PAIGE J. GOSSETT, Magistrate Judge.
This social security matter is before the court pursuant to Local Civil Rule 83.VII.02 (D.S.C.) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) for final adjudication, with the consent of the parties, of the plaintiff's petition for judicial review. The plaintiff, Lafayette Emanuel Reed, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the defendant, Acting Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"), denying his claims for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"). Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the applicable law, the court concludes that the Commissioner's decision should be affirmed.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) and (d)(5), as well as pursuant to the regulations formulated by the Commissioner, the plaintiff has the burden of proving disability, which is defined as an "inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a);
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
Under this analysis, a claimant has the initial burden of showing that he is unable to return to his past relevant work because of his impairments. Once the claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. To satisfy this burden, the Commissioner must establish that the claimant has the residual functional capacity, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and impairments, to perform alternative jobs that exist in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A);
In October 2010, Reed applied for DIB, alleging disability beginning April 29, 2010. Reed's application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, and he requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). A hearing was held on November 13, 2012, at which Reed, who was represented by Christi B. McDaniel, Esquire, appeared and testified. After hearing testimony from a vocational expert, the ALJ issued a decision on December 6, 2012 finding that Reed was not disabled. (Tr. 9-17.)
Reed was born in 1961 and was forty-eight years old on his alleged disability onset date. (Tr. 124.) He has a high school education and has past relevant work experience as a dump truck operator, an assembly line worker, a printer color mixer, a box maker, and a boat builder. (Tr. 166.) Reed alleged disability due to hairy cell leukemia, stroke, diabetes, and hypertension. (Tr. 165.)
In applying the five-step sequential process, the ALJ found that Reed had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 29, 2010—his alleged onset date. The ALJ also determined that Reed's atypical leukocytosis and restless leg syndrome were severe impairments. However, the ALJ found that Reed did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the "Listings"). The ALJ further found that Reed retained the residual functional capacity to
(Tr. 12.) The ALJ found that Reed was unable to perform any past relevant work, but that considering Reed's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Reed could perform. Therefore, the ALJ found that Reed was not disabled from April 29, 2010 through the date of her decision.
The Appeals Council denied Reed's request for review on January 2, 2014, making the decision of the ALJ the final action of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-3.) This action followed.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court may review the Commissioner's denial of benefits. However, this review is limited to considering whether the Commissioner's findings "are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standard."
Reed generally alleges that the Commissioner erred in finding that Reed was not disabled. However, review of the arguments in his brief reveals that Reed is essentially raising two specific issues: (1) the ALJ erred in failing to consider the severity of several alleged impairments at Step Two of the sequential process, and (2) the ALJ erred in discounting the opinions of Reed's treating physician, Dr. Iris Floyd-Norris. As a result of these allegations of error, Reed also argues that the ALJ erred in assessing his residual functional capacity and in failing to find that he was disabled according to the medical-vocational guidelines, located at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 (the "Grids"). (Pl.'s Br., ECF No. 14.)
Step Two of the sequential evaluation requires the ALJ to "consider the medical severity of [a claimant's] impairment(s)." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). The claimant bears the burden at this step to show that he has a severe impairment.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b). "[A]n impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability to work, irrespective of age, education, or work experience."
At Step Two, the ALJ found that Reed's atypical leukocytosis and restless leg syndrome constituted severe impairments. The ALJ also considered Reed's status post transient ischemic attack (TIA), hypertension, cholesterol, depression, and diabetes mellitus and found them to be non-severe. Reed argues that the ALJ erred in failing to address his chronic pain, osteoarthritis, chronic cramping, and generalized weakness and in failing to find that these impairments constituted severe impairments.
In support of his allegations of error, Reed relies on his reports of chronic pain, osteoarthritis, chronic cramping, and weakness. Reed also points to an assessment completed by Dr. Iris Floyd-Norris indicating that Reed had widespread osteoarthritis in multiple joints including the upper and lower extremities which affected his gait, balance, endurance, and ability to do fine manipulation tasks, and a clinical assessment of pain indicating that Reed's pain would distract from adequate performance of daily activities of work and that physical activity would increase Reed's pain such that it would distract him from tasks or cause a total abandonment of tasks. (Pl.'s Br. at 12, ECF No. 14 at 12) (citing Tr. 411, 410). Reed also argues that Dr. Norris's prescription of a taper of Prednisone supports the severity of his chronic pain and that Dr. Norris found clinical evidence supporting his osteoarthritis in multiple joints. (
As an initial matter, a medically determinable impairment "results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508. "A physical or mental impairment must be established by medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, not only by your statement of symptoms." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508 (citing § 404.1527). Reed's reliance on his self-reports of chronic pain, osteoarthritis, chronic cramping, and weakness do not meet this standard. Moreover, although the ALJ may not have mentioned the alleged impairments at issue in Step Two of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ's decision reflects that she specifically considered Dr. Norris's assessments discussing these impairments and found them to be unsupported and inconsistent with the record.
