RICHARD A. LANZILLO, United States Magistrate Judge.
The cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Norman Johnston (ECF No. 46) and Defendants John Wetzel and Michael Overmyer (ECF No. 50) present primarily four issues:
The following factual background is largely undisputed. Johnston was committed to the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) in 1980 following a conviction for homicide. ECF No. 47 ¶ 1. He is serving a life sentence. Id. at ¶ 2. While incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution (SCI) at Huntingdon, he escaped from that facility on August 1, 1999. Id. at ¶ 3. Johnston was apprehended twenty days later, re-incarcerated at SCI-Camp Hill, and placed in solitary confinement.
Upon his transfer to SCI-Forest in 2005, Johnston was immediately placed in solitary confinement and housed in a cell that measured ninety-one square feet, but which provided only fifty-six square feet of practical space. Id. at ¶ 12. This cell had one narrow, five-inch window. Id. at ¶ 27. Johnston was isolated in this cell for twenty-three hours per day, seven days per week, for approximately eleven years. Id. at ¶ 14. His cell also contained a light fixture that he claims was left on twenty-four hours a day.
Johnston was allowed time in an "exercise cage" five days per week for one hour from 2005 until 2012. Id. at ¶ 15. Starting in 2012, he was permitted two hours in the exercise cage. Id. This cage measured seventy-five square feet and Johnston was not permitted access to any exercise equipment. Id. Access to this outdoor facility was withheld during inclement weather. Id. at ¶ 18. Johnson was not issued a single misconduct after April 7, 2013. Id. at ¶ 36. Approximately four months after filing this action, Johnston was released from solitary confinement, marking approximately seventeen years in solitary confinement. Id. at ¶ 43.
Between 2003 and 2005, the DOC instituted a program under which it placed certain inmates on a "Restricted Release List" or "RRL." Placement on the RRL meant that the inmate would be subjected to indefinite solitary confinement.
In or around 2012, the policy changed to include the Secretary's annual review of an inmate's status on the RLL. Since 2012, as to each RLL inmate, the Secretary annually receives a "vote sheet" that records a vote in favor or against release from solitary confinement and possible comments from the Superintendent and the Deputy Superintendent of the inmate's facility as well as from the Regional Deputy Secretary and the Executive Deputy Secretary. Following receipt of the vote sheet, the Secretary, as the sole decisionmaker, then determines whether an inmate will remain on or be removed from the RRL. Id. at pp. 41, 43. Between April 7, 2003 and the present, Johnston was not cited for misconduct or disciplined for any reason. The only concern ever expressed by a prison official in support of continuing his status on the RLL that he was "dangerously manipulative, simply by being so nice and polite all the time." (2016 Vote Sheet). Despite this assessment and no meaningful change in circumstances since it was made, Johnston was released to General Population at SCI-Forest on March 13, 2017.
Johnston initiated this action pro se on November 7, 2016. ECF No. 1. His Complaint alleged that the conditions and duration of his confinement violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and that the absence of any meaningful means to challenge that confinement violated his right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Attorney John F. Mizner entered his appearance on Johnston's behalf on March 1, 2017. ECF Nos. 11, 12.
On May 20, 2019, following a lengthy period of discovery, this Court approved the stipulated dismissal of several defendants. ECF No. 45. John Wetzel, Secretary of the DOC, and Michael Overmyer, Superintendent of SCI-Forest, are now the sole remaining defendants in this action. Both Johnston and Defendants Wetzel and Overmyer filed cross-motions for summary judgment, supporting briefs and concise statements of material facts on May 21, 2019. ECF Nos. 46, 47, 48; ECF Nos. 50, 51, 52. Each filed a response to the opposing party's concise statement of material facts. See ECF Nos. 59, 60, 61, 62. The parties' cross-motions for summary judgment are appropriate for simultaneous disposition. See Swanberg v. PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc. 2016 WL 4493684, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2016).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the court to enter summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial, the court must view the record and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party. Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v. Consol. Rail Corp., 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). To avoid summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party may not rest on the unsubstantiated allegations of his or her pleadings. Instead, once the movant satisfies its burden of identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must to go beyond his pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or other record evidence to demonstrate specific material facts that give rise to a genuine issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Further, under Rule 56, a defendant may seek summary judgment by pointing to the absence of a genuine fact issue on one or more essential claim elements. The Rule mandates summary judgment if the plaintiff then fails to make a sufficient showing on each of those elements. When Rule 56 shifts the burden of production to the nonmoving party, "a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. See Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1992).
