DONETTA W. AMBROSE, Senior District Judge.
Pending before the Court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 14 and 16). Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (ECF Nos. 15 and 17). After careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth below, I am denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 14) and granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 16).
Plaintiff brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying an application for supplemental security income pursuant to the Social Security Act. Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), David F. Brash, held video hearings on February 2, 2016 and again on June 1, 2017. (ECF No. 7-3). On February 13, 2017, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (ECF No. 7-2, pp. 17-34).
After exhausting all administrative remedies thereafter, Plaintiff filed this action. The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 14 and 16). The issues are now ripe for review.
The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Commissioner's decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate." Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Additionally, the Commissioner's findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner's decision or re-weigh the evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if the court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however, the district court must review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. §706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he cannot engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).
The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use when evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a). The ALJ must determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment, whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P., appx. 1; (4) if the impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant's impairments prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity ("RFC").
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).
With regard to opinion evidence, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to follow the treating physician rule when discounting the opinion of Dr. DeMatteis and further "erred by creating his mental RFC determination out of whole cloth." (ECF No. 15, pp. 9-15). The amount of weight accorded to medical opinions is well-established. Generally, the ALJ will give more weight to the opinion of a source who has examined the claimant than to a non-examining source. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(1). In addition, the ALJ generally will give more weight to opinions from a treating physician, "since these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant's] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations." Id. §416.927(c)(2). The opinion of a treating physician need not be viewed uncritically, however. Rather, only where an ALJ finds that "a treating source's opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of [a claimant's] impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence [of] record," must he give that opinion controlling weight. Id. "[T]he more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight [the ALJ generally] will give to that opinion." Id. § 416.927(c)(4).
If the ALJ finds that "a treating source's opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of [a claimant's] impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence [of] record," he must give that opinion controlling weight. Id. Also, "the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight [the ALJ generally] will give to that opinion." Id. §416.927(c)(4).
In the event of conflicting medical evidence, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained:
Becker v. Comm'r of Social Sec. Admin., No. 10-2517, 2010 WL 5078238, at *5 (3d Cir. Dec. 14, 2010). Although the ALJ may choose whom to credit when faced with a conflict, he "cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason." Diaz v. Comm'r of Soc. Security, 577 F.3d 500, 505 (3d Cir. 2009).
In this case, Plaintiff argues that the reasons the ALJ gave Dr. DeMatteis' opinion partial weight are not supported by substantial evidence. (ECF No. 15, pp. 9-13). The ALJ gave Dr. DeMatteis, a treating neurologist, partial weight, because the "assessed limitations are not fully supported by the medical evidence." Id. After relating Dr. DeMatteis' opinion in his medical source statement, the ALJ weighed the same. (ECF No. 7-2, p. 31). In so doing, the ALJ set forth examples of internal inconsistency and inconsistency with other evidence of record. Id.
(ECF No. 7-2, p. 31).
In challenging the reasons, Plaintiff first asserts that while it is true that the treatment records do not include any exertional limitations, this is not a valid reason for discounting the opinion because "there was no reason for Dr. DeMatteis to include any of these facts." (ECF No. 15, p. 11). A record need not contain anything in particular, nonetheless, it is appropriate for the ALJ to look to the treatment record for consistency. Consistency is a valid reason for crediting or discrediting evidence. See, 20 C.F.R. §§416.927, 404.1527 (Evaluating Opinion Evidence). Furthermore, I note that, as set forth above, this was not the only reason for discounting Dr. DeMatteis' opinion. See, ECF No. 7-2, p. 31.
Plaintiff also points to evidence of record to support Dr. DeMatteis' assessed limitations. (ECF No. 15, pp. 11-12). To be clear, the standard is not whether there is evidence to establish Plaintiff's position. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989).
Weidow v. Colvin, Civ. No. 15-765, 2016 WL 5871164 at *18 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2016). Thus, the question before me is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989). Therefore, Plaintiff's argument in this regard is misplaced.
