R. BRYAN HARWELL, District Judge.
Plaintiff Ronnie J. Vanzant, a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the nine above named defendants alleging they violated his constitutional rights by acting in deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. See Complaint, ECF No. 1. The matter is before the Court for review of the Report and Recommendation ("R & R") of United States Magistrate Judge Jacquelyn D. Austin, made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 73.02 for the District of South Carolina.
According to the allegations in his complaint, Plaintiff was involved in a work-related accident sometime in late February 2014 and suffered injuries to his left knee, lower back, and neck. Complaint at 5. He was transported via ambulance to a hospital, where he was X-rayed and given pain medication. Id.
On March 5, 2014, the City of Charleston ("the City"), a named defendant, arrested Plaintiff and placed him in custody at the Charleston County Detention Center ("CCDC"), also a named defendant. Id. Plaintiff immediately began complaining about the ongoing pain from his previous injuries, and he received treatment at the Carolina Center for Occupational Health ("CCOH"),
The results of the MRI showed Plaintiff had a torn meniscus in his left knee. Id. at 6. Huffman and defendant Michelle Page, an assistant director of nursing, informed Plaintiff that defendant Dr. Theodolph Jacobs had received the results of the MRI and determined Plaintiff needed surgery on his knee.
Plaintiff wrote letters to defendants Dr. Berry Weissglass and Charleston County Sheriff Al Cannon requesting that they allow him to have knee surgery and that they pay for the operation. Id. However, Plaintiff received no response from either Dr. Weissglass or Sheriff Cannon. Id. On September 24, 2014, Plaintiff filed the current complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging the nine defendants violated his constitutional rights by acting in deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
The defendants filed various motions in this case, and Plaintiff himself filed a motion for summary judgment. See ECF Nos. 12 (motion to dismiss filed by the City and CCDC), 20 (motion to dismiss filed by CCOH and the Insurance Company), 26 (motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff), 32 (motion to dismiss filed by Huffman, Page, and Dr. Jacobs), 60 (motion to dismiss or for summary judgment filed by Dr. Weissglass), & 65 (motion for summary judgment filed by Sheriff Cannon, the City, and CCDC). On June 23, 2015, the Magistrate Judge issued an R & R recommending the Court: (1) grant the motion to dismiss filed by the City and CCDC; (2) grant the motion to dismiss filed by CCOH and the Insurance Company; (3) grant the motion for summary judgment filed by Dr. Weissglass; (4) grant the motion for summary judgment filed by Sheriff Cannon; (5) deny the motion to dismiss filed by Huffman, Page, and Dr. Jacobs; and (6) deny the motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff. R & R at 11-21. The Magistrate Judge also recommended the Court find Plaintiff's claims for injunctive and/or declaratory relief moot due to Plaintiff's release from incarceration at CCDC. Id. at 10-11.
On June 22, 2015—the day before the Magistrate Judge issued the R & R—the Court received a notice of change of address from Plaintiff. See ECF No. 94. Plaintiff stated in his notice that his address was no longer at CCDC, and he provided a new address matching that of a transitional homeless shelter in Charleston, South Carolina.
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court. The Magistrate Judge's recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The Court must conduct a de novo review of those portions of the R & R to which specific objections are made, and it may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The Court must engage in a de novo review of every portion of the Magistrate Judge's report to which objections have been filed. Id. However, the Court need not conduct a de novo review when a party makes only "general and conclusory objections that do not direct the [C]ourt to a specific error in the [M]agistrate [Judge]'s proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In the absence of specific objections to the R & R, the Court reviews only for clear error, Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005), and the Court need not give any explanation for adopting the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199-200 (4th Cir. 1983).
The Court further notes the Magistrate Judge's R & R sets forth the correct legal standards for a motion to dismiss made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and the requirements for a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See R & R at 5-10.
The Court first addresses the Magistrate Judge's recommended findings as to each defendant and Plaintiff's respective objections.
The Magistrate Judge recommends granting the motions to dismiss filed by CCDC, the City, CCOH, and the Insurance Company because (a) CCDC, CCOH, and the Insurance Company are not "persons" amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (b) Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts showing the City was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs or otherwise stating a claim against the City. R & R at 11-13. Plaintiff does not contest the Magistrate Judge's recommended findings regarding the Insurance Company and the City, but he does object to her findings regarding CCDC and CCOH. Pl.'s Objs. at 3-4.
