REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

BRISTOW MARCHANT, Magistrate Judge.

This action was originally filed by the Plaintiff in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, Marlboro County. Plaintiff, who was at all times relevant to this action an inmate with the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC), asserted claims against the Defendants relating to his medical care for gross negligence/recklessness pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (SCTCA), S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-10, et seq. (First Cause of Action), for violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 19831 (Second Cause of Action), and for violations of his rights under the South Carolina Constitution (Third Cause of Action). Plaintiff sought monetary damages. See generally, Complaint (Court Docket No. 1-2).

As Plaintiff's Complaint asserted a federal cause of action, the Defendants removed the case to this United States District Court on October 5, 2017. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. That same day, the Defendants filed a notice of motion and motion for dismissal and/or partial dismissal of Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the Defendants' motion to dismiss on November 17, 2017, following which the Defendants filed a reply on November 27, 2017. On March 5, 2018, the undersigned entered a Report and Recommendation recommending that Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action asserting a claim under the South Carolina Constitution be dismissed with consent of the parties; that the Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action asserting a federal constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Defendant Davis be granted, and that that claim be dismissed; that as Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action was the only cause of action in which Davis was named, that Davis should further be dismissed as a party Defendant in this case in toto; and that Plaintiff's remaining state law causes of action should be remanded back to state court for disposition. See Court Docket No. 20 (Report and Recommendation).

Plaintiff filed objections to the Report and Recommendation on March 19, 2018, and the Defendants filed a reply memorandum on April 2, 2018. In an Order entered May 2, 2018, the Honorable Mary G. Lewis, United States District Judge, construed Plaintiff's objections as a request to amend his Complaint, and Plaintiff was granted an opportunity to file an amended complaint by no later than May 9, 2018.2 Plaintiff thereafter filed an Amended Complaint on May 8, 2018, adding two (2) new Defendants (Eagleton and Sellers), and asserting a state cause of action against the SCDC and federal § 1983 claims against the three (3) natural Defendants. The Defendants then filed a new motion for dismissal and/or partial dismissal on May 22, 2018. Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition on June 25, 2018, and Defendants filed a reply on July 2, 2018.

Defendants' second motion to dismiss and/or for partial dismissal is now before the Court for disposition.3

Discussion

When considering a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, the Court is required to accept the allegations in the pleading as true, and draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. The motion can be granted only if the party opposing the motion has failed to set forth sufficient factual matters to state a plausible claim for relief "on its face". Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); see also Vogt v. Greenmarine Holding, LLC, 318 F.Supp.2d 136, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ["[O]n a motion to dismiss, the Court does not weigh the strength of the evidence, and simply considers whether the [claim] alleges sufficient facts which, if true, would permit a reasonable fact finder to find [the party seeking dismissal of the claim] liable."].

I.

(Plaintiff's Federal Claim Against the Defendant Davis)

Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant Davis violated his constitutional right to "be free from cruel and unusual punishment, medical neglect and to receive medical, psychological and other treatment, while incarcerated . . ." by failing to properly respond to substantial risks of harm to the Plaintiff of which Davis was aware, and by being deliberately indifferent towards the welfare of the Plaintiff. See generally, Amended Complaint, ¶ ¶ 40-42. The undersigned concluded in the previous Report and Recommendation entered in this case that Plaintiff had failed to set forth sufficient factual allegations (in his original Complaint) to show any personal involvement by Davis in the deprivation of any of Plaintiff's constitutional rights, and Plaintiff's Amended Complaint suffers from this same factual infirmity.

Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from high blood pressure, which may sometimes cause blurred vision and dizziness if he does not get the necessary medication, and that during much of his confinement the "SCDC has prevented Plaintiff from getting his blood pressure medicine on multiple days, often consecutively, one after another, making his symptoms more pronounced." Amended Complaint, ¶ ¶ 10-11. Specifically with respect to the Defendant Davis, Plaintiff alleges that on February 9, 2016 he informed Davis (a correctional officer who had come to get him to go to a disciplinary hearing) that he was experiencing chest pains, dizziness, and blurred vision, and that he asked Davis to call medical. Plaintiff alleges that instead of calling medical, Davis shackled his hands to his waist and told him he [Plaintiff] was going to his disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff alleges that he obeyed Davis' instructions, but that he asked Davis for assistance while he was walking because he "could not hold himself up". Plaintiff alleges that Davis failed to provide him with the necessary assistance and that when he was around the top of a stairwell, he reached for Davis' support but that "Davis was not there to help . . ." and he fell down the stairwell, suffering injuries. Id., ¶ ¶ 15-17. Plaintiff alleges that the conditions under which Davis was transporting him were in violation of SCDC policy OP-22-38, § 17, which requires that whenever RHU Behavioral level inmates (such as the Plaintiff) are removed from, escorted, or placed back in their cells, they are supposed to be in "full restraints" (while Plaintiff was only placed in hand shackles secured at his waist) and that a minimum of 2 certified officers (one of whom is to be of a supervisory rank of Sergeant or above) are supposed to be present. Plaintiff alleges, however, that Davis was the only officer in the "vicinity".4 Finally, Plaintiff alleges that ever since that day, "Officer Davis always laughs at Plaintiff when he sees him". Id., ¶ ¶ 18-19, 21.

After careful review and consideration of these allegations in conjunction with the applicable standard for deciding a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, the undersigned is constrained to agree with the Defendants that Plaintiff has failed to set forth a "plausible" constitutional claim against the Defendant Davis in his Complaint, and that Davis is therefore entitled to dismissal as a party Defendant in this case. Essentially, Plaintiff's claim is that Davis did not exercise due care in transporting him to a disciplinary hearing, which resulted in him falling down the stairs. However, the Supreme Court made clear in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), that a mere "lack of due care" will not support a claim for a violation of a constitutional right. See also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200-203 (1989) [§ 1983 does not impose liability for violations of duties of care arising under state law]. Plaintiff has alleged no facts to show that Davis had any aforeknowledge that he was going to fall down the steps; rather, he only generally alleges that he was suffering from "symptoms" that he contends required medical care, and that while Davis was transporting him from his cell he did not assist Plaintiff sufficiently to prevent him from falling down the stairs, thereby making that event Davis' fault.

Even assumed to be true for purposes of the Defendants' motion, these factual allegations simply do not set forth a plausible claim that Davis violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Cf. Miller v. Turner, 26 F.Appx. 560, 563 (7th Cir. 2001) [A mere possibility that something could happen, or the occurrence of a random act, is not sufficient to impose liability on prison officials for a constitutional violation]; Farmer v. Brennen, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) [Deliberate indifference can be established only where "the official [was] both aware of facts from which the inference can be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference"] (emphasis added); see also Irvin v. Owens, No. 10-1336, 2012 WL 1534787, at * 4 (D.S.C. Apr. 30, 2012) [General statement that Plaintiff believed conditions placed him in danger not sufficient]. While Plaintiff's allegations may be sufficient to set forth a plausible claim that Davis acted negligently in not preventing him from falling down the stairs, they simply are not sufficient to establish a claim that Davis violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 333 ["Where a government official's act causing injury to life, liberty or property is merely negligent, no procedure for compensation is constitutionally required"] (internal quotations omitted); see also Pruitt v. Moore, No. 02-395, 2003 WL 23851094, at * 9 (D.S.C. Jul. 7, 2003) [Only deliberate or callous indifference on the part of prison officials to a specific known risk of harm states an Eighth Amendment claim]; Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 [Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but has not shown — that the pleader is entitled to relief].

This conclusion is further supported by the fact that Plaintiff's main argument for finding that he has stated a plausible constitutional claim against Davis rests on his allegation that, in transporting him, Davis failed to comply with the transport requirements of SCDC policy OP-22-38. See Amended Complaint, ¶ ¶ 18-19, 42. However, any such policy violation (Plaintiff's allegations again assumed to be true for purposes of the motion to dismiss) is not in and of itself a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Keeler v. Pea, 782 F.Supp. 42, 44 C.D.S.C. 1992); cf. Scott v. Hamidullah, No. 05-3027, 2007 WL 904803 *5 n. 6 (D.S.C. March 21, 2007) (citing Riccio v. County of Fairfax, Virginia, 907 F.2d 1459, 1469 (4th Cir. 1990)); Johnson v. S.C. Dep't of Corrections, No. 06-2062, 2007 WL 904826 at *12 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2007) ["Plaintiff's allegation that defendants did not follow their own policies or procedures, standing alone, does not amount to a constitutional violation."] (citing Riccio, 907 F.2d at 1469 [if state law grants more procedural rights than the Constitution requires, a state's failure to abide by that law is not a federal due process issue]). Therefore, Plaintiff's assertion that he was injured as a result of Davis' failure to comply with this prison policy does not make this a claim assertable under § 1983.5

