REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

SHIVA V. HODGES, Magistrate Judge.

Charles Law, Sr., and Betty J. Law ("Plaintiffs") filed this civil rights action alleging claims of gross negligence, violations of Mr. Law's constitutional rights, and assault and battery.1 They sue the Town of Fairfax ("Town"), and John Doe ("Doe") and J. Singleton ("Singleton"), individually as police officers for Town (collectively "Defendants"). This matter is before the court on Defendants' motion to dismiss. [ECF No. 4]. The motion having been fully briefed [ECF Nos. 6, 8], it is ripe for disposition.

All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(f) (D.S.C.). Because the motion is dispositive, this report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends Defendants' motion to dismiss be denied.

I. Factual Allegations in the Complaint

Plaintiffs' complaint contains the following factual allegations: On or about June 9, 2013, Mr. Law was lawfully driving in Town, when Doe stopped him. [ECF No. 1-1 at ¶8]. According to Doe, he observed Mr. Law "walking funny," and stopped Mr. Law because the tag on his vehicle had been used in a felony in Texas. Id. at ¶10. Mr. Law was allowed to drive his vehicle to the police department, where Singleton arrived on the scene. Id. at ¶11. Mr. Law tried unsuccessfully to convince Doe and Singleton that the matter concerning his tag was a mistake. Id. at ¶12. Mr. Law produced identification and "attempted to reason with the officers, all to no avail." Id. Doe and Singleton, "without provocation or legal justification, violently arrested, detained, and seized Mr. Law by forcefully throwing him to the ground with such force that Mr. Law's hip was knocked out of the socket and causing severe bruising and other injuries to Mr. Law." Id. at ¶13. Plaintiffs allege Doe and Singleton's conduct "was vicious, violent, reckless, deliberate, and intentional and was done totally in disregard for Mr. Law's constitutional rights." Id. at ¶32.

II. Discussion

A. Standard on a Motion to Dismiss

To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court is "not required to accept as true the legal conclusions set forth in a plaintiff's complaint." Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999). Indeed, "[t]he presence of a few conclusory legal terms does not insulate a complaint from dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when the facts alleged in the complaint cannot support" the legal conclusion. Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 577 (4th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, in analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court may consider "documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Tellabs. Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).

B. Analysis

Defendants argue that Doe and Singleton are entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff's claims for assault and battery because the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-10, et seq. ("SCTCA") is the exclusive remedy for any tort committed by a governmental employee acting within the scope of his official duty, and it provides that the proper defendant is the governmental entity. [ECF No. 4 at 2-3]. In their response, Plaintiffs argue that the SCTCA contains an exception to the immunity typically enjoyed by government employees when the employees acted with intent to harm. The SCTCA provides as follows:

S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs argue that they alleged in the complaint that Doe and Singleton acted with an intent to harm. [ECF No. 6]. In their reply, Defendants do not address Plaintiff's argument. A review of Plaintiffs' complaint reveals that Plaintiffs allege that "Doe and Singleton's conduct was vicious, violent, reckless, deliberate, and intentional and done totally in disregard for Mr. Law's constitutional rights." [ECF No. 1-1 at ¶32]. The undersigned finds that Plaintiffs' complaint has sufficiently alleged that Doe and Singleton acted with an intent to harm to survive dismissal at this early stage in the litigation. Therefore, the undersigned recommends Defendants' motion to dismiss be denied.

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends Defendant's motion to dismiss [ECF No. 4] be denied.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.