Justice BEATTY:
In this heirs' property dispute, the Court granted the petition of Sara Mae Robinson and others ("Petitioners") for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in Robinson v. Estate of Harris, Op. No. 2008-UP-648 (S.C. Ct.App. filed Nov. 24, 2008). In this opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed a circuit court order that granted summary judgment in favor of The Converse Company, LLC ("Converse") on the grounds Petitioners' action to set aside a 1966 quiet title action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations as established by section 15-67-90 of the South Carolina Code,
This action involves a portion of a 20-acre tract of land located on Fort Johnson Road, in James Island, South Carolina. The tract was formerly owned by Simeon B. Pinckney, who died intestate in 1921 and allegedly left a wife, Laura Pinckney, and two sons, Ellis and Herbert Pinckney, as his heirs.
The land held by Simeon B. Pinckney originated from a conveyance to him by deed executed in 1874 (and recorded in 1875) from Thomas Moore. The property was described as being 20 acres, more or less. In 1888, Simeon B. Pinckney conveyed 5 acres of this property to his wife, Isabella Pinckney, leaving approximately 15 acres. A survey conducted in 1923, however, found that exactly 14.3 acres remained.
In 1946, Laura Pinckney, Ellis Pinckney, and Herbert Pinckney executed two cross-deeds that divided the 14.3-acre parcel among themselves, creating a 4.3-acre tract and a 10-acre tract.
As the result of subsequent conveyances, the 4.3-acre tract was ultimately divided into four lots. The owners of these lots are as follows: (1) The Converse Company, LLC (Lot # 1); (2) Martine A. Hutton (Lot # 2); (3) David Savage and Lisa M. Shogry-Savage (Lot # 3); and (4) Debbie (Shogry) Dinovo (Lot # 4). The instant case involves the interests of Converse ("Respondent").
On February 1, 2005, Petitioners filed an action to quiet title to several tracts of land located on James Island, including the 4.3-acre tract at issue in the instant case. In their Complaint, Petitioners sought "to establish their legitimate relationship as lineal descendants and heirs" of Simeon B. Pinckney. The first twenty-five named Petitioners claimed they were heirs of Simeon B. Pinckney, and the remaining Petitioners claimed they purchased interests in the property and were the legitimate owners of those interests.
In support of these claims, Petitioners alleged the 1946 deeds and 1966 action to quiet title were fraudulent and were undertaken without consideration for the rights or interests of Petitioners and other heirs. Specifically, Petitioners asserted the 4.3-acre tract was fraudulently conveyed to Herbert Pinckney in 1946 and, thereafter, wrongly passed by inheritance to his mother Laura Pinckney Heyward at Herbert's
Based on these allegations, Petitioners sought "(a) a determination of all owners of the four (4) tracts of property, ... a determination of each owner's respective rights and interests in said tracts, and the quieting of the titles to these four (4) tracts and (b) the sale of the respective owners' interests in these four (4) tracts."
Respondent answered and filed a motion for summary judgment. In its answer, Respondent raised a number of affirmative defenses and counterclaims, including laches, stale demand, equitable estoppel, waiver, bona fide purchaser for value, betterment, acquiescence, adverse possession, presumption of grant, slander of title, and the applicable statute of limitations.
In response to the motion for summary judgment, Petitioners argued their claim was not barred by section 15-67-90 given the 1966 quiet title action was the result of extrinsic fraud. Because they offered affidavits supporting their claim that the 1966 quiet title action was procured through fraud and forgery, Petitioners contended their action was distinguishable from the case of Yarbrough v. Collins, 301 S.C. 339, 391 S.E.2d 873 (Ct.App.1990).
After a hearing, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent. In so ruling, the circuit court relied on its previously-issued order granting summary judgment
Petitioners appealed the circuit court's order to the Court of Appeals.
In a summary opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit court. See Robinson v. Estate of Harris, Op. No. 2008-UP-648 (S.C. Ct.App. filed Nov. 24, 2008). In support of its decision, the court cited: (1) the three-year statute of limitations as codified in section 15-67-90; and (2) Yarbrough as interpreting section 15-67-90.
