REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

PAIGE J. GOSSETT, Magistrate Judge.

The plaintiff, Larry Jerome Rainey, a self-represented state prisoner, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 50.) Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Plaintiff of the summary judgment and dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to the defendants' motion. (ECF No. 52.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion. (ECF No. 54.) Having reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court finds the defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are either undisputed, or are taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, to the extent they find support in the record. Plaintiff was incarcerated at Evans Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections at the time of the incident giving rise to this matter. Plaintiff claims that on September 22, 2015, as he was taking the stairs to his room, he fell and broke three ribs on his right side. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 6; Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 2, ECF No. 50-2 at 2.) Plaintiff also claims his "medical profile" indicates that he should not climb or lift anything over ten pounds, but the defendants nevertheless placed him in a housing unit that required him to walk down stairs to access his bed.1 (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 4.) He also claims that using stairs for an unspecified number of weeks caused his left knee to swell. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff claims he informed all of the defendants about his need to have a bottom bunk bed on the ground floor so that he did not have to climb or use stairs, but he was not assigned a proper bed until May 24, 2016. (Id.) Plaintiff filed this action on June 20, 2016 alleging the defendants placed Plaintiff in improper housing based on his medical profile in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff seeks damages for his pain and suffering related to his knee and ribs, and he seeks medical care for those injuries. (Id. at 7.)

DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record" or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. at 248.

The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

B. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

A legal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows "a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In this case, Plaintiff alleges the defendants' failure to place him in housing appropriate for his medical condition is a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, the court has construed the Complaint as asserting a claim of deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's medical needs in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. (Order, ECF No. 15.)

Deliberate indifference by prison personnel to a prisoner's medical needs is actionable under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-105 (1976). To establish a claim under the Eighth Amendment, an inmate must establish two requirements: (1) a sufficiently serious deprivation occurred, resulting "in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities," and (2) the prison official had a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the second prong, an inmate must show that the prison official's state of mind was "deliberate indifference" to the inmate's health and safety. Id. A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he has actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to an inmate and disregards that substantial risk. Id. at 847; Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 2004). To be liable under this standard, the prison official "must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. However, because even a subjective standard may be proven through circumstantial evidence, "a prison official cannot hide behind an excuse that he was unaware of a risk, no matter how obvious." Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Brice v. Va. Beach Corr. Ctr., 58 F.3d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1995)). Therefore, "a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that a risk was obvious." Makdessi, 789 F.3d at 133 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).

Plaintiff alleges two distinct injuries in this matter. First, he claims he fell on stairs leading to his unit resulting in his breaking three ribs. Second, he claims he had knee pain as a result of having to walk up the stairs over a period of time. Plaintiff also indicates he has or had a medical condition, of which the defendants were aware, that hinders his ability to use stairs and bunk beds, and despite his efforts to warn the defendants about his condition, the defendants assigned him to an unit that could only be accessed by stairs.2 Plaintiff does not specify what medical condition prevented him from using stairs. The defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim, arguing Plaintiff has failed to show the defendants had the requisite state of mind to establish deliberate indifference, and regardless, Plaintiff has not suffered any serious harm.

The court finds Plaintiff has failed to show the defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical needs. The record in this case contains no allegation or evidence of what medical condition prevents Plaintiff from using stairs or climbing into bunk beds. Both parties in this case have submitted copies of Plaintiff's medical records, but none of the records indicates that a "medical profile" of Plaintiff exists or that he has been diagnosed or even has alleged that he has a condition that prevents him from ably using stairs or bunk beds. Plaintiff's medical records show that Plaintiff has a history of reporting back, neck, and knee pain beginning in 2013 that relates to a motor vehicle accident that occurred in 2003. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 1, ECF No. 50-1 at 2-4.) However, the records also indicate medical personnel found nothing wrong with Plaintiff's back, neck, or knee and believed Plaintiff was malingering. (Id.) Also, nothing in the medical records supports Plaintiff's claim that he is unable to use stairs or bunk beds. Rather, the records indicate Plaintiff has a history of observed strenuous exercise in prison involving his neck and knees, including situps, jumping jacks, pushups, and pullups. (Id.) Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that he has a medical condition that prevents him from using stairs or bunk beds.

The only indication in the record that the defendants were warned about Plaintiff's alleged inability to use stairs or bunk beds comes from staff requests and grievances written by Plaintiff in May 2016.3 However, Plaintiff's medical records show that he fell on the stairs and purportedly injured his ribs on September 22, 2015, and the only record of his complaining of knee pain occurred in 2013. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 1, ECF No. 50-1 at 2-4.) In his deposition, Plaintiff alleged he filed grievances prior to his purported rib and knee injuries, but the court cannot identify evidence in the record to substantiate that claim. (Pl.'s Resp., ECF No. 54-1 at 42.) Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the defendants had actual knowledge of a substantial risk that he could be harmed by using the stairs prior to his purported injuries.4 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. Nor has Plaintiff presented any evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that defendants should have known about his purported limitation because it was obvious. See Makdessi, 789 F.3d at 133. The undisputed evidence in the record shows that when Plaintiff raised the issue of his purported inability to use stairs to the defendants in May 2016, he was promptly moved to a ground level unit with a bottom bunk bed. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at 4; Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 4, ECF No. 50-4 at 4; Pl.'s Resp., ECF No. 54-1 at 2-3, 5-6.) Thus, the record presented unequivocally shows that the defendants quickly accommodated Plaintiff.5 Accordingly, no reasonable jury could conclude on this record that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his purported limitations.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court recommends the defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted. (ECF No. 50.)

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must `only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).