REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
BRISTOW MARCHANT, Magistrate Judge.
The pro se Defendant Eugene Elmore (Defendant) filed a notice of removal on November 10, 2015, which purports to remove Civil Action No. 2011-CP-08-02434, from the Court of Common Pleas of Berkeley County, South Carolina. Defendant appears to asserts that removal of the state court mortgage foreclosure action is proper pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 95a(2) and 8 U.S.C. § 1481. Notice of Removal, ECF No.1 at 1. Plaintiff, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Morgan Stanley Capital 1 Inc. Trust 2006-NC2, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-NC2, filed a motion to remand on November 25, 2015, asserting that this action should be remanded to state court because this Court lacks jurisdiction, removal is defective because all Defendants have not joined in or consented to removal, and Defendant's notice of removal was not timely. Defendant did not file a response within the time permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, allows a state court defendant to remove a case to a federal district court if the state court action could have originally been filed there. See Darcangelo v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 292 F.3d 181, 186 (4th Cir. 2002). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, see Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994), and a district court is charged with ensuring that all cases before it are properly subject to such jurisdiction. In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Further, the burden is on the removing defendant to establish subject matter jurisdiction. Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chemicals Co., Inc., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994).
When considering removal jurisdiction, federal courts must "scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined." Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In addition, "[r]emoval statues must be strictly construed against removal," Scott v. Greiner, 858 F.Supp. 607, 610 (S.D.W.Va. 1994), and a federal court must "resolve all doubts about the propriety of removal in favor of retained state court jurisdiction." Marshall v. Manville Sales Corp., 6 F.3d 229, 232 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Palisades Collections LLC v. Shorts, 552 F.3d 327, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2008); Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151 ["If federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand is necessary."].
Generally a case can be filed in a federal district court only if there is diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, or if there is federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Here, Defendant appears to have based the removal of this case on federal question jurisdiction. "The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the `well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiffs properly pleaded complaint. The rule makes the plaintiff the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (internal citation omitted); see Harless v. CSX Hotels, Inc., 389 F.3d 444, 450 (4th Cir. 2004)[discussing the well-pleaded complaint rule]. Potential defenses and counterclaims involving the Constitution or laws of the United States are ignored. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009).
A careful review of the pleading in this case fails to reveal any basis for federal question jurisdiction. This is a state law foreclosure action, and a review of the complaint reveals that it is solely based on state law. See ECF No.1-I, at 1-7. No federal jurisdiction exists over a complaint which "merely states a cause of action for enforcement of a promissory note and foreclosure of the associated security interest in real property." Burbage v. Richburg, 417 F.Supp.2d 746, 749 (D.S.C. 2006); see also Pettis v. Law Office of Hutchens, Senter, Kellam and Pettit, C/A No. 3:13-147-FDW, 2014 WL 526105, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 7, 2014)(collecting cases); Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Lovett, C/A No. 3:12-1819-JFA, 2013 WL 528759, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 11, 2013). Additionally, to the extent that Defendant is attempting to raise a defense to the foreclosure action based on a federal statute or constitutional amendment, such defenses do not establish removal jurisdiction. See Merrell Dow Pharm" Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986); Cook v. Georgetown Steel Corp., 770 F.2d 1272, 1275 (4th Cir. 1985)["A federal defense to a state cause of action is not sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction."]. Nor do the statutes cited, 12 U.S.C. §§ 95a(2)1 and 8 U.S.C. § 1481,2 establish removal jurisdiction.
Additionally, Defendant has not asserted removal based on diversity jurisdiction, but even if he had, Defendant is precluded as a matter of law from removing the case on the basis of diversity of citizenship because he is a citizen of South Carolina and because no federal question is presented on the face of Plaintiffs properly-pleaded complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)["A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought."].
Therefore, Plaintiffs motion to remand should be granted for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in this Court. In the alternative, it is recommended that this action be remanded back to the state court sua sponte because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction (as discussed above). A district court is obligated to consider sua sponte whether jurisdiction is present and remand the case to state court if it determines that it lacks jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiffs motion to remand should also be granted because Defendant failed to comply with the provision of the removal statute requiring all defendants to consent to removal of the action. In a case removed from state court to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction, all properly joined and served defendants "must join in or consent to the removal of' such an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A). However, Defendant provides no indication that the other defendants to the state court action (Gwendolyn Elmore also known as Gwendolyn Beverly Frazier, the South Carolina Department of Revenue, the United States of America acting by and through its agency the Internal Revenue Service, and Nadine Harpingnies-Rohn -see state court complaint, ECF No. 1-1 at 1) have consented to the removal of this case from state court.3 Thus, Defendant has failed to comply with this provision of the removal statute. See Payne ex reI. Estate of Calzada v. Brake, 439 F.3d 198, 203 (4th Cir. 2006); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hunt, C/A No. 6:13-1333-MGL-KFM, 2013 WL 6383255, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 22, 2013).
Additionally, Plaintiffs motion to remand should be granted because Defendant failed to timely file his notice of removal. "The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Defendant was personally served with the summons and complaint on September 6, 2011 (Affidavit of Service, ECF No. 6-2 at 2), but did not file his Notice of Removal until November 10, 2015, well past the 30-day deadline provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). The failure to file a timely notice is a defect in the removal procedure. Cades v. H & R Block Inc., 43 F.3d 869, 873 (4th Cir. 1994).
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Plaintiff's motion to remand (ECF No.6) be granted and this case be remanded back to state court. In the alternative, it is recommended that this action be remanded sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in this Court.4
The parties are referred to the Notice Page attached herein.