BRUCE H. HENDRICKS, District Judge.
This is an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) seeking judicial review of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security's ("Commissioner") final decision, which denied Plaintiff John Lewis Addison, Jr.'s ("Plaintiff") claim for disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). The record includes the report and recommendation ("Report") of United States Magistrate Judge Kaymani D. West, which was made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a) (D.S.C.).
In her Report, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court affirm the Commissioner's final decision denying benefits. Plaintiff filed objections to the Report, and the Commissioner filed a response to those objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (providing that a party may object, in writing, to a Magistrate Judge's Report within 14 days after being served a copy). For the reasons stated below, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge's Report and affirms the Commissioner's final decision denying benefits.
Plaintiff protectively filed for DIB on October 3, 2014, alleging disability beginning on October 2, 2014, due to the following medical conditions: neuropathy, diabetes, hypertension, knee pain, and post traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"). His applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration, and he requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). A hearing was held on December 2, 2015, at which Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, appeared and testified. The ALJ also heard testimony from vocational expert ("VE") Robert E. Brabham, Jr. The ALJ issued a decision dated January 13, 2016, denying Plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff requested review of his decision, and on June 2, 2016, the Appeals Council issued a notice denying Plaintiff's request for review. On July 5, 2016, the Appeals Council notified Plaintiff it was "setting aside [its] earlier action to consider additional information." (Tr. at 1-7.) Upon consideration, the Appeals Council "found no reason under [its] rules to review the Administrative Law Judge's decision." (Tr. at 1.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of judicial review. Plaintiff filed this action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision on September 2, 2016.
Plaintiff was born in 1967 and was 47 years old on his alleged onset date of October 2, 2014. Plaintiff completed high school and has past relevant work as a logistics associate for an automotive manufacturing business. Plaintiff's duties as a logistics associate included loading and unloading trucks with a forklift.
Plaintiff also served in the United States Military for the following dates: September 27, 1985-July 28, 1989 (Marine Corps); November 1, 2002-October 11, 2003 (Army); and January 29, 2007-July 5, 2008 (Army). On November 28, 2011, Plaintiff received a disability Rating Decision from the Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA"). He was given a service connection disability rating of 30 percent for PTSD effective April 28, 2011, and in a VA award letter dated September 26, 2014, Plaintiff was provided a 100 percent disability evaluation and was "considered to be totally and permanently disabled due to [his] service-connected disabilities." (Tr. at 303.) A second award letter dated October 16, 2014, noted the effective date of his disability as November 24, 2013. (Tr. at 304.)
The Court conducts a de novo review to those portions of the Report to which a specific objection is made, and this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendations contained in the Report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any written objection must specifically identify the portion of the Report to which the objection is made and the basis for the objection. Id.
The federal judiciary plays a limited role in the administrative scheme as established by the Social Security Act. Section 205(g) of the Act provides that "[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security, as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Consequently, judicial review . . . of a final decision regarding disability benefits is limited to determining whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law was applied." Walls v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2002). "Substantial evidence" is defined as:
Shively v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Laws v. Celebreeze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966)). In assessing whether substantial evidence exists, the reviewing court should not "undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of" the agency. Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (alteration in original).
The Commissioner is charged with determining the existence of a disability. The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1399, defines "disability" as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). This determination involves the following five-step inquiry:
Mastro, 270 F.3d at 177 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920).
If the claimant fails to establish any of the first four steps, review does not proceed to the next step. Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 35 (4th Cir. 1993). The burden of production and proof remains with the claimant through the fourth step. However, if the claimant successfully reaches step five, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to provide evidence of a significant number of jobs in the national economy that the claimant could perform, taking into account the claimant's medical condition, functional limitations, education, age, and work experience. Walls, 296 F.3d at 290.
