MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MARY S. McELROY, District Judge.

This case is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendant Nationwide Property & Casualty Insurance Co., contending that, as a matter of law, on undisputed facts it was entitled to deny property coverage for the destruction by explosion and fire of the three-family apartment building where the plaintiffs lived. The plaintiffs are Todd Laber, his son Zachary Laber, and his stepdaughter Natasha Sorrentino; all three are insureds on the homeowner policy issued for 228 State Street, Bristol, Rhode Island.1

The plaintiffs claimed a loss of $671,557.54, and an entitlement to the full amount of coverage up to the policy limit of $308,100.00. (ECF No. 1-1 at 44, No. 17-9 at 2.) On March 3, 2018, Nationwide denied coverage. The action was filed in state court and removed to this Court on July 31, 2018. Jurisdiction lies by virtue of diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a)(1), as the plaintiffs are residents of Rhode Island and the defendant is a foreign corporation.

The plaintiffs' Complaint sets forth two bases for relief breach of contract and bad-faith denial of the claim. Both arose from Nationwide's resting on the policy's Exclusion of Coverage provision to justify its refusal to compensate plaintiffs for the loss. The parties concurred that the bad-faith claim should be severed, as success on the breach claim is a predicate for recovery for bad-faith denial. Bibeault v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313, 319 (R.I. 1980).

For the reasons that follow, I GRANT summary judgment to the defendant on the breach of contract claim and, as a consequence, GRANT it as well on the bad faith denial claim.2

Standard for Summary Judgment

The task of a district court when presented with a motion for summary judgment is clear. It is to review the record to determine whether there exists a genuine issue in dispute as to any material fact. If there is not, the Court then determines whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Continental Cas. Co. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 370, 373 (1st Cir. 1991). The facts and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party — here, the plaintiffs. Emsbo v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 950 F.Supp.2d 369, 371 (D.R.I. 2013).

The Explosion and Zachary's Plea

On July 15, 2017, an explosion destroyed the residential property at 228 State Street, Bristol, in which the plaintiffs lived. A subsequent investigation, coupled with the statement under oath of Zachary Laber, revealed that on that day 24-year-old Zachary was engaged in making hash3 in the room that he occupied in his father's apartment. (ECF 17-2 at 8.) Zachary explained that in order to make hash, he would "fill a glass tube receptacle with cannabis, wash butane over that and allow that to collect in a tray, and that tray, as previously stated, would be put into the oven to safely remove any gas." Id. at 5. Zachary kept about ten butane canisters, bought at a local "grow store" in Massachusetts, in the apartment for this purpose. Id. at 6.

The fire occurred, Zachary recollected, at "the moment before [he placed] the receptacle into the oven." Id. at 8. The marijuana buds were already in the glass receptacle, and he had poured two canisters of butane over them. Id. at 9. On at least three prior occasions, Zachary had followed this process to make hash, apparently without incident. Id. at 9. On this day, however, tragedy struck.

On this hot mid-July morning, Zachary was "sweating," he explained, so he turned on a window air conditioning unit. He turned the dial ... and remembered nothing more except that the room was suddenly entirely on fire. Id. at 10. Vincent P. Calenda, CFI, CFEI, a fire investigator retained by Nationwide, later examined the scene and determined that the fire "result[ed] from an explosion that occurred during the manufacturing and cooking procedure involving cannabis." (ECF No. 17-10 at 2.)4

Zachary was charged in state court by Information P2-2018-0921A with three counts of manufacturing a controlled substance, one count of conspiracy, and one count of maintaining a common nuisance. The four major felonies were dismissed by the prosecution pursuant to R.I.Super.R.Crim.P. 48(a), and he entered a plea of nolo contendere to the nuisance charge. He was placed on three years probation. (ECF No. 17-7 at 3.)

The Policy

Under Rhode Island law, the insured has the burden of proving that insurance coverage was in place that applied to the loss suffered. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 770 A.2d 403, 417 (R.I. 2001). The plaintiffs have met that burden. The policy by its express terms professes to cover comprehensive property loss subject only to certain exclusions described in Section 1 therein. (ECF No. 17-8.) Because the plaintiffs have surmounted that hurdle, the burden shifts to the insurer to prove any exclusion of coverage justifying its failure to pay for the otherwise-covered loss. Kaiser-Roth, 770 A.2d at 417.

As seems to be typical of the standard Nationwide residential policy,5 Section 1 provides as follows:

(ECF No. 17-8 at 7) (emphasis supplied).

Nationwide contends that three exclusions justify its refusal to pay for the loss. It maintains that Zachary's production of hash increased the risk, that Zachary's use of butane, which then filled the room with fumes ignited by his turning on the air conditioner, was an intentional act that could have reasonably been expected to result in the fire, and that Zachary committed a criminal act resulting in the fire. Because I find that Nationwide has carried its burden with respect to a criminal act, and that there is no genuine issue of material fact to preclude granting summary judgment on that basis, I do not reach the appropriateness of summary judgment with respect to either of the other purported exclusions.6

Application of Law

When language in an insurance policy is clear and unambiguous, a court must apply its plain meaning. Zarrella v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 824 A.2d 1249, 1259 (R.I. 2003). Here, the policy unambiguously excludes coverage for injury resulting from a criminal act. It is not disputed that Zachary's conduct violated two distinct criminal statutes. The first, R.I.G.L. § 21-28-4.01(a)(4)(i), prohibits the manufacture of any Schedule I or II controlled substance, including hash.7 The second, R.I.G.L. § 11-30-3 prohibits maintaining a common nuisance.8 Zachary unambiguously admitted that he was engaged in the manufacture of hash.

The plaintiff contends that because those charges were dismissed, and Zachary was not convicted of that crime, manufacturing a controlled substance cannot be used as the criminal act that would, under the policy, exclude coverage for any resulting injury. When policy language is clear on its face, there is nothing for a court to do but apply its plain language. Zarrella, 824 A.2d at 1259. In reading this policy exclusion, there is no way — short of adding words that do not there appear — that one could read it as requiring a conviction. It simply does not. It merely requires proof of a "criminal act[s]." The defendant is, of course, required to prove commission of a criminal act, which it could do by relying on a conviction if there were one. But in the absence of a conviction here, Nationwide relies squarely on Zachary's admission and that is sufficient proof.9

There is no dispute between the parties of the operative facts here: Zachary was engaged in the manufacture of hash. As a direct result of that activity, the butane he was using ignited, inferentially from a spark caused by the engagement of an air conditioner. A fire ensued, and the loss was sustained. The policy exclusion is clear on its face and these undisputed facts satisfy it.

Summary judgment is GRANTED to the defendant Nationwide on Counts I, breach of contract, and on Count II, bad-faith denial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.