THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCARC.

PER CURIAM.

Geary Thomas Dooly appeals the master-in-equity's order dismissing his counterclaims with prejudice. On appeal, Dooly argues (1) this case was wrought with fraud, deception, and acts of bad faith; (2) Deutsche Bank National Trust Company's (the Bank's) counsel failed to establish their authority and jurisdiction to represent the Bank; (3) the Bank failed to provide a signed contractual agreement delegating authority to its counsel; (4) the Bank failed to reply, defend, or comply with the allegations presented in his Third Amended Counterclaim; (5) the master-in-equity lacked jurisdiction; (6) the circuit court failed to schedule a hearing on his motion to reconsider its order; (7) the master-in-equity erred in dismissing his counterclaims; (8) the circuit court erred in declining to grant his request for a continuance; (9) the circuit court erred in dismissing his counterclaims; (10) the circuit court ignored his motion to reconsider; (11) this case should be dismissed due to the bad faith and fraudulent actions of the Bank's counsel; and (12) the master-in-equity erred in denying his request for a continuance. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1.

As to Issue Five: Rule 53(b), SCRCP ("In an action . . . for foreclosure, some or all of the causes of action in a case may be referred to a master . . . by order of a circuit judge or the clerk of court."); Rule 53(c), SCRCP ("Once referred, the master . . . shall exercise all power and authority which a circuit judge sitting without a jury would have in a similar matter."); Rule 71(a), SCRCP ("Actions to foreclose liens or obtain partition of real property shall be tried by the court, and shall ordinarily be referred to a master pursuant to Rule 53."); Eddins v. Eddins, 304 S.C. 133, 135, 403 S.E.2d 164, 166 (Ct. App. 1991) ("[I]n construing an ambiguous order or decree, the determinative factor is to ascertain the intent of the judge who wrote the order."); id. at 136, 403 S.E.2d at 166 ("`[T]he interpretation or construction of a judgment must be characterized by justice and fairness.'" (quoting 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 73 (1969))).

2.

As to Issue Seven: Judy v. Martin, 381 S.C. 455, 459, 674 S.E.2d 151, 153 (2009) ("[A]n unappealed ruling becomes the law of the case and precludes further consideration of the issue on appeal." (citing In re Morrison, 321 S.C. 370, 372 n.2, 468 S.E.2d 651, 652 n.2 (1996))); Rule 59(e), SCRCP ("A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than [ten] days after receipt of written notice of the entry of the order.").

3.

As to Issue Twelve: First Sav. Bank v. McLean, 314 S.C. 361, 362, 444 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1994) ("A motion for continuance is within the sound discretion of the [circuit] court and the ruling will not be reversed without a clear showing of abuse."); Purex Corp. v. Walker, 278 S.C. 388, 390, 296 S.E.2d 868, 869 (1982) ("Whether a judge does or does not abuse his discretion depends upon the facts before him at the time.").

4.

As to the remaining issues: Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("[A]n issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review."); Elam v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 361 S.C. 9, 25, 602 S.E.2d 772, 780 (2004) ("If a party is unsure whether he properly raised all issues and obtained a ruling, he must file a Rule 59(e)[, SCRCP,] motion or an appellate court may later determine the issue or argument is not preserved for review.").

AFFIRMED.1

FEW, C.J., and HUFF and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.