The court applies the foregoing standards no differently when reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment. Lawrence v. City of Phila., 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008). "`Cross-motions are no more than a claim by each side that it alone is entitled to summary judgment, and the making of such inherently contradictory claims does not constitute an agreement that if one is rejected the other is necessarily justified or that the losing party waives judicial consideration and determination whether genuine issues of material fact exist.'" Id. (quoting Rains v. Cascade Indus., Inc., 402 F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 1968)). If review of cross-motions reveals no genuine issue of material fact, then judgment may be granted in favor of the party entitled to judgment in view of the law and undisputed facts. Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 F.3d 298, 302 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
Johnston argues that the Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment by keeping him in solitary confinement for more than seventeen years and that the Defendants also denied him his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by offering him no meaningful procedure or process to challenge his confinement conditions. The
Johnston commenced this action on November 7, 2016. Defendants contend that the statute of limitations bars Johnston's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, at least to the extent he seeks relief for injury that occurred prior to November 7, 2014, two years prior to his filing date. Because § 1983 provides no independent statute of limitations, federal courts look to the most analogous limitations period of the forum state. Dique v. New Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has determined that the Pennsylvania state law claim most analogous to a § 1983 claim is a personal injury action, which is subject to the Commonwealth's two-year statute of limitations under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.§ 5524. Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998); Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 190 (3d Cir. 1993). For purposes of calculating the two-year limitations period, a § 1983 cause of action typically accrues, and the statute of limitations commences to run, "when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which [his] action is based." Sameric, 142 F.3d at 599. Defendants argue that Johnston was aware of the conditions of his solitary confinement for well more than two years before he filed his lawsuit. Johnston counters that the "continuing violation" doctrine tolled or extended the limitations period on his claims.
The continuing violation doctrine is an "equitable exception to the timely filing requirement" that applies "when a defendant's conduct is part of a continuing practice." West v. Phila. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 754 (3d Cir. 1995) (superseded in part by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009)). This doctrine allows untimely actions to be considered timely "so long as the last act evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitations period" by instructing the court to "grant relief for the earlier related acts that would otherwise be time barred." Brenner, 927 F.2d at 1295. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that "[t]o prevail on a continuing violation theory, however, the plaintiff must show more than the occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts...." Jewett v. Int'l Tel. and Tel. Corp., 653 F.2d 89, 91 (3d Cir. 1981). A "continuing violation is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not continual ill effects from an original violation." Sandutch v. Muroski, 684 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1981)), abrogated on other grounds by Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 117 S.Ct. 1984, 138 L.Ed.2d 373 (1997).
The Court should consider three factors when determining whether a defendant's acts constitute a continuing practice or sporadic incident: (1) subject matter jurisdiction-whether the violations constitute the same type of discrimination, tending to connect them in a continuing violation; (2) frequency-whether the acts are recurring or more in the nature of isolated incidents; and (3) degree of permanence-whether the act had a degree of permanence which should trigger the plaintiff's awareness of and duty to assert his/her rights and whether the consequences of the act would continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to discriminate.
Here, Johnston has not alleged a series of distinct wrongs but rather he has claimed that Defendants' conduct is part of a continuing seventeen-year practice of unconstitutionally restricting him to solitary confinement. The rationale underlying the continuing violation doctrine applies to this type of claim. Shoatz, 2016 WL 595337, *3. Because Johnston filed suit within two years of his release from solitary confinement, he is entitled to challenge all conduct that was a part of that alleged violation of his rights, even conduct that occurred outside the limitations period.
The Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the record to support Johnston's Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Alternatively, they argue that qualified immunity shields them from liability on both claims. Johnston argues that the record establishes each of his claims as a matter of law and that neither Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Because an assessment of the legal sufficiency of the constitutional claims is an element of the qualified immunity analysis, the Court will address the viability of Johnston's claims in the context of qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity "shield[s] [government actors] from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (alterations in original) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). "When the material facts are not in dispute, the district court may decide whether a government official is shielded by qualified immunity as a matter of law." Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 n.6, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)).
