MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

SILVIA CARREÑO-COLL, Magistrate Judge.

Attached are the instructions that I propose to give the jury at the close to trial, along with a proposed verdict form. In preparing these proposed instructions, I have thoroughly reviewed the parties' submissions, but I have not followed them in every respect.1 Below, in order to stream-line the charge conference in this case, I briefly explain some of the decisions that I have made, as well as their legal bases.

The most significant departure from the parties' submissions is my decision not to instruct the jury as to Plaintiffs' negligent design claim. This position finds strong support in the Restatement, which provides that "two or more factually identical defective-design claims . . . should not be submitted to the trier of fact in the same case under different doctrinal labels." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, cmt. n. This is because regardless of doctrinal label, design claims "rest on a risk-utility assessment." Id. Thus, submitting both a negligence and a strict-liability claim to the jury "would generate confusion and may well result in inconsistent verdicts." Id.

In Puerto Rico courts, of course, there are no civil juries, and so the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has not spoken to this question. I note, however, that case law from the Supreme Court of California, strictly interpreted, suggests that a plaintiff should have the option of determining whether one or both of the theories are submitted to the jury. See Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., 19 Cal.3d 530, 543 (1977), overruled on other grounds, Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 8 Cal.4th 548, 574 (1994); see also Montez v. Ford Motor Co., 101 Cal.App.3d 315, 317 (1980) ("A plaintiff in an action for personal injuries in a products liability case is not required to elect whether to proceed on a theory of strict liability in tort or on a theory of negligence where the instructions on the two theories will not be confusing to the jury."). In Hasson, however, the plaintiff's negligence theory did not depend on the existence of a defect. Hasson, 19 Cal. 3d at 543. Other cases from California, moreover, have recognized that where the plaintiff's negligence claim depends on the existence of a defect, submitting both a strict liability and negligence claim to the jury risks a possibility of inconsistent verdicts. See Lambert v. Gen. Motors, 67 Cal.App.4th 1179 (1998) ("Where liability depends on the proof of a design defect, no practical difference exists between negligence and strict liability; the claims merge."); see also Boekamp v. Gen. Motors, LLC, D062390, 2013 WL 5807627, at *4 (Cal. App. Nov. 15, 2013) (following Lambert). Oxford v. Foster Wheeler LLC, 177 Cal.App.4th 700, 720-21 (collecting cases and following Lambert). And even the cases rejecting election in principle recognize that in cases where the negligence action depends on the existence of a defect, negligence instructions are superfluous. See Montez, 101 Cal. App. 3d at 319-20 ("[A]lthough instructions on the two theories would not have been necessarily confusing to the jury, they were not necessary." (internal citations omitted)).

Here, Plaintiffs bring both a strict-liability design claim and a negligent design claim. Both claims depend on the existence of a design defect, and both require the application of a risk-utility balancing. The difference is that the negligence claim requires an additional showing. See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 26 Cal.4th 465, 479 (2001) ("[U]nder either a negligence or a strict liability theory of products liability, to recover from a manufacturer, a plaintiff must prove that a defect caused the injury. Under a negligence theory, a plaintiff must also prove an additional element, namely, that the defect in the product was due to negligence of the defendant." (internal quotations and citations omitted)); see also id. at 481 (explaining that "the risk/utility test for defective design . . . applies in a products liability action under both negligence and strict liability theories"); see also Vazquez-Filipetti v. Banco Popular de P.R., 504 F.3d 43, 52-53 (1st Cir. 2007) (recognizing that Puerto Rico negligent design law is drawn from its strict liability design defect case law, which is itself drawn from California law). Given the above, I see no good reason for instructing the jury on the law of negligent design: if the jury finds that a defect existed, Ox Bodies would be liable regardless of its negligence. Including instructions as to negligent design, on the other hand, may confuse the jury and risks the possibility of inconsistent verdicts. The better course is to instruct the jury only as to the theory with the lower standard of proof for Plaintiffs: strict liability.