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 2, 2014, the alleged onset date. Next, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: diabetes mellitus with neuropathy, bilateral knee degenerative joint disease and arthritis, obesity, PTSD, depression, and anxiety disorder. However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 ("the Listings"). With regard to residual functional capacity ("RFC"), the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) except that Plaintiff: must change positions without leaving the work station one time per hour; cannot use ladders; can climb stairs, kneel, crawl, and crouch occasionally; can stoop and balance frequently; must avoid concentrated exposure to cold and hazards; is limited to unskilled work with no more than occasional interaction with the general public and frequent interaction with coworkers and supervisors. The ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work, but that, considering his age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that he could perform. Therefore, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled from the alleged onset date through the date of the decision.
In her Report, the Magistrate Judge evaluated Plaintiff's claims and found them to be without merit. First, the Magistrate Judge rejected Plaintiff's claims that the ALJ erred in her credibility and RFC assessments. Next, the Magistrate Judge found that the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff's VA disability rating. The Magistrate Judge also found that Plaintiff failed to show that the ALJ should have given more consideration to Plaintiff's treating psychiatrist's records. Finally, the Magistrate Judge rejected Plaintiff's claim that the ALJ erred in her hypothetical to the VE.
Plaintiff filed written objections to the Magistrate Judge' Report. For the most part, Plaintiff's objections simply reiterate certain arguments raised in his brief that the Magistrate Judge specifically rejected, but the Court will consider each of Plaintiff's objections in turn.
As a first objection, Plaintiff states that the Magistrate Judge erred in determining that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's assessment of Plaintiff's RFC. According to Plaintiff, his mental and emotional limitations, and particularly his PTSD, significantly erode his vocational base, and Plaintiff claims that the ALJ failed to properly take that into consideration. Plaintiff states:
(ECF No. 24 at 4.) In addition, Plaintiff asserts that his five-day admission to the VA Hospital for suicidal ideation, which occurred two days after the hearing before the ALJ, provides additional evidence of the severe nature of Plaintiff's PTSD, and he argues that the ALJ should have considered this information in assessing Plaintiff's RFC.
After consideration, the Court finds Plaintiff's objection without merit. As the Magistrate Judge noted in her Report, an individual's RFC is an assessment of his "ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis." S.S.R. 96-8p at *1. An ALJ assesses a claimant's RFC "based on all the relevant medical and other evidence." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
S.S.R. 96-8p. Thus, an ALJ can give weight to some medical evidence, while disregarding other medical evidence, when determining a claimant's RFC. See Bacnik v. Colvin, No. 1:12-cv-801, 2014 WL 3547387, at *4 n. 7 (M.D.N.C. July 17, 2014). However, "`a necessary predicate to engaging in a substantial evidence review is a record of the basis for the ALJ's ruling,' including `a discussion of which evidence the ALJ found credible and why, and specific application of the pertinent legal requirements to the record evidence.'" Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 189 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2013)). In other words, the ALJ must "`build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.'" Id. (quoting Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000)).
Here, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's assessment of Plaintiff's RFC. As the Magistrate Judge noted, in assessing Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ reviewed Plaintiff's subjective complaints and the objective evidence as well as the medical opinion evidence and the VA's finding of total disability. The ALJ ultimately found that Plaintiff could perform a reduced range of light, unskilled work with no more than occasional interaction with the general public and frequent interaction with coworkers and supervisors, and the Court finds that the ALJ thoroughly explained the reasons supporting her decision. With respect to Plaintiff's mental and emotional state, the ALJ noted:
(Tr. at 173; ECF No. 13-5 at 20.) The ALJ found that claimant's statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms were not entirely credible because they were not supported by the objective clinical findings and observations. Specifically, with respect to Plaintiff's mental and emotional state, the ALJ found:
(Tr. at 174; ECF No. 13-5 at 21 (internal citations omitted).)
The ALJ also outlined the medical opinion evidence, including the opinion of psychologist Mark D. Worthen, who opined that Plaintiff's PTSD would have a moderate impairment on his ability to work with co-workers, supervisors, and the general public. (Tr. at 175; ECF No. 13-5 at 22.) The ALJ gave great weight to the State agency psychological consultant's determination that Plaintiff could perform simple, routine tasks away from the public, finding it "consistent with the objective findings, which show that the claimant often has an irritable or anxious mood, but is able to make good eye contact." (Id.)
