LINCOLN D. ALMOND, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") denying Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") and Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under the Social Security Act (the "Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff filed his Complaint on January 17, 2014 seeking to reverse the decision of the Commissioner. On August 29, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reverse Without a Remand for a Rehearing or, Alternatively, With a Remand for a Rehearing the Commissioner's Final Decision. (Document No. 9). On October 30, 2014, the Commissioner filed a Motion for an Order Affirming the Decision of the Commissioner. (Document No. 11).
This matter has been referred to me for preliminary review, findings and recommended disposition. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); LR Cv 72. Based upon my review of the record, the parties' submissions and independent research, I find that there is not substantial evidence in this record to support the Commissioner's decision and findings that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Consequently, I recommend that the Commissioner's Motion for an Order Affirming the Decision of the Commissioner (Document No. 11) be DENIED and that Plaintiff's Motion to Reverse Without a Remand for a Rehearing or, Alternatively, With a Remand for a Rehearing the Commissioner's Final Decision (Document No. 9) be GRANTED.
Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on September 9, 2010 alleging disability since June 8, 1999. (Tr. 164-170). Plaintiff's date last insured for DIB is June 30, 2000. (Tr. 12). The application was denied initially in June 2011 (Tr. 93-101) and on reconsideration in October 2011. (Tr. 103-111). Plaintiff requested an Administrative hearing. (Tr. 123). On October 23, 2012, a hearing was held before Administrative Law Jason Mastrangelo (the "ALJ") at which time Plaintiff, represented by counsel, and a vocational expert ("VE") appeared and testified. (Tr. 45-92). The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision to Plaintiff on November 16, 2012. (Tr. 7-23). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's Request for Review on December 2, 2014, therefore the ALJ's decision became final. (Tr. 3). A timely appeal was then filed with this Court.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to consider the opinion of Dr. Beverly Walters, a treating neurosurgeon, failing to secure the testimony of an impartial medical expert, and mis-evaluating the 2005 opinion of Dr. Stanley Stutz.
The Commissioner disputes Plaintiff's claims and asserts that any error in failing to consider Dr. Walters' opinion was harmless on this record and that the ALJ was not required to call a medical expert to testify.
The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla —
Where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court must affirm, even if the court would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact.
The court must reverse the ALJ's decision on plenary review, however, if the ALJ applies incorrect law, or if the ALJ fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning to determine that he or she properly applied the law.
The court may remand a case to the Commissioner for a rehearing under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); under sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); or under both sentences.
Where the court cannot discern the basis for the Commissioner's decision, a sentence-four remand may be appropriate to allow her to explain the basis for her decision.
In contrast, sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) provides:
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). To remand under sentence six, the claimant must establish: (1) that there is new, non-cumulative evidence; (2) that the evidence is material, relevant and probative so that there is a reasonable possibility that it would change the administrative result; and (3) there is good cause for failure to submit the evidence at the administrative level.
A sentence six remand may be warranted, even in the absence of an error by the Commissioner, if new, material evidence becomes available to the claimant.
The law defines disability as the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505. The impairment must be severe, making the claimant unable to do her previous work, or any other substantial gainful activity which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505-404.1511.
Substantial weight should be given to the opinion, diagnosis and medical evidence of a treating physician unless there is good cause to do otherwise.
Where a treating physician has merely made conclusory statements, the ALJ may afford them such weight as is supported by clinical or laboratory findings and other consistent evidence of a claimant's impairments.
The ALJ is required to review all of the medical findings and other evidence that support a medical source's statement that a claimant is disabled. However, the ALJ is responsible for making the ultimate determination about whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e). The ALJ is not required to give any special significance to the status of a physician as treating or non-treating in weighing an opinion on whether the claimant meets a listed impairment, a claimant's residual functional capacity (
The ALJ has a duty to fully and fairly develop the record.
The ALJ is required to order additional medical tests and exams only when a claimant's medical sources do not give sufficient medical evidence about an impairment to determine whether the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.917;
The ALJ must follow five steps in evaluating a claim of disability.
In determining whether a claimant's physical and mental impairments are sufficiently severe, the ALJ must consider the combined effect of all of the claimant's impairments, and must consider any medically severe combination of impairments throughout the disability determination process. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B). Accordingly, the ALJ must make specific and well-articulated findings as to the effect of a combination of impairments when determining whether an individual is disabled.
The claimant bears the ultimate burden of proving the existence of a disability as defined by the Social Security Act.
Once the ALJ finds that a claimant cannot return to her prior work, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the claimant could perform other work that exists in the national economy.
Exclusive reliance is not appropriate when a claimant is unable to perform a full range of work at a given residual functional level or when a claimant has a non-exertional impairment that significantly limits basic work skills.
"Pain can constitute a significant non-exertional impairment."
Where an ALJ decides not to credit a claimant's testimony about pain, the ALJ must articulate specific and adequate reasons for doing so, or the record must be obvious as to the credibility finding.