A second point of departure with the parties' submissions has to do with the burden of proof. Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 15 provides that the burden never shifts, but their Proposed Jury Instruction No. 38 is to the contrary. Similarly, Plaintiffs' Proposed Instruction No. 14 places on themselves the burden of "establish[ing] that a reasonable alternative design would have reduced the injuries that caused the death of Maribel Quilez." Docket No. 427, at 16. A strict products liability plaintiff's burden is a simple one: he must show that the defendant's design proximately caused (or exacerbated) his injuries; at that point, the burden shifts to the defendant "to establish that the benefits of the design out-weigh[] its risks." Collazo-Santiago v. Toyota Motor Corp., 149 F.3d 23, 27 (1st Cir. 1998). This burden-shifting framework follows California law. See Quintana-Ruiz v. Hyundai Motor Corp., 303 F.3d 62, 69 (1st Cir. 2002). As Puerto Rico law recognizes, moreover, the risk/utility balancing generally inquires into the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design. Id. However, while the Restatement suggests that the plaintiff has the burden to put forth the reasonable alternative design, California rejects this notion as fundamentally inconsistent with burden-shifting principles. See Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 8 Cal.4th 548, 571 n.8 (1994) (reaffirming that under California law, "the manufacturer has the burden of proving that the utility of the challenged design outweighs its dangers"); Feliciano v. Toyota Indus. Equipment Mfg., Inc., No. A110538, 2007 WL 2020056, at *7 (Cal. App. July 13, 2007) (following Soule and holding that the plaintiff need not prove safer alternative design). Given that California's law regarding burdens of proof is based upon Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 143 Cal.3d 413 (1978), on which the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has expressly relied, I see no reason to depart from California law on this question.

A few other brief notes:

The parties shall come prepared to the charge conference with their objections to the proposed instructions, legal support for those objections, and proposed alternative language.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

JURY INSTRUCTION 1 PROVINCE OF THE COURT AND JURY

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:

Now that you have heard the evidence and the argument, it becomes my duty to give you the instructions of the Court as to the law applicable to this case.

It is your duty as jurors to follow the law as stated in the instructions of the court, and to apply the rules of law so given to the facts as you find them from the evidence in the case.

You are not to single out one instruction alone as stating the law, but must consider the instructions as a whole. And unless I state otherwise, you should consider each instruction given to apply separately and individually to each plaintiff and to each defendant in the case.

You should not be concerned with the wisdom of any rule of law stated by the Court. Regardless of any opinion you may have as to what the law ought to be, it would be a violation of your sworn duty to base a verdict upon any other view of the law than that given in sworn duty, as judges of the facts, to base a verdict upon anything but the evidence in the case.

Nothing I say or have said through out trial in these instructions is to be taken as an indication that I have any opinion about the facts of the case or what that opinion is. It is not my function to determine the facts: it is yours.

Justice through trial by jury must always depend upon the willingness of each individual juror to seek the truth as to the facts from the same evidence presented to all the jurors, and to arrive at a verdict by applying the same rules of law, as given in the instructions of the Court.

You must perform your duties as jurors without bias or prejudice as to any party. The law does not permit you to be governed by sympathy, prejudice or public opinion or a desire to rule promptly on the case. All parties expect that you will carefully and impartially consider all of the evidence, follow the law as it is now being given to you, and reach a just verdict, regardless of the consequences.

JURY INSTRUCTION 2 ALL PERSONS STAND EQUAL BEFORE THE LAW

This case should be considered and decided by you as an action between persons of equal standing in the community, of equal worth, and holding the same or similar stations in life. All persons stand equal before the law, and are to be dealt with as equals in a court of justice. This includes corporations like Ox Bodies, which is a person under the law.

JURY INSTRUCTION 3 AGENTS OF CORPORATIONS

A corporation may act only through natural persons as its agents or employees. In general, agents or employees of a corporation may bind the corporation by their acts and declarations made while acting within the scope of their authority delegated to them by the corporation, or within the scope of their duties as employees of the corporation.

JURY INSTRUCTION 4 PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE

"Establish by a preponderance of the evidence" means to prove that something is more likely so than not so. In other words, a preponderance of the evidence means such evidence as, when considered and compared with the evidence opposed to it, has more convincing force, and produces in your minds belief that what is sought to be proved is more likely true than not true. This standard does not require proof to an absolute certainty, since proof to an absolute certainty is seldom possible in any case.

In determining whether any fact in issue has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence you may, unless otherwise instructed, consider the testimony of all witnesses, regardless of who may have called them, and all exhibits received in evidence, regardless of who may have produced them.

Many of you will have heard of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt." This is the standard in criminal cases: it requires more proof than a preponderance of the evidence. The reasonable doubt standard does not apply to a civil case such as this, and you should put that standard out of your mind.

JURY INSTRUCTION 5 "IF YOU FIND" OR "IF YOU DECIDE"

When I say in these instructions that a party has the burden of proof of any proposition, or use the expressions "if you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded, considering all of the evidence in the case, that the proposition is more probably true than not true.

