MARY GORDON BAKER, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Terry Beaver ("Plaintiff"), brought this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 405(g), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration regarding his claim for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under the Social Security Act (the "Act"). This matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), D.S.C., and Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends the Court affirm the Commissioner's decision.
Plaintiff initially filed applications for DIB and SSI on July 14, 2008, alleging a disability onset date of July 1, 2008. (R. at 123-33.) Plaintiff claimed disability due to limited use of his left hand, as the result of a stroke, and a seizure disorder. (R. at 149.) Plaintiff has a limited education and past relevant work as a millwright, a pipefitter, and a set up person. (R. at 551.)
Plaintiff's application was denied initially on June 10, 2010. (R. at 15-23.) Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an action in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. Beaver v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., D.S.C. Civil Action No. 2:12-1810-MGL. On August 12, 2013, the District Court remanded the action for further proceedings consistent with its Order (R. at 657-71); Beaver, No. 2:12-cv-1810-MGL. Following the District Court's Order, the Appeals Council vacated the ALJ's June 10, 2010 decision and remanded the matter to the ALJ. (R. at 672-75.)
In the interim, Plaintiff filed a subsequent SSI application on September 7, 2010, amending his alleged disability onset date to August 14, 2012. (R. at 535.) On October 1, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was "disabled" as of August 14, 2012, the amended alleged onset date. (R. at 652-56.) The Appeals Council did not disturb the favorable decision with respect to Plaintiff's subsequent claim for SSI, but instructed the ALJ to adjudicate the issue of disability from July 1, 2008, the initial alleged onset date, through August 13, 2012. (R. at 674.)
On July 25, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not under a "disability" as defined in the Act from July 1, 2008 through August 13, 2012 (R. at 680-95). On February 2, 2016, the Appeals Council granted Plaintiff's request for review and remanded the case to back to the ALJ. (R. at 701-04.) On August 3, 2016, the ALJ held a second hearing at which a vocational expert again testified. (R. at 560-74.) On September 16, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act between July 1, 2008, and August 13, 2012. (R. at 535-52.) On August 14, 2017, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review (R. at 510-12), making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of judicial review.
In making the determination that the Plaintiff is not entitled to benefits, the Commissioner has adopted the following findings of the ALJ:
(R. at 535-52.)
The Act provides that disability benefits shall be available to those persons insured for benefits, who are not of retirement age, who properly apply, and who are under a "disability." 42 U.S.C. § 423(a). "Disability" is defined in the Act as the inability to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than" twelve months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To facilitate a uniform and efficient processing of disability claims, the Act has by regulation reduced the statutory definition of "disability" to a series of five sequential questions. An examiner must consider whether the claimant (1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity, (2) has a severe impairment, (3) has an impairment which equals an illness contained in the Administration's official Listing of Impairments found at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, (4) has an impairment which prevents past relevant work, and (5) has an impairment which prevents him from doing substantial gainful employment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (DIB context); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (SSI context). If an individual is found not disabled at any step, further inquiry is unnecessary. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); see also Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1981).
A plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act if he can return to past relevant work as it is customarily performed in the economy or as the claimant actually performed the work. See SSR 82-62, 1982 WL 31386, at *3. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing his inability to work within the meaning of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5); He must make a prima facie showing of disability by showing that he is unable to return to his past relevant work. Grant v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 1983); see also Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2016).
Once an individual has established an inability to return to his past relevant work, the burden is on the Commissioner to come forward with evidence that the plaintiff can perform alternative work and that such work exists in the national economy. See Monroe, 826 F.3d at 180. The Commissioner may carry the burden of demonstrating the existence of jobs available in the national economy which the plaintiff can perform despite the existence of impairments which prevent the return to past relevant work by obtaining testimony from a vocational expert. Id.
The scope of judicial review by the federal courts in disability cases is narrowly tailored to determine whether the findings of the Commissioner "are supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law was applied." Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 691 (4th Cir. 2018); Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634 (4th Cir. 2015); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). Consequently, the Act precludes a de novo review of the evidence and requires the court to uphold the Commissioner's decision as long as it is supported by substantial evidence. Pyles v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 846, 848 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Mascio, 780 F.3d at 640; Bird v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012).
Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be less than a preponderance." Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012)). "In reviewing for substantial evidence, [the court does] not undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [ALJ]." Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472. "Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [ALJ]," not on the reviewing court. Id. However, "[a] factual finding by the ALJ is not binding if it was reached by means of an improper standard or misapplication of the law." Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in failing to find him disabled. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ "failed to properly evaluate the opinion evidence" of two physicians, Dr. Carol Kooistra and Dr. Petra Warren. (Dkt. No. 11 at 14.) Plaintiff argues that these physicians "provided consistent opinions that [Plaintiff] was limited to sedentary work," and the ALJ failed to properly consider these opinions when finding that Plaintiff's RFC was limited to light work, rather than sedentary work. (Id. at 14-17.)
Under the regulations of the Social Security Administration, the Commissioner is obligated to consider all medical evidence and the opinions of medical sources, including treating physicians. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927.
