REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN, Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant [Doc. 6] and a motion to remand filed by Plaintiff [Doc. 13]. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.

On or about December 28, 2016, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action in the Court of Common Pleas for Greenville County, South Carolina. [Doc. 1-1.] On April 12, 2017, Defendant removed the action to this Court, alleging that Plaintiff asserts federal constitutional claims under § 1983. [Doc. 1.] Specifically, in his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges denial of his due process and equal protection rights. [Doc. 1-1 at 4.] On April 17, 2017, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. [Doc. 6.]

On May 8, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand the matter to state court, contending he did not want to bring federal constitutional claims and that the Court of Common Pleas was the proper venue for his Complaint. [Doc. 13.] In its response, Defendant consents to the remand if Plaintiff abandons any and all federal claims. [Doc. 14.] On July 10, 2017, with leave of Court, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint setting forth only state law claims. [Doc. 22.]

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brought his action under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. [Doc. 22 at 1.] Plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to relief against Defendant for gross negligence and for violating his due process and equal protection rights under the South Carolina Constitution. [Id.] Plaintiff's claims surround his removal from the Character Based Unit ("CBU") at Perry Correctional Institution. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that his rights were violated when Defendant removed him from the CBU program for allegedly threatening his roommate without first notifying Plaintiff and allowing him to present his side of the story. [Id. at 16.] Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and any additional relief to which he may be entitled. [Id. at 19.]

APPLICABLE LAW

Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint

Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even under this less stringent standard, however, the pro se complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. Id. at 520-21. The mandated liberal construction means only that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court "conjure up questions never squarely presented." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

Motion to Remand Standard

Remand of a case to state court following removal is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and (d). "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). "The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is placed on the party seeking removal." Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92 (1921)). "Because removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns," courts "must strictly construe removal jurisdiction." Id. at 151 (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941)). Thus, remand is necessary if federal jurisdiction is doubtful. Id. (citing In re Business Men's Assur. Co. of Am., 992 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1993); Cheshire v. Coca-Cola Bottling Affiliated, Inc., 758 F.Supp. 1098, 1102 (D.S.C. 1990)).

DISCUSSION

The Court agrees that remand is appropriate. Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over two types of cases, generally referred to as federal question cases and diversity cases.1 Federal question cases are "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Here, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint raises claims of gross negligence and denial of due process and equal protection in violation of the South Carolina Constitution. Moreover, Defendant consents to remand because Plaintiff expressly abandons any and all federal claims. [Doc. 14 at 1.] Because "a plaintiff is the master of his claim and may avoid federal jurisdiction by relying exclusively on state law," Cook v. Georgetown Steel Corp., 770 F.2d 1272, 1275 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 399 (1987)), the Court finds that remand is appropriate here as the Plaintiff relies solely on state law. Whether to remand in a removed case when federal claims have been eliminated is a matter generally left to the discretion of the district court. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 351, 357 (1988); see also Harless, 389 F.3d at 450 (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the plaintiff's motions to amend her complaint and by remanding the case to state court when a plaintiff had good faith reasons to amend her complaint beyond simply defeating federal jurisdiction and where her counsel represented to the court that he never intended to allege a federal claim). Here, because the Amended Complaint relies solely on state law and Defendant consents to remand, the undersigned recommends that this Court exercise its discretion to remand this case.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends Plaintiff's motion to remand [Doc. 13] be GRANTED and Defendant's motion to dismiss [Doc. 6] be deemed as MOOT.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must `only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).