JURY INSTRUCTION 6 "DIRECT" AND "CIRCUMSTANTIAL" EVIDENCE

Generally speaking, there are two types of evidence that are presented during a trial: direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. "Direct evidence" can be a document or the testimony of a person who asserts or claims to have actual knowledge of a fact, such as an eyewitness. "Indirect" or "circumstantial" evidence is proof of a chain of facts and circumstances indicating the existence or nonexistence of a fact.

As a general rule, the law makes no distinction between the weight or value to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence. Nor is a greater degree of certainty required of circumstantial evidence. You are simply required to find the facts in accordance with the preponderance of all the evidence in the case, both direct and circumstantial.

JURY INSTRUCTION 7 WHAT IS, AND WHAT IS NOT, EVIDENCE

In reaching your verdict you may consider only the testimony and exhibits received into evidence and the parties' stipulated facts as informed to you by the Court.

During the course of trial, certain testimony was presented to you by way of the reading of a deposition. You should give this testimony the same consideration you would give it had the witnesses appeared and testified here in court. Certain things are not evidence and you may not consider them in deciding what the facts are. I will list them for you:

JURY INSTRUCTION 8 INFERENCES

You are to consider only the evidence in the case. But in your consideration of the evidence you are not limited to the bald statements of the witnesses. In other words, you are not limited solely to what you see and hear as the witnesses testify. You are permitted to draw, from facts which you find have been proved, such reasonable inferences as seem justified in the light of your experience.

Inferences are deductions or conclusions which reason and common sense lead the jury to draw from facts which have been established by the evidence in the case.

JURY INSTRUCTION 9 NUMBER OF WITNESSES

You are not bound to decide any issue of fact in accordance with the testimony of any number of witnesses which does not produce in your minds belief in the likelihood of truth, as against the testimony of a lesser number of witnesses or other evidence which does produce such belief in your minds.

The test is not which side brings the greater number of witnesses, or presents the greater quantity of evidence, but which witness, and which evidence, appeals to your minds as being most accurate and otherwise trustworthy.

The testimony of a single witness which produces in your minds belief in the likelihood of truth is sufficient for the proof of any fact, and would justify a verdict in accordance with such testimony, even though a number of witnesses may have testified to the contrary, if, after consideration of all the evidence in the case, you hold greater belief in the accuracy and reliability of the one witness.

JURY INSTRUCTION 10 CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES

You are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight their testimony deserves. You may be guided by the appearance and conduct of the witness, or by the manner in which the witness testifies, or by the character of the testimony given, or by evidence contrary to the testimony.

You should carefully examine all the testimony given, the circumstances under which each witness has testified, and every matter in evidence tending to show whether a witness is worthy of belief. Consider each witness' intelligence, motive and state of mind, and demeanor or manner while testifying.

Consider the witness's ability to observe the matters as to which the witness has testified, and whether the witness impresses you as having an accurate recollection of these matters. Also, consider any relation each witness may have with either side of the case, the manner in which each witness might be affected by the verdict, and the extent to which the testimony of each witness is either supported or contradicted by other evidence in the case.

Inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony of a witness, or between the testimony of different witnesses may or may not cause you to discredit such testimony. Two or more persons seeing an event may see or hear it differently.

In weighing the effect of a discrepancy, always consider whether it pertains to a matter of importance or an unimportant detail, and whether the discrepancy results from innocent error or intentional falsehood.

After making your own judgment, you will give the testimony of each witness such weight, if any, that you may think it deserves. In short, you may accept or reject the testimony of any witness, in whole or in part.

JURY INSTRUCTION 11 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES

A witness may be discredited or impeached by contradictory evidence or by evidence that at some other time the witness has said or done something, or has failed to say or do something, that is inconsistent with the witness's present testimony.

If you believe any witness has been impeached and thus discredited, you may give the testimony of that witness as much credibility, if any, you think it deserves.

If a witness is shown knowingly to have testified falsely about any material matter, you have a right to distrust such witness's other testimony and you may reject all the testimony of that witness or give it such credibility as you may think it deserves.

A witness's false testimony is given "knowingly" if it is done voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.

JURY INSTRUCTION 12 PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS

Evidence that, at some other time while not under oath, a witness who is not a party to this action has said or done something inconsistent with the witness's testimony at the trial, may be considered for the sole purpose of judging the credibility of the witness. However, such evidence may never be considered as evidence of proof of the truth of any such statement.

