MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SILVIA CARREÑO-COLL, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiffs seek to discover the contents of the various settlement agreements reached between the parties to this case and the case with which it was consolidated, Civ. No. 12-1797. Previously, I denied a motion to compel this information because of the parties failure to meet and confer on the matter. See Docket No. 341. Now, Plaintiffs inform the Court that the parties were not able to agree to a resolution, and they renew their motion to compel. See Docket No. 345. For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted.

No court of appeals has ruled on the question of when and to what extent a party may compel the disclosure of a confidential settlement agreement between other parties to the litigation.1 The First Circuit, however, has pointed out that there are two conflicting lines of cases on the question. See Mathewson Corp. v. Allied Marine Indus., Inc., 827 F.2d 850, 852 n.2 (1st Cir. 1987) (Selya, J.). The first of these lines stems from Bottaro v. Hatton Associates, where the Eastern District of New York held that a party seeking such information must make a "particularized showing of a likelihood that admissible evidence will be generated by the" agreements' disclosure. 96 F.R.D. 158, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). Bottaro's was based principally on what it reasoned were policy considerations, embodied in the Rules of Evidence, "favoring settlements and . . . insulating the bargaining table from unnecessary intrusions." Id.

The other line of cases grew out of Bennet v. La Pere, which rejected Bottaro's "particularized showing" test. 112 F.R.D. 136, 139-40 (D.R.I. 1986) (Selya, J.). Instead, Bennet focused on the liberality of discovery under the Rules of Civil Procedure, reasoning that "[i]f there is some legitimate relevance to the requested information and if no cognizable privilege attaches, it ought to be discoverable." Id. at 138. Bennet went on to itemize the many ways that disclosure of settlement agreements might lead to discoverable information. See id. at 138-40. More to the point, Bennet implicitly rejected taking an in camera look at the agreements to determine whether, in the court's opinion, they might lead to discoverable information. Instead, Bennet tips the scales strongly in favor of disclosure, noting that only after disclosure will the discovering party know whether anything in the agreements will be admissible. See id. at 139 ("There is, of course, no satisfactory way for the [discovering party] to determine whether it can slip within the integument of the Rule 408 exception unless it gains discovery access to the settlement documents.").

In the years since Bottaro and Bennet were decided, the balance of the precedent has supported Bennet's rule.2 Every case from this circuit considering the question has been decided in keeping with Bennet's reasoning. See, e.g., Cook v. CTC Commc'n Corp., Civ. No. 06-58, 2006 WL 3313838, at *3 (D.N.H. Nov. 13, 2006) (following Bennet); Atchison Casting Corp. v. Marsh, Inc., 216 F.R.D. 225, 227 (D. Mass. 2003) (holding that the "broad scope of the discovery rules" required disclosure);3 EnergyNorth Nat. Gas, Inc. v. Cent. Indem. Co., Civ. No. 97-64, 2000 WL 33667085, at *1 (D.N.H. March 8, 2000) (following Bennet). Likewise, the district from which Bottaro emerged has lately rejected its reasoning. See, e.g., Rates Tech. Inc. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., Civ. No. 05-3583, 2006 WL 3050879, at *3 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2006) (holding that Bottaro was in conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see also ABF Capital Mgt. v. Askin Capital Mgt., Civ. No. 96-2978, 2000 WL 191698, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2000) ("Prevailing authority within this Circuit holds that the discovery of settlement-related information is governed by [Rule 26(b)(1)], and that no heightened showing of relevance need be made in order to justify the disclosure of the settlement agreement."). Based on what I see as a trend in the case law, I too will follow Bennet.

Bennet makes a presumption in favor of the agreements' disclosure; the party opposing discovery has the burden of "establishing some good cause or sound reason for blocking disclosure." 112 F.R.D. at 140. Defendants—the parties opposing discovery here—fail entirely to meet this burden.4 They write that "the prejudicial value of these agreements is immense" because "jurors will immediately wonder why Defendants would pay any money at all to settle a claim they deny liability for." Docket No. 347, at 4. This confuses discover-ability with admissibility. The fact that I am ordering disclosure of the settlement agreements does not mean that Plaintiffs will be able to introduce them at trial; to the contrary, Federal Rule of Evidence 408 makes the agreements presumptively inadmissible. See Bennet, 112 F.R.D. at 139, 141 & n.3.5 Furthermore, without a prior order from this Court, Plaintiffs are prohibited from disclosing the contents of the settlement agreements to any non-parties to this litigation. With these caveats, the motion to compel is GRANTED; all settling parties shall promptly produce to Plaintiffs copies of any settlement agreements.6

IT IS SO ORDERED.