REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN, Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants The Woodlands at Furman, Bobby Kimmons, and Brandy Reese ("the Moving Defendants").1 [Doc. 6.] Based on the June 24, 2017, termination from her job, Plaintiff alleges claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ("Title VII"), as well as other state-law claims. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in employment discrimination cases are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration.

Plaintiff filed this action in the Greenville County Court of Common Pleas. [Doc. 1-1.] On September 13, 2018, the Moving Defendants removed the case to this Court2 and filed a motion to dismiss the action. [Docs. 1; 6.] Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on October 8, 2018. [Doc. 12.] The Moving Defendants filed a reply on October 15, 2018. [Doc. 14.] Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is ripe for review.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that on June 24, 2017, Plaintiff was employed by some Defendants and that she was terminated because she had previously filed a South Carolina Workers' Compensation claim and because she had filed discrimination charges with the South Carolina Human Affairs Commission and/or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). [Doc. 1-1 at 4-5.]

In their notice of removal, the Moving Defendants contended that Plaintiff's claim that she was terminated in retaliation for filing a claim with the EEOC "presumably . . . alleged violation of Title VII." [Doc. 1 at 2.] On that basis, the Moving Defendants maintained that "this Court has federal question jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and this action may be removed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)." [Id. at 3.] The Moving Defendants asserted that this Court should "accept supplemental jurisdiction as to [Plaintiff's] state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367(a)" because those claims "form part of the same case or controversy" as the Title VII claims. [Id.]

APPLICABLE LAW

Motion to Dismiss Standards

Rule 12(b)(1)

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) examines whether the complaint fails to state facts upon which jurisdiction can be founded. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). It is the plaintiff's burden to prove jurisdiction, and the court is to "regard the pleadings' allegations as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment." Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). To resolve a jurisdictional challenge under Rule 12(b)(1), the court may consider undisputed facts and any jurisdictional facts that it determines. See id. The court may dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any of the following bases: "`(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.'" Johnson v. United States, 534 F.3d 958, 962 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)).

Rule 12(b)(6)

Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim should be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court should "accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). However, the court "need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts" nor "accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). Further, for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may rely on only the complaint's allegations and those documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference. See Simons v. Montgomery Cnty. Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 31 (4th Cir. 1985). If matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

With respect to well-pleaded allegations, the United States Supreme Court explained the interplay between Rule 8(a) and Rule 12(b)(6) in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly:

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (footnote and citations omitted); see also 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, at 235-36 (3d ed. 2004) ("[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than a bare averment that the pleader wants compensation and is entitled to it or a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion that the pleader might have a legally cognizable right of action.").

"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a `probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2)—the pleader must plead sufficient facts to show he is entitled to relief, not merely facts consistent with the defendant's liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ("Where a complaint pleads facts that are `merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it `stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement to relief."'" (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)). Accordingly, the plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to articulate facts that, when accepted as true, demonstrate that the plaintiff has stated a claim that makes it plausible the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

DISCUSSION

The Moving Defendants maintain, among other arguments, that Plaintiff's Title VII claim is barred by the 90-day statute of limitations. [Doc. 6 at 6-7.] The Court agrees.

Before filing suit under Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC. Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 247 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing King v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 538 F.2d 581, 583 (4th Cir. 1976)). In South Carolina, the charge must be filed within 300 days after an "alleged unlawful employment practice" occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Jones v. Calvert Group, Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Tinsley v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 155 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 1998)). "If the EEOC does not take action within 180 days from the date of filing [of a charge], the aggrieved party is entitled to notice from the EEOC. Upon notification, i.e. a right to sue letter, the aggrieved party has 90 days to file suit." Davis v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 180 F.3d 626, 628 n.3 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Dickey v. Greene, 710 F.2d 1003, 1005 (4th Cir. 1983)); Aziz v. Orbital Scis. Corp., 165 F.3d 17, 1998 WL 736469, at *1 (4th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) ("Title VII and the ADEA allow an aggrieved party ninety days after receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC to file a civil action." (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(e))).

Here, Plaintiff denies that she intended to assert a Title VII claim and, indeed, concedes that she "does not have a valid federal claim." [Doc. 12.] Moreover, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff filed this case more than 90 days after receiving her right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. [See Doc. 1-1 (Summons and Complaint, stamped filed in the Greenville County Court of Common Pleas on June 20, 2018); 6-4 (EEOC Dismissal and Notice of Rights, dated August 16, 2017).] Accordingly, Plaintiff's Title VII claim should be dismissed.

Plaintiff's state law claims could be heard by this Court through the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, which allows federal courts to hear and decide state law claims along with federal law claims. Federal courts are permitted to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), however, if "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." In deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, courts look at "convenience and fairness to the parties, the existence of any underlying issues of federal policy, comity, and considerations of judicial economy." Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995). Further, the Supreme Court has warned that "[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law. . . . [I]f the federal claims are dismissed before trial . . . the state law claims should be dismissed as well." United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

In the instant case, remand of the state law claims is appropriate in light of the Shanaghan factors. The case has been pending in this Court for less than two months and remains in its infancy. Additionally, the case originated in state court and, thus, Plaintiff would not have to file a new action. Moreover, the remaining claims are state law questions. Based on these factors, the Court recommends that the district judge decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims in this case.

RECOMMENDATION

Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that Defendant's motion to dismiss [Doc. 6] be GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff's Title VII claims. It is further recommended that the action be REMANDED to the state court to address Plaintiff's state-law claims.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.