Where the witness is a party to the case, and by such statement or other conduct admits some fact or facts against the witness's interest, then such statement or other conduct, if knowingly made or done, may be considered as evidence of the truth of the fact or facts so admitted by such party, as well as for the purpose of judging the credibility of the party as a witness.

JURY INSTRUCTION 13 EXPERT WITNESSES

The rules of evidence normally do not permit witnesses to testify as to opinions or conclusions. There is an exception to this rule for "expert witnesses." An expert witness is a person who by education and experience has become expert in some art, science, profession, or calling. Expert witnesses give their opinions as to matters in which they profess to be expert, and may also state their reasons for their opinions.

You should consider each expert opinion received in evidence in this case and give it such weight as you think it deserves. If you should decide the opinion of an expert witness is not based upon sufficient education and experience, or if you should conclude the reasons given in support of the opinion are not sound, or if you feel the expert's opinion is outweighed by other evidence, you may disregard the opinion entirely.

JURY INSTRUCTION 14 LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS

You will recall that during the course of this trial I instructed you to disregard certain testimony and to consider certain exhibits for a limited purpose. You may consider such evidence only for the specific limited purposes for which it was admitted.

JURY INSTRUCTION 15 LIABILITY

Plaintiffs claim damages for their own personal injuries alleged to have been suffered as a result of Maribel Quilez-Bonelli's death. Maribel Quilez-Bonelli died as the result of a rear-impact collision with a dump truck owned by the Municipality of San Juan. Plaintiffs allege that their damages were proximately caused by the dump truck's rear underride guard, which was designed and manufactured by Defendant Ox Bodies, Inc. Plaintiffs argue that the rear underride guard was defectively designed.

Defendant Ox Bodies argues that the underride guard it designed was not defective. It further argues that the accident in which Maribel Quilez died was the result of her own negligence as well as the negligence of the Municipality of San Juan.

JURY INSTRUCTION 16 ELEMENTS OF A DESIGN DEFECT CLAIM

To prevail on their defective design claim, the plaintiffs must first prove that they were harmed and that the rear underride guard that Ox Bodies designed proximately caused their damages.

If you find that the plaintiffs meet this burden, you must then determine whether Ox Bodies successfully proved that, in the balance of interests, the benefits offered by its design exceeded the risks inherent in that design. In deciding whether the benefits outweigh the risks, you should consider the following:

In weighing the risk and utility of Ox Bodies' design, you may consider that a manufacturer has a duty to design and manufacture its products so as reasonably to reduce the foreseeable harm that may occur in an accident brought about by causes other than a product defect.

You may also consider Ox Bodies' compliance with applicable federal regulations in determining whether the rear uderride guard was defective with respect to the risks sought to be reduced by the regulation. Compliance does not, however, preclude you from finding a product defect.

The relevant regulation in this case is 49 CFR 393.86(b), which requires that all vehicles manufactured after December 31, 1952, except trailers or semi-trailers, in which the vertical distance between the rear bottom edge of the body and the ground is greater than 30 inches be equipped with a rear underride guard. The regulation further requires that:

JURY INSTRUCTION 17 FORESEEABILITY

When I speak of foreseeability, I do not mean that the person must be able to foresee the precise sequence of events that give rise to another's injuries. Instead, liability may arise where a person should have foreseen, in a general way, the consequences of its actions. That said, there is no duty to foresee all possible consequences of one's actions, just those that would have been foreseeable to a reasonable and prudent person under the same circumstances.

JURY INSTRUCTION 18 PROXIMATE CAUSE

An injury is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act whenever it appears from the evidence that the act or failure to act played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. An injury may have more than one proximate cause: indeed, many factors or things, or the conduct of two or more persons, may operate at the same time, either independently or together, to cause injury and damage. In such case, each may be a proximate cause.

JURY INSTRUCTION 19 COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

In addition to denying that there was a defect in the underride guard, Defendant Ox Bodies has alleged that the plaintiffs' injuries were caused by the negligence of the decedent, Maribel Quilez-Bonelli, and the Municipality of San Juan.

Under Puerto Rico law, the actions of multiple people can proximately cause an injury. This is called comparative fault. By arguing comparative fault, Ox Bodies argues that even if its product was defectively designed, most of the responsibility for the plaintiffs' injuries rests on the negligent acts of others.

Under Puerto Rico law, negligence on the part of Maribel Quilez or the Municipality of San Juan does not automatically exempt Ox Bodies from liability. Instead, if you also find that Ox Bodies bears some responsibility, it would entail a reduction in the amount of damages that Ox Bodies owes the plaintiffs.