The Supreme Court has mandated a two-step process for resolving issues of qualified immunity. First, "a court must decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged ... make out a violation of a constitutional right." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). If the plaintiff has satisfied this first step, the court must next decide "whether the law clearly established that the [defendant's] conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of the case" at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct. Id. In Mann v. Palmerton Area Sch. District,
Although the Supreme Court has instructed that the two steps of the qualified immunity analysis need not be addressed in sequential order, see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009), courts often find it efficient first to consider the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's constitutional claim before addressing whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the defendants' actions. See Jones v. Walsh, 2018 WL 1203472, at *4 n.4 (D.N.J. Mar. 8, 2018) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151) ("Because the first step of a qualified-immunity analysis is to examine whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the defendant violated a constitutional or statutory right, that question overlaps with the issue of whether the plaintiff has stated a claim under § 1983").
Johnston claims that the conditions of confinement to which he was subjected over a seventeen-year period violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court has "interpreted this prohibition... to impose affirmative duties on prison officials to `provide humane conditions of confinement.'" Young v. Martin, 801 F.3d 172, 177 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)). To succeed, Johnston must satisfy both an objective and a subjective element of the claim. First, he must establish that the Defendants' conduct was "objectively harmful enough or sufficiently serious to violate the Constitution." Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 473 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted). To meet the subjective component of this claim, Johnston must show that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to those conditions by acting with a reckless disregard of a known risk of harm. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-303, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991); Watson v. Sec'y Penn. Dep't of Corr., 567 Fed. Appx 75, 79 (3d Cir. 2014). So "the [prison] official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw that inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970.
Based upon the summary judgment record, the Court finds that a reasonable jury could conclude that Johnston's conditions of confinement were objectively harmful enough to constitute a constitutional violation. The facts, however, are not so clear and free from doubt to support judgment for Johnston as a matter of law as he requests in his motion for summary judgment.
The detrimental effects of prolonged solitary confinement on prisoners have been well documented. See, e.g., Reforming Restrictive Housing: The 2018 ASCA-Liman Nationwide Survey of Time-in-Cell, Yale Law School 2018; Jeffrey L. Metzner & Jamie Fellner, Solitary Confinement and
Other courts throughout the nation have similarly recognized the potential adverse effects of solitary confinement. Indeed, the Supreme Court, more than a century ago, observed, that when housed in isolation, "a considerable number of prisoners fell, after even a short confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to arouse them, and others became violently insane; others still, committed suicide; while those who stood the ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did not recover sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the community." In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168, 10 S.Ct. 384, 33 S.Ct. 835 (1890). See also Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Medley). More recently, several Supreme Court justices have noted the serious harms confinement in isolation inflicts on inmates. See Apodaca, et al. v. Raemisch, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 5, 6, 202 L.Ed.2d 251 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Ruiz v. Texas, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S.Ct. 1246, 1247, 197 L.Ed.2d 487 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of stay of execution); Glossip v. Gross, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2726, 2765, 192 L.Ed.2d 761 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2210, 192 L.Ed.2d 323 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Here, Johnston's seventeen years of solitary confinement deprived him of, at a minimum, exercise, sleep, social contact and interaction, and environmental stimulation. ECF No. 48, p. 8. These items have been recognized in a wide variety of cases as basic human needs. See, e.g., Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304, 111 S.Ct. 2321 (exercise); Conway v. Cty. Of Camden, 2017 WL 3783263, *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2017) (sleep); Shoatz v. Wetzel, 2016 WL 595337, *8 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2016) (social interaction and environmental stimulation). For seventeen years, Johnston's existence was limited to approximately sixty square feet of space, where he was confined twenty-three hours per day, seven day per week. He was permitted to go outdoors where he was confined to a cage for one hour each day during weekdays. After 2012, he was granted an extra hour of outdoor time. When the weather was inclement, he was confined to his cell twenty-four hours a day. Even when available, Johnston often did not avail himself of his permitted outdoor
ECF No. 46-2, 30-31.
Johnston's "primary view of the world" was through a small window that was later equipped with blinds to let the light in but prevent Johnston from seeing anything. See, e.g., Johnson, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 777. He had no contact or interaction with other inmates and no physical contact with visitors. In fact, except for incidental contact with corrections officers, Johnston had no physical contact with any other person for the duration of his stay in solitary confinement. Johnston's prolonged solitary confinement also caused him to suffer from cognitive impairment, chronic depression, emotional pain and suffering, and other psychological harms. ECF No. 48, p. 8-9.