In sum, while Plaintiff may have a negligence claim against the SCDC under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act as a result of Davis' actions, the allegations of the Complaint do not set forth sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for a constitutional violation against this Defendant. Baker v. McClellan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1976) [Section 1983 claim does not lie for a violation of state law duty of care]; cf. Robles v. Prince George's County, MD., 302 F.3d 262, 271 (4th Cir. 2002) ["[N]ot every instance of inappropriate behavior on the part of police rises to the level of a federal constitutional violation"]. Therefore, Davis is entitled to dismissal as a party Defendant in Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action (Federal Cause of Action).

II.

(Plaintiff's Federal Claim Against the Defendants Eagleton and Sellers)

The Defendant Eagleton is the Warden of the Evans Correctional Institution (where Plaintiff is housed), while Sellers is the Associate Warden. Plaintiff alleges that these two Defendants violated his constitutional rights by "failing to provide and enforce adequate means of inmates locked up in cells to obtain medical treatment, and/or be attended to by staff, and/or failing to adequately staff their prison." Plaintiff further alleges that these two Defendants failed to "adequately train and supervise their employees". Amended Complaint, ¶ ¶ 36-37. Finally, Plaintiff also faults these two Defendants for failing to ensure that he received prompt and adequate medical care. Id., ¶ 43.6

Public employees such as Eagleton and Sellers are subject to monetary damages under § 1983 in their individual capacities. However, in order to state a "plausible" constitutional claim against either of these two Defendants sufficient to survive a Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff must have alleged facts sufficient to permit a reasonable fact finder to find that these Defendants, or either one of them, personally engaged in conduct which denied Plaintiff his constitutional rights. See Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1999) ["Liability . . . must be based on the personal involvement of the Defendant"], cert denied, 522 U.S. 1154 (1999); Wilson v. Cooper, 922 F.Supp. 1286, 1293 (N.D.Ill. 1996); see also Horton v. Marovich, 925 F.Supp. 540, 543 (N.D.Ill. 1996) ["Thus, a plaintiff suing a government official in his individual capacity and therefore seeking to hold the official personally liable must show that the official personally caused or played a role in causing the deprivation of a federal right"]. Plaintiff's allegations fail to meet this standard. Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from high blood pressure, which may sometimes cause blurred vision, headaches and dizziness if he does not get the necessary medication, and that the "administration" at ECI (i.e., Eagleton and Sellers) "has prevented Plaintiff from getting his blood pressure medicine on multiple days, often consecutively, one after another, making his symptoms more pronounced". Amended Complaint, ¶ ¶ 10-11. This is, of course, a mere conclusory allegation. Cf. Irvin v. Owens, No. 10-1336, 2012 WL 1534787 at * 4 (D.S.C. Apr. 30, 2012) [General statement that Plaintiff believed conditions at Institution placed him in danger not sufficient]; House v. New Castle County, 824 F.Supp. 477, 485 (D.Md. 1993) [Plaintiff's conclusory allegations insufficient to maintain claim]; see also Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 [Allegations that are "no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth"].

Plaintiff does, however, set forth some specific allegations of purported misconduct in his Complaint. Plaintiff specifically alleges that on February 7, 2016 he woke up around midnight experiencing chest pains, a headache and dizziness, and that he asked a "Sgt. Herrington" to call medical, which he did. Plaintiff alleges that Herrington then told him that the nurse would come to see him when she came around in the morning to pass out medications. Plaintiff alleges that when the nurse (Ms. White) arrived, she took his blood pressure (which Plaintiff alleges was "extremely high") and vital signs. Plaintiff alleges that Nurse White informed him that he could not be seen at medical at that time because the RHU was short-staffed, so she instructed Sgt. Herrington to log Plaintiff in to be seen by medical at the shift change. Id., ¶ ¶ 12-13. Plaintiff alleges that he also personally sent in an "emergency sick call request", but that he was never seen by medical at any other time that day. Id., ¶ 14.

As previously noted, Plaintiff also alleges that on February 9, 2016 he told Officer Davis (who had come to get him to take him to a disciplinary hearing) that he was experiencing chest pains, dizziness, and blurred vision, and that he asked Davis to call medical for him. Id., ¶ 15. Plaintiff then alleges that after he fell down the stairs, he was transported to the hospital, but that even though the hospital instructed the SCDC to provide Plaintiff with pain medications and a wheelchair, the SCDC did not comply. Id., ¶ 20.