This Court granted Petitioners' request for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
On appeal from the grant of a summary judgment motion, this Court applies the same standard as that required for the circuit court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP; Brockbank v. Best Capital Corp., 341 S.C. 372, 379, 534 S.E.2d 688, 692 (2000).
Rule 56(c) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a trial court may grant a motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
"In determining whether any triable issue of fact exists, the evidence and all inferences which can reasonably be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Pye v. Estate of Fox, 369 S.C. 555, 563, 633 S.E.2d 505, 509 (2006).
In essence, Petitioners contend summary judgment was improperly granted given that significant and material questions of fact exist relating to extrinsic fraud and forgery in the underlying 1966 quiet title action and the 1946 cross-deeds upon which the action was based.
In support of this contention, Petitioners argue the circuit court and the Court of Appeals erred in determining that section 15-67-90 constitutes an "absolute bar" to setting aside judgments quieting title to land. Because they submitted affidavits in support of their claims of extrinsic fraud and forgery, Petitioners assert their cause of action is distinguishable from Yarbrough and should not have been procedurally barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
In analyzing Petitioners' arguments, we must determine whether section 15-67-90 constitutes an "absolute bar" to Petitioners' action or whether Petitioners' claim of extrinsic fraud supersedes the application of this statute of limitations.
This determination requires us to revisit our decision in Hagy v. Pruitt, 339 S.C. 425, 529 S.E.2d 714 (2000). In Hagy, the biological parents brought an action in 1994 to set aside the 1992 adoption of their daughter on the ground that their consent to the adoption was induced by fraudulent statements made by the adoptive parents, who were also the biological mother's father and stepmother. Id. at 428-29, 529 S.E.2d at 716. In response, the adoptive parents defended on the merits and asserted the action was time-barred by section 20-7-1800 of the South Carolina Code, which at the time provided: "No final decree of adoption is subject to collateral attack
On appeal, this Court affirmed as modified the decision of the Court of Appeals. In so ruling, this Court considered the novel question of "whether a facially applicable statute of limitation will bar an action to set aside a judgment procured by extrinsic fraud." Id. at 430, 529 S.E.2d at 717.
We find Hagy supports Petitioners' contention that this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the circuit court have the inherent authority to set aside the 1966 quiet title action and the underlying 1946 cross-deeds if in fact they were procured as the result of extrinsic fraud. Moreover, a broad reading of Yarbrough indicates that a court could consider the ground of extrinsic fraud, if sufficiently proven, as affecting the application of section 15-67-90. See Yarbrough, 301 S.C. at 341-42, 391 S.E.2d at 875 (concluding property claimant's action to quiet title brought seven years after title clearance action was barred by section 15-67-90 but implicitly recognizing that extrinsic fraud, if proven, could operate to preclude application of the three-year statute of limitations).
"A judgment may be set aside on the ground of fraud only if the fraud is `extrinsic' and not `intrinsic.'" Hagy, 339 S.C. at 431, 529 S.E.2d at 717. Extrinsic fraud is "`fraud that induces a person not to present a case or deprives a person of the opportunity to be heard.'" Id. at 431, 529 S.E.2d at 717-18 (quoting Hilton Head Ctr. of S.C., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 294 S.C. 9, 11, 362 S.E.2d 176, 177 (1987)). "[R]elief is granted for extrinsic fraud on the theory that by reason of the fraud preventing a party from fully exhibiting and trying his case, there never has been a real contest before the court of the subject matter of the action." Chewning v. Ford Motor Co., 354 S.C. 72, 82, 579 S.E.2d 605, 610 (2003). If a judgment procured by extrinsic fraud could have been avoided if the challenging party exercised due diligence, a court generally will not grant relief from the judgment. Center v. Center, 269 S.C. 367, 373, 237 S.E.2d 491, 494 (1977).
