J. MICHELLE CHILDS, District Judge.
Plaintiff Founders Insurance Company ("Plaintiff") filed a Declaratory Judgment action against Defendants John Hamilton a/k/a Jim Hamilton, individually and d/b/a Aces High Club ("Hamilton"), and Aces High Club ("AHC") (together "Defendants")
This matter is before the court on Defendants' and their Co-Defendant Kenneth Weatherford's ("Weatherford") Motions to Reconsider, Alter, or Amend the court's August 9, 2017 Order granting Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 82). (ECF Nos. 84, 85.) Plaintiff opposes their Motions. (ECF No. 86 at 1.) For the reasons set forth below, the court
Defendants are involved in the Underlying Lawsuit that alleges their negligence in serving Oscar Melvin ("Melvin") excessive amounts of alcohol, on or about January 22, 2012, was the cause of an assault perpetrated by Melvin against Weatherford. (ECF No. 1 at 4 ¶ 16-17.) This alleged assault occurred at a different bar than AHC, and resulted in physical injury to Weatherford. (Id. at 4 ¶¶ 15.) Defendants claim they are entitled to coverage under the Policy, and are also entitled to have Plaintiff defend and indemnify them in regard to the Underlying Lawsuit. (Id. at 4-5 ¶¶ 19-20.)
Plaintiff issued the Policy to Defendants with effective dates of June 3, 2011, through June 3, 2012. (ECF No. 64-2 at 8.) In the Policy, there is an "Exclusions to Coverage" subsection that contains a paragraph (k) titled "Assault and/or Battery," which provides as follows:
(Id. at 2-3.)
On April 18, 2014, Weatherford filed the Underlying Lawsuit alleging claims against Defendants, John Calvin Sikes and Fish Tales a/k/a JB Fish Tales for (1) "negligence/dram shop/negligence per se/survival/conscious pain and suffering"; and (2) piercing the corporate veil. (ECF No. 1-2 at 9-13 ¶¶ 24-37.) Plaintiff provided Defendants a defense in the Underlying Lawsuit pursuant to a reservation of rights. (ECF No. 64-1 at 3.)
On January 28, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Declaratory Judgment action in this court pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 1.)
Plaintiff filed a Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment on February 13, 2017 (ECF No. 64), that was granted on August 9, 2017. (ECF No. 82.) Defendants and Weatherford filed Motions to Reconsider, Alter, or Amend the court's Order on September 1 and September 5, 2017, respectively. (ECF Nos. 84, 85.) Plaintiff responded on September 15, 2017, opposing their Motions. (ECF No. 86.)
The court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) based on Plaintiff's allegations that the action is between citizens of different states and the amount in controversy is in excess of $75,000, exclusive of costs and interest. (ECF No. 1 at 2-3 ¶¶ 5-11.)
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), a court may "alter or amend the judgment if the movant shows either (1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence that was not available at trial, or (3) that there has been a clear error of law or a manifest injustice." Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp., 599 F.3d 403, 407 (4th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). It is the moving party's burden to establish one of these three grounds in order to obtain relief under this rule. Loren Data Corp. v. GXS, Inc., 501 Fed. App'x 275, 285 (4th Cir. 2012). The decision whether to reconsider an order pursuant to this rule is within the discretion of the district court. See Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1382 (4th Cir. 1995). A Rule 59(e) motion should not be a "vehicle for rearguing the law, raising new arguments, or petitioning a court to change its mind." Lyles v. Reynolds, No. CV 4:14-1063-TMC, 2016 WL 1427324, at *1 (D.S.C. Apr. 12, 2016) (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486 n. 5 (2008)).
Defendants and Weatherford move the court to reconsider, alter or amend its Order granting Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 82) on the basis that the court did not address the specific argument of "negligent training" and gave a "blanket ruling" that "[Plaintiff] has no duty to defend or indemnify in the underlying case due to the assault and battery exclusion." (ECF No. 84 at 2 ¶¶ 4-6.)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff must defend them in the Underlying Lawsuit based on the language of the Policy which "does not include an exclusion for the negligent training of employees. . . ." (ECF No. 84 at 2 ¶ 4.) Defendants also raised this argument in their Response to Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 66 at 6.)
The court finds that the Fourth Circuit's analysis in St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Riviello, 296 F. App'x 377 (4th Cir. 2008) is more analogous to this case than Jessco. Jessco concerns a builder's insurance company's duty to defend and indemnify it in a suit brought by homeowners whose house flooded and suffered damage. 472 F. App'x. 226-27. Riviello concerns the "assault and battery" exclusion of a bar's Liquor Liability portion of its insurance policy, and whether the insurance company had a duty to defend or indemnify the bar. 296 F. App'x at 379.
In Riviello, the Fourth Circuit affirmed this court's reliance on Sphere Drake Ins. Co. v. Litchfield, in which the South Carolina Court of Appeals addressed an "assault and battery" exclusion within an insurance policy. 296 F. App'x at 379 (citing St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Ollie's Seafood Grille & Bar, LLC, 242 F.R.D. 348, 351 (D.S.C. 2007)). The Court of Appeals found that "[] the separate acts of negligence alleged by [the plaintiff in the underlying case] are not actionable without the assault and battery, because without the assault and battery there would be no damage suffered as a result of the alleged negligence of [the defendant nightclub]. The negligence claims are for bodily injury "arising out of" assault and battery and come within the exclusion." Sphere Drake Ins. Co. v. Litchfield, 438 S.E.2d 275, 277 & n.1 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993) ("[Plaintiff's] [C]omplaint alleged, inter alia, negligence in failing to protect customers, failing to provide adequate security devices, failing to properly train and supervise employees, and negligence in hiring") (emphasis added).
The court's Order also relied on Sphere Drake finding that Weatherford's "negligence/dram shop/negligence per se/ survival/conscious pain and suffering" cause of action fell within the "assault and battery" exclusion of the Policy because the separate acts arose from the assault and battery, therefore foreclosing Plaintiff's duty to defend and/or indemnify. (ECF No. 82 at 9-10.)
Upon review of the court's August 9, 2017 Order, the court finds that Defendants' argument that "negligent training" is not excluded from coverage under the Policy is without merit. Weatherford's claim of negligent training is not actionable without the assault and battery claim, therefore it "arises from" the assault and battery claim and is excluded under the Policy. The court's Order observed that ". . . claims arising from an assault and battery, whether rooted in the actual assault and battery or couched in terms of negligence, fall within the parameters of an assault and battery exclusion and, therefore, such claims do not trigger an insurer's duty to defend or indemnify." (ECF No. 82 at 9.)
For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that it has not made a clear error of law or manifest injustice and therefore