LOCKEMY, J.
In this medical malpractice action, Rock Hill Gynological and Obstetrical Associates, PA, (the Practice) argues the trial court erred in denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to Samantha Jamison's allegations of negligence in the death of her son, Jayden. We affirm.
The Practice assumed the pre-natal care of Samantha Jamison a little over halfway through her pregnancy in July 2008. Jamison came to the Practice with pregnancy risks due to her chronic hypertension.
On August 9, 2008, Jamison went to the emergency room complaining of lower abdominal pain. Dr. Gregory Miller, a physician with the Practice, attended to Jamison at the hospital. After noting Jamison's elevated blood pressure, Dr. Miller conducted a series of tests that ruled out preterm labor. Lab results, including blood work and a urinalysis, revealed no medical grounds for intervention or immediate treatment. Dr. Miller discharged Jamison and told her to keep her next scheduled office visit at the Practice.
Jamison returned to the Practice for a checkup on August 25, 2008, and again saw Dr. Miller. Jamison's only complaint that day was of swelling in her left ankle. Based on an examination and the results of tests he conducted, Dr. Miller found no complications or dangers with Jamison's pregnancy. Dr. Miller did not order a non-stress test. Jamison had no complaints of decreased fetal movement when she saw Dr. Miller on August 25, 2008. Dr. Miller nevertheless instructed Jamison to start doing "kick counts" to monitor the timing and frequency of her baby's movement.
On the morning of September 5, 2008, Jamison became concerned about feeling the baby move less frequently and went to the Practice. Jamison arrived at the office around 8:40 a.m. and waited approximately one hour to be seen. The first available professional was nurse practitioner Robin Pruitt, who examined Jamison. The examination included taking
After the non-stress test, the nurses told Jamison they were going to do a biophysical profile, which would evaluate the baby's movement, among other things. A sonographer performed that test in the office. The biophysical profile ran for approximately ten minutes, during which time the baby had a normal heart rate. After the ten minutes had elapsed, Dr. Ansley Hilton looked over the preliminary results. Dr. Hilton determined the baby was in a breach presentation and was not moving as much as a 32-week old fetus normally would be expected to move. Dr. Hilton then stopped the test around 11 a.m. because she wanted to send Jamison to the hospital in case any emergency treatment was necessary. Dr. Hilton instructed Jamison to go straight to the labor and delivery section of the hospital, which was approximately five minutes away from the office. Before releasing Jamison, Dr. Hilton confirmed that Jamison had transportation to the hospital and knew how to get to labor and delivery. Dr. Hilton then called labor and delivery to explain the situation and inform them that Jamison would be arriving soon. During her phone call to the hospital, Dr. Hilton also discussed Jamison's case with Dr. Christopher Benson, another physician with the Practice who was on call at the hospital that morning. After that conversation, Dr. Benson got everything ready at the hospital for an emergency cesarean section (c-section) in case one had to be performed.
According to Jamison, the admissions process at the hospital, which did not involve any of the Practice's employees, took around thirty minutes. A hospital employee then took Jamison to a room where other hospital staff members examined her. The nurses involved in that examination called Dr. Benson to notify him that Jamison had arrived, but that they could not find a fetal heartbeat. Dr. Benson got to the room within two minutes of receiving the call and performed an ultrasound. He was also unable to find a fetal heartbeat, and he informed Jamison that the baby was deceased. Later that day, a C-section was performed. No cause of death has been determined.
The case was called to trial on April 8, 2013. Jamison presented the testimony of two experts. Dr. Edward Karotkin opined Jayden died sometime between 11 and 11:48 a.m. on September 5, 2008, and his death was foreseeable based upon evidence he was not growing appropriately in the weeks prior to his death and his abnormal fetal heart rate on the morning of September 5th. According to Dr. Kartokin, Jayden would have survived had a C-section been performed prior to 11:45 a.m. on September 5th. Jamison also called Dr. Douglas Phillips as an expert witness. Dr. Phillips opined Drs. Hilton and Benson both breached the applicable standard of care in treating Jamison. According to Dr. Phillips, Dr. Hilton failed to adequately inform Jamison that she needed to get to the hospital as soon as possible for an immediate C-section. Dr. Phillips opined Dr. Benson failed to take an active role to have Jamison admitted to the hospital and transported to labor and delivery in a timely manner. Dr. Phillips also testified Dr. Miller was negligent in failing to order a non-stress test and biophysical profile during Jamison's August 25, 2008 office visit, and Practice employees did not ensure Jamison received timely care on the morning of September 5, 2008.
Following Jamison's case-in-chief, the defendants moved for a directed verdict arguing there was no expert testimony that the defendants caused Jayden's death. The trial court denied the motion.
Drs. Hilton and Benson both testified they could not determine what caused Jayden's death. Similarly, all of the experts who testified were unable to offer opinions as to the cause of death. The defendants' two experts opined Drs. Hilton and Benson did not breach the applicable standard of care and did not cause Jayden's death. At the close of their case, the defendants renewed their directed verdict motions, which the trial judge again denied.
Thereafter, the defendants made oral motions for a new trial or, in the alternative, for judgment as a matter of law. The trial court denied those motions from the bench. On April 25, 2013, the Practice filed a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion which the trial court denied in an order filed on July 15, 2013. The Practice appealed.
A motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) is merely a renewal of the directed verdict motion. Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 20, 640 S.E.2d 486, 496 (Ct.App. 2006). When reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion for a directed verdict or a JNOV, this court must apply the same standard as the trial court by viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Elam v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 361 S.C. 9, 27-28, 602 S.E.2d 772, 782 (2004). The trial court must deny a motion for a directed verdict or JNOV if the evidence yields more than one reasonable inference or its inference is in doubt. Strange v. S.C. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429-30, 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994). Moreover, "[a] motion for JNOV may be granted only if no reasonable jury could have reached the challenged verdict." Gastineau v. Murphy, 331 S.C. 565, 568, 503 S.E.2d 712, 713 (1998). In deciding such motions, "neither the trial court nor the appellate court has the authority to decide credibility issues or to resolve conflicts in the testimony or the evidence." Welch v. Epstein, 342 S.C. 279, 300, 536 S.E.2d 408, 419 (Ct.App.2000).
The Practice argues the trial court erred in denying its JNOV motion because there was no legal or evidentiary basis for a finding of liability against the Practice. The Practice contends the defense verdicts in favor of Drs. Hilton and
Conversely, Jamison contends the Practice's argument that there is no evidence of malpractice by any of the defendants that proximately caused her damages is unpreserved.
A plaintiff must prove the following facts by a preponderance of the evidence to establish a cause of action for medical malpractice:
Brouwer v. Sisters of Charity Providence Hospitals, 409 S.C. 514, 521, 763 S.E.2d 200, 203 (2014) (citing 27 S.C. Jur. Med. & Health Prof'ls § 10 (2014)). "A plaintiff in a medical malpractice case must establish by expert testimony both the standard of care and the defendant's failure to conform to the required standard, unless the subject matter is of common knowledge or experience so that no special learning is needed to evaluate the defendant's conduct." Carver v. Med. Soc. of S.C., 286 S.C. 347, 350, 334 S.E.2d 125, 127 (Ct.App.1985).
"When one relies solely upon the opinion of medical experts to establish a causal connection between the alleged negligence and the injury, the experts must, with reasonable certainty, state that in their professional opinion, the injuries complained of most probably resulted from the defendant's negligence." Hoard ex rel. Hoard v. Roper Hosp., Inc., 387 S.C. 539, 546, 694 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2010) (quoting Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 125, 473 S.E.2d 793, 795 (1996)). "When expert testimony is the only evidence of proximate cause relied upon, the testimony `must provide a significant causal link between the alleged negligence and the plaintiff's injuries, rather than a tenuous and hypothetical connection.'" Id. at 546-47, 694 S.E.2d at 5 (quoting Ellis at 125, 473 S.E.2d at 795).
While a majority of the testimony at trial focused on the actions of Drs. Hilton and Benson, there was some testimony regarding the actions of Practice employees other than Drs. Hilton and Benson.
On August 25, 2008, Jamison had an office visit with Dr. Miller. Her only complaint that day was swelling in her left ankle. Jamison did not report any decreased fetal movement at that time. Dr. Miller examined Jamison and found no complications or dangers with the pregnancy. According to Dr. Miller, he did not order a non-stress test because he did not believe one was indicated by the applicable medical standards.
Jamison's expert, Dr. Phillips, opined that Dr. Miller breached the applicable standard of care by not ordering a non-stress test and biophysical profile either during the office visit on August 25, 2008, or within one week of that visit. Dr. Phillips believed those tests were necessary due to Jamison's chronic hypertension. However, Dr. Phillips could not testify with any degree of certainty what the tests would have shown had they been run. Dr. Phillips did not opine that the alleged breach of care by Dr. Miller proximately caused Jayden's death. He testified Dr. Miller was not "directly" responsible for Jayden's death and agreed that the opinion stated in his deposition ("I don't think Dr. Miller caused the baby to die") was still his opinion at trial.
Although she did not have an appointment, Jamison went to the Practice on the morning of September 5, 2008, because she was concerned about feeling less fetal movement. She arrived before 9 a.m. and signed the intake sheet, which indicated she was the twentieth patient on the waiting list. There is no evidence Jamison asked to be seen immediately or that she was in any acute distress. Jamison testified she informed the staff when she arrived that she had called to say she was coming in, but she did not specifically testify as to what she told them upon her arrival.
Jamison waited about an hour before the first available care provider saw her. The nurse practitioner who saw Jamison ordered a non-stress test, which revealed a fetal heartbeat within normal limits. Nevertheless, the nurse practitioner decided to conduct a biophysical profile to obtain more information about the baby. All of the medical experts at trial agreed the baby was alive when Dr. Hilton stopped the biophysical profile and told Jamison to go immediately to the hospital shortly before 11 a.m.
Dr. Phillips testified it was a breach of the applicable standard of care not to move Jamison to the front of the
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Jamison, we find there was some evidence of negligence by the Practice. During the direct examination of Dr. Phillips, the following exchange occurred:
Dr. Phillips explained:
We affirm the trial court's denial of the Practice's motion for JNOV as to Samantha Jamison's allegations of negligence in the death of her son.
SHORT and McDONALD, JJ., concur.
We find the motion properly identified the Practice's argument concerning the lack of expert testimony establishing causation.