Plaintiff contends that although he does not know the names of the specific jail officials who committed the unconstitutional acts alleged in his complaint, CCDC bears liability under § 1983 because the unknown individuals "make[] decisions on behalf of (CCDC)." Id. Similarly, Plaintiff claims CCOH is liable under § 1983 for the actions of its employees. Id. at 3-4. Despite these objections, Plaintiff still fails to establish CCDC and CCOH are "persons" within the meaning of § 1983. It remains well-settled law in this circuit that detention centers and medical facilities, such as CCDC and CCOH, cannot be sued in a section 1983 lawsuit. See, e.g., Preval v. Reno, 203 F.3d 821, 2000 WL 20591, at *1 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision) ("The [district] court also properly determined that the Piedmont Regional Jail is not a `person' and is therefore not amenable to suit under § 1983, and we affirm dismissal of the claims against the jail for that reason."); Dudley v. Food Serv.-Just Care, 519 F.Supp.2d 602, 604 (D.S.C. 2007) (stating "plaintiffs seeking redress for federal constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law (§ 1983 causes of action) may not sue inanimate buildings such as jails or detention facilities"); Jackson v. Palmetto Baptist Hosp., No. 3:05-1901-CMC-BM, 2005 WL 5405815, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 17, 2005) (dismissing Palmetto Baptist Hospital as a defendant because it was not a person withing the meaning of § 1983), aff'd, 181 F. App'x 391 (4th Cir. 2006). The Court therefore overrules Plaintiff's objections and adopts the portion of the Magistrate Judge's R & R recommending the action be dismissed as to CCDC and CCOH, as well as to the City and the Insurance Company.
The Magistrate Judge recommends granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Dr. Weissglass—who, according to his affidavit, is the medical director at CCOH—because he was not involved in Plaintiff's medical treatment in either a personal or supervisory role and because there is no respondeat superior liability in a section 1983 lawsuit. R & R at 13-17; see also ECF No. 60-2 (Dr. Weissglass's affidavit). In objecting to the Magistrate Judge's finding, Plaintiff supplements the allegations made in his complaint, presenting many new facts not originally pled. Compare Complaint at 5-6, with Pl.'s Objs. at 4-5. Plaintiff alleges, "Dr. Weissglass is directly involved because since the filing of [P]laintiff's complaint, Dr. Weissglass has been to CCDC twice to medically visit [P]laintiff to discuss his medical issues." Pl.'s Objs. at 4 (emphasis added). Plaintiff describes what allegedly has occurred during Dr. Weissglass's recent visits, and he claims Dr. Weissglass "refuses to not only treat [P]laintiff, but to inform his staff to medically and adequately treat Plaintiff[']s medical condition." Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff further details various mental impairments from which he suffers, and claims Dr. Weissglass authorized medical personnel to terminate Plaintiff's medications, thereby causing Plaintiff to suffer seizures and other symptoms. Id. at 5.
The Court reiterates that it may only consider objections that direct it to specific error in the R & R. See Camby, 718 F.2d at 199-200; Orpiano, 687 F.2d at 47. The new allegations summarized in the previous paragraph do not challenge any part of the Magistrate Judge's R & R. Plaintiff cannot use his objections to plead new facts not alleged in his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (providing de novo review encompasses a "determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2)-(3) (same); cf. United States v. George, 971 F.2d 1113, 1118 (4th Cir. 1992) (specifying a district court has the duty "to consider all arguments . . ., regardless of whether they were raised before the magistrate" (emphasis added)); Backus v. Cox, No. 4:13-CV-00881-RBH, 2013 WL 5707328, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 18, 2013) ("Plaintiff, however, cannot use his objections to plead new claims or cure the factual defects of his existing claims against Defendant. . . ."). Accordingly, the Court need not consider Plaintiff's objection because it does not dispute the Magistrate Judge's findings and recommendations. The Court therefore overrules Plaintiff's objection and adopts the portion of the Magistrate Judge's R & R recommending summary judgment be granted for Dr. Weissglass.
The Magistrate Judge recommends granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Sheriff Cannon because Plaintiff has made no showing that Sheriff Cannon engaged in the type of conduct required to establish a claim of deliberate medical indifference against a non-medical defendant. R & R at 17-18. Plaintiff argues in his objections that Sheriff Cannon knew of Plaintiff's serious medical needs but did nothing. Pl.'s Objs. at 5. Plaintiff appears to base this argument on the allegation in his complaint that he mailed Sheriff Cannon a letter but received no response, stating, "Just because [Sheriff Cannon] didn't respond to [P]laintiff's letters and grievances doesn't mean he did not see or read them." Id. at 5; see Complaint at 6.