Plaintiff also alleges that during his time at ECI, a nurse tried to give him medicine for diabetes, but that he refused the medicine because he is not diabetic. However, Plaintiff alleges that on May 20, 2016, a nurse told him that the doctor had stated that Plaintiff was diabetic and that he needed to take the medicine she had for him, so he took the medicine, although he was not diabetic. Plaintiff alleges that the diabetes medicine given to him included Metformin, which blurred his vision, made him dizzy, gave him headaches and nausea, and caused him to have extreme stomach pains. Plaintiff alleges that when he informed "Officer Caldwell" that he was suffering from these symptoms on May 21, 2016 and showed Caldwell the medicines he was taking, Caldwell left and then subsequently returned with "Lt. Moultrie", who informed Plaintiff that medical had "said Plaintiff had been given the wrong medications". Id., ¶ ¶ 23-25. Plaintiff alleges that about an hour later, he was taken to medical and informed by "Ms. Johnson" that he had been issued the wrong medications by medical and a doctor at the Kirkland Correctional Institution, and that he was placed on a liquid diet for the next 48 hours. Id., ¶ ¶ 27, 29. Plaintiff alleges that after requesting his medical records, he noted that "encounter 352" had been deleted, and that "further investigation" revealed that a Dr. Gregory Furness had prescribed diabetes medicine for him on April 21, 2016 that included 1000 mg. of Metformin daily, and that a dose of this medication had been given to him on May 20, 2016. Id., ¶ 31.

None of these specific factual allegations of purported wrongdoing involve either Eagleton or Sellers, and neither of these two Defendants can be held liable for a constitutional violation (assuming one occurred) that was committed by others merely because they hold supervisory positions at the prison, as the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior are not applicable in § 1983 cases. See Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 927-929 & nn. 1-2 (4th Cir. 1977). Rather, as supervisory officials, Eagleton and/or Sellers may be held liable in this case only if Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated as a result of an official policy or custom for which these Defendants were responsible. See generally, Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs.; 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Wetherington v. Phillips, 380 F.Supp. 426, 428-429 (E.D.N.C. 1974), aff'd, 526 F.2d 591 (4th Cir. 1975); Stubb v. Hunter, 806 F.Supp. 81, 82-83 (D.S.C. 1992); see Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 375-376 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, Reed v. Slakan, 470 U.S. 1035 (1985); Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 67 (1994); Fisher v. Washington Metro Area Transit Authority, 690 F.2d 1133, 1142-1143 (4th Cir. 1982) (citing Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980)). However, Plaintiff merely alleges that providing "the wrong medications to inmates happened because Warden Eagleton and Associate Warden Sellers lacked the procedures, failed to adequately staff their medical department, or failed to provide the proper training to their understaffed medical department employees"; Id., ¶ 26; and that Eagleton and Sellers "should have [ECI] inmates treated by a doctor on site at [ECI] instead of using a doctor at [KCI], an institution with entirely different administration separated from [ECI] by about 100 highway miles. These Defendants should have trained their medical staff better than to write a prescription for a patient they had never examined". Id., ¶ 28. These are quintessentially conclusory allegations, but Plaintiff's specific factual allegations about the amount and quality of medical care he received fail to contain any reference whatsoever to these two supervisory Defendants.

Plaintiff's failure to provide any specific factual allegations to show that the allegedly improper care he received was the result of a policy or custom of either one of these two Defendants is fatal to his claim.7 See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 [Noting that "[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations"]. For example, although Plaintiff generally alleges that providing "the wrong medications to inmates happened because Warden Eagleton and Associate Warden Sellers lacked the procedures, failed to adequately staff their medical department, or failed to provide the proper training to their understaffed medical department employees"8, he fails to actually identify any procedure, policy or decision of these two Defendants which resulted in his being provided with wrong medications;9 he fails to show how any purportedly improper medical care he received was the result of a policy or decision of these two Defendants to inadequately staff the medical department at the prison; nor has he provided any factual allegations concerning the training requirements of medical personnel at the prison, whether or how either of these two Defendants were responsible for those training requirements, and/or how or why any such training requirements were improper or led to the providing of improper medical care.

