TIMOTHY M. CAIN, District Judge.
Plaintiff Raymond A. Bivings (Bivings) filed this complaint against Greenville Technical College (Greenville Tech), alleging various civil rights violations. (Dkt. No. 1.) This matter is before the court for review of the Report and Recommendation (Report) of the United States magistrate judge made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 of the District of South Carolina. (Dkt. No. 39.)
The Report adequately sets out the facts and procedural history, and the court incorporates the Report here. (Dkt. No. 39.) As detailed in the Report, Biving's allegations arise from his application for a position with Greenville Tech. Greenville Tech advertised an opening for a carpentry instruction position with the following job requirements:
The advertisement also outlined the general responsibilities:
Bivings, an African-American male and experienced carpenter, applied for the position, along with a number of other individuals. Greenville Tech formed a hiring committee, composed of a number of individuals to review the applications
Following his rejection, Bivings filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EECO) and ultimately in the Greenville County Court of Common Pleas.
The magistrate judge filed the Report on March 19, 2012. (Dkt. No. 39.) In the Report, the magistrate judge recommended granting Greenville Tech's motion for summary judgment. In a very well-written and reasoned Report, the magistrate judge recommended finding that Bivings failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to (1) whether Greenville Tech's actions were motivated by racial discrimination; and (2) whether Bivings was better qualified than the eventual hiree such that an inference of discrimination may be rationally drawn.
Bivings timely filed objections to the Report. (Dkt. No. 42.) Specifically, Bivings argues that the magistrate judge erred in finding no demonstrated racial animus. Secondly, he argues that the magistrate judge erred in finding that the eventual hiree was qualified according to the requirements listed in the job advertisement. As detailed below, the court finds both of these objections unpersuasive and adopts the recommendations of the magistrate judge.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this court must "grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56, Fed. R. Civ. P. A fact is material if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect the disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Of course, all inferences and ambiguities must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The moving party must initially shoulder the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has met this burden, the non-moving party may not rest on the allegations made in his pleadings but must instead demonstrate specific, material facts that exist to raise a genuine issue. Id. at 324. Further, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting a motion for summary judgment. Ross v. Commc'ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds by Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is "an unlawful employment practice for an employer to . . . fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); see also id. § 2000e-2(m) ("[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race . . . was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice."). To survive a motion for summary judgment in a Title VII case, a plaintiff may pursue two avenues of proof:
Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., 354 F.3d 277, 284-285 (4th Cir. 2004).
At the outset, the court will address whether Bivings has established, through direct or circumstantial evidence, that racial discrimination motivated Greenville Tech's decision not to hire him. The court holds that Bivings has not done so.
As stated above, "a plaintiff may establish a claim of discrimination by demonstrating through direct or circumstantial evidence that . . . discrimination motivated the employer's adverse employment decision." Direct evidence is evidence that the employer "announced, admitted, or otherwise indicated that the [racial animus] was a determining factor. . . ." Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481, 485 (4th Cir. 1982) (citing Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1113 (4th Cir. 1981)). Direct evidence is also "evidence of conduct or statements that both reflect directly the alleged discriminatory attitude and that bear directly on the contested employment decision." Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). Circumstantial evidence is evidence that may include but is "not limited to proof of the claimant's general qualifications, from which the inference of . . . discrimination may rationally be drawn independently of any presumption" of discrimination. Cline, 689 F.2d at 485. In essence, the plaintiff need only show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that some impermissible factor was a motivating factor in the decision not to hire. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101-02.
Here, Bivings asserts direct evidence of racial animus in the form of the alleged use of a racial epithet. Specifically, Bivings alleges that Jay Pearson (Pearson), the department head for the Building Construction Technology Department and a member of the hiring committee, used the "N" word in his presence in a way that made Bivings believe that Pearson exhibited racial animus and did not want Bivings to apply for the position. However, a review of the evidence in this case does not support Bivings' assertions. Bivings' own deposition testimony is as follows:
This deposition testimony does not support Bivings' assertion that Pearson's alleged use of the "N" word was directed towards Bivings in regards to the open position. Bivings could not remember the timing of the alleged statement—if it occurred before, during, or after the hiring process—or if it was even related to the hiring decision at all. Nothing in Bivings' recitation indicates that Pearson directed the epithet at Bivings in any manner; it appears from the testimony that Pearson was recounting his and others' use of the epithet in the past.