Intrinsic fraud is fraud which was presented and considered at trial. Chewning, 354 S.C. at 81, 579 S.E.2d at 610. "It is fraud which misleads a court in determining issues and induces the court to find for the party perpetrating the fraud." Id.
Considering the facts of the instant case in the procedural posture of a motion for summary judgment, Petitioners offered evidence that arguably created a material question of fact regarding whether the 1946 cross-deeds and 1966 quiet title action were procured by extrinsic fraud.
Although Petitioners' affidavits are very detailed, they essentially outlined Petitioners' ancestry as direct descendants of Simeon B. Pinckney and his son Samuel James Pinckney. The affidavits indicate Laura Pinckney was not married to Simeon B. Pinckney and that Herbert and Ellis Pinckney were of no relation to Simeon B. Pinckney. The affidavits also provide that several of Petitioners' relatives had lived on the subject property prior to the institution of the 2005 quiet title action. Additionally, the affidavits state Petitioners were unaware of the 1966 quiet title action and did not realize until
However, even assuming Petitioners offered sufficient evidence of extrinsic fraud to withstand Respondent's motion for summary judgment, this alone is not dispositive of Petitioners' appeal. Instead, this case presents a unique set of circumstances that operate to preclude Petitioners' action.
As evidenced by our decision in Hagy, this Court recognized that the doctrine of laches would be applicable in determining whether an action is time-barred even if extrinsic fraud is established. Hagy, 339 S.C. at 431 n. 7, 529 S.E.2d at 717 n. 7 (discussing the one-year statute of limitations for a collateral attack on an adoption decree and stating "[a]lthough not an issue in this case, the doctrine of laches will apply in determining whether such an action is barred"). We believe the instant case presents such a scenario.
"Courts have the inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary to ensure that just results are reached to the fullest extent possible." Jones v. Leagan, 384 S.C. 1, 19, 681 S.E.2d 6, 16 (Ct.App.2009). The equitable doctrine of laches is defined as "neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, under circumstances affording opportunity
Applying the foregoing to the facts of the instant case, we find Respondent established the requisite factors to bar Petitioners' action based on the doctrine of laches.
Here, Petitioners waited thirty-nine years to challenge the 1966 quiet title action. Although Petitioners claim they did not have notice of the 1966 quiet title action until 2004, their own affidavits appear to discount this claim. In the affidavits, Petitioners assert that one of their heirs paid the county property taxes on the Fort Johnson Road properties until at least 1988. If this was in fact the case, Petitioners would have received county tax documents that corresponded to the respective properties. After the property was sold, the subsequent purchasers would have then received these tax documents. In turn, Petitioners' failure to receive tax documents should have served as notice regarding a problem with their title to the property. Thus, given that the deeds and the quiet title action were publicly-recorded and documented, it was an unreasonable length of time for Petitioners to delay in instituting the 2005 quiet title action.
Additionally, Respondent would be undoubtedly prejudiced if Petitioners' claim is not barred by laches given it purchased the lot for significant consideration and has been in possession of it since 2003.
In reaching our decision, we have thoroughly considered and are empathetic to Petitioners' plight. However, given the specific facts of the instant case, we are compelled to hold the doctrine of laches precludes Petitioners from pursuing their claim. Here, Petitioners waited thirty-nine years to assert
Our decision should not be construed as establishing a general rule. Instead, we believe under the proper facts a claim of extrinsic fraud could be utilized to successfully circumvent the three-year statute of limitations as established by section 15-67-90.
Based on the foregoing, we find the circuit court properly granted Respondent's motion for summary judgment. Even assuming Petitioners sufficiently established their extrinsic fraud claim to avoid the three-year statute of limitations provided for in section 15-67-90, we hold the doctrine of laches operates to bar their claim. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
TOAL, C.J., KITTREDGE, J, Acting Justices JAMES E. MOORE and E.C. BURNETT, III, concur.
S.C.Code Ann. § 15-67-90 (2005).
S.C.Code Ann. § 30-7-10 (2007).
