J. MICHELLE CHILDS, District Judge.
This matter is before the court pursuant to Magistrate Judge Kevin F. McDonald's Report and Recommendation ("Report"), recommending that the Commissioner's decision be affirmed and Plaintiff Jerry Wayne Boulware's claims for disabled widower's benefits and supplemental security income benefits be denied. (ECF No. 21.) For the reasons set forth below, the court
The court concludes upon its own careful review of the record that the factual and procedural summation in the Report (ECF No. 21) is accurate; therefore, the court adopts this summary as its own. The court will only recite herein procedures pertinent to the court's review of the Report (id.). On December 19, 2017, the Magistrate Judge filed the Report (id.), and on December 27, 2017, Plaintiff timely filed an objection (ECF No. 22). On February 23, 2017, the Commissioner replied to Plaintiff's objection (ECF No. 23).
The court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) which gives the court jurisdiction over a review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security.
The Magistrate Judge's Report is made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a) for the District of South Carolina. The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this court, which has no presumptive weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with this court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which specific objections are made. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2)-(3).
The parties were advised of their right to file objections to the Report. (ECF No. 21.) On December 27, 2017, Plaintiff filed an objection. (ECF No. 22.) In his objection, Plaintiff states that (1) the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") residual functional capacity ("RFC") assessment of Plaintiff is not supported by substantial evidence; (2) the ALJ did not appropriately assess Plaintiff's pain and credibility; and (3) since the evidence in the record supports that Plaintiff is limited to sedentary work, he is disabled under Medical-Vocational Rule 201.09. (ECF No. 22.)
As to Plaintiff's first assertion, the court finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly found that the ALJ's evaluation of Plaintiff's functional abilities was supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ evaluated the medical record at some length. (ECF No. 8-2 at 22-25.) He considered the medical opinions in the record in rendering an analysis of Plaintiff's functional abilities. (Id. at 25.) As the Magistrate Judge summarized, "the record did not bear-out the plaintiff's allegations regarding standing, walking, or lifting, and repeated medical findings referenced the plaintiff's normal gait and/or unremarkable extremity function." (ECF No. 21 at 17.) The Magistrate Judge also appropriately concluded that "the ALJ's decision reflects that the ALJ sufficiently considered Plaintiff's impairments in combination when making the [residual functional capacity] assessment." (Id. at 18.) Moreover, Plaintiff does not cite any medical evidence that he charges the ALJ with overlooking. As long as substantial evidence—more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance, of evidence—supports the ALJ's decision, it should be affirmed. See, e.g., Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the court determines that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence.
Next, the court finds that the Magistrate Judge appropriately determined that the ALJ's assessment of Plaintiff's subjective complaints was supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's decision erroneously relied on "a few daily activities and . . . limited medical[] treatment over the years." (ECF No. 22 at 2.) However, the Magistrate Judge already considered and rejected this view, finding that the ALJ analyzed Plaintiff's medical history as a whole in considering Plaintiff's self-reported symptoms. (See ECF No. 21 at 13.) The Magistrate Judge outlined that:
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ penalized him for lack of treatment. (ECF No. 22 at 3.) However, the Magistrate Judge rejected this argument:
(ECF No. 21 at 14.)
In addition, the Magistrate Judge acknowledged that the ALJ detected discrepancies in the record but still gave Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt and expressly limited Plaintiff's functional restrictions more significantly than the state agency experts suggested. (Id. at 15.) Thus, the court finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly determined that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's evaluation of Plaintiff's subjective complaints.
Lastly, Plaintiff's position as to the Medical-Vocational Rule 201.09 is inapplicable. Plaintiff argues that since he is limited to sedentary work, he is disabled under Medical-Vocational Rule 201.09. (ECF No. 22 at 3.) However, the Magistrate Judge aptly summarized that this argument relies on the erroneous premise that the ALJ was obligated to limit Plaintiff to sedentary work. (ECF No. 21 at 19.) Rather, substantial evidence supported the ALJ's decision to instead limit Plaintiff to a range of light work. (ECF No. 8-2 at 22-23.) Consequently, Plaintiff's argument on this point is mistaken.
Based on the foregoing reasons, the court