REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

BRISTOW MARCHANT, Magistrate Judge.

The pro se Defendant, Joyce A. Bryant, filed a notice of removal on November 23, 2015, which purports to remove Civil Action No. 2-14-CP-18-1054 from the Court of Common Pleas of Dorchester County, South Carolina. Defendant appears to asserts that removal of this state court mortgage foreclosure action is proper pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 95a(2) and 8 U.S.C. § 1481. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1-1 at 1.

The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, allows a state court defendant to remove a case to a federal district court if the state court action could have originally been filed there. See Darcangelo v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 292 F.3d 181, 186 (4th Cir. 2002). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, see Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994), and a district court is charged with ensuring that all cases before it are properly subject to such jurisdiction. In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Further, the burden is on the removing defendant to establish subject matter jurisdiction; Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chemicals Co., Inc., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994); and a district court is obligated to consider sua sponte whether jurisdiction is present and to remand the case to state court if it determines that it lacks jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2008).

When considering removal jurisdiction, federal courts must "scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined." Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In addition, "[r]emoval statues must be strictly construed against removal," Scott v. Greiner, 858 F.Supp. 607, 610 (S.D.W.Va. 1994), and a federal court must "resolve all doubts about the propriety of removal in favor of retained state court jurisdiction." Marshall v. Manville Sales Corp., 6 F.3d 229, 232 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Palisades Collections LLC v. Shorts, 552 F.3d 327, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2008); Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151 ["If federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand is necessary."].

Generally a case can be filed in a federal district court only if there is diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, or if there is federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Here, Defendant appears to have based the removal of this case on federal question jurisdiction. "The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the `well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint. The rule makes the plaintiff the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (internal citation omitted); see Harless v. CSX Hotels, Inc., 389 F.3d 444, 450 (4th Cir. 2004)[discussing the well-pleaded complaint rule]. Potential defenses and counterclaims involving the Constitution or laws of the United States are ignored. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009).

A careful review of the pleading in this case fails to reveal any basis for federal question jurisdiction. This is a state law foreclosure action, and a review of the complaint reveals that it is solely based on state law. See ECF No. 1-1, at 10-13. No federal jurisdiction exists over a complaint which "merely states a cause of action for enforcement of a promissory note and foreclosure of the associated security interest in real property." Burbage v. Richburg, 417 F.Supp.2d 746, 749 (D.S.C. 2006); see also Pettis v. Law Office of Hutchens, Senter, Kellam and Pettit, C/A No. 3:13-147-FDW, 2014 WL 526105, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 7, 2014)(collecting cases); Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Lovett, C/A No. 3:12-1819-JFA, 2013 WL 528759, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 11, 2013). Additionally, to the extent that the Defendant is attempting to raise a defense to the foreclosure action based on a federal statute or constitutional amendment, such defenses do not establish removal jurisdiction. See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986); Cook v. Georgetown Steel Corp., 770 F.2d 1272, 1275 (4th Cir. 1985)["A federal defense to a state cause of action is not sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction."]. Nor do the statutes cited, 12 U.S.C. § 95a(2)1 and 8 U.S.C. § 148,2 establish removal jurisdiction. Removal of this case under federal question jurisdiction is therefore improper, requiring that this case be remanded to state court.3

Finally, Defendant has not asserted that this removal is based on diversity jurisdiction, but even if she had, Defendant is precluded as a matter of law from removing this case on the basis of diversity of citizenship because she is a citizen of South Carolina and because no federal question is presented on the face of Plaintiff's properly-pleaded complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)["A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought."].

Therefore, this action should be remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in this Court.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is recommended4 this case be remanded back to state court.