Reed also argues that the ALJ erred in discounting the opinions of his treating physician, Dr. Iris Floyd-Norris. Typically, the Social Security Administration accords greater weight to the opinion of treating medical sources because treating physicians are best able to provide "a detailed, longitudinal picture" of a claimant's alleged disability.
Additionally, SSR 96-2p provides that a finding that
SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5. This Ruling also requires that an ALJ's decision "contain specific reasons for the weight given to the treating source's medical opinion, supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight."
On December 22, 2011, Dr. Norris completed a one-page "Clinical Assessment of Pain" form in which she circled responses indicating that Reed's pain was present to such an extent as to be distracting to adequate performance of daily activities at work, that physical activity would greatly increase pain to such a degree as to cause distraction from tasks or total abandonment of tasks, and that drug side effects could be expected to be severe and limit effectiveness due to distraction, inattention, drowsiness, etc. (Tr. 410.) Also on December 22, 2011, Dr. Norris completed a "Physical Capacities Evaluation" form in which she checked or circled responses indicating that Reed would be able to lift and/or carry ten pounds occasionally and five pounds frequently during a normal workday, and sit for eight hours and stand and/or walk for two hours in an eight-hour workday. Dr. Norris also marked boxes indicating that Reed would require an assistive device to ambulate even minimally in a normal workday; that he would not need to avoid dust, gases, extremes of temperature, humidity, and other environmental pollutants; that he could push and pull with arm and/or leg controls and perform gross and fine manipulation occasionally; that he could climb stairs or ladders, balance, bend and/or stoop, reach, and operate motor vehicles rarely, and that he could never work with or around hazardous machinery. Dr. Norris indicated that Reed was likely to be absent from work four days a month. Finally, Dr. Norris stated that the medical basis for her assessment was "widespread osteoarthritis in multiple joints, including upper and lower extremities. This affects his gait, balance, endurance, and ability to do fine manipulation tasks." (Tr. 411.)
The ALJ summarized both of these opinions. After also discussing the other evidence of record, including the treatment records and Reed's testimony, and the relevant law on evaluating opinions from treating physicians, the ALJ stated:
(Tr. 15.)
Reed argues that the Commissioner did not find any contradictory evidence to Dr. Norris's opinions in the medical records. Further, Reed argues that "[w]hile the Commissioner's statement that Dr. Iris Floyd-Norris found that the Plaintiff passed the DOT physical requirements on November 22, 2010, (Tr. 332-335) is accurate, the rest of the Commissioner's statements regarding the evidence are not accurate." (Pl.'s Br. at 15, ECF No. 14 at 15.) However, Reed argues that "after this date, it is clear from the medical evidence from Dr. Floyd-Norris that the Plaintiff's condition deteriorated" and that there is "no evidence in this case after November 22, 2010, that truly discounts the December 2011, opinions of Dr. Floyd-Norris."
Upon review of the ALJ's decision and the record, the court concludes that the ALJ appears to have applied the relevant factors in evaluating Dr. Norris's opinions and finds that Reed has failed to demonstrate that the ALJ's decision to afford little weight to Dr. Norris's opinions is unsupported by substantial evidence or based on an incorrect application of the law.
For all of these reasons, the court finds that Reed has not shown that the ALJ's decision with regard to Dr. Norris's opinions was unsupported by substantial evidence or reached through application of an incorrect legal standard. Thus, Reed's final arguments that the ALJ's residual functional capacity assessment is unsupported based on Dr. Norris's opinions and his argument that as a result, he should be found disabled under the medical-vocational guidelines, located at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 (the "Grids"), similarly fail.
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that Reed has not shown that the Commissioner's decision was unsupported by substantial evidence or reached through application of an incorrect legal standard.