Instead, it is readily apparent that Plaintiff seeks to hold these two Defendants responsible for the purportedly improper care or treatment he received at the prison because they are the Warden and Associate Warden at the prison, not because either of them was personally involved in, or responsible for, the actual medical care and treatment he received. However, as previously noted, the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior are not applicable in § 1983 cases; Vinnedge, 550 F.2d at 927-929 & nn. 1-2; and neither of these two Defendants can be held responsible for the medical care provided by medical professionals just because they hold supervisory positions at the prison. Cf. Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 167 (4th Cir. 1995) [officials entitled to rely on judgment of medical personnel]; Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 854 (4th Cir. 1990) [officials entitled to rely on expertise of medical personnel].10 Under Iqbal a supervisor can be held liable only for his or her own misconduct, not on a theory that they either knew or should have known about their subordinates' alleged misconduct. Allowing a lawsuit to proceed on such a theory of liability would "directly contradict[ ] Iqbal's holding that such allegations, standing alone, cannot give rise to supervisory liability". Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 736, 661 (4th Cir. 2013) (Wilkinson concurring); see also Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 [allegations that are "no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth"]. "The requirement [of Iqbal] is . . . designed to ensure that the serious burdens of defending against this sort of lawsuit are visited upon a departmental supervisor only when the complaint `plausibly suggests [s]' that the supervisor engaged in `his or her own misconduct'". Evans, 703 F.3d at 661, citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1937 (emphasis added). This requires factual (not conclusory) allegations that the supervisory official was himself (or herself) personally involved in or responsible for the alleged misconduct by virtue of a specific policy or custom for which they were responsible and which resulted in illegal conduct. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; see also Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 ["liability . . . must be based on the personal involvement of the defendant"].

Plaintiff's Complaint is simply devoid of any factual allegations to show that any allegedly improper medical care he received was the result of any policy or training decision made by (or the responsibility of) either of these two Defendants.11 Therefore, Eagleton and Sellers are entitled to dismissal from Plaintiff's § 1983 claim asserted against them in their supervisory capacities. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 [Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but has not shown — that the pleader is entitled to relief].

III.

(State Law Claim against the SCDC)

As was the case with Plaintiff's original complaint, his remaining claim is a state law claim against the South Carolina Department of Corrections under the SCTCA. See Amended Complaint, First Cause of Action. Although the Defendants have also moved for dismissal of this cause of action, since (for the reasons set forth hereinabove, supra) Plaintiff has asserted no valid federal claim in his Complaint, this Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claim. See Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 1999) [`"[T]he Constitution does not contemplate the federal judiciary deciding issues of state law among non-diverse litigants"]. When federal claims presented in a case originally filed in state court are dismissed, any remaining state law claims are ordinarily remanded back to state court for resolution under the general doctrine developed in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). See In Re Conklin, 946 F.2d 306, 324 (4th Cir. 1991); Nicol v. Imagematrix, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 744, 746, 749 (E.D.Va. 1991); Mills v. Leath, 709 F.Supp. 671, 675-676 (D.S.C. 1988); Carnegie-Mellon v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988); Taylor v. Waters, 81 F.3d 429, 437 (4th Cir. 1996). This doctrine recognizes the state court's role in determining whether dismissal of state law claims is warranted; Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 ["Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well"]; and remand of these remaining state law causes of action will therefore allow the more appropriate court to rule on this exclusively state law issue. Even more importantly, if Plaintiff's First Cause of Action were to not be dismissed, it would be much more appropriate for it to be considered and tried by the state courts.

Therefore, if the Court adopts the recommendation herein for dismissal of Plaintiff's federal claim, his remaining state law cause of action should be remanded back to state court for disposition. See Clark v. Brown, 861 F.2d 66, 68 (4th Cir. 1988)[Directing dismissal of state law claims on remand following dismissal of Plaintiff's federal § 1983 claim]; Mills, 709 F.Supp. at 675-676 [Noting that federal courts should generally decline to exercise pendant jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissal of federal claims in a lawsuit]; Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350, n. 7 ["[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims."].

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action asserting a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Defendants Davis, Eagleton and Sellers be granted, and that that claim be dismissed. Additionally, as Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action is the only Cause of Action in which these three Defendants are named, all three of these Defendants should be dismissed as a party Defendants in this case, in toto. This case should then be remanded back to state court for disposition of Plaintiff's remaining state law cause of action (First Cause of Action) against the remaining Defendant SCDC.

The parties are referred to the Notice Page attached hereto.

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must `only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).