THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCARC.

PER CURIAM.

George and Teresa Payne (Grandparents) appeal an order denying their motion to intervene in a Department of Social Services (DSS) removal action involving their grandchildren. On appeal, Grandparents argue the family court erred in denying their motion to intervene. We reverse and remand.

On appeal from the family court, this court reviews factual and legal issues de novo. Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011); Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 386, 709 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2011). However, "a family court's evidentiary or procedural rulings . . . [are] review[ed] using an abuse of discretion standard." Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593, 594 n.2, 813 S.E.2d 486, 486 n.2 (2018).1

Rule 24(b), SCRCP. The permanency planning statute provides, "Any . . . party in interest may move to intervene in the case pursuant to the rules of civil procedure and if the motion is granted, may move for review." S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-1700(J) (Supp. 2018). "`Party in interest' includes . . . an individual with physical or legal custody of the child . . . ." S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-20(17) (Supp. 2018). "Generally, the rules of intervention should be liberally construed whe[n] judicial economy will be promoted by declaring the rights of all affected parties." Ex Parte Gov't Emp.'s Ins. Co., 373 S.C. 132, 138, 644 S.E.2d 699, 702 (2007).

The family court abused its discretion by not considering the factors set forth in Rule 24(b) when determining whether to permit intervention. See Stoney, 422 S.C. at 594 n.2, 813 S.E.2d at 486 n.2 (providing a family court's procedural rulings are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard). When the children were removed, Grandparents had physical custody of the children through a safety plan; thus, Grandparents were parties in interest and could move to intervene pursuant to section 63-7-1700(J). See § 63-7-20(17) (providing a "party in interest" includes "an individual with physical or legal custody of the child"). The plain language of section 63-7-1700(J) contemplates permissive rather than mandatory intervention. See id. ("Any . . . party in interest may move to intervene . . . pursuant to the rules of civil procedure and if the motion is granted, may move for review." (emphasis added)). Thus, the proper framework for analyzing this intervention is Rule 24(b), which governs permissive intervention.

Rule 24(b) requires the court to consider whether the intervention is timely and "whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties." See id. ("Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action . . . . In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties." (emphases added)). However, nothing in the record indicates the family court considered the timeliness of the motion or whether intervention would prejudice the original parties. The family court considered the merits of Grandparents' underlying request for placement rather than the procedural question of whether they should be permitted to intervene. Nothing suggests the family court weighed the considerations set forth by Rule 24(b), which was error. Thus, this case is reversed and remanded for a new hearing on Grandparents' motion. At the hearing, the family court shall consider their motion to intervene within the framework of Rule 24(b). We offer no opinion as to whether Grandparents' intervention was warranted or appropriate.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.2

HUFF, THOMAS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.