The burden is on Ox Bodies to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Maribel Quilez or the Municipality of San Juan was at fault and that such fault contributed one of the proximate causes for Plaintiffs' injuries and damages.

What this all means is that you may find that the plaintiffs' injuries were caused by the acts of all of these people, that is, by the defendant, Ox Bodies, and Maribel Quilez and the Municipality, or you can find that the injuries are entirely the fault of any one or combination of them, or you can find that none of these entities are responsible.

On your verdict form, you will be asked whether you find either Defendant Ox Bodies or Maribel Quilez or the Municipality—or all or any of them—at fault, and you will be asked to assign a percentage of fault to each. You may assign a percentage from 0 to 100 to any party, but the sum of the percentages must be exactly 100.

JURY INSTRUCTION 20 NEGLIGENCE DEFINED

I will now briefly define negligence for you. Under Puerto Rico law, negligence means the failure to use reasonable care. A failure to use reasonable care is a failure to anticipate or foresee the rational consequences of an act or a failure to act, which a prudent and reasonable person could have foreseen under the same circumstances.

Proof of negligence requires three showings:

To prevail on its arguments that Maribel Quilez and/or the Municipality was negligent in this case, Ox Bodies must prove each of these elements by a preponderance of the evidence.

JURY INSTRUCTION 21 LEGAL DUTIES

In evaluating whether or not Maribel Quilez-Bonelli or the Municipality of San Juan acted negligently, you may consider the following legal principles:

JURY INSTRUCTION 22 CONSIDER DAMAGES ONLY IF NECESSARY

If the plaintiffs have proven their claim against the defendants, you must determine the damages to which the plaintiffs are entitled. You should not interpret the fact that I have given instructions about the plaintiffs' damages as an indication in any way that I believe that the plaintiffs should, or should not, win this case. It is your task first to decide whether the defendants are liable. I am instructing you on damages only so that you will have guidance in the event you decide that the defendants are liable and that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover money from the defendants. If you find that the plaintiffs have failed to prove their claim, then you will not consider the question of damages.

JURY INSTRUCTION 23 INJURY IN FACT

If you find that Defendant Ox Bodies is liable to the plaintiffs, then you must determine an amount that is fair compensation for all of the plaintiffs' damages. These damages are called compensatory damages.

The purpose of compensatory damages is to make the plaintiffs whole: that is, to compensate the plaintiffs for the damages they have suffered. Compensatory damages are not limited to expenses that the plaintiffs may have incurred because of their injuries. Instead, plaintiffs are entitled to compensatory damages for the pain and suffering, mental anguish, shock, and discomfort that they have suffered because of Ox Bodies' conduct.

You may award damages only for those injuries which you find plaintiffs have proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, to have been the direct result of Ox Bodies' actions. The damages that you award must be fair compensation for all of the plaintiffs' damages, no more and no less. The damages may not be reduced because of any comparative negligence on the part of the decedent, Maribel Quilez-Bonelli, or the Municipality of San Juan, as any such reduction will be made by me based on the law of Puerto Rico after you have returned your verdict. Likewise, the amount of damages may not be reduced because of any insurance, disability, or other benefits that the plaintiffs may be receiving.

Damages are not allowed as a punishment and cannot be imposed or increased to penalize Defendant Ox Bodies. You should not award compensatory damages for speculative injuries, though you may award compensatory damages for injuries that the plaintiffs are reasonably likely to suffer in the future.

If you decide to award compensatory damages, you should be guided by dispassionate common sense. Computing damages may be difficult, but you must not let that difficulty lead you to engage in arbitrary guesswork. On the other hand, the law does not require that the plaintiff prove the amount of his losses with mathematical precision, but only with as much definiteness and accuracy as the circumstances permit.

You must use sound discretion in fixing an award of damages, drawing reasonable inferences where you find them appropriate from the facts and circumstances in evidence.

JURY INSTRUCTION 24 RELATIVES' RIGHT TO COMPENSATION

The family of a deceased person may claim their own indirect mental anguish flowing from the direct injuries of the principal victim. Accordingly, the parents and siblings of an injured person, who themselves suffer damages for mental anguish and suffering, have a right to a separate and contingent cause of action.