The Court is mindful of the cases holding that solitary confinement "does not, in itself, violate the Constitution," and isolation "may be a necessary tool of prison discipline." Johnson v. Wetzel, 209 F.Supp.3d 766, 777, 780 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (citing Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 364 (3d Cir. 1992), superseded on other grounds by statute, Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq.). In Peterkin v. Jeffes, for example, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit examined conditions of solitary confinement in Pennsylvania correctional institutions comparable to those at issue in this case and held that they did not contravene the Eighth Amendment. 855 F.2d 1021, 1031 (3d Cir. 1988). There, the challenged conditions of confinement included 1) twenty-two or twenty-three hours of confinement in a cell per day; 2) limiting all activities (eating, sleeping, toileting, etc.) to the cell; 3) small cell size; 4) permitting showers only three times each week; 5) prohibiting physical contact with visitors; 5) access only to a small, outdoor caged activity area; and 6) no access to activities permitted prisoners in general population, including counseling. Id. at 1022. In holding that these conditions did not violate the Eighth Amendment, the Court emphasized:
Id. at 1032-33.
Unlike this case, however, the duration of the confinement was not at issue in Peterkin and the Supreme Court has instructed that the duration of confinement "cannot be ignored" in determining whether challenged conditions withstand constitutional scrutiny. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978). While no bright line exists to say when the duration of solitary confinement contravenes the Eighth Amendment, Johnston's seventeen-years align his case much closer to those finding a viable Eighth Amendment violation than those cases rejecting the claim. Compare
The second element of Johnston's Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim requires that he show that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the prison conditions that caused his constitutional injury. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833, 114 S.Ct. 1970; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297, 111 S.Ct. 2321; Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). To sustain this element, the record must support a finding that, subjectively, the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. The Supreme Court has explained:
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838, 114 S.Ct. 1970. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. A trier of fact may infer the existence of this subjective state of mind from the fact that the risk of harm is obvious. Id. at 842, 114 S.Ct. 1970. The Supreme Court further clarified in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002), that courts also "may infer the existence of this subjective state of mind from the fact that the risk of harm is obvious."
Defendants acknowledge that they were aware of Johnston's solitary confinement and the general conditions of that confinement, but they argue that the record is inadequate to support a finding that either of them believed that these conditions were harming Johnston to the point of an Eighth Amendment violation. The Court finds that genuine issues of material fact remain for trial regarding the extent of Wetzel's knowledge of the adverse effects Johnston was experiencing as a result of his prolonged isolation.
The record demonstrates that Wetzel was aware of the risks inherent in prolonged solitary confinement in general and that he was specifically aware of Johnston's situation. For example, Wetzel admitted to being familiar with the body of literature describing the negative effects of long-term solitary confinement. ECF No. 53-7, at 72. He also testified at his deposition that he knew of Dr. Grassian's research on the subject and that he had talked about Grassian's findings and conclusions with other doctors and professionals. Id. at 72-73. Additionally, the Secretary was named as a defendant in numerous other lawsuits in which courts recognized the negative impact of solitary confinement. See, e.g., Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 226 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting
Similarly, as the prison Superintendent and a member of the Program Review Committee (PRC), Overmyer personally interacted with and observed Johnston and voted against his release from the RRL in 2014 and 2015. Although Wetzel had the ultimate decision-making authority regarding Johnston's release, Overmyer's personal involvement in the asserted violation is enough to deny him summary judgment on Johnston's claim.
In sum, the Court holds that genuine issues of material fact remain for trial and preclude summary judgment as to viability of Johnston's Eighth Amendment claim against Wetzel and Overmyer. Accordingly, the Court will proceed to analyze whether the right asserted by Johnston was clearly established at the time the Defendants acted in this case.
As our Court of Appeals recognized in 1992, solitary confinement, while alone not seen as cruel and unusual, will become so when it is combined with other conditions that unreasonably threaten the physical or mental health of an inmate:
Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 363-64 (3d Cir. 1992), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Ghana v. Holland, 226 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685-87, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978); Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1029-30 (3d Cir. 1988)). Years earlier, in 1978, the Supreme Court instructed that "the length of confinement cannot be ignored in deciding whether the confinement meets constitutional standards." Hutto, 437 U.S. at 686, 98 S.Ct. 2565.