If the ALJ decides a treating physician's opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, the ALJ must consider the following non-exclusive list of factors to determine the weight to afford the physician's opinion: (1) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examinations; (2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (3) the evidence with which the physician supports his opinion; (4) the consistency of the opinion; (5) whether the physician is a specialist in the area in which he is rendering an opinion; and (6) other factors that support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). The Commissioner must provide specific reasons, supported by the record, for the weight afforded a treating physician's medical opinion. SSR 96-2p.
In her decision, the ALJ discussed in exhaustive detail the available opinion evidence, including that of Dr. Kooistra and Dr. Warren. (R. at 546-51.) With respect to Dr. Koositra, the ALJ specifically recognized "her area of specialty is neurology." (R. at 546.) The ALJ discussed the evidence in the record detailing Dr. Kooistra's specific interactions with Plaintiff at Carolina Neurology: a diagnostic testing performed on September 15, 2010 and a "new patient visit" dated December 15, 2010. (R.at 546.) Plaintiff was initially referred to Carolina Neurology by his attorney "for an electromyogram and nerve conduction study of the upper extremity, based on his allegation of numbness and nerve tingling in his left arm and left leg." (R. at 543.) After quoting Dr. Kooistra's account of Plaintiff's medical history, the ALJ explained in detail why Dr. Kooistra's account was "inconsistent with the medical record." (R. at 546-47.) Upon a thorough review of the evidence in the record relevant to Dr. Kooistra, the ALJ made the following findings:
(R. at 546-548.)
With respect to the opinion of Dr. Warren, the ALJ similarly engaged in a detailed analysis of Dr. Warren's opinion that Plaintiff was limited to sedentary work. The ALJ noted that Dr. Warren saw Plaintiff three times between November 2008 and August 2009 at the Center for Family Medicine Chesnee (CFMC) and that Plaintiff was "primarily treated by resident physicians, whose work [Dr. Warren] reviewed." (R. at 548.) In assigning "no weight" to Dr. Warren's opinion that Plaintiff was restricted to sedentary work, the ALJ noted the "persuasive contradictory evidence" in the record:
(R. at 549.)
The ALJ proceeded to assign "controlling weight" as to Dr. Warren's opinion that Plaintiff "should not work around dangerous machinery or hazardous conditions," finding this opinion to be reasonable given Plaintiff's history of stroke and seizures. (R. at 549.) Likewise, the ALJ assigned controlling weight to Dr. Warren's opinion that Plaintiff "would not be able to use his left hand any more than occasionally during the work day," finding this opinion to be reasonable based on Dr. Warren's clinical observations of impaired grip strength and similar observations by other physicians. (R. at 549.) The ALJ incorporated these opinions into her RFC finding.
Here, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in rejecting these physicians' opinions that Plaintiff was limited to sedentary work. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that "the record clearly shows a mix of positive and negative findings" as to Plaintiff's ability to perform sedentary work, and that the ALJ failed to provide "any explanation for choosing negative findings over the positive findings." (Dkt. No. 11 at 16.) Plaintiff also relies on the recent case, Hill v. Berryhill, Case No. 0:15-cv-05091-JMC, 2017 WL 2703971 (D.S.C. June 23, 2017), to argue that the ALJ erred in his evaluation of the opinion evidence. (Dkt. No. 13 at 5.)
In Hill, the district court considered the claimant's allegation that the ALJ erred in his RFC analysis both in his "one-sided" descriptions of the treatment notes and in his failure "to explain how the treatment notes in the record and Plaintiff's reports of his daily activities related to his subjective statements of pain and other symptoms." Id. at *4-5. The district court found that the decision recently issued by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858 (4th Cir. 2017), was potentially applicable to Hill. Hill, 2017 WL 2703971, at *6-7. Specifically, the district court noted that the Lewis decision
Hill, 2017 WL 2703971, at *6. The court then recommitted the case to the magistrate judge for consideration of "Plaintiff's arguments in the first instance in light of the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Lewis." Id. at *7.
Plaintiff argues that here, as in Hill, the ALJ "cherry-picked the records." (Dkt. No. 13 at 5.) In support, Plaintiff contends that the prior ALJ limited Plaintiff to sedentary work when considering whether Plaintiff was disabled from his amended onset disability date of August 14, 2012, and he relied on a consultative examination from 2010 and Dr. Kooistra's August 14, 2012 opinion to do so.
Plaintiff offers no other specific examples of "cherry-picked" evidence by the ALJ, and the undersigned finds no reason to remand on this basis. Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, the ALJ provided detailed, concrete reasons to reject the opinion evidence at issue, as demonstrated above. For example, the ALJ highlighted the evidence in the record indicating that "there is only minimal evidence of left leg limitation." (R. at 547.) The ALJ further cited evidence indicating that Plaintiff's residual stroke symptoms did not appear to significantly limit Plaintiff's lower extremities. (R. at 549.) While Plaintiff argues that there is evidence in the record to support the opinions of Dr. Kooistra and Dr. Warren that Plaintiff is limited to sedentary work, such reweighing of the evidence is not within the province of this Court. See Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that a reviewing court should not undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ). Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in his analysis of the opinion evidence.
It is therefore
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.