In this case, Plaintiffs allege that Ox Bodies' actions caused the death of Maribel Quilez-Bonelli and that Plaintiffs—her relatives—were themselves indirectly injured by this fact. Your computation of damages should take into account the damages suffered Maribel Quilez's parents, Berardo A. Quilez-Velar and Marta Bonelli-Cabán, and her brothers, Berardo A. Quilez-Bonelli and Carlos Antonio Quilez-Bonelli.

On the verdict form, you will be asked to assess the damages of each plaintiff separately. In doing this, think only of the damages suffered by that particular plaintiff, and not of the damages suffered by any of his or her family members. Likewise, in computing Plaintiffs' damages, you must not consider the pain and suffering of Maribel Quilez herself.

JURY INSTRUCTION 25 MENTAL ANGUISH DEFINED

The term "mental anguish" refers to mental or emotional distress, suffering, and anguish. It includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, shock, humiliation, and indignity, as well as physical pain.

JURY INSTRUCTION 26 DUTY TO DELIBERATE AND REACH A UNANIMOUS VERDICT

The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each of you. In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that each juror agree: your verdict must be unanimous.

It is your duty as jurors to consult with one another, and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disregard of individual judgment. You must each decide the case for yourself, but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence in the case with your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views—and feel free to change your opinion if you are convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.

Remember at all times that you are not partisans. You are judges—judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to seek the truth from the evidence in the case.

JURY INSTRUCTION 27 ELECTION OF A FOREPERSON AND VERDICT FORM

Upon retiring to the jury room, you will select one of your members to act as your foreperson. The foreperson will preside over your deliberations and will be your spokesperson here in court. A verdict form has been prepared for your convenience. You will take this form to the jury room. [Read the verdict form.]

Follow the instructions on the verdict form closely. If a question calls for a "Yes" or "No" answer, answer it with a "Yes" or "No" and nothing more. If it asks for an amount of money, write only that. Based on your answer to certain questions, you may be directed to skip certain other questions on the form. Pay close attention and follow the form's directions precisely.

You must answer the questions in the order provided by the form, and your answer to each question must be unanimous before you may proceed. Your foreperson will write your unanimous answer to each question in the space provided.

Once the form has been completed, the foreperson will date and sign it, and you will then return with it to the courtroom.

JURY INSTRUCTION 28 VERDICT IS JURY'S SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE DUTY AND RESPONSIBILITY

Nothing said in these instructions, and nothing in any form of verdict prepared for your convenience, is meant to suggest or convey any suggestion or hint as to what verdict I think you should find. What the verdict shall be is your sole and exclusive duty and responsibility.

JURY INSTRUCTION 29 COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE COURT AND THE JURY DURING DELIBERATION

If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send a note via a bailiff, signed by your foreperson or by one or more members of the jury. No member of the jury should ever attempt to communicate with me by any means other than a signed writing, and I will never communicate with any member of the jury on any subject touching the merits of the case otherwise than in writing, or orally here in open court.

You will note from the oath about to be taken by the bailiffs that they too, as well as all other persons, are forbidden to communicate in any way or manner with any member of the jury on any subject touching the merits of the case.

Bear in mind also that you are never to reveal to any person—not even to me—how the jury stands, numerically or otherwise, on the questions before you, until after you have reached a unanimous verdict.

VERDICT FORM

1. Do you find that the plaintiffs have proven, by a preponderance of evidence, that Plaintiffs suffered damages and that these damages were proximately caused by the design of impact guard designed by Defendant Ox Bodies?

2. Do you find that Defendant Ox Bodies has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the benefits offered by the underride guard design outweighed the risks inherent in that design?

3. Do you find that Defendant Ox Bodies has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the decedent, Maribel Quilez-Bonelli, and/or the Municipality of San Juan, was negligent and that this negligence was a proximate cause contributing to plaintiffs' damages?

4. What proportion or percentage of the plaintiffs' damages do you find, from a preponderance of the evidence, to have been proximately caused by the acts of Ox Bodies, Maribel Quilez-Bonelli, and the Municipality of San Juan, respectively? (Note: The total of the three percentages must equal exactly 100%.)

5. What sum of money do you find, from a preponderance of the evidence, would compensate each of the plaintiffs for the injuries they suffered as a proximate result of the defective design of the rear underride guard? (Note: You should give the entire amount of damages that you find each plaintiff to have suffered. Do not reduce the amount, even if you have found that Maribel Quilez-Bonelli or the Municipality of San Juan was also negligent. The Court will make any necessary reductions after you have returned your verdict and based on your answers on this form.)

This is the unanimous verdict of the jury.