"For a right to have been `clearly established,' `existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.'" Williams, 848 F.3d at 570 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
Johnston contends that Wetzel and Overmyer violated his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide him with any meaningful review or opportunity to be heard in opposition to his seventeen-year detention in solitary confinement. "The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake." Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005). In analyzing a procedural due process claim, "the first step is to determine whether the nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the `liberty or property' language of the Fourteenth Amendment." Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2000). If the asserted interest falls within the protections of the Due Process Clause, the second step is to determine whether the plaintiff was afforded "all of the process he was due." Id. The Court begins then with the threshold question whether Johnston has asserted a liberty interest sufficient to trigger due process protections.
Liberty interests arise from the Constitution or "from an expectation or interest created by state laws." Williams v. Sec'y, Dep't. of Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 558-59 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005)). In the prison context, a protected liberty interest arises only where a restraint "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Williams v. Secretary Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 848 F.3d 549, 558-59 (3d Cir.) cert. denied sub nom. Walker v. Farnan, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 357, 199 L. Ed. 2d 263 (2017), and cert. denied sub nom. Williams v. Wetzel, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 357, 199 L. Ed. 2d 263 (2017) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). In determining whether a condition of confinement creates a protected liberty interest, a court must consider: "(1) the duration of the challenged conditions; and (2) whether the conditions overall imposed a significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2000). See also Williams, 848 F.3d at 560 (quoting Shoats); Powell v. Weiss, 757 F.3d 338, 346 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that Shoats is the governing standard). Employing that two-step inquiry in Shoats, the Court of Appeals determined
In Williams, the Third Circuit examined the "robust body of scientific research on the effects of solitary confinement" and concluded that indefinite exposure to isolated confinement causes "deep and long-term psychic harm" and "poses a grave threat to well-being." Id. at 566. Because such harm "is the essence of the atypical and significant hardship inquiry," the Court held that the plaintiffs, each of whom had been indefinitely confined on death row for several years after their death sentences had been overturned, possessed a "due process right to be free from indefinite conditions of solitary confinement." Id. at 566, 574-75.
Notably, the Third Circuit did not pronounce that any and every exposure to solitary confinement violates the Constitution. Such a holding would have run afoul of the United States Supreme Court's prior decision in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), in which the Court held that a thirty-day stay in solitary confinement did not give rise to a protected liberty interest. Id. at 486-87, 115 S.Ct. 2293. Rather, the Third Circuit held that inmates have a clearly established Fourteenth Amendment right to avoid unnecessary, unexamined, and indefinite solitary confinement. Williams, 848 F.3d at 574. As the Court of Appeals explained:
Id. at 562.
Like the unexamined and indefinite solitary confinement addressed in Williams, Johnston's seventeen-year stint in solitary confinement was not finite or fixed in duration. Instead, the record indicates that its end was more likely precipitated by the Williams decision or the filing of this lawsuit than any natural term or meaningful review. While his status was subject to annual review after 2012, the record supports that each review was pro forma at best, and, on this record, may not have considered any valid penological purpose for continuing Johnston in solitary confinement. While his initial eighteen-month commitment to solitary confinement was precipitated by an acute incident—his successful escape—the Defendants did not relate his subsequent years-long continuation in solitary confinement to this or any other misconduct.