A lack of a sufficiently explicit credibility finding becomes a ground for remand when credibility is critical to the outcome of the case.
Plaintiff was sixty years old on the date of the ALJ's decision. (Tr. 64). Plaintiff has a high school diploma. (Tr. 202). Plaintiff's date last insured for DIB is June 30, 2000. (Tr. 102). Plaintiff worked in the relevant past as construction worker, group home counselor and youth corrections officer. (Tr. 217). Plaintiff alleges disability due to a back injury, severe bone infection, ruptured discs, infection of saccralius and osteomyelitis. (Tr. 216).
The ALJ decided this case adverse to Plaintiff at Step 5. Because Plaintiff's insured status expired on June 30, 2000, the issue presented to the ALJ was whether Plaintiff was disabled at any time from June 8, 1999, the alleged onset date, through June 30, 2000. At Step 2, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's lumbar degenerative disc disease status post-discectomy surgery and osteomyelitis (bone infection) were "severe" impairments within the meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). (Tr. 12). The ALJ did not, however, find at Step 3 that these impairments met or medically equaled any of the Listings. (Tr. 13). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform a limited range of light work. While the ALJ found at Step 4 that Plaintiff could not resume his past work, he concluded at Step 5 that Plaintiff was not disabled because he was capable of performing various light and sedentary unskilled jobs through June 30, 2000. (Tr. 21-22).
The issue in this DIB case is whether Plaintiff was disabled at any time from his alleged onset date, June 8, 1999, through his date last insured, June 30, 2000. Plaintiff was admitted to Miriam Hospital on June 18, 2000 with severe back pain. (Tr. 629). Plaintiff's back issues arose out of a work-related injury which occurred on June 8, 1999.
Because of the severity of his pain, emergency back surgery was performed on June 20, 2000 by Dr. Walters. (Tr. 637-639). Plaintiff developed a post-surgical infection and suffers from chronic vertebra/osteomyelitis. (Tr. 490-491, 640-641).
On June 18, 2000, Dr. Walters opined that Plaintiff could not return to his former job and was "not capable of other work." (Tr. 631). She assessed that he could not lift more than five pounds and could not sit for more than fifteen minutes.
It is undisputed that the ALJ failed to consider and evaluate this treating source opinion in his decision. Defendant concedes that "it would be a stretch to argue that the ALJ was entitled to ignore this opinion" and "[e]qually difficult . . . to claim that [this] opinion was erroneous when it was written." (Document No. 11 at p. 6). Despite these concessions, Defendant contends that a remand is not warranted.
First, Defendant "questions" whether Dr. Walters was actually a treating source. (Document No. 11 at p. 7). This argument merits little attention. Dr. Walters treated Plaintiff for his back pain, performed emergency back surgery on him, and provided post-surgical care. It is unquestionable that Dr. Walters was a treating source. Second, Defendant argues that Dr. Walters' opinion is not entitled any special significance because it amounts to little more than a statement that Plaintiff was disabled which is an issue reserved to the Commissioner pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Although Dr. Walters did opine that Plaintiff was not capable of working, she also opined on his specific functional limitations supporting that opinion which are entitled to consideration pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). (
Defendant also invites the Court to speculate as to how much weight the ALJ would have given to Dr. Walters' opinion had he considered it and posits that it would have been given limited weight. The Court declines the invitation. First, it is unclear to the Court what weight the ALJ may have given to Dr. Walters' opinion and how his view of that evidence may have altered his evaluation of other medical evidence. For instance, the ALJ gave "considerable weight" to the 2011 opinions of Dr. Conklin and Dr. Laurelli for the period prior to June 30, 2000 as they were "consistent with the limited findings on examinations and imaging studies" and because the alleged limitations for that period were "not substantiated by competent medical evidence to the degree alleged." (Tr. 18-19). Since Dr. Walters examined Plaintiff and opined on his functional limitations during the relevant time period, her opinion may have impacted the ALJ's conclusions as to the weight to give to the 2011 opinions. Moreover, since Dr. Walters was a treating source, the ALJ was required to give "good reasons" for the weight given to Dr. Walters' opinion which he did not do.
Because of the timing and substance of Dr. Walters' June 18, 2000 opinion, the ALJ's failure to evaluate that opinion cannot be considered harmless error on this record. A remand is warranted to ensure a full and fair evaluation of Plaintiff's disability benefits claim.
For the reasons discussed herein, I recommend that the Commissioner's Motion for an Order Affirming the Decision of the Commissioner (Document No. 11) be DENIED and that Plaintiff's Motion to Reverse Without a Remand for a Rehearing or, Alternatively, With a Remand for a Rehearing the Commissioner's Final Decision (Document No. 9) be GRANTED. Further, I recommend that Final Judgment enter in favor of Plaintiff remanding this matter for further administrative proceedings consistent with this decision.
Any objection to this Report and Recommendation must be specific and must be filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen (14) days of its receipt.