PER CURIAM:

Appellant Karen Cue-McNeil (Mother) brought this medical malpractice action in her capacity as guardian ad litem for her minor daughter, Tori M. (Daughter), against George W. Watt, M.D., Medical Park OB/GYN, P.A., and Palmetto Health Alliance d/b/a Palmetto Richland Memorial Hospital (collectively Respondents) to recover damages for allegedly negligent medical care during Daughter's birth. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to Respondents, concluding that only a minor's parents, not the minor herself, have a cause of action for the recovery of medical expenses resulting from the minor's injury. Mother appeals.

In its order granting partial summary judgment, the circuit court concluded that summary judgment is proper for an action by a minor attempting to collect medical expenses during minority "because she does not have the capacity to sue." We agree that a minor may not recover medical expenses from a tortfeasor in her own personal injury action, and we affirm this part of the circuit court's order.1 However, it is possible to infer from the circuit court's conclusion that the entirety of Daughter's personal injury action against Respondent is invalid because she does not have the legal capacity to bring this action. To the extent that the trial court implied that Daughter did not properly bring her action through a guardian ad litem and therefore may not pursue damages other than medical expenses, the statement is erroneous and is therefore vacated. Daughter properly brought this action against Respondents through her guardian ad litem pursuant to Rule 17(c), SCRCP, which states in pertinent part:

(emphasis added).

Here, the circuit court had issued an order appointing Mother to serve as guardian ad litem for Daughter well before Respondents sought partial summary judgment. Therefore, Daughter may pursue this action against Respondents except to the extent that she claims medical expenses.

As to Mother's argument that the circuit court erred in failing to recognize the lack of evidence of any payments made by Daughter's parents for her medical care, we affirm pursuant to the following authority: Haselden v. Davis, 353 S.C. 481, 484, 579 S.E.2d 293, 295 (2003) ("A plaintiff in a personal injury action seeking damages for the cost of medical services provided to him as a result of a tortfeasor's wrongdoing is entitled to recover the reasonable value of those medical services, not necessarily the amount paid.").

In view of our disposition of the foregoing issues, we need not address Mother's remaining arguments. See Webb v. Sowell, 387 S.C. 328, 332 n.6, 692 S.E.2d 543, 545 n.6 (2010) (citing Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999)) (holding that an appellate court need not discuss the remaining issues of an appeal when its resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).

AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART.2

THOMAS, PIEPER, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.