J. MICHELLE CHILDS, District Judge.
This action arises from a dispute over Plaintiff Shaun Nathan Scipio's use of a handicapped parking permit while an employee at the Fairfield County Detention Center. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Fairfield County took adverse employment actions against him — unfavorable work conditions, hostile work environment, reprimands, and harassment — because of his disability. (ECF No. 43 at 1.) The matter before the court is a review of the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation ("Report") issued on May 15, 2019, recommending that the court grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Id. at 21.)
For the reasons below, the court
The Report sets forth the relevant facts and legal standards, which this court incorporates herein without a full recitation. In December 2013, Plaintiff was diagnosed with congestive heart failure. (ECF No. 41 at 1.) Defendant Fairfield County hired Plaintiff as a corrections officer at the Fairfield County Detention Center on November 23, 2015. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff passed the physical examination required to work as a corrections officer. (Id.) However, Plaintiff suffered health issues that caused him to leave shifts early or to be medically excused from work by his physician. (Id. at 2-4.) On May 10, 2016, Plaintiff received a letter about his ten absences from work, recognizing that he had experienced "some health problems," informing him he did not have any more time off, and instructing him to have the Fairfield County doctor complete a "fit-for-duty slip" before returning to work. (Id. at 4.) On May 16, 2016, Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital for three days and underwent heart catheterization, an angiogram, and a transthoracic echocardiogram. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff was diagnosed with severe systemic disease with functional limitation, and his doctor allowed him to return to work on May 19, 2016 (Id. at 6.) On May 20, 2016, Plaintiff met with Human Resources to discuss his absences and request leave due to the death of his sister. (Id.) Human Resources granted the request and asked Plaintiff to provide doctors' excuses for the time he missed due to his health condition, an obituary or funeral bulletin, and a completed fit-for-duty form by his next shift assignment on Thursday, May 26, 2016. (Id.)
On May 23, 2016, Plaintiff returned to the emergency department with complaints of nausea, vomiting, dizziness, and rapid heartbeat. (Id.) On May 26, 2016, Plaintiff arrived for work and parked in the handicap parking space at the Detention Center (Id. at 7.) Lt. Gray, the shift supervisor, told Plaintiff he could not return to work without his fit-for-duty paperwork, that reporting for work suggested he was fully capable of performing his job, and that he could not park in the handicap parking space. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff explained that he had a handicap placard due to certain physical impairments and that he had an appointment with his heart doctor. (Id.) Human Resources requested that he submit another fit-for-duty form signed by the cardiologist. (Id.) The cardiologist cleared Plaintiff for work without restrictions. (Id. at 9.)
On June 13, 2016, Plaintiff returned to work and was presented with a memorandum from Davis instructing that, because his doctors had cleared him for work without restrictions, he should not park in the handicap space. Moreover, Plaintiff was placed on a six-month probationary period and monitored under a performance review plan. (Id.) On June 14, 2016, Plaintiff submitted his letter of resignation. (Id. at 10.)
On October 13, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas, alleging (1) disability discrimination; (2) failure to provide a reasonable accommodation; and (3) retaliation pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2009). (ECF No. 1-1 at 5-8 ¶¶ 25-42.) The ADA protects a "qualified individual" by prohibiting a covered entity
On November 16, 2017, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal. (ECF No. 1.) On December 31, 2018, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, declaring that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment due to disability or retaliation. (ECF No. 24-1 at 33.) Furthermore, Defendant avers that none of the alleged employment actions demonstrate pretext for unlawful discrimination. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition on February 4, 2019, to which Defendant filed a Reply on February 11, 2019. (ECF Nos. 34, 36.) The Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff failed to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding his status as a qualified individual under the ADA and as such "summary judgment is appropriate on all claims." (ECF No. 41 at 21.) Plaintiff timely filed objections to the Report on May 28, 2019, and Defendant filed a Reply on June 3, 2019. (ECF Nos. 43, 45.) The court held oral arguments on June 26, 2019. (ECF No. 48.)
The Magistrate Judge's Report is made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 for the District of South Carolina. The Magistrate Judge only makes a recommendation to this court, and the recommendation has no presumptive weight. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The responsibility to make a final determination remains with the court. Id. at 271. As such, the court is charged with making de novo determinations of those portions of the Report to which specific objections are made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). In the absence of specific objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report, the court is not required to give any explanation for adopting the Report. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). Rather, "in the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note). Thus, the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the Magistrate Judge's recommendation or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect the disposition of the case under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A genuine question of material fact exists where, after reviewing the record as a whole, the court finds a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Newport News Holdings Corp. v. Virtual City Vision, 650 F.3d 423, 434 (4th Cir. 2011). When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1990). The non-moving party may not oppose a summary judgment motion with mere allegations or denial of the movant's pleading, but instead must "set forth specific facts" demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (1); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1012 (4th Cir. 1991). All that is required to survive summary judgment is that "sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties differing versions of the truth at trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. "Mere unsupported speculation . . . is not enough to defeat a summary judgment motion." Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff objects to the Report and argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that: (1) Plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he is a "qualified individual" under the ADA; (2) Plaintiff failed to sufficiently explain his contradicting SSDI application and ADA claim; and (3) Defendant Fairfield County did not admit that Plaintiff could perform the essential functions of a corrections officer. (ECF No. 43 at 4-13.)
Plaintiff asserts that he is a qualified individual under the ADA and that a reasonable jury may well conclude that, "absent Defendant [Fairfield County's] discriminatory treatment and failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, Plaintiff would have performed the essential functions of his job and could have continued to work as [a corrections officer]." (ECF No. 43 at 5.) The Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff's allegations do not "explain or even address how, in light of his assertions of disability, he was, in fact, qualified to perform the essential functions of the position." (ECF No. 41 at 21 (citing Lane v. BFI Waste Sys. of North America, 257 F.3d 766, 770 (8th Cir. 2001).) Moreover, "there is no explanation in the record `to warrant a reasonable juror's concluding that, assuming the truth of, or [the Plaintiff's] good faith belief in, the earlier statement, [he] could nonetheless perform the essential functions of [his] job.'" (ECF No. 41 at 21 (quoting Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 802, 807 (1999).) The court agrees.
The court observes that "[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of showing that he can perform the essential functions of the job and is, therefore, qualified . . . [t]hus, to bring any of his claims, [Plaintiff] must show that he is a qualified individual under the [ADA]." (ECF No. 41 at 15 (citing Doe v. Univ. of Maryland Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1264-65 (4th Cir. 1995)).) Simply put, Plaintiff's status as a qualified individual depends on whether he: (1) has a disability;
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2009).
The record includes the essential functions of a corrections officer at the Detention Center. For example, a "terms of employment" form indicates that Plaintiff as a "full-time employee" that is subject to the following schedule:
(ECF No. 24-3 at 2.)
Here, Plaintiff worked 12-hour shifts in the control room or inmate dormitory and was responsible for the care, custody, and transport of inmates. (Id. at 15.) In general, Plaintiff's duties included monitoring day-to-day activity, controlling door locks as officers moved throughout the Detention Center, conducting security checks, and controlling inmates he transported to off-site appointments. (ECF No. 41 at 2.) Plaintiff testified about his duties when conducting security checks:
(ECF No. 24-5 at 17.)
Plaintiff's explained his duty to care for the inmates:
(ECF No. 24-5 at 28.)
Plaintiff testified that his duty to transport inmates also required him to keep non-inmates safe:
(ECF No. 24-5 at 29.)
Plaintiff testified that fights had occurred in the areas that he patrolled:
(ECF No. 24-5 at 26-27.)
As to Plaintiff's ability to perform the essential duties mentioned above, the record shows that Plaintiff's health was unstable while employed at the Detention Center. For example, in April 2016, Plaintiff, at the direction of his supervisor, went to the hospital with a blood sugar reading of 478, well-above his normal range of 70-105. (ECF No. 24-8 at 16). Contrary to Plaintiff's claim that his blood sugar spikes were not uncommon and that his supervisor "overreacted," medical records show that the hospital wanted to admit Plaintiff and only discharged him against medical advice. (Id.) Moreover, in May 2016, shortly after his doctor wrote him out of work, Plaintiff returned to the emergency room for chest pain. (ECF No. 24-8 at 24.) Plaintiff testified, "I didn't have a choice" about the hospital admitting him (Id. at 89), and that he told medical personal that he "felt jittery and had not slept in two days." (Id. at 90.) Defendant claims that "[t]he Emergency Department at Providence was so concerned about Plaintiff's condition that they transferred him by ambulance to Providence's Downtown campus. (ECF No. 24-1 at 4.) Plaintiff's lab results revealed that he continued to suffer from uncontrolled blood sugar. (Id. at 27.) Plaintiff testified that in April and May of 2016:
(ECF No. 24-5 at 89-90.)
In May 2016, Plaintiff returned to the hospital emergency room because of nausea, vomiting, dizziness, and stated that his heart was beating fast. (ECF No. 24-8 at 38.) He was discharged the following day. (Id.) In June 2016, a cardiologist at the South Carolina Heart Center noted "[Plaintiff] is currently working as a corrections officer although is having difficulty keeping up with the demands of his occupation." (ECF No. 24-8 at 42.)
Furthermore, Plaintiff claims that he could perform the essential duties of his job "with reasonable accommodations." (ECF No. 43 at 5.) Under Section 12111 of the ADA, "reasonable accommodation" may include:
42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2009).