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Sheriff Cannon is entitled to summary judgment. Although Plaintiff alleges he sent Sheriff Cannon a letter asking him to authorize Plaintiff's knee surgery, see Complaint at 6, Plaintiff has presented no evidence showing Sheriff Cannon acted with deliberate indifference toward his medical needs. As the Magistrate Judge stated, a plaintiff cannot maintain a claim of deliberate medical indifference against a non-medical defendant (here, Sheriff Cannon) unless the plaintiff shows the non-medical official (1) failed to provide the incarcerated plaintiff with prompt medical care, (2) deliberately interfered with the jail physician's performance, or (3) implicitly authorized or was indifferent to the jail physician's unconstitutional performance. Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 854 (4th Cir. 1990). In this case, the evidence
Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment against Huffman, Page, and Dr. Jacobs, asserting summary judgment was proper because they were served but failed to file a responsive pleading or otherwise defend the action asserted against them.
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that good cause exists to extend the time for service of process. In reaching this conclusion, the Magistrate Judge cited Greene v. Holloway, 210 F.3d 361, 2000 WL 296314, at *1 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision), in which the Fourth Circuit held that if an incarcerated plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis and provides the United States Marshals Service adequate information to identify the defendant, but the Marshals Service fails to complete service, good cause exists under Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for extending the time for service. R & R at 20-21; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (stating that if a defendant is not served within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the court "must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time," but specifying the court must extend the time for service upon a showing of good cause by the plaintiff). As the Magistrate Judge explains in detail, Plaintiff, proceeding in forma pauperis, issued summonses containing the address for Huffman, Page, and Dr. Jacobs, but the Marshals Service served these defendants at a different address. Compare ECF No. 10 at 7-9 (Plaintiff's summonses listing the address for Huffman, Page, and Dr. Jacobs at 3841 Leeds Avenue, North Charleston, SC 29405), with ECF No. 29 at 7-9 (completed process receipts and returns signed by a United States Marshal showing process was served for Huffman, Page, and Dr. Jacobs by giving the summonses and complaint to Johanna Gardener at 4045 Bridge View Drive, 3rd Floor, North Charleston, SC 29405). In light of these facts, the Court finds good cause exists to extend the time for service and to not dismiss Plaintiff's complaint as to Huffman, Page, and Dr. Jacobs.
Plaintiff also argues the Magistrate Judge erred in denying his motion to amend the complaint. Pl.'s Objs. at 1-3. Plaintiff asserts that had the Magistrate Judge permitted him to amend his complaint, the "Report and Recommendation would not be so harsh against [P]laintiff." Pl.'s Objs. at 3. Plaintiff also uses his objections to present several proposed amendments. Id. at 2-3.
Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a magistrate judge to hear and issue orders on nondispositive pretrial matters. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). A motion to amend qualifies a nondispositive pretrial matter.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (emphases added). "[A] party who fails to comply with Rule 72(a) waives his right to appeal a magistrate's order." Nevin v. Freedman, 202 F.3d 259, 1999 WL 1267351, at *3 n.* (4th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision).
The docket shows Plaintiff filed a motion to amend on January 5, 2015, and the Magistrate Judge denied it in a text order on February 27, 2015.
Plaintiff's remaining objection concerns his request for injunctive and/or declaratory relief. Pl.'s Objs. at 3. As summarized in the "Background" section above, the day before the Magistrate Judge issued the R & R, Plaintiff filed a notice of change of address indicating he had been released from CCDC. ECF No. 94. Based on Plaintiff's release, the Magistrate Judge recommended the Court find Plaintiff's claims for injunctive and/or declaratory relief were moot because he was no longer incarcerated. R & R at 10-11. Subsequent to the filing of the R & R, Plaintiff was rearrested and again booked at CCDC, where he currently remains in custody. See ECF No. 102; Charleston Cty. Pub. Index, supra note 7; Booking Results, Charleston Cty. Sheriff's Office, supra note 7.
In his objections, Plaintiff argues his claims for injunctive and/or declaratory relief are not moot because he "is still incarcerated at the same place of confinement[,] . . . needs all his medications, specifically adequate pain medications for his knee, back and neck injuries[,] and . . . needs the surg[e]ry on his knee. . . ." Pl.'s Objs. at 3. The Court finds this objection is moot as to all defendants except Huffman, Page, and Dr. Jacobs. Specifically, the objection is moot as to the City, CCDC, CCOH, the Insurance Company, Dr. Weissglass, and Sheriff Cannon because the Court is granting these defendants' motions. As to Huffman, Page, and Dr. Jacobs, however, the objection is not moot because the Court is denying these defendants' motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, because the three defendants have a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment pending before the Magistrate Judge, see ECF No. 109, the Court overrules Plaintiff's objection as premature.
The Court has conducted a thorough review of the entire record, including Plaintiff's complaint, the Magistrate Judge's R & R, Plaintiff's objections to the R & R, and the applicable law. For the reasons stated in this order and in the R & R, the Court overrules Plaintiff's objections, finds no error in the Magistrate Judge's R & R, and adopts and incorporates by reference the R & R [ECF No. 95].
The Court therefore