Plaintiff next argues that "[t]he fact that an outdated State agency opinion from 2014 contradicts Dr. DeMatteis' assessment is not indicative of substantial evidence" and a non-examining physician's opinion cannot serve as a sufficient reason to discount a treating physician's opinion. (ECF No. 15, p. 13). To begin with, a treating doctor's opinion is not automatically entitled to greater weight over that of a non-examining doctor's opinion, as Plaintiff suggests. In accordance with the Regulations, the ALJ is charged with the responsibility of weighing all of the medical opinion evidence in determining whom to credit and he must explain his rationale for doing so. See, 20 C.F.R. §§404.1527; 416.927 (Evaluating Opinion Evidence). Additionally, an ALJ is entitled to rely upon the findings of an evaluator even if there is a lapse of time between the report and the hearing. Chandler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2012) ("The Social Security regulations impose no limit on how much time may pass between a report and the ALJ's decision in reliance on it."). In this case, the ALJ did not give the state agency medical consultant, Dr. Fox, great weight. (ECF No. 7-2, p. 30). Rather, the ALJ gave Dr. Fox's opinion only partial weight because Dr. Fox did not have the opportunity to review all of the records and the treatment records indicated Plaintiff had residual pain, numbness, and weakness. Id. As a result, the ALJ acknowledged subsequent medical limitations and accommodated the same in the RFC. Id. I am able to conduct a meaningful review and the ALJ's assessment is supported by substantial evidence. (ECF No. 7-2, pp. 23-32). Consequently, I find Plaintiff's arguments are without merit. Therefore, remand is not warranted.
Next, Plaintiff submits that the ALJ improperly created the mental RFC assessment "out of thin air." (ECF No. 15, p. 5). In support of the same, Plaintiff agrees that she has mental limitations, but simply argues that "it is unclear how the ALJ reached his mental RFC determination." Id. at 14. As such, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence such that remand is warranted. Id. After a review of the record, I disagree.
The ALJ determined Plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work with various physical and mental limitations. (ECF No. 7-2, p. 23). With regard to the mental limitations, the ALJ found numerous and specific exceptions.
(ECF No. 7-2, p. 23). "Rarely can a decision be made regarding a claimant's [RFC] without an assessment from a physician regarding the functional abilities of the claimant." Gormont v. Astrue, No. 11-2145, 2013 WL 791455 at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2013), citing Doak v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1986). In this case, however, the only opinion evidence related to Plaintiff's mental abilities is from the state agency consultant, Dr. Croyle, who determined that Plaintiff's mental impairment was nonsevere. (ECF No. 7-2, p. 31). The ALJ gave this opinion little weight because "Dr. Croyle did not have an opportunity to review all of the records at the time of his assessment. Further, he did not adequately consider the combined effect of the claimant's impairments." Id. Thus, contrary to Plaintiff's inferences, the ALJ is not rejecting more restrictive opinion evidence related to her mental impairments. Rather, after rejecting the mental opinion evidence that Plaintiff has a nonsevere mental impairment, the ALJ gave Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt and added additional limitations based on the other evidence of record. (ECF No. 7-2, pp. 23-32). To be clear, there is no medical opinion evidence opining that Plaintiff's alleged mental limitations result in limiting her abilities to function. In fact, as the ALJ pointed out, "[t]he record indicates that the claimant did not receive ongoing mental health treatment during the period under adjudication. Further, she often denied depression." (ECF No. 7-2, pp. 29-30). The ALJ then went on to provide Plaintiff's mental claims, with the benefit of the doubt, and included numerous mental limitations in the RFC. Providing Plaintiff with limiting mental abilities in the RFC only serves Plaintiff's advantage. Thus, I find remand is not warranted on this basis.
Plaintiff's husband testified at the hearing. (ECF No. 7-2, p. 31; No. 7-3, pp. 60-67). Plaintiff submits that the ALJ erred in failing to provide legitimate reasoning for discounting her husband's testimony. (ECF No. 7-2, pp. 15-16). Again, to be clear, the ALJ did not reject her husband's testimony. (ECF No. 7-2, pp. 31-32). Rather, the ALJ gave Plaintiff's husband's testimony "limited weight." (ECF No. 7-2, p. 32). As explained by the ALJ, the ALJ found Plaintiff's husband was not a medical professional and further that his statement was inconsistent with the overall medical evidence. Id. That is not to say, as Plaintiff infers, that the ALJ did not consider the evidence, just that he was not considering it as opinion evidence from a medical professional. After a review of the record, I find there is substantial evidence to support this finding of the ALJ. (ECF No. 7-2, pp. 23-32). Therefore, I find no error in this regard.
An appropriate order shall follow.
THEREFORE, this 25
