attention for two-hour segment. (R. 972) McDonald also opined that Stewart would miss more than four days of work each month. (R. 974)
The ALJ "decline[d] to afford Dr. McDonald's opinion much weight." (R. 25) She explained that the assessment did not disclose when McDonald last treated Stewart and that progress notes from the McClelland Family Practice indicated that Stewart discontinued counseling in May of 2011. (R. 25) The ALJ also noted that McDonald failed to include any progress notes documenting his clinical observations. (R. 25) Further, the ALJ noted that, "[b]eyond receiving psychotropic medicine from her primary care physician Dr. Lillis, the record is devoid of other forms of treatment related to the claimant's anxiety or depression." (R. 25) The ALJ also stated that, at the time of the hearing, Stewart was cooperative, was able to answer questions, and articulated her claims of disability without difficulty. (R. 22) Nevertheless, in accordance with certain of McDonald's findings, the ALJ fashioned an RFC which included mental limitations. She limited Stewart to simple tasks, decisions and instructions; no contact with the general public; occasional contact with co-workers and supervisors; no consistent, rapid, or production-rate pace; few changes in work processes or locations; and few independent decisions. (R. 23) I find that the ALJ provided sufficient explanation of her assessment so as to provide a reviewing court with the benefit of the factual basis underlying the ultimate disability finding. Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981). Further, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination in this regard.
In fact, Stewart does not seem to actually dispute the ALJ's specific findings in this regard. She does not identify any records indicating that she sought mental health treatment during the relevant period. Nor does she cite to McDonald's progress notes or treatment records. Instead, she faults the ALJ for failing to develop the record.
Stewart also contends that the ALJ failed to adequately explain the rejection of her subjective complaints in contravention of SSR 16-3p. SSR 16-3p went into effect on March 28, 2016 and supersedes SSR 96-7p, the previous rule governing the evaluation of subjective symptoms. See, SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (March 16, 2016). SSR 16-3p removes the term "credibility," clarifying that the subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of an individual's character but rather that an ALJ is to "consider all of the evidence in an individual's record ... to determine how symptoms limit ability to perform work-related activities." Id., at * 2. In so doing, an ALJ is to use a two-step process. Id., at * 2-3. Thus, after an ALJ finds "that the individual has a medically determinable impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to produce those symptoms," the ALJ shall then consider all of the evidence in the record when he/she evaluates the intensity and persistence of symptoms to determine how "symptoms limit [the] ability to perform work-related activities." Id. In this regard, and to the extent relevant and available, the ALJ should consider objective medical evidence; individual statements; other medical sources; non-medical sources; the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) and § 416.929(c)(3) including daily activities; the location, duration, frequency and intensity of pain or other symptoms; factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; the type, dosage, effectiveness and side effects of any medication an individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; treatment other than medication an individual receives or has received for relief of pain or other symptoms; any measures other than treatment used to relieve pain or other symptoms; and any other factors concerning an individual's functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. Id., at * 4-7.
Here, the ALJ cited to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529,
Therefore, this 4