In Williams, the Third Circuit explicitly distinguished solitary confinement as a disciplinary sanction from indefinite segregation. See Williams, 848 F.3d at 562 (noting that indefinite solitary confinement "contrasts sharply with other common forms of solitary confinement, such as ... punitive segregation"). See also Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485-86, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (holding that a finite
Further, the conditions of Johnston's solitary confinement were significantly harsher than those imposed on the general inmate population. See Williams, 848 F.3d at 561. As noted, for seventeen years, Johnston was confined to a small space with limited to no access to exercise and the outdoors; he was required to eat his meals alone in his cell; he was prohibited from showering more than three times a week. His visitation privileges were severely limited as compared with those of other inmates. Johnston was not permitted to participate in any of the institution's educational, recreational, or vocational programs. And he was not provided any meaningful avenue to challenge his confinement. The Court concludes that these deprivations departed significantly from the normal hardships of prison life and thereby triggered a protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Having concluded that Johnston's protracted solitary confinement implicated his right to due process, the question becomes whether he received the process to which he was due under the Constitution. In support of their position that he did, Defendants rely primarily upon the Third Circuit's decision in Shoats v. Horn, which held that although the plaintiff had "a protected liberty interest that ha[d] been adversely affected by his indefinite segregation in administrative custody," he had not "been deprived of the process he is due under the Fourteenth Amendment." 213 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2000). Shoats, however, does not provide the blanket approval of the DOC practices that the Defendants suggest in their brief. ECF No. 51, p. 25-26. The Third Circuit has clarified its holding on that very point, writing:
Williams, 848 F.3d at 575-76, (emphasis added). As Williams makes clear, the due process analysis in this context is fact-specific, and the facts of this case are distinguishable from those in Shoats. Here, the record falls short of establishing as a manner of law that Johnston's protracted solitary confinement received meaningful review. Indeed, on the existing record, a jury could reasonably find that the reviews that occurred were pro forma and meaningless. This conclusion is bolstered by the
Although a closer call, the Court finds that the record also supports Johnston's due process claim against Overmyer. As the Court previously discussed, a reasonable jury ultimately may find that the process of reviewing Johnston's prolonged and indefinite solitary confinement was pro forma and meaningless. Overmyer participated directly in that process. It is true that Wetzel was the sole decision maker regarding whether Johnston would be removed from the RRL. Nevertheless, Overmyer's involvement in the process was significant enough to sustain a viable claim against him.
Having concluded that the summary judgment record adequately supports Johnston's due process claim against both Wetzel and Overmyer, the Court will turn to whether qualified immunity shields them from suit on this claim. In Williams, the Court made "clear what prison officials should have already known: those no longer subject to the death penalty ... have a due process right to be free from indefinite conditions of solitary confinement." Williams, 848 F.3d at 574-75 (quoting Plaintiffs' Supp. Br. at 4). The Court so proclaimed on February 9, 2017, a little more than a month before Johnston was released to General Population. The facts and circumstances of the present case differ from those underlying the Williams decision. Here, Johnston was never subject to the death penalty; his initial placement in solitary confinement was based upon his escape in 1999. This distinction does not appear to be material. What is more significant is that at least since 2012, a process ostensibly existed to review Johnston's continuation on the RRL. While acknowledging the existence of this process, Johnston has proffered evidence from which a jury may find that the Defendants exercised their roles in the process in a manner that rendered it meaningless. At the same time, Defendants do not genuinely dispute that the process did not afford Johnston a meaningful opportunity to be heard and challenge his continuation on the RRL.
Johnston has presented enough evidence to preclude dismissal of his due process claim based upon qualified immunity. Johnston is not claiming a liberty interest because he was placed on the RRL. Nor is he making a facial challenge to DOC policy. Rather, as he explains, Johnston raises an as applied challenge to the deprivation of his liberty interest through the failure to provide notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard and challenge his prolonged solitary confinement and to the "conscience-shocking" decisions to continue him in solitary confinement for an exceptionally long period of time without providing sufficient procedural protections.
As the Court noted previously, since 2000, the Court of Appeals has determined that eight years in administrative custody, where, for example, an inmate is confined to his cell for 23 hours each day, eats meals by himself, and is prohibited from participating in organization activities, is atypical and implicates a protected liberty interest. Shoats, 213 F.3d at 144. The Third Circuit also held that an "informal, nonadversary review at which the prisoner has the opportunity to state his views satisfies the requires of due process." Id. (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 476, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)). Further, based on the current record, the Court cannot say as a matter of law that Johnston's long-term solitary confinement was based upon security or other legitimate penological considerations, and not punitive. The procedural protections that are due to a prison inmate facing a disciplinary
The law establishing what amount of due process is required when a prisoner's liberty interest is at stake has been clear since at least 1983, when the Supreme Court decided Hewitt, supra. See Shoatz, 2016 WL 595337, *13. Here, the summary judgment record, when viewed in the light most favorable to Johnston, raises genuine issues of material fact as to whether he has been deprived of due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment that were well-established when Wetzel and Overmyer acted in this case. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff Norman Johnston's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 46) and Defendant John Wetzel and Michael Overmyer's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 50) are denied.
Ordered and entered this