The court will now turn to circumstantial evidence. Bivings alleges that Greenville Tech's hiring of an applicant of another race, who was allegedly less qualified than Bivings, constitutes circumstantial evidence from which an inference of discrimination may be rationally drawn. The court disagrees.
The Report thoroughly discusses this allegation in detail, but in essence, Bivings was not adequately qualified for the position, while the eventual hiree was. As stated above, the job description listed the qualifications necessary for the open carpentry position:
The job description also outlined the general responsibilities:
While Bivings met most of the qualifications, the hiring committee was concerned that he had no college level teaching experience and no experience with the preferred software program. Furthermore, the hiring committee members expressed concern that Bivings would be able to perform duties of position, particularly the ability to communicate with and teach college students. The court notes, as Bivings does, that the description does not require college-level teaching experience but mere teaching experience. Even accepting proposition that any sort of teaching experience meets the job requirement, the hiring committee was not persuaded that Bivings would be able to teach and communicate with college students—which is an express requirement in the job description.
By way of contrast, the eventual hiree met all qualifications: he had the requisite construction and carpentry experience, college-level teaching experience (at Greenville Tech), experience with the preferred software program, and, in the minds of the committee members, the ability to communicate and teach college students. Furthermore, the hiring committee was particularly impressed at the interview with his level of preparedness and teaching experience at Greenville Tech. While Bivings may earnestly believe that his qualifications were better than those of the eventual hiree, the decision maker's assessment of an applicant's qualifications (in this case, the assessment by the hiring committee) is what matters—not the applicant's necessarily biased self-assessment of his qualifications. Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co. 80 F.3d 954, 960-61 (4th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, the court holds that Bivings has not put forth either direct or circumstantial evidence to support a rational inference that the decision was based upon discrimination.
As the magistrate judge noted in the Report, Bivings does not clearly identify which avenue of proof he is pursuing. To the extent that his complaint could be construed as an attempt to pursue the pretext avenue of proof, the court holds that he has failed to establish that the decision not to hire him was a pretext for discrimination.
To proceed under the pretext framework, the applicant must prove a prima facie case of discrimination and then demonstrate that the "employer's proffered permissible reason for taking an adverse employment action is actually a pretext for discrimination." Hill, 354 F.3d at 285 (citing Texas Dep't of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981)).
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in a pretext case, the plaintiff must show
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Hill, 354 F.3d at 285 (citing Brinkley v. Harbour Recreation Club, 180 F.3d 598, 606-07 (4th Cir. 1999)). As outlined in Subsection A, supra, the court finds that Bivings did not meet the qualifications for the position. Therefore, he cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Accordingly, he may not proceed under the pretext avenue of proof.
Though the court finds that Bivings has failed to put forth evidence under either avenue of proof, "[t]he ultimate question in every employment discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 153. As the Fourth Circuit has held, "To demonstrate such an intent to discriminate on the part of the employer, an individual alleging disparate treatment based upon a protected trait must produce sufficient evidence upon which one could find that `the protected trait . . . actually motivated the employer's decision.'" Hill, 354 F.3d at 286 (citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141); see also id. at 286 ("The protected trait must have actually played a role in the employer's decision making process and had a determinative influence on the outcome."). The court finds that Bivings has failed to demonstrate that he was the victim of intentional race discrimination. Accordingly, the court holds that summary judgment is appropriate.
After a thorough review of the Report and the record in this case, the court adopts the Report and incorporates it herein. (Dkt. No. 39.) Accepting the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, he has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that Greenville Tech's hiring decision was motivated by racial animus. It is therefore