In addition, the ALJ considered the VA's finding of disability and ultimately gave the decision little weight, noting:
(Tr. at 176; ECF No. 13-5 at 23.)
To the extent Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to consider Plaintiff's posthearing hospitalization as evidence of the "doubts" that Plaintiff's treating psychiatrist had about Plaintiff's mental stability, the Court finds that there was no error on the part of the ALJ. As the Magistrate Judge determined, the supplemental records submitted by Plaintiff were new information and "did not affect the decision whether Plaintiff was disabled beginning on or before January 13, 2016." (ECF No. 22 at 25 (citing Tr. at 2).)
In all, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the ALJ appropriately considered the evidence of record, including Plaintiff's testimony and the medical opinion evidence, in assessing Plaintiff's RFC, and the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff could maintain no more than occasional interaction with the general public and frequent interaction with coworkers and supervisors. As the Magistrate Judge remarked:
(ECF No. 22 at 22.); see also Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (noting that a reviewing court should not "undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of" the agency in assessing whether substantial evidence supports a decision); Colvard v. Chater, 59 F.3d 165, *2 (4th Cir. 1995) ("The determination of a claimant's residual functioning capacity lies with the ALJ, not a physician, and is based upon all relevant evidence.") (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 404.1546, 416.945(a), 416.946). Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff's first objection without merit.
As a second objection, somewhat related to his first, Plaintiff reiterates his claim that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's conclusion concerning the number of jobs available to Plaintiff. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's hypothetical question to the VE failed to take into account the nature and frequency of Plaintiff's multiple episodes of anger and decompensation caused by his PTSD.
After review, the Court overrules this objection because the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge, for the reasons set forth above and for the reasons set forth in the Magistrate Judge's Report, that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's RFC assessment and that the ALJ's hypothetical to the VE fairly included Plaintiff's credible limitations. As the Magistrate Judge explained, the ALJ asked the VE to opine on jobs Plaintiff could perform given his age, education, and work experience, and limiting him to light work with various physical limitations and the mental limitations of unskilled work, no more than "occasional interaction with the general public due to anger issues," and frequent interaction with coworkers and supervisors. (ECF No. 22 at 26 (citing Tr. at 214).) The ALJ also explained to the VE that Plaintiff "does have an anger issue and it has caused him some problems in the past." (Id.) In all, because the Court has determined that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's RFC assessment, the Court also finds that substantial evidence supports the limitations contained in the hypothetical question presented to the VE, and the Court therefore finds Plaintiff's objection without merit.
As a final objection, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to make a proper credibility determination. Plaintiff provides no argument or evidence in support of this objection, and Plaintiff points to no specific error in the Magistrate Judge's Report other than his conclusory assertion that "the reasoning set forth by the ALJ for her rejection of Plaintiff's testimony is flawed and the ALJ's failure to set forth sufficient evidentiary support for his rejection of Plaintiff's testimony is erroneous." (ECF No. 24 at 6.) After review, the Court finds this objection without merit.
As the Magistrate Judge stated, an ALJ must consider the extent to which a claimant's self-reported symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence. Pursuant to Social Security Ruling 96-7p, if an ALJ finds a claimant to be less than fully credible, the ALJ must cite specific reasons based on the evidence. This Ruling provides:
SSR 96-7p. In evaluating a claimant's subjective complaints, the Social Security Regulations direct the Commissioner to consider the following factors:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3).
Here, as the Court explained above, the ALJ outlined Plaintiff's hearing testimony in her decision and found that Plaintiff's statements "concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible." (Tr. at 173.) The ALJ then explained her decision by discussing the objective medical evidence, the opinion evidence, and Plaintiff's reported activities of daily living. For the reasons set forth herein and for the reasons set forth in the Magistrate Judge's Report, the Court has little difficulty in determining that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the ALJ's credibility analysis is unsupported by substantial evidence or controlled by an error of law. Accordingly, this objection is overruled.
The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge properly summarized the facts and applied the correct principles of law when she determined that Plaintiff failed to show that the Commissioner's decision was not supported by substantial evidence or that it was reached through application of an incorrect legal standard. Accordingly, it is hereby