Here, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Fairfield County denied his only requested accommodation, i.e., allowing him to park in the handicap parking space. (ECF No. 43 at 4.) Plaintiff "had occasionally parked in the handicap spot . . . when he experienced symptoms of his heart condition." (ECF No. 41 at 7 (citing ECF No. 24-6 at 40).) The Magistrate Judge found that ["Plaintiff] has not argued or shown walking approximately fifteen fewer feet before and after his shift would improve any of his significant functional limitations and allow him to exert himself at the necessary level to perform the routine functions of his job throughout the day." (ECF No. 41 at 19.) The record shows that Plaintiff testified that parking in the handicap spot would: "ensure somebody found him if he had an episode coming into or leaving work; allow him to sit and "make sure he was ok," rather than leave his shift; ensure his vehicle would remain in a safe, secure spot if he did have to leave; and reduce his time in the heat and humidity, thereby reducing some of his symptoms." (ECF No. 24-7 at 30-32, 36-37.) Therefore, the court finds there is insufficient evidence that Plaintiff is a "qualified individual" within the purview of the ADA and that, with or without reasonable accommodation, a reasonable jury would find that he could perform the essential functions of a corrections officer.
As to Plaintiff's second objection, the court finds that the Magistrate Judge did not err in concluding that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently explain his contradicting SSDI application and ADA claim. After his congestive heart failure diagnosis, Plaintiff applied for an Application Summary for Disability Insurance Benefits. (ECF Nos. 24-8; 41 at 20.) His application notes that "[he] became unable to work because of [his] disabling condition on December 2, 2013" and continued to be disabled when he applied. (ECF No. 24-8 at 50.) In 2014, Plaintiff's "Disability Report," drafted in 2014, indicated that he could no longer perform household chores, only bathed when his wife was in the house for fear of passing out due to dizziness, became very tired while walking or standing, and had a very hard time taking the trash out once a week. (Id. at 56.) A 2014 "Function Report" noted that Plaintiff was at risk of a heart attack due to a sudden drop in oxygen levels and that he lived with "extreme fatigue." (Id. at 67.) Plaintiff made it clear that he could only walk short distances and that he had to rest for a few minutes afterward. (Id. at 72.) However, the Social Security Administration deemed Plaintiff was capable of sedentary work, not disabled. (Id. at 82.) In September 2015, Plaintiff appeared before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") and applied for a total disability decision, which he received; the ALJ declared that Plaintiff was disabled as of December 2, 2013. (Id. at 84-92.)
The court recognizes that, while a SSDI application and an ADA claim may coexist,
Plaintiff claims that:
(ECF No. 43 at 9 (quoting ECF No. 41 at 19 n.6).)
The Magistrate Judge concluded that "[t]hese statements do not amount to a general admission that Plaintiff could perform the essential functions of his position." Moreover, "having secured an award of disability benefits on the strength of his assertion that he could no longer perform his job, to create a factual dispute, Plaintiff must do more now than merely contradict his sworn statements to the SSA." (ECF No. 41 at 19 n.6 (citing Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 806 (finding a plaintiff `cannot create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment simply by contradicting his or her own previous sworn statement'); Lee v. City of Salem, Ind., 259 F.3d 667, 675-78 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding plaintiff failed to establish a question of fact with respect to his ability to perform the essential functions of his past work where he offered contradictory statements in his SSDI and ADA filings, rather than reconciling the two claims).)
The court observes that Defendant Fairfield County attached a full copy of Davis Anderson's deposition testimony to their Reply (ECF No. 45-1) presumably in response to the Magistrate Judge's statement that the excepts provided made "it difficult to infer the full context." (ECF No. 41 at 19 n.6.) The relevant section of the deposition testimony is provided verbatim:
BY MR. AHN:
(ECF No. 45-1 at 99-101.)
Here, deposition testimony from Davis Anderson, who did not work in the Detention Center, only establishes that Plaintiff provided a fit-for-duty form stating his ability to work without restrictions in May 2016, not that Defendant Fairfield County knew of Plaintiff's failing health or the statements regarding his health in the SSDI application. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 806 ("an ADA plaintiff cannot simply ignore the apparent contradiction that arises out of the earlier SSDI total disability claim. Rather, [they] must proffer a sufficient explanation.") Furthermore, Plaintiff's assertion that Davis Anderson's unawareness as to any instances of him failing to detain an inmate is misleading. (ECF No. 43 at 11.) Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he never had to defend himself from an inmate (ECF No. 24-5 at 27-28) and that his condition could cause him to be overcome by an inmate (ECF No. 24-7 at 40-41). A plaintiff cannot create a genuine issue of material fact by contradicting himself. See Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 960 (4th Cir. 1984). Therefore, the court finds that the Magistrate Judge did not err in concluding that Defendant Fairfield County did not generally admit that Plaintiff could perform the essential functions of a corrections officer. (ECF No. 41 at 15.)
For the reasons below, the court
