KONDUROS, J.
In this appeal arising out of wrongful death, survival, and negligence actions, Appellants
Myers entered into timber harvesting contracts with landowners under which it would arrange for a third party to cut timber from the landowner's property and haul it to mills that
Myers would send one of its employees to a site at times to make sure the crew had not cut any trees on other property and was keeping the property neat, but the employee would not remain on site. On March 26, 2007, an employee of Myers was on site while one of Levister's trucks, a tractor-trailer rig, was being loaded with cut logs. Myers and Levister learned the mill where they had planned to send the logs was shut down. One of Levister's employees, George Rogers, was to drive the log truck and wanted to take the logs to Bowater Mill. Instead, one of Myers's employees instructed him to take the logs to Chester Wood Mill in Chester County. However, the logs that had already been loaded onto the truck had to be cut to conform to the log size requirements at Chester Wood Mill.
Once the logs were loaded, Rogers began driving the truck towards the Chester Wood Mill. The truck approached an intersection with a traffic light. At the same time, Alice Quinton, who had just picked up her two children and their two friends from elementary school, was stopped at the intersection in her van. Quinton drove her van into the intersection, where Roger's truck ran into the driver's side of it.
Appellants brought wrongful death, survival, and negligence actions against Myers alleging it was vicariously liable for Rogers's and Levister's negligence. Myers answered, asserting Levister was an independent contractor and thus denying it was vicariously liable. Myers filed a motion for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the circuit court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding Levister was an independent contractor of Myers and thus Myers was not liable for the acts of Levister's employees. The circuit court found (1) Myers had no right to exercise control over Levister; Levister could harvest the timber and transport it in any manner it saw fit; (2) Levister was not paid a wage or salary but instead was paid based on the end result, the amount of timber delivered; (3) Levister furnished all of its own equipment; and (4) Myers had no right to hire or fire Levister's employees. This appeal followed.
The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite the disposition of cases not requiring the services of a fact finder. George v. Fabri, 345 S.C. 440, 452, 548 S.E.2d 868, 874 (2001). When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, this court applies the same standard that governs the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP; summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C. 488, 493, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860 (2002). In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from it must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sauner v. Pub. Serv. Auth. of S.C., 354 S.C. 397, 404, 581 S.E.2d 161, 165 (2003).
Appellants argue the circuit court erred in granting Myers's motion for summary judgment by finding Levister was an independent contractor and not an employee. Specifically,
"Generally, an employer is not liable for the torts of an independent contractor. No concrete rule has been established to determine whether the relationship of independent contractor has been established, but the general test is the degree of control exercised by the employer." Creighton v. Coligny Plaza Ltd. P'ship, 334 S.C. 96, 116, 512 S.E.2d 510, 520 (Ct.App.1998) (citations omitted). The distinction between employees and independent contractors is not the actual control exercised, but whether there is the right and authority to control and direct the particular work or undertaking, as to the manner or means of its accomplishment. Id. at 116, 512 S.E.2d at 520-21. "An independent contractor ... contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods, without being subject to the control of his employer except as to the result of his work." Id. at 116, 512 S.E.2d at 521 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Norris v. Bryant, 217 S.C. 389, 398, 60 S.E.2d 844, 847 (1950). Courts have recognized four factors bearing on the right of control: (1) direct evidence of the right to, or exercise of, control; (2) method of payment; (3) furnishing of equipment; and (4) right to fire. Chavis v. Watkins, 256 S.C. 30, 32, 180 S.E.2d 648, 649 (1971).
Id. at 117, 512 S.E.2d at 521.
In Norris, 217 S.C. at 395, 398, 60 S.E.2d at 846, 847, our supreme court found a logging contract somewhat similar to one in this case created the relationship of independent contractor between Poinsett Lumber and Manufacturing Company, a company that owned timber land in different locations, and S.C. Grant, who cut the timber on one area of Poinsett's
Id. The court also noted, "Hauling contracts of a similar nature have also been held to create the relation of employer and independent contractor in other jurisdictions." Id. at 399, 60 S.E.2d at 847. The court found "it is clear from a consideration of the entire contract that the general direction and supervision reserved to Poinsett related only to the result to be attained and not to the details of the operation." Id. at 399, 60 S.E.2d at 848.
In this case, the circuit court correctly granted summary judgment. Appellants did not present evidence Myers had control over Levister. Levister could harvest the timber how it wanted, owned all of the equipment, and was paid based on the end result. Myers could not directly fire Levister's employees, and Levister paid its own employees, including withholding taxes. Myers's being able to tell Levister it was leaving too much stump or leaving ruts in the ground is similar to Creighton in which the partnership would give D & M specific instructions of what needed attention. The arrangement here is also like the one in Norris between Poinsett and Grant. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in granting Myers summary judgment by finding the only evidence